ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION PROCESSES: AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR EFFECTS ON MUSLIM YOUTHS IN ISIOLO COUNTY, KENYA

DAVID LOKORO LOMOJO

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY, RELIGIOUS STUDIES AND COUNSELING IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE CONFERMENT OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES OF KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY

JUNE 2020
DECLARATION AND RECOMMENDATION

Declaration

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any other award in any other University.

Signed………………………………….………………Date………………………………………

DAVID LOKORO LOMOJO (PRS-4-0101-1/2015)

Recommendation

I/We confirm that the work reported in this thesis was carried out by the candidate under my/our supervision

First Supervisor

Signed………………………………………………Date………………………………………

REV. PROF. JOHN KOBIA ATAYA, Ph.D.
KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY

Second Supervisor

Signed………………………………………………Date………………………………………

REV. DR. MARY KINOTI, Ph.D.
KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY
DEDICATION

Dedicated to my children, my wife Venita and mother Moding Korie for their love, care, support and interest in my academic work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgments go to Rev. Prof. John Kobia Ataya, PhD and Rev. Dr. Mary Kathambi Kinoti, PhD, who were my first and second supervisors respectively for their supervision, guidance and motivation. Further appreciations go to the Directorate Postgraduate Studies, the Dean School of Education and Social Sciences of Kenya Methodist University for seminars/workshops on publishing and academic writing. Special regards to the staff members in the department of Theology, Religious Studies and Counseling and my PhD peers.

Special thanks to Kenya Defence Forces Command, the Principal Chaplain the Rev. Colonel A.K. Lelei, Head of Training NCTC Major Naor Bett, Executive Director ISTL Zurich, Switzerland Stefan Von Rueti, NGOs Directors/Administrators namely Isiolo PeaceLink Abdia Mohamud, Star of Hope Association A.A. Set, the County Government of Isiolo and NACOSTI.

Finally, accolades to research assistants, school principals/head teachers/teachers/students/pupils, Imams/sheikhs/Maalims/chaplains, security officers/military/police/wardens and the general public that made this study possible. God bless all.
ABSTRACT

The recent occurrence of radicalization as an ideological process involving socialization of individuals or groups and mostly youths to participate in non-state violent activities for political or other reasons had necessitated a multi-sectoral scrutiny yet with scarce empirical research so far. In fact, Islamic radicalization processes analyzed and discussed interchangeably throughout this study with religious radicalization and as a socialization into violent religious ideology had been obscured by a populist violent extremist approaches from stakeholders as governments, policy makers, media reports and multi-disciplinary approaches all of which in significant ways affected and interfered with objective scrutiny. Therefore, this study considered Islamic sources from global religious terror networks as the reason behind contemporary violence. Mainstreaming Islamic radicalization processes required that this research focus on Mosques, schools, prisons and the homes/villages in Isiolo county as avenues used by radicalizers and recruiters to lure youths into the violent religious ideologies which entrench homegrown radicalization through media and cell groups. The conceptual and theoretical knowledge underpinning Islamic radicalization processes included but not limited to violent religious extremism, *jihad* terrorism and global radical networking. The centrality of McCauley and Moskalenko pyramid theory in this study was occasioned by the convincing and exhaustive use of mechanisms and levels of radicalization up to and including the place of religion in political violence. Triangulation designs and methods were used to unearth the extent, the processes, the characteristics and the assessable effects of Islamic radicalization on youths in Isiolo central sub county. The reliability and validity was attained through piloting of tools and instruments with research assistants most of whom were from the Muslim community. Eventually, a questionnaire and a measurement scale with small group discussion schedule was designed and administered to a purposive sample of respondents comprising of an array of respondents and informants including six (6) secondary schools and two (2) primary schools, key informants as government officials, police and intelligence agencies, military personnel, principals, head teachers, teachers, chaplains/religious leaders (Sheikhs/Imams/Maalims), NGOs directors and staff, community leaders/elders, National Counter Terrorism (NCTC) seminar delegates comprising of religious leaders from the upper Eastern region, staff members of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the general public were the primary subjects of the study. The ethical considerations included security fears by the subjects and the state due to the sensitivity of the area of study. Other ethical considerations were on the perceived sampling out of Muslims for the study and the historicity surrounding the Muslim community as perceived baseline terrorists in most contexts. Consequently, the study unearthed certain Islamic radicalization processes, the characteristics of radicalized youths and effects of the processes as indoctrination, recruitment, truancy, violence, psychological trauma, feelings of alienation and youths becoming holy warriors or *jihadi* terrorists, among others. Religious radicalization processes therefore can be intercepted through government and religious interventions to minimize the effects on youth. The study brought out new information in the identification of Islamic radicalization processes and their effects on youths which enabled key stakeholders to institute relevant interventions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION AND RECOMMENDATION ................................................................. ii
COPYRIGHT........................................................................................................ iii
DEDICATION......................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... v
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................... vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................. vii
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................... vii

## CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1
1.1 Background of the Study ........................................................................... 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem ......................................................................... 35
1.3 The Purpose of the Study .......................................................................... 38
1.4 Objectives of the Study ............................................................................ 38
1.6 Justification of the Study .......................................................................... 39
1.7 Limitations of the Study ........................................................................... 39
1.8 Delimitation of the Study .......................................................................... 41
1.9 Significance of the Study ........................................................................... 41
1.10 Assumptions of the Study ........................................................................ 43

## CHAPTER TWO : LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................... 49
2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................. 49
2.1 The Concept of Religious Radicalization .................................................. 50
5.1 SUMMARY........................................................................................................ 347
5.2 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 350
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................... 356
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 364
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................... 377
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.1</td>
<td>Characteristics of U.S-Based Extremists</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.2</td>
<td>Case Comparison on Religious versus Secular Terrorism</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.3</td>
<td>Generational Pathways to Terrorism</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.4</td>
<td>Nationalistic and Jihadist Agenda of Terror Groups</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.5</td>
<td>European Jihadi Converts</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.6</td>
<td>Characteristics of Left-Wing &amp; Right-Wing Terrorist Groups in the U.S</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.7</td>
<td>Mechanisms and Pathways to Violence</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.8</td>
<td>Behavioral Indicators of Stage Progression in Radicalization Trajectories</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1</td>
<td>Questionnaire return rate</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.2</td>
<td>Secondary School students who respondent to Likert scale Questionnaire</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.3</td>
<td>Geographical Distribution of Respondents</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.4</td>
<td>Respondents by Occupations</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.5</td>
<td>Radicalization in Institutions</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.6</td>
<td>Overt Islamic Radicalization</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.7</td>
<td>Infiltration Routes in the Country</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.8</td>
<td>Characteristics of Radicalized Youths</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.9</td>
<td>Views of leaders on online addition in radicalization</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.10</td>
<td>Views of students on online Addiction in radicalization</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.11</td>
<td>Incidences of Terrorism in Kenya Linked to Radicalization</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.1</td>
<td>Isiolo County Administrative Divisions of Isiolo</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 2.1</th>
<th>Trends in Radicalization from 1990 – 2011</th>
<th>58</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.2</td>
<td>Awareness of Radicalization in Kenya</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.3</td>
<td>Staircase Model of Radicalization</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.4</td>
<td>Schmid Typology of Terrorism (Adapted and modified)</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.5</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda Organizational Structure</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.6</td>
<td>Moghadam “Staircase Model” of Terrorism</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.7</td>
<td>Four Models of Recruitment</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.8</td>
<td>Stages of Recruitment</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.9</td>
<td>Cell Structure</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.10</td>
<td>Religious Radicalization Processes Theory</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.11</td>
<td>Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.1</td>
<td>Respondents by Age Cohort(s)</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.2</td>
<td>Respondents by Schools</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.3</td>
<td>Respondents by Education Levels</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.4</td>
<td>Recruitment Scope in Isiolo</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.5</td>
<td>Radicalization Score in Homes/Villages</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.6</td>
<td>Radicalization Score in the Mosque(s)</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.7</td>
<td>Radicalization Score in School(s)</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.8</td>
<td>Online radicalization</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.9</td>
<td>Reinterpreted Sacred Texts and Concepts</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.10</td>
<td>Madrassa(s) Attendance at an Early Age</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.11</td>
<td>The Concept of Jihad on Youths</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.12</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab Terror Group Activities</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.13</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda Terror Group Activities</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.14</td>
<td>Boko Haram Terror Group Activities</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.15</td>
<td>Political Factors Promoting Youth Recruitment</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.16</td>
<td>Sleeper cells in Isiolo County</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.17</td>
<td>Indoctrination by Incentives(s)</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.18</td>
<td>Hotspots of radicalization in Isiolo County</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.19</td>
<td>Returnees from Global Terror Networks</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.20</td>
<td>Deployment Destinations</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.21</td>
<td>Radicalized Beliefs</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.22</td>
<td>Violent Religious Views</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.23</td>
<td>Indicators of Radicalized behaviors</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.24</td>
<td>Youths Who Joined Violent Religious Groups</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.25</td>
<td>Countries and Types of Targets/Assignments for Youths</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.26</td>
<td>Radicalized Youths as a National Threat</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.27</td>
<td>Percentages of Radicalized youths who joined Terror Network(s)</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.28</td>
<td>Convicted Radicalized Youths in Kenya</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.29</td>
<td>Percentage of Youths who joined Al-shabaab</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.30</td>
<td>Kenya Naval Base Manda Airstrip/US attacks in January 2020</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.31</td>
<td>9/11 Terrorists Attackers</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.32</td>
<td>Location of Isiolo County in the map of Kenya</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.33</td>
<td>Map of Isiolo County</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.H.</td>
<td>Arabic Hijri (calendar)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Maghrib</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and Semi-Arid Lands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPU</td>
<td>Anti – Terror Police Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDs</td>
<td>Compact Discs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCE</td>
<td>Before Common Era</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>County Action Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORD</td>
<td>Coalition for Reform of Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDE</td>
<td>Early Child Development Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith Based Organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Foundation for Defense of Democracies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIS.................................................................Islamic Salvation Front
FOBs..........................................................Front Operation Bases
GJM.............................................................Global Jihad Movement
HT..............................................................Hizb ut-Tahrir
IED..............................................................Improvised Explosive Device
IPK..............................................................Islamic Party of Kenya
IR1..............................................................Interview Respondent 1
IS...............................................................Islamic State
ISIS............................................................Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISTL............................................................International Seminary of Theology &

  Leadership
JI.............................................................Jemaah Islamiyah
KeMU........................................................Kenya Methodist University
KCAA........................................................Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
KDF............................................................Kenya Defence Forces
KTN News....................................................Kenya Television Network News
MCB........................................................Muslim Council of Britain
MRC...........................................................Mombasa Republican Council
NACOSTI..................................................National Commission for Science

  Technology and Innovation
NE..........................................................North Eastern
NEP........................................................North Eastern Province
NGOs........................................................Non-Governmental Organization(s)
NIJ………………………………………………………National Institute of Justice
NIS…………………………………………………….National Intelligence Service
NYPD…………………………………………………New York Police Department
OLB…………………………………………………..Operation Linda Boni
PAS……………………………………………………Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
PFLP……………………………………………………Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PhD……………………………………………………..Doctor of Philosophy
PIRUS……………………………………………..Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States
PKM………………………………………………….Pulemyot Kalashnikova Modernizirovannyi
PLO………………………………………………….Palestine Liberation Organization
POTA………………………………………………..Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012
PTSD………………………………………………..Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
PVE…………………………………………………..Preventing Violent Extremism
RAF…………………………………………………..Republican Army Faction
RPGs………………………………………………..Rocket Propelled Grenades
RRPT………………………………………………Religious Radicalization Processes Theory
RQ…………………………………………………..Research Questions
RSMB…………………………………………….Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
SERC.................................................................Scientific and Ethics Review Committee
SLAA...............................................................The Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014
SOS.................................................................Supporters of Sharia
S-P.................................................................Social Progressives
SSA.................................................................Sub-Saharan Africa
START............................................................Studies on Terrorism and Responses on Terrorism
SUPKEM.........................................................Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
TLT.................................................................Transformative Learning Theory
TRM...............................................................Thika Road Mall
UBL...............................................................Osama Bin Laden
UK.................................................................United Kingdom
UN.................................................................United Nations
UNSC............................................................United Nations Security Council
US.................................................................United States
VBIEDs............................................................Vehicle Bound Improvised Explosive Devices
VCDs..............................................................Video Compact Discs
VE.................................................................Violent Extremism
VRE.............................................................Violent Religious Extremism
VERA 2.............................................................Violent Extremist Risk Assessment
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The study expounded the background by which religious radicalization processes were anchored upon. In regard to this concern the study explored the complex religio-political nature of radicalization. The concerted concern from scholars presented multiplicities of analysis with some laying emphasis on the sociopolitical aspects, others on the psychological dynamics, the religious aspect and still others on several aspects. The intersections thereof were probed and analyzed in the context of religious processes on youths. Therefore, the context of religious radicalization processes in this section engaged with a diversity of arguments from sociological, psychological or political fronts among others and thereby established the gaps from previous discourse(s) and studies. To this end the role of the political theory of Islam on society as fronted by radical clerics and extremist was seen as the philosophical frameworks by which the context of religious radicalization processes were to be analyzed. As Sookhdeo (2013) considered the preoccupation and struggle by radical Islamists to establish Islamic states (IS) in countries such as Nigeria, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan and Pakistan, among others, it was also conceived in this study that clandestine radicalization anchored and explained how such possibilities of caliphates was envisioned.

There were four Sunni schools of thought which were named after their founders. The schools were Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali. Shia Islam had three sects comprising of the Twelvers, Ismaelis, and the Zaydis. It was noted from the onset that Islamic radicalization processes were not domiciled in any particular school of thought since the concept of political theory of Islam was normative but extremists cut a niche therein to advance violent narratives. In that case
radicalization discourse which was domiciled in the Wahhabist doctrine, that is, the fundamentalist; eighteenth century version of Islam that imposes sharia law embraced by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) (Cockburn, 2015) informed the Islamic approach that this study took as opposed to situating the research on Islam jurisprudence wholesale. In fact, the sectarian strife between Sunni and Shiite sects was fanned by Saudi Arabia predominantly Sunni Islam by funding the training of preachers on Wahhabism and construction of Mosques dedicated to the self-same conservative doctrine.

The option to situate this discourse on Wahhabi Islam never conflicted with Rosenthal (2009) constitutional theory of Islam with the functions and offices of an Emir and Imam often integrated in one and the same person as an ideal philosophical thought in attaining and preserving the political theory of Islam. Actually what made religions violent was the processes of interpretation and application of texts. In this regard Sacks (2015) established the nexus that existed between violence based on hard texts in Semitic religious traditions.

For almost the whole of their histories, Jews, Christians and Muslims have wrestled with the meanings of their scriptures, developing in the process elaborate hermeneutic and jurisprudential systems…Islam has its fiqh, its four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, and their Shia counterparts; its principles of taqleed, itijihad and qiyas. Hard texts need interpreting; without it, they lead to violence (Sacks, 2015, p.208)

As much as the antagonism between Iran and the West appeared to be an envisioning of a theocracy on one hand the preoccupation of Islamic states on the other hand tended to take shape
through worldwide Sunni community yet the recent emergence of violent religious extremists aptly articulated a global *umma* and a *caliphate* where *sharia* law prevailed over such religious states. Perhaps the struggle for dominance pitting sectarian group interests were as articulated by Arnove (2006) in the Iraqi Arab Sunni insurgents seeking to restore Sunni rule against the Shia hegemony while Al-Qaeda in Iraq played an opportunist role by capitalizing on both Sunni and Shiite conflicts to propose its version of a theocracy as the magic bullet to societal problems. Said (1997) suggested a third level of Islam which was culturally relevant as opposed to mainstream Islam that was anchored on Sunni versus Shia brands of Islam. In this case the doctrinal gave way to the reinterpretation of texts to produce a lived out religious phenomena. Ishmaelis sect was given as an example of existential brand emanating from textual reinterpretation for contextual meanings.

Again, the issue of interpretation of texts depending on the surrounding needs and cultures represented what Islam or Islamic entailed at particular times. In conclusion the extremist reinterpretation of sacred texts that promoted violence can hardly be assigned to the intent of the texts or mainstream religious communities per se. In short, the Islamic worldviews based on their schools stood aloof of revisionist aspects of *Jihad* for a global caliphate.

In the interest of comprehending mainstream Islam from a reinterpreted Islam that promoted violence scholarly work was often blurred. In Mazrui (2006) the argument that Islamists goal could be peace than an Islamic State goes against the very pronouncements and vision of a global *Jihad* agenda fronted by violent religious extremists. However, situating the Battle of *Badr* in inter-Arab *jihad* as opposed to contemporary Islamic violence was admissible such that both the violent aspect of *Jihad* by global terror networks and the *Jihad* against self-corruption and defilement were made distinct.
Further, the context of processes of religious radicalization was investigated in order to understand the effects on youths. These approaches created space for an exhaustive study in the general area of Islamic radicalization processes. Eventually, a spillover effect was what contemporary radicalization represented in terms of discussing homegrown terrorism in different global contexts up to and including the target audience in this study.

1.1.1 The context of religious radicalization processes

The concept of religious radicalization as an emerging phenomenon had elicited an ongoing debate from scholarship and its stakeholders alike on the basic definitions and understanding. Generally, scholars engage the subject of radicalization as a process of socialization that could lead some people especially youths to become extremists or hold violent extremist views on sociocultural, economic and political dimensions. The choice of youths for this study on religious radicalization processes was informed by their age as that of struggle for identity, experimentation and a search for autonomy which was also grounded by data from an Israeli study that established that 17-22 years olds engaged with suicide bombings and also been victims of radicalization from radical imams. The aforementioned age bracket seamlessly fitted in the mean score by age in this research.

According to Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff and Weine (2014) the youthful nature of members of Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and most terror groups networks identify the vulnerabilities of youths to radicalization as they seek identity, independence and struggle with developmental crisis and such youthful characteristics anchors and situates youth as a cohort of this study. Further, the need for a context – relevant approach according to Vidino (2014), gave the rationale and additional geographical factors suitable in this research. In that regard context
was adopted to refer to the prevailing situation while the location of the study was identified to be Isiolo as a gateway to the Northern Kenya frontier, with history of Islamic influence, geographically lies at a central point of the country and therefore was chosen based on these characteristics as suitable for empirical inquiry.

Conspicuously, studies on religious radicalization are relatively scarce and often such studies rarely emanate from empirical data yet (Patel, 2011) present studies that debunked the religion – terrorism nexus thereafter blaming governments that accepted and adopted the view that radicalization was a religious concern. In this research such persuasions and studies were anchored on immediacy in analysis of field dynamics that never sought the philosophical foundations by which Islamic radicalization processes were rooted. In that case such studies including Sageman’s 500 cases and United States (US) and United Kingdom FDD (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) inquiry seeking correlations between factors as lack of religious literacy and education, intolerance and theological indifference to other religious groups on one hand found no linkages on these factors as drivers of Islamic terrorism (Patel, 2011) yet were on the other hand and according to this study peripheral and superficial factors encroaching on sound philosophical inquiry on religious radicalization processes and outcomes.

In fact, this research probed the philosophical ends by which contemporary radicalization was anchored. It was the persuasion of this work that any grounded argument on radicalization processes and effects thereof on youths had to grapple with the resurgence of religion in politics and vice versa and also situating the argument on Islamic jurisprudence over the centuries. Often the religious radicalizing ideology rests on the philosophers of Jihad as opposed to youths who are innocent consumers of both extremist narratives and who also get manipulated into global terror outfits. In other words we see the processes of radicalization acting on youths who in most
cases are unaware of the philosophical groundings of religious radicalization and objectives thereof.

In the interest of shading light and giving a panoramic view on the effect of Islam on society a two-pronged approach emerges. The radicalizing aspect on states purely governed by *sharia* law already caused fault lines in the society as the case of Nigeria and Southern Sudan on one hand and the radicalizing aspect that created homegrown terrorism pitting youthful populations against their governments on the other hand. Perhaps the scenario in Iraq whereby the Islamic community produced several brands of insurgencies also helped comprehend religious radicalization processes. As earlier indicated this was the classification by Arnove (2006) that Arab insurgents, Shia militancy and Al-Qaeda terror networks whereby a religious brand produced three distinct antagonistic forces.

As much as Charles (2005) engaged with ethical and moral concerns on whether Western democracies should cushion third world countries from rampage through the rise of militant Islam such preoccupations hardly consider the frameworks by which religious radicalization processes mutate to influence youths for participation in global *jihad* activities. Generally, religious radicalization processes hereby considered the overarching objectives of global terror networks but also engaged with the processes involved in Islamic radicalization.

George (2002) engaged with the normative analysis of concepts of *Jihad* and *Hijra* but Gerges (2007) links both concepts and associated sacred texts as a pullout from the Mohammedan era and squarely applied to the ousting of Osama Bin Laden (UBL) from Saudi Arabia (perceived modern day Mecca) to Sudan and Afghanistan (perceived modern day Medina) as a replica and a parallel to Mohammed ouster by Meccans into Medina where *qital* (fighting) verses (22:39-40; 2:216; 4:84) were sanctioned. The revisiting of these *qital* verses and correlations of modern day
approach by defensive *Jihad* became instructive and a religious radicalizing stratagem. These Qur’an texts among many others on contemporary violence speak volume on the *Jihad* concept (Appendix ii)

Permission is granted those (to take up arms) who fight because they were oppressed. God is certainly able to give to those Who were driven away from their homes for no reason than they said: “Our Lord God,” And if God had not restrained some men through some others, monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques, where the name of God is honored most, would have been razed. God surely help those who help Him – verily God is all-powerful and all-mighty (Al – Hajj 22:39 – 40)

Enjoined on you is fighting, and this you abhor. You may dislike a thing yet it may be good for you; or a thing may haply please you but may be bad for you. Only God has knowledge, and you do not know (Al-Baqara 2:216)

So fight on in the way of God (irrespective of the others). You cannot compel anyone except your own self; but urge the believers to fight. It may well be that God will keep back the might of the infidels, for God’s might is greater, and severe His punishments (Al-Nisaa 4:84)

From these texts the sanctioning of *Jihad* against infidels is undeniable. It also appears from the texts that oppression had been made more serious than killing and therefore a radicalized Islamic
system easily agitated for social justice based on these approaches. The sanctioning of battles which made the vice of oppression worse than killing are further enshrined in the sacred texts (Al-Baqara 2:191 – 192; 2:217) which space limits their listings. In regard to youth radicalization these sacred texts easily fed feelings of oppression, marginalization, unemployment and disenfranchisement, among others (Appendix ii)

The discussions and positions taken to explain the use of sacred texts for violence clearly indicates a grey area shrouded by controversy amongst Islamic sects and authorities. Vertigans (2002) points out the dispute of textual interpretations amongst members of the Muslim community. Sorting out texts that promote armed conflict against the infidels was a grey area yet such texts were curved out by Jihadists to advance their cause. The chapters and verses that violent extremists interpret in their favor include but not limited to these listed Al-Nisaa 4:76,89; Al-Anfaal 8:60 and At-Tawba 9:5). These verses apart from conferring identity to its adherents were also highly segregationist which though understandable for preserving such faith practices safe inherent animosities towards infidels therein the sacred texts.

Osama bin Laden was on the forefront in articulating his violent and political ideology through such texts which affirmed the merging and reinterpretation of texts bordering on these feelings to promote radicalization and religious violence. Often he is cited calling it sacrilege caused by Americans based on close ties with Saudi government. In 1994 he is quoted:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al – Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of
all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.” (Corduan, 2012:157)

In retrospect mainstream Muslim practitioners were disadvantaged and misrepresented by radicalized ideology of Islam that undermines mainline interpretation of their book – the Qur’an affirming what Vertigans (2002:51) calls ‘the religion of Islam has been hijacked by the likes of Osama bin Laden and his fellow terrorists’. Worse still was when the ‘war on terror’ appeared to be fought against Muslims wholesale. In fact, as stakeholders on combating terrorism mistakenly fail to diagnose and situate the efforts towards specifically countering extremists than all Muslims then more radicalization will go unabated. It must be reiterated time and again that the insurmountable task of drawing the line between extremist and moderates was the great assignment.

It is hereby argued that periodization of history as observed in the case of Osama bin Laden simulating Muhammad’s era in defense of Islam (George, 2002) was a potent strategy on how religion can easily be manipulated to abet violence. *Jihad* texts and objectives often favored religious extremist of any kind and explained why religious/political sects thrive in throughout religious history. The aspect of indoctrinating youths through such texts and concepts which capitalizes on identity issues and fault lines in the society had become the preoccupation of Jihadists terror networks the prime being Al-Qaeda.
Perhaps had Islamic revivalists and reformers as Abduh, Mohammed Rashid Rida and Hassan Al Banna succeeded in integrating Islam to modernity religious radicalization processes might have taken another perspective. In that case application of *ijtihad* (reason) to changing contexts especially modern state perspectives as opposed to how Islamic political theory defines society was lost at the altar of another league of conservative scholars promoting *salafist* interpretation to Islam. A protest towards modernity by *Salafiyyah* or the faith and practices by the ancestors provided a fertile ground in contemporary religious radicalization processes.

It was admitted here that Rahnema (2008) contrast on scholars on Islamic progressivisms, dualisms and conservatisms served as the forces that shaped and grounded the face of religious radicalization as we experience today. The focal point promoting *Salafiyah* brand of Islam as the ultimate answer to modernity was the caliphate which the *ulema* were accused of distorting. The *Salafi*-Islam structure of society based on the pillars of *Ummah, Caliph* and *Sharia* which anchored the global caliphate ideology of Muslim brotherhoods came into sharp contrasts with the democratic structures of the West. In this respect Roshash (2013) articulation of the of an Islamic approach to issues from a kind of consultative or *shura* dynamics became a point of dialogue with Western democracy.

Clarke (2004) argument that an environment of counter-Western domination ideology was fronted by Jihadists networks favoring a caliphate or Islamic state as the basis of entrenching Islamic political theory of society. The revivalist Hassan Al Banna preoccupation with political establishment of Islam and Islamic state upholding *jihad* clearly worked against *Ijtihad* progressivism and dualistic approach to the interpretation of Qur’an texts and application of concepts as *Sharia, Ummah* and *Ijtihad* to modernity as fronted by Abduh and Rida’s argument.
‘...the necessary legitimatizes or justifies the forbidden,’ ‘need takes precedence over prohibitions’, ‘rules change with time, and ‘if principles of the Sharia are not in conformity with custom, they do not constitute a reliable legal principle.’ Rida believed that if full use was made of the Sharia’s ‘inherent mechanism for renovation’ the Islamic system would prove capable of adjusting itself to unforeseen and emerging problems (Rahnema, 2008, pp.xlvi-xlvii)

In Rahnema (2008) and Saikal (2003) Islamic scholars, ideologues and reformist as Banna, Mawdudi and Qutb were responsible for the radical extremist ideology against the effect of modernization on Islam. As much as the threat on Islam was often described in terms European domination it was argued here that the political vision of these Islamic scholars eventually made Islam align itself to the future global sway on matters social justice and politics. The scholars having promoted conservative and regressive Islam in Salaf, that is, faith practices of predecessors, the concepts of Jihad and taqlid (obedience to a religious leader’s views) among others became the foundation which Islamic radicalization was grounded for future generations to engage global affairs and preservation of their value systems. In spite of the conservatives having influenced Islamic thought patterns in relation to modernization the influence of Shari’ati (Sookhdeo, 2013) and his many disciples progressive paradigm shift was clear in contemporary Iran.

In fact Roshash (2013) position that Islamic ideology from his interpretations of the sacred history that Islamic understanding of democracy stands in contradistinction to the West and therefore a point of concern was also a basis of religio-political radicalization. The theory of Shura, that is, consultation took the shape of contemporary understanding of Islamic democracy
and should guide the affairs of an Islamic government or state. The operations of the Shura made it possible for the ummah to depose or rise against a ruler. Therefore, Islamic jurisprudence countered the West model of democracy and became a source of conflict by alluding that the Western model is secular in nature and not representative nor reflective of an Islamic government or state. By extension the political radicalization enshrined and inherent in Muslim organizational structure is presented by Khan (2013) where religion became the mobilizing ideology against injustice in spite of the same religion fostering Islamic identity.

This research situated religious radicalization in its present state to geopolitical forces up to and including the already polarized notion of encroachment by the Western culture on Islam and its lands and the Palestinian crisis, among others. In that case radicalization fed on the narratives formed around global politics, religion and economics. In short, the existence of Islamic violence in the contemporary world finds reason in the radicalizing narratives from extremist groups aligned to radical philosophers and ideologues of Islamic jurisprudence.

Arguably so, the climax of religious radicalization processes from a political front was seen during the bombing of the World Trade Organization (WTO) center in what had come to be termed in academic and popular discourse as the 9/11 event. A combination of factors especially in the aftermath of these bombings changed global interests and policies as a response to the emergence of a new global threat – religious terrorism. The 9/11 event became the wake up call to the world in general on the effects of Islamic radicalization processes since the bombings were perpetrated by Al-Qaeda network operatives.

In Saikal (2003) the threats against Islamic political theory argued by violent extremists emanated from both political and military alliances of European democracies from North America, Western Europe and Australasian democracies since World War Two (WWII) mostly
global threats. Consequently, the domain of Islam comprise of Arabs and non – Arab adherents of Islam in Muslim dominated countries or anywhere in the world as a minority. The political polarization of global affairs into Western versus political Islam introduces the political aspect of radicalization where global historical narratives cause sectarian, economic, social and political differences to flare up and cause mobilization for cultural or civilizational survival.

The post-9/11 US foreign policies on military deployment unsupported by a political strategy turned counterproductive as the domain of Islam blames the ‘war on terror’ as targeting Muslims in Saikal (2003) Gallup Poll Survey. The cultural and religious clash based on the ‘war on terror’ from the days of Bush Administration although meant to counter Al-Qaeda networks and operatives produced narratives that fuel religious radicalization. The support that Al-Qaeda network receive emanates from historical grievances, mistrust and hatred occasioned by pro-Western policy targeting the Arab world and Islam religion in particular as a culture. In fact, Osama bin Laden’s preoccupation with Qutbian and Ibn Taymiyyah philosophy puts his ideas in sharp contrast with American hegemony.

In fact, the 9/11 commission’s report by Kean, Hamilton, Ben-Veniste, Kerry, Fielding, Lehman, Gorelick, Roemer, Gorton and Thomson (n.d) confirmed the enmity to which Islamist scholars were pitted against the Americans as the cause of all ills in society including encroachment on Middle Eastern lands, wealth and undermining of Islam. The landmark strategy to combat the US can be understood by issuance of a fatwa against perceived jahiliyyah or barbaric state of things in the world as occasioned by a corrupt American civilization. Fatwa here was a reference on a ruling on an Islamic law pronounced by a recognized authority within mainstream Islam although recent times, fatwa had been pronounced even by leaders of non-mainstream as well.
Consequently, Bin Laden’s view of history informed by violent ideologues became the philosophical foundation under which his organization, that is, Al-Qaeda and his followers finds explanation. That Bin Laden approach is revisionist and regressive cannot be overstated and having aligned himself with philosophers of a political Islam who seek to mobilize violent armies against Western democracy religious radicalization processes only become the stratagem to score global political scores.

Based on Cobb (2007) the narrative against Muslims only promotes American global hegemony by allocating resources on the war on terror at the expense of establishing the underlying causes of the violent extremism. He also blames the religious divide for having historically created an environment for what he calls neoconservatives violence. Often parochial ethnocentric and nationalist interest took sway in preservation of own identities at the expense of other cultures whereby religion fueled conflicts

In recent times the causes of enormous conflict and suffering have also included political and economic ideologies. For the most part religion has intensified these conflicts (Cobb, 2007, p.9)

The broad radicalization processes have to do with merging of political and economic interests together and thereby the religious ideology fuels national, regional and global interests. The clash of interests and ideologies breeds feelings of animosity and hatred amongst groups who tend to theologize their problems and recruit members to defend their identity and space from perceived and identified opponents. In the case of Islamic radicalization issues to do with demonizing democracy as Western and Christian tool to dominate Islamic beliefs systems and
desecrate their lands by the presence of foreign troops propagates and endears the jihadist ideology to youths. That does not mean the rest of religious cultures have gone scot free in entrenching historical violence on Muslim lands especially during crusades but the focus on contemporary Islamic radicalization as the reason of current violence was the mainstay of this research.

Huntington (2002) in his civilizational analysis of religious cultures situated Islam as historically violent to other cultures and civilizations as Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Hindu, Chinese, Buddhist and Jews, but the pendulum of violence in the contemporary settings switches from mainstream Islam to Islamist extremism as an emerging trend. Perhaps a better understanding on the contestations between religious ideology, political masterminding and domination can be traced through the interaction between radical Islamists and the modernizing effect of Algerian society by France.

Apart from Goytisolo’s (2000) observation that French colonial power effort to strike a balance between traditional Islam and official Islam as a modernization strategy in Algeria it proved that Islam on the political front can produce many strands of governing systems. This explained the presence of a variety of governments in the Muslim world. Therefore, depending of surrounding circumstances religious radicalization can occur irrespective of the popular culture at any given time.

Muslim governments can be totalitarian or liberal, adepts of the ideas of social progress or locked into rigid, anachronistic traditions. The Koran justifies the legitimacy of traditional monarchies, whether the open variety (Morocco, Jordan), or fundamentalist (Saudi Arabia), but it also encompasses their bitterest enemies.
(Algeria, Egypt). Some underline community and social progress; others stress respect for the Sunnah and quietist values...“conservatives” opt for technical, material, and scientific progress but never abandon the return to cultural and religious sources of identity, “cleansed” of all contamination by the West (Goytisolo, 2000, p.64)

From this prism, an argument towards broad radicalization processes that involve political approaches on Islam as a rallying point in governance and the kind of government that a geographical space adopted became a matter of cultural assimilation on one hand but a contestation for political space on the other hand. The underlining factor was the force of the religious ideology in shaping particular societies to accept or oppose perceived political domination. In the context of the emerging radical terror groups violent extremism became a modus operandi in achieving these political ends. It was argued time and again that the political landscape created by terror groups in democratic, undemocratic and democratizing societies varies from place to place notwithstanding the political undertones and controversies whether what passes for democratic in one society can apply to other cultural contexts, and mostly so, Islamist contexts.

Gerges (2007) citing of an Egyptian extremist group Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya, the largest Jihadist organization on one hand and Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria adoption of democratic principles on the other hand shade light or reduced radicalization in most Arab/Muslim nations apart from adopting da’wa, that is, the call, was as an Islamizing society from the bottom in contrast to revolutionary approaches. Perhaps Rahnema (2008) exposition on the ijtihad, that is, the use of reason and relating Islam to emerging issues and changing contexts as an attempt to
make Qur’anic texts, hadiths and *sharia* respond to and engage with global challenges including colonialism was a an objective approach that was never realized at the onset of cultural interactions between Islam and the West.

This study observed that broad radicalization processes were unfortunately discussed alongside religious radicalization processes by previous studies as discussed hereunder. The compartmentalization and juxtaposing of such radicalization processes were seen to obscure objective scrutiny of Islamic radicalization processes as a distinct process without linkages/relations nor characteristics with the erroneous discussion on broad radicalization processes.

McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) inclusion of political radicalization as the Red Army Faction, national/racial radicalization as Irish Republican Army Faction (RAF) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), among others, served as such processes of kind of distinct movements which rarely share in design or vision with religious radicalization that distinguished Islamic radicalization as a strand of its kind. In fact, as these groups were motivated by peers, family members and comrades in recruitment, Islamic radicalization processes are distinct in design and objectives and this study took cognizance of that fact because they also adhered to a divine course and a commitment to a religious ideology or doctrine. The anchor that distinguished Islamic radicalization processes from other groups was the theocentric nature of its ideology from inception to present regardless of whether a political or sociocultural or religious dimension was to be taken.

Lopez and Pasic (2018) among others represented persuasions that identified with political radicalization as a distinct type to religious radicalization. However, that there were commonalities amongst practitioners of violent extremism whether considered from religious or
political prism in terms of their operations is an undeniable fact but which in itself risked objective analysis of religious radicalization processes separately and distinctly. Such analytical approaches in the engagement with broad radicalization processes only hinder objective scrutiny of the violent extremism from radicalism.

Mazer (2017) gave a distinct definition of concepts as radical, radicalism and recent radicalization concept whereby the latter is used interchangeably with fundamentalism as an emerging field of religious engagement in politics and which favors the corpus of this study. Actually, a distinction between radical and radicalism as normative political terminologies and persuasions are supported and anchored by studies (Lopez & Pasic, 2018) which provided for a separate analysis of Islamic radicalization as an emerging religious concern in relation to Islamic studies. Kelly (1998) observed the lack of thorough studies on why political activists using religious ideologies, concepts and language as a mobilization tool became so effective a persuasion that this study engaged with from ideological development lenses.

Patel (2011) and Renaires (2008) presented approaches which sought to downplay Islamism in radicalization despite the complexities involved in the linkages that existed between violence and religious radicalization processes. Therefore, the debate between Islamism and violence can only be conceptualized through the antagonism that exists between Salafist (return to conservative models of Islamic faith as practiced by ancestors) and the perceived secularized Western ideals of democracy and statehood seen to undermine Islamic piety. Noteworthy, an outcry on the concept of Islamism or Jihadism as a creation of the West to undermine Islam rarely escaped mention and critical analysis in this study. But by the fact that words helped explain identities and the social construction of discourses this academic piece adopted the term for objective scrutiny.
Bhatt (2007) held that contemporary terrorism finds motivation in Islamic religious extremism. In that case the defining characteristic as to the recruitment process and indoctrination of youth into violent extremist groups explained jihadi terrorism linked to religious radicalization. The effects were observed through radical revolutionaries and nationalists movements (Table 2.3) that sought to oust anti-religious regimes and replace them with Islamic states. In respect to religious radicalization processes terrorism was comprehended as the end product of a process that begun by altering the beliefs, feelings and behaviors of youth.

From the onset, broad religious radicalization processes are determined through sociopolitical and economic claims by insurgents especially in the Middle East where religious culture drives political ideals. Therefore, religious radicalization processes do not occur separately but interplay of the sociocultural, political and economic dynamics. Religion became a psychological agent that radicalizes the mind to embrace political, socioeconomic and cultural grievances and narratives.

Martin (2011) also agreed that religious terrorism, that is, violence motivated by faith ideals, was a predominant model towards political violence in the modern world and also reported on the decline of secular terrorism. Actually, appeal made by religion against repressive regimes spells out how Islamic radicalization processes have become an alternative for political dominance. An occurrence of a kind of a paradigm shift from secular terrorism to religious terrorism which was inspired by the paradise and its rewards in the afterlife defined Islamic radicalization processes. A comparative analysis of religious versus secular terrorism often was markedly different in focus and emphasis (Table 2.2)
An approach often overlooked in the studies of radicalization involved viewing religious motivations apart from political motivations. Mazrui (2006) downplayed the effect of religious values in the conflict existing between Western and Islamic cultures in his admittance that Arab cultures have produced Mujahidin, that is, holy warriors, in contradistinction to Western culture which also produced street violence as a valid observation. However, a close analysis of the existence of modern Jihadi inspired networks to violence around the world was in resonance with the fact that Islamic ideals, values and cultural stability were presumably achievable through political dominance. In the era of resurgence of religion in the political arena which took the form of redefining Islamic beliefs and practices squarely rationalized the existence of violent radicalization in the world today.

The viewpoint of this study embraced the latter whereby Islamists have deviated from previous secular engagements to religious radicalization as an overarching principle of achieving sociocultural, religious, political and economic ends by calling for global ummah and Jihad against perceived enemies. Maskaliuaitne (2015) persuasion that an overemphasis of recent radicalization literature was on Islamist aspects conflated the reality that Islamic radicalization had an Islamic religious and philosophical background. It also compounded radicalization with related concepts as terrorism, extremism and radicalism which were only but related components of radicalization but which cannot be engaged with as separate entities or concepts. However, the issues that pitted and divided scholars included the mindsets that radical beliefs predispose individuals to violence on one hand and those who held that radical beliefs did not always lead to violence on the other hand. The limiting of radicalization as a one – sided conflict as opposed a two-sided conflict by (Rink and Sharma, 2018) as well was a divisive point of engagement in the discussion of Islamic radicalization.
It was the persuasion of this study that post 9/11 understanding of radicalization made it to take a religious shape supported by authentic literature and data and any other such persuasion seeking to consider prior 9/11 literature on terrorism only served the purposes of denying a conceptual and theoretical analysis of Islamic radicalization processes in the world today. For the purposes of unbiased scrutiny of a religious tradition some reconstruction thinkers of Christian Identity movements in America had advocated for violence albeit in localized manner in defense of their faith and value systems (Esposito, Fasching & Lewis, 2008). The main concerns with Islamic radicalization processes come from the global nature on its impact in contemporary society thereby attracting and rightly so a concerted probing by scholars, researchers, governments and policy makers.

Bhatt (2007) argued against drawing lines between the secular and sacred as a practice that had evaded orientalist’s studies and those seeking to understand Islamic culture. The Western approach of the separation of the church and state, as influenced by modernism (Esposito et al, 2008) or religion from politics cannot bear fruit in the studies of Islam which by far is a religious culture that was meant to affect all facets of life, the political, the economic and sociocultural, among others.

A discussion on religious radicalization processes were never exhaustive without checking the influence of radical clerics the chief of whom was Sayyid Qutb who had been regarded as the “philosopher of terror, the Marx of global Jihad and ideologue of Islamism” Martin and Abbas (2010, p.1) especially as his ideas caused the Iranian revolution of 1979 and events of September 11, 2001 terror attacks on World Trade Centre. Radical clerics have utilized madrasas and Mosques to entrench the perceived supremacy of Islam as championed by religious extremists. In
that case, promotion of *sharia* and the philosophy of a global *jihad* to create cells and radicalization networks envision an agenda of purely Islamic states or caliphates.

Arguably, political Islam sought to entrench religious identity in the global political space. The successes of terror networks led by Al-Qaeda and their clandestine nature pitting the congress against the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) necessitated the probing of a much wider implication of global politics.

Turchie and Puckett (2008) represented mindsets that had probed the power politics in the White House and preoccupation with party issues and presidential scandals from Nixon’s Watergate to Clinton’s Monica Lewinsky scandals to be responsible for American homeland insecurity. Apart from probing the scandals in the white house the real issue that was zeroed in had to do with the growing undemocratic politics and manipulation of processes including the FBI. In that case modern day terrorism apart from being blamed on administrative failures spanning four American Presidents to what had been dubbed Washington politicians shifts focus and apportions blame on FBI making it look a derogatory institution on counterintelligence and counterterrorism initiatives.

The Washington issue in making America and the world unsafe bordered around Jihadists ingenious especially in bombing the World Trade Centre in a kind of surprise attacks. The questions as to how Al-Qaeda network and ideology managed to plan and executive such attacks in the heart of a super power and planting cells all over the world cannot easily be assumed.

In summary the US hegemony especially American presence and policy in global politics involving arming the Afghan jihadists against the Soviet war in Afghanistan only served geopolitical perspectives of perceived broad radicalization processes. It had been argued that the failure of Washington to address the vacuum created by its policies on cold war with the Soviet
and almost lack foresight in containing Afghan jihadists leading to the emergence of Al-Qaeda from such militant scenario in the Middle East remained a debatable concern. Clarke (2004) attempted to address these geopolitical concerns of radicalization. But as the American homeland security system sought to check religious radicalization processes within and outside of America and in order to curtail acts of terror by radicalized individuals, Brooks (2011) noted that only one hundred and seventy five (175) arrests of radicalized individuals had been made since 2001 suggesting that religious radicalization processes were clandestine and difficult to discover in its entirety.

1.1.2 The Context of the Effects on Youths

The effects on youths were informed by how the processes of religious radicalization acted on individual youths and groups as a gradual process of socialization. The context of the effects on youths considered the gradual psychological journeys and sociological influences that eventually altered the mind processes of youths to adopt or join a terrorist group. The effects of religious radicalization on youths, therefore, can be said to follow a pattern that sometimes can span long periods of time though uncommon cases existed on rapid mind altering processes.

A vivid example of gradual radicalization comes from Della Porta, who quotes an Italian militant as follows: “‘a choice [made] in cold blood, such as ‘now I will become a terrorist,’ [did] not exist. It was a step-by-step evolution, which passed through a kind of human relation that I had with Guido, and with the people I worked with.’” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2018, p.420)
Renaires (2008) report by the European Commission on how some *salafist* groups were non-violent while among the same groups there were those seeking to restore traditional Islamic ideals through violence only was suggestive to the processes and journeys that individuals and groups undergo as they interact with the violent religious ideology over time. Riddell and Cotterel (2003) also probed why some converts become radicalized into *Jihad* and others remained law abiding citizens. The individual or group processes involved confirmed the effect of the religious ideology produced different results to different youths according to their personalities and environments. The point of concern remained that processes produced effects on youths.

Again, the resurgence of religion in politics especially in the decades before the end of cold war and its role in *Jihadi* terrorism made the world to reconsider the role of religious radicalization in threatening global peace. Specifically, Islamism even as a contested concept explained the centrality of religion both in radicalization processes and violence (Bhatt, 2007; Martin & Abbas, 2010). In this connection, radicalization processes were hereby presumed to occur when individuals or a group in society rejected orthodox perspectives and instead adopted extremist religious ideology, beliefs, practices and attitudes which undermined the rule of law and established societal order. As an ideology that was deeply rooted in radical interpretation of Islam the processes thereof involved recruitment of youths through misinforming, misinterpreting and misrepresenting orthodox religious doctrines.

Perhaps the founder of the Wahhabi sect as portrayed by Shorrosh (1988) on mystical interpretation of Islam was evident through letters written to the treasurer of paradise and hang together with a copy of small Qur’an on soldiers necks during war as an assurance of entry to paradise in case of falling in combat but also with powers to protect them from being seen by the
enemies. The mysticism and assurance of safety that religious radicalization conferred on soldiers at war explained how the beliefs influenced mental processes of youths. These processes still acted on youths in the target audience to a measurable degree.

But if they are obstinate, know that God is your helper and protector; How excellent a helper; and how excellent a protector is He! Know that one-fifth of what you acquire as booty (of war) is for God and His Apostle, and for relatives and orphans, the poor and wayfarers, if you truly believe in Allah and what We revealed to Our votary on the day of victory over the infidels when the two armies clashed (at Badr). For Allah has the power to do any thing (Al-Anfaal 8:40-41)

The perpetration of violence by youths was the apex of radicalization processes. In that regard a comprehensive analysis of religious radicalization processes required that this study probed the concept of Jihad among the Muslim community. It was established that the Islamic faith community was divided on the interpretation of Jihad. In that case Islamic radicalization in the context of complex and multiple theological persuasions proved the argument that religion was a conveyor belt to violence inadequate.

Actually, the pathways that individuals, groups and communities travel in the process of radicalization so far remain unpredictable but the catalyst place of religion in radicalization cannot be overemphasized even when sects differ on concept of Jihad. While Speckhard (2014) engaged with the militant Jihadī ideology by Al-Qaeda and affiliates as a hijacking of mainstream Islamic beliefs, sacred texts and traditions for jihad George (2002) was preoccupied with scholars as al Ghazali’s exposition of the greater Jihad and the lesser Jihad and the position
taken by moderate Muslims in recent times. The latter *Jihad* involved the struggle against self-indulgence on matters that defile the human person while the former, that is, lesser *jihad* was the defensive nature which had been reinterpreted to achieve political goals by conservative and radical Muslim clerics and philosophers. It was necessary that at any given time and place an assessment of individuals and communities required objectivity in terms of determining the radical element or the sympathizer attitude. However, the textual reinterpretation and application of combat or *qital* texts to contestations for political space can hardly be removed from religion as revealed and practiced from its inception which (Nehls, 2015) analyzes from a dichotomized approach of the *Dhar-ul Islam* on one hand and *Dhar-ul-Harb*’ that is, the terrorary of Islam and the territory of war respectively. In retrospect most *Jihad* texts radically reinterpreted reinforce the duty of extremists to subdue the whole world to the rule of Allah with a reward attached to falling in combat

> Those who barter the life of this world for the next should fight in the way of Allah. And We shall bestow on him who fights in the way of Allah, whether he is killed or is victorious, a glorious reward (An-Nisaa 4:74)

The presence of combat texts in most Semitic religious traditions also classified as *hard texts* (Sacks, 2015) do not necessarily make all faith adherents violent (Nehls, 2015) but were the ground by which violent extremism thrived. Striking such distinctions was necessary in order to comprehend contemporary religious violence and the background by which it was perpetuated. Further, a caveat existed where the violent extremist perceived those who did not wage war against infidels to be not true Muslims
It was a fact that much is yet to be known on the thin line that exists between jihadi extremists and mainstream Islam especially in traditional conflict zones in the Muslim world where a religious culture or Arab culture informed the popular social discourse through the years. The winning of hearts and minds of individual youths and groups to engage in suicide though complex justified the role that religious arguments played in convincing young Muslims especially inside conflict zones. The prevailing conditions of perennial alienation, frustrations, loss and anger experienced by youths in conflict zones made them vulnerable to militant jihadi ideology eventually breeding suicidal tendencies amongst some youths. The theologizing of existential problems and the promises of bliss or paradise or Jannah through martyrdom appealed to some youths and therefore considered partly an escape route from suffering but also access to a glorious life by martyred youths.

The argument that promoted Islamic radicalization emanated from pro-Western democratic ideals even in the Arab world which provided Islamists with an anti – democracy narrative to justify violence. Further, religious radicalization as a psychological process was a means whereby Islamic religious extremists alter the thinking patterns of communities especially the youth. This included the process of brainwashing and indoctrinating youths with religious propaganda in the home, school, prison and Madrasas. Nowadays, the internet had become a tool for radicalization and recruitment through online interactions. Through Jihadi Salafism brand of Islam religious radicalization had domesticated international religious terrorism event to non-Muslim countries thereby planting a culture of homegrown terrorism as a global phenomenon (Migue et al., 2014)
Perhaps the context on the effects on youths can be understood through the recent attacks by perceived Al-Shabaab (AS) terrorists on a Kenya Naval Base airstrip in Manda Lamu County and a US military camp where at least five militants were killed. These fighters were claimed to be locals by the fluent Kiswahili they spoke. But the attacks on convoys in Lamu area also proved the effects radicalization on youths.

Four days ago, three people were killed while another three were injured when the militants ambushed a convoy of buses, including Simba coach, Mombasa Raha and TSS that were headed to Lamu from Mombasa. The attack happened on January 2nd at Nyongoro area on the Lamu-Mombasa road...On Tuesday, a suspected Al-Shabaab returnee was shot dead by unknown assailants while driving home. Mr. Omar Salim Unda, 27, was shot three times in the head and neck at close range at Dabaso Primary school. Mr. Unda is said to have undergone rehabilitation after returning from Somalia where he is suspected to have joined Al-Shabaab (Daily Nation, Monday, 6th January 2020, p.4)

The import of clips and photos portraying the prowess of global terror groups were meant to build narratives promoting Islamist ideology. Some of these clips in the East African context were the Lamu airstrip attack and the previous El-Adde attacks. The clips and photos often circulated was a calculated scheme for youth recruitment. Apart from the objective of the Lamu airstrip attacks in January 2020 which was a daring manouvre at both a Kenya Naval Base and United States military installations a close scrutiny of the Al-Shabaab casualties was an indicator of homegrown radicalization and terrorism.
The physical characteristics of at least four terrorists appeared of Somali origin and one of Kenyan origin. An assortment of military gears and weaponry displayed alongside these terrorists also was indicative of the paramilitary nature and preparedness of these radicalized youths. The source of these weapons and military gears was suggestive of the overrunning of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) bases as occurred amongst Ugandan, Burundian and Kenyan troops in Somalia. In a nutshell Islamic radicalization processes had dealt a blow on the locals and the country already harbors underground training cells or spots for training and radicalizing of youths.

1.1.3 The Context of Processes

In this section the processes involved how the religious ideology evolved through the centuries to affect global contexts. The concept of *da’wa* or the call and the emergence of *Tabligh* movement as much as not directly linked to religious radicalization processes to violent extremism yet situating radicalization. The spread of Islam throughout the world left the trails that extremists fomented their religious narratives. It must be noted that in some instances the ideology that spread in most parts of the world failed to integrate into the prevailing cultural contexts and mostly the Western democratic ideals. Eventually, the feelings of alienation coalesced around violent extremist narratives. The process of radicalization in this space follows through specific instances and locations where the violent ideology through narratives entrenched itself. Al-Qaeda terror group props into prominence as a radicalizing agency committed to violence as a means of achieving the global Islamist agenda. The cells that have been created in Africa, Asia, Europe and the United States and which are coordinated through Al-Qaeda leadership structure,
shura, or council are examples of religious radicalization processes targeting a creation of a religious order globally (Riddell & Cotterell, 2003).

In Europe, for example, religious radicalization took the form of conversion to Islam dating back to 1887 CE movement by William Quilliam. Between the years 1990 to 2010 European converts to Islam portrayed a trend of Jihadi converts directly linked to conversion and radicalization albeit in lesser numbers (Table 2.5). The Madrid 2004 and London 2005 terror attacks by some converted European citizens against their fellow citizens have thrust the concern to study homegrown terrorism by scholars in West and specifically the United States.

In addition, the radicalization of Muslim in diaspora in Europe indicated that immigrants’ failure to integrate into Western societies’ value system and identity had made them support Islamism as observed by (Zimmerman & Rosenau, 2009). But the processes influencing radicalization into violent Islamic extremism are varied. Further, a trend that is emerging was that it is difficult for European countries to integrate the Muslim community in the West that was seen to be so much secularized. Consequently, the lack of integration to Western value system created a soft spot for radicalization into religious value system to take effect (Karagiannis, 2012).

In the Middle East where religious Islamic radicalization was perceived to have emanated in the recent and current form and shape, the struggle for controlling the geopolitics of Arab bloc had kept Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran in a perpetual conflict of interests with each side seeking to gainsay the other thereby fueling radicalization processes. In a nutshell this amounted to what Charles (2005) described as Talibanization of the Nations of Middle East and Asia where religious extremism through creation of purely religious states referred to as caliphates, governed by Islamic law or Sharia informed religious radicalization processes. The religious imperatives that caused havoc in the Middle East through intifadas and uprisings in the 1970s, 1980s and the
1990s had received impetus in the 21st century through globalization and transportation of the religious ideology for social, economic, and political reasons around the world. In the recent decades Islamists have cut a niche towards influencing society through retracing radical teachings and abandoning orthodox approaches to doctrinal issues.

Ousman (2004) observed a revival of political activism which sought to restore the fundamentals of Islam by supporting traditional Islamic theory that a state must be governed by three pillars namely the Ummah representing the community of believers, the Caliphate and Islamic jurisprudence or Sharia (Islamic Law). By this revival, religious extremists entrench their identity and their value system pervading governance, politics, culture, art and all areas of human existence, an Islamic revival that Al Turabi identified with what he called the holy book, the Qur’an.

Noteworthy, as much as establishment of Islamic states needed to prove the authenticity of governance systems aligned to Islamic practice the failure of Ummayad and Abbasid caliphates blamed on depravation, arrogance and corruption as indicated by (Goytisolo, 2000) remained an issue to be tackled by adherents of the Islamic golden age idea of caliphates.

The case of Islamic Salvation Front often cites Algeria, Iran and Sunni preachers of the golden age as prime examples as to why Islamist had opposed corrupt Islamic regimes and designations of takfir (declaration and attachment of infidel status to a Muslim) status to corrupt Muslim nations often mobilizing youth support for intifadas, that is, uprisings.

Additionally, the radicalization of political discourse Noor (2016) by Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in the 1980s and 1990s was a case in point of how a creation of religio-political contexts promoted state radicalization towards an Islamic state agenda. PAS supported Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda and Taliban against Afghan war and agitated for global Jihad against the
West, especially, the United States. So far, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan stood in a class of their own forming governments that exemplified countries in support of governance practices inclined on religious pillars as Sharia or Islamic law. Religious radicalization from a political perspective involved such instances as these whereby Islamic nations supported political Islam and Jihad wholesale. This made pro-Islamists groups undermine secular regimes worldwide through politicized brand of Islam.

In Africa, radicalization processes emerged from ideological and existential issues as poverty and unhealthy competition for limited resources. For instance, despite weak structural and governance fault lines in Nigeria the founder of Boko Haram, Yusuf, was also inclined to Salafist/Wahhabi religious ideas which opposed Western ideals. The merging of religious grievances, ethnic identities, political marginalization and underdevelopment in Nigeria clearly indicated how religious radicalization processes can cause violence in what some scholars refer to as theological armed conflict (Ugwu, 2015 & Williams, 2016).

The Boko Haram insurgency employed religious radicalization processes that culminated in the recent kidnapping of Chibok school-girls. This represented both the nature and the effect of radicalization that continued to mutate from terror groups to fully fledged militant insurgency that sought to wage war fronts against the governments. The philosophical frameworks by which Jihadist ideology thrived in Africa and elsewhere in the case of Gerges (2007) presented a useful history of radicalization in Africa. In what he termed as generations of Jihadists an understanding of the philosophical grounding of Jihad in Egypt combined the contestations for space that took place between mainstream Islamists with a vision to create a morally upright society through Islamization on one hand and the pro-Western secular regimes on the other hand. This kind of periodization of history dating back to al-Banna’s Muslim brotherhood and successors as Qutb,
and as revisionist as it was explained why modern *Jihad*, that is, political violence in the contemporary settings can be understood.

In East Africa and particularly in the Horn of Africa religious radicalization processes have been promoted by radical Islamic groups such as Al-Shabaab which were associated with terrorism. With the disintegration of Somali government in the 1990s after the fall of President Siad Barre, warlords and eventually Al-Shabaab militants established themselves an Islamic militant group in the region. Affiliated to Al-Qaeda terror network they have infiltrated the East African nations causing great havoc to the populations.

The US embassy bomb attacks in 1998 by Al-Qaeda in Kenya and later in Tanzania marked the beginning of terror activities linked to contemporary militant Islam in East Africa. The growth of Islamic militancy in the Sudan is associated with the presence of Osama Bin Laden in Sudan in 1991 who built a network of Islamists in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) and East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in guise of charitable activities have been accused of aiding the growth of Islamic militancy in East Africa (Haynes, 2005).

Pirio (2007) linked the 1998 bombing of United States (U.S) Embassy, 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel near Mombasa and failed missile attack of an Israeli civilian jetliner with the establishment of an Al-Qaeda’s cell by Osama bin Laden in East Africa, Nairobi, to support international jihadist movement in the Horn of Africa. The cell, that is, a recruitment and radicalization base, radicalized youths to support operations, finance activities, smuggle arms and organize attacks using Kenya as a gateway to Somalia’s *Al *ijtihad* group in support of Al-Qaeda’s operations targeting Kenya and Tanzania from 1992 to 2002.
Gradually, the space accorded to radical clerics made the radicalization of political discourse by Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) led by a radical cleric Sheikh Balala preach against successive regimes on disenfranchisement of Muslim youths. The North Eastern (NE) parts of the country have also been radicalized with then *Al ijtihad* operatives with Osama’s charities as Mercy International Relief Agency and Help Africa Peoples which recruited youths from both Kenyan Somalis and from refugee camps.

The recent attacks in Kenya including Garissa University Massacre, Mandera bus and quarry attacks targeting Christians, Westgate Mall attacks, among others were interpreted based on Pirio (2007) as a culmination of a decades’ long radicalization processes that had created homegrown terrorism in the country. The ideological radicalization was closely linked to political grievances by the Islamic community which explained why radicalization of youths had occurred in the country. The radicalization cells have expanded to regions as Nairobi, North Eastern, Coast, Central, and Nyanza areas in the past two decades.

The prominence of Al-Qaeda as a terror organization existed in its very nature and philosophy of a global *Jihad*. So far the outfit had dotted the world with cells that induce youths with *Jihad* vision. In Kenya religious radicalization processes involves Islamic fundamentalism introduced in the NE parts of the country after the fall of Somalia state in 1991. In fact, the country became the nucleus of a radicalization cell in East Africa. Both Somali community from Somali and the native Somali community have been targets of radical Islamism by both Al-Qaeda and *Al Itihaad* propaganda. In the Coast province the IPK mixed its radicalization processes with electoral politics in the country. Noteworthy international organizations promoting radicalization processes in Kenya other than Al-Qaeda included Sudan’s National Islamic Front support for
IPK and foreign Islamic charities targeting Mosques, schools and Madrasas with wahabbist brand of Islam (Pirio, 2007).

The geographical location of Isiolo as a frontier, transit zone and central point in Kenya, made it a focal point for religious radicalization processes to thrive. The routes for transit include Mandera to Isiolo to Marsabit to Moyale. The other route was through Wajir to Garissa to Isiolo to Nairobi. The Dadaab camp closure also attracted extremists to Isiolo to escape repatriation to Somalia. This study confirmed that these routes, among others, made the county of Isiolo a hotspot for both influx of radicalizers and exit points of radicalized youths. The processes of Islamic radicalization were aided by the influx of recruiters into the country through a porous Kenya-Somalia border. From this perspective, the study considered Isiolo was a gateway county and a route that recruiters had discovered for the objectives. It was at the backdrop of this spillover effect that the study was conducted.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

According to Haynes (2005), Hansen (2013), Pirio (2007), Botha (2014), Riddell and Cotterell (2003) the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi, radicalized youths in the state of Minnesota fighting alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the presence of Al-Qaeda cells from 2001 in most parts of the world including but not limited to the Middle East, Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States all pointed towards a complex problem that affected the entire globe.

The processes that youth underwent to be recruited were unknown and therefore recourse to conduct research to determine such processes. The general effects of religious radicalization were not fully known but more importantly the specific effects on Muslim youth in Isiolo were yet to be discovered. Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell (2013) confirmed that a lack of probing
promoted inmate radicalization which entrenched the objectivity of conducting a study on religious radicalization processes in Isiolo.

A lot had been said on radicalization especially in regard to terrorist activities in Isiolo but generally little had been researched on religious radicalization particularly the processes and the effects of radicalization. Silke (2008) observation that only 1 (one) percent of interviews have been used to provide data on radicalized individuals buttressed the need for conducting this research especially as appertains the processes that produced jihadi extremism. To solve this problem a study was needed with interviews and numbers recorded to determine the extent of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo, the processes of that radicalization and the effects of the processes.

The study observed that youths were disappearing from homes and others running out schools to become criminals or outright terrorists. This scenario prompted and inspired this study in an effort to find solutions. At the same time parents, teachers and civil authorities in the county raised a concern towards youth radicalization in Isiolo evidenced by disappearances from homes and school drop outs.

Youths from Isiolo both boys and girls were targeted by teachings of radical Muslim clerics, teachers, students and guardians who enticed them to follow radical interpretation of Islamic religion. Girls and boys were promised marriages to virgins once they join extremist groups. Instances have occurred where short-lived marriages end up into being recruitment and an abduction strategy. Incentives based radicalization favored youths from poor backgrounds who fall prey to radicalization dragnet. These promises of money, status and women among others made youths to be willing to run away from homes and schools to join Al-Shabaab terror group in East Africa, Islamic State In Syria (ISIS) and other global terror groups and organizations.
The former county commissioner from Isiolo George Natembeya statement that over 27 cases of youth from Isiolo being transported to Somalia and other parts of the world evidenced the problem of radicalization in county (https://ww.nation.co.ke). The study established this information to be factual based on field research as well.

The recent freezing of assets belonging to nine terror financiers of terrorism in Kenya by Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiang’i was an indicator of terror activities in the country (The Standard 3rd September 2020). The terror financiers were businessmen and women in Eastleigh, Mombasa and Mandera. The statements by the Cabinet Secretary were as follows:

The enemy is progressively planting operatives among civilians strategically to advance his agenda through recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism and terrorism…we shall neither surrender into the hands of terrorism nor play into the narrative propounded by terrorists of discrimination along ethnic and religious lines in this war. The only way to deny terrorists the means to threaten our way of life is to choke their facilitation networks (The Standard 3rd September 2020)

The aforementioned locations were valid in this study since the radicalization process was fluid and radicalization cells were interlinked and connected in most cases. The incidents as reported by the standard were listed in Appendix ii. Based on these concerns this study documented religious radicalization processes so as to aid intervention measures by government, religious groups and various stakeholders. It further recorded the effects of religious radicalization by cataloguing the processes in detail.
In conclusion the study having identified religious radicalization of youth in Isiolo as problem based on families and school outcry conducted field study and documented religious radicalization processes to aid intervention by government and religious groups. The study was expected to fill a scholarly gap especially on scarce sources and an outright lack of empirical research on religious radicalization processes and their effects on youths. By so doing the historical radicalization as suggested by Pirio (2007) in the Upper Eastern region and mostly in Isiolo County as a northern frontier zone was anchored on concrete and substantive research.

1.3 The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to undertake an assessment of the effects of Islamic radicalization processes on Muslim youth in Isiolo County, Kenya.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study were to:

1. Examine the extent of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo County
2. Investigate the processes of Islamic radicalization
3. Determine the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths
4. Assess the effects of Islamic radicalization on youth in Isiolo County

1.5 Research Questions

The research questions of the study were:

1. To what extent has Islamic radicalization penetrated Isiolo County?
2. What are the processes of Islamic radicalization?
3. What are the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths?

4. What are the assessable effects of Islamic radicalization on youths in Isiolo County?

1.6 Justification of the Study

The study was set to partly confirm the claim from parents and the school system that youths in Isiolo County were being radicalized. The rationale for this study was based on religious, cultural, economic and political effects of religious radicalization processes on youths in Kenya. There was need to understand religious radicalization of youth at home, school, mosque and other socio-religious settings. Both the government and Islam would benefit from this study to stem negative effects on youths. Religious radicalization required a context based analysis since the processes involved were complex and varied from place to place thus the need to undertake a study in Isiolo County. The location of the study was a frontier zone with Islamic practices and historically was associated with Islamic radicalization processes such as recruitment of youth to extreme Islamic groups and activities therefore its suitability to provide relevant data for the study.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The size of the sample of youths in the age cohort if 10-35 years was relatively small in contrast to youths who had been radicalized in other parts and regions in the country. But the collection of data in Isiolo County was viewed as a representative sample for generalizations. Further, religious radicalization processes involved cells which were unique and varied from place to place besides youths from different parts of the country intermingled in these underground radicalization cells.
The sampling of youths appeared prejudiced since Muslim youths were not the only ones that got radicalized. The study chose Muslim youths as a sample representing all religious radicalization because Islam was dominant in Isiolo County and since religious concepts and texts in contemporary religious radicalization were largely from Islam. Ethical considerations were expected to limit the subjects of the study from freely and honestly providing data. Radicalization often occurred in secretive and undercover processes. Fear to victimization for those youths who had recanted radical groups or those with characteristics to join terror organizations would not naturally give information. This goes in tandem with the difficulty of researching on a complex and sensitive subject that is so emotive and rooted in personal beliefs and value systems. An assurance of protecting participants through anonymity and coding of data to mitigate reprisals to those giving information was used to win their confidence and thereby release of sensitive data. Sensitive and classified information was analyzed for study purposes only.

According to Clutterbuck and Warnes (2013), the threat and sensibilities involved in researching on such studies were real based on suspicions surrounding this kind of work. The study used proxies and gatekeepers as fellow Muslim chaplains, that is, Imams and maalims, government officials and fellow students, among others. Lastly, anti-terrorism concerns of the state as the intelligence agencies were cautious in release of classified information but since the study remained focused on academic purposes and desisting from the operational concerns of the state it was possible to receive data for analysis of the processes, characteristics, and assessable effects of radicalized Muslim youths.
1.8 Delimitation of the Study

According to the Kenyan legal frameworks the age cohort between 18-35 years were classified as youths (Constitution of Kenya Chapter Seventeen Article 260). In this study youth comprised of youths from the ages of 10-35 years. This redefinition allowed for the inclusion of children in madrassa and primary schools since terrorists also targeted lesser ages for radicalization and recruitment.

Recent history had recorded Isiolo County as the place where recruitment of more Muslims youths occurred. In Isiolo central sub-county the dominant religious practices were represented by Islam, Christianity, and Hindu. This cosmopolitan nature of Isiolo County made it ideal to conduct this study because youths had been exposed as they interacted with people of other faiths.

The inclusion of respondents as youths, parents, teachers and affected institutions as the homes, mosque and schools was based on the widening scope of the study to attain representativeness in terms of respondents and attainment of rich data. The geographical location of the study was almost at the very center of the country which made it possible to track youth movements and available cells within the county and the country at large. Lastly, the researcher understood the subjects and institutions in the sample on one hand and the terrain and history of the county on the other hand and thus was advantageous to conduct the study.

1.9 Significance of the Study

The study engaged with a relatively new study area and cut a niche in the midst of emerging scholarly work. Dolnik (2013) identified the lack of in – depth scrutiny in terrorism studies so far. The need to entrench terrorism studies on empirical data would relieve scholarly work from
overreliance on secondary data, the media and official sources that set analysis on a trajectory of recycling results. From these perspectives the study was significant in understanding religious radicalization processes and their effects on youth which helps to design interventions that were specific to the local situation in Isiolo County, anchored on primary data analysis and eventually provided a critical solution to the situation. The study was an important contribution to curbing further religious radicalization of youth in Isiolo County. The study was likely to have immediate impact within the Islamic community and state agencies dealing with violent extremism.

Additionally, the study had the potential to add value to the multi-agency approach by governments(s) nationally and internationally in combating radicalization as opposed to combating terrorism generally and youth radicalization specifically. Further certain institutions such as homes, schools, mosques and even prison can understand the processes that lead to religious radicalization of youth and possibly adopt intervention strategies presented to mitigate the impact thereof. According to Kenney (2013), future studies can benefit from empirical insights from this kind of research in related areas as terrorism studies.

Perhaps the significance of this study was bolstered by Dolnik (2013) observation that Africa, South Asia and Central Asia represented regions yet to receive any academic attention on terrorism studies. The gaps as identified through the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in Kenya during a leadership training seminar which involved radicalization in learning institutions, the recent and growing trend of homegrown radicalization and terrorism, improvement of facilities dealing with CT, among others, were the aims that this study engaged with and which it sought to give its contribution. Such empirical and research-based approaches reflecting domestic dynamics and populations fed into the national security aims and goals. In summary the findings of the study had the ability to inform and enhance policy formulations on
interventions to deal with radicalization targeting youths. The study advanced scholarly work by providing situation-based analysis of religious radicalization in the county. The specific objectives of the study help understand the processes, effects and characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths as a unique perspective on radicalization studies.

1.10 Assumptions of the Study

The data collected from sampled youths represented a percentage of the total youth population in Isiolo County. Nevertheless, it was assumed that this did not affect the generalization of results either in Isiolo County, Kenya or the world at large. The sample was enough to enable the study to make conclusions that there existed religious radicalization processes in Isiolo County and that they had effect on youth.

The use of questionnaires and interview schedule rarely captured all aspects of religious radicalization processes because some processes happen in the mental processes and this study never employed any psychological instruments to capture these thoughts but was assumed that this lack of psychological instrument never affected the data collected and the conclusions arrived at. It was also presumed that the level of honesty in giving information was attained through making the youths understand the purpose of the research.
1.11 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

Al-Qaeda……………………………………This was the terrorist group began by Osama Bin Laden with preoccupations with global *Jihad* Agenda

Al-Shabaab…………………………………The word basically means ‘youth’ but in this study means the militant group as affiliated to Al-Qaeda and an offshoot of ICU (Islamic Court Union) in Somalia

Amir/Emir…………………………………..Arabic word for ruler, commander or king

Caliph…………………………………………A temporal and spiritual ruler or commander of Islam or the faithful or the *umma* and the Jurisdiction presided over caliphate(s)

Dar Al Harb ………………………………This is the abode of the non-Muslim world or the lands to be won over to Islam peacefully or by force if that became the only option (Riddell & Cotterell, 2003, p.122). This also explained the ultimate goal of global *Jihad* movement where infidels and heretics must be subdued.

Dar Al Islam ……………………………….This is the abode of Islam also represented by *Umma* or the territory over which Islamic faith and practice reigns.

Extremism…………………………………..This involved the holding of views that were divergent from the orthodox and radical to
conservative views of religion which apart from
being applicable to any religious adherent(s) in
this case applied to Islamic terrorism with
militant interpretation of Islamic tenets and
concepts. In most cases violent extremism
competed for space and sought to obscure the
religious background of extremism

_Fiqh_................................................. Islamic jurisprudence

_Hadith(s)_........................................... The sayings, narrative records, traditions and
customs of Muhammad and his companions.

_Intifada(s)_........................................ This is an Arabic word meaning ‘shaking off’

which is an uprising to topple governments that
were seen to be pro-Western

_Isiolo County_................................. This is one of three sub-counties which in

this study refer to Isiolo County, Garbatula and
Merti. It is located almost at the centre of
Kenya. It is mostly inhabited by all ethnic
tribes while the leading religion was Islam.

It comprises of six divisions, six locations
and 12 sub-locations covering an area of
269km² (County Commissioner’s
Office, Isiolo County, 2013)
Islamists.............................The word carried the same meaning with Jihadists and was used interchangeable so in this study. It was associated with the West and derogatory to the umma

Jihadist(s)..............................These were adherents to Islamic religious extremism who presume themselves to be fighting a religious war against infidel nations and their allies.

Jihadi converts..........................These are converts to Islam in Europe and elsewhere who proceed into becoming terrorists

Madrasah.................................Islamic school dedicated only to study of Islamic religious texts

Mujahid/Mujahidin..........................A fighter or warrior of faith (Jihad) or holy warrior

Muslim Youth..............................In this study youth covered ages 10 -35 years. This redefinition of age helped the study to include children in madrassas and primary schools and who dominated the sample at 64.5%

Qur’an.................................This is the holy of book of Muslim faith

Community
Radicalization: The process of making people, especially youths, to adopt extremist views on religion and ready to take action including violence based on their radical views on religion, society and state.

Religious Radicalization Processes: These were stages or steps or phases of influencing religious people to adopt extreme views on the faith and practices different from the mainstream views taught in that religion.

Salafi: A Muslim who emphasizes the Salaf ('Predecessors' or 'ancestors'), the earliest Muslims, as models of Islamic faith and practice.

Sharia: Islamic law that is derived from the Qur'an.

Sleeper Cells: These were underground training spaces that were used by operatives for recruitment and indoctrination of youths.

Surat al-Qital: Combat or war verses.

Terrorism: In this study terrorism referred to non – state actors’ use of violence to achieve political or religious goals and was also used to mean religious terrorism or jihadi terrorism.
Ulama or Ulema……………………………… Scholars with formal training in Islamic religious disciplines as law (fiqh), theology (kalam), exegesis (tafsir) and traditions of the prophets (Hadith) Saeed (2003)

Violent Extremism…………………………..This was embracing views which were radical in nature and which may go as far as killing and maiming enemy populations (people) for both religious and political reasons.

Violent Religious Extremism …………………..This was a new concept recovered by this study that sought to situate radicalization discourse in the resurgence of religion in politics and was used in this study to bargain for space and in contrast to the populist and compounded analysis in the radicalization debate
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter a review of literature on the general concept was necessary so as to lay the foundation by which the study was anchored. In that case an overview of radicalization involved its emerging and evolving definitions, its historicity and the characteristics of Islamic radicalization. The Islamic nature of contemporary violence made the study engage with the philosophical foundations by which the concept was grounded. From this perspective it was concluded that the pretext and unorthodox exegesis of Qur’anic texts and concepts informed why Salafist-Jihad thrived and gave global extremist groups a discourse to perpetrate their ideology. An exploration of studies and literature review eventually shade light on the rise of the radicalization processes and effects as engaged with herein. The chapter eventually dealt with theoretical and conceptual frameworks under which this research was conducted.

In short in order to understand religious radicalization processes and their effect on youths this study examined the concept of religious radicalization (Section 2.1), contemporary approaches (Section 2.1.1.), radicalization as extremism (Section 2.1.2), Islamic doctrine and teachings (Section 2.1.3), the history of religious radicalization (Section 2.2), religious fundamentalism (Section 2.2.1), violent religious extremism (Section 2.2.2), the nexus between Islam and fundamentalism (Section 2.2.3), Islamic radicalization as a process (Section 2.3), struggle for cultural identity (Section 2.3.1), psychological trauma (Section 2.3.2), factors and methods of religious radicalization (Section 2.3.3) and Islamic radicalization processes (Section 2.3.4). A theoretical framework proposed to explain the phenomenon of religious radicalization processes was partly anchored in (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008) pyramid theory. A further
explanation of this study was found in Maskaliunaite (2015) theory of internal and external individual motivational factors. Finally a conceptual framework was constructed around that idea of Islamic radicalization as the independent variable and effects of Islamic radicalization on youths as the dependent variable. The study also introduced a theory that was coined to mitigate the gaps in the competing ideological frameworks around radicalization discourses.

2.1 The Concept of Religious Radicalization

Framing the concept of religious radicalization among other studies and legal issues was necessary. Scholars McCauley (2004), Goede and Simons (2012), Yusuf (2014), Stieghar (2015) slightly differ in their understanding of the concepts but agreed that radicalization was a process. Nevertheless, the consensus that radicalization had something to do with holding extreme views as orthodox on a variety of subjects validated Sookhdeo (2013) observation on reversion to the traditionalist or Islamist view of Islam which suppressed modernists. To the extent that Islamists projection of sharia-isation of especially the Muslim world as the solution to global socio-economic and political problems was a complex issue courting global instability. Once these views were entrenched a radical positioning was adopted by individuals or groups who sincerely belief the status quo lacked legitimacy. Consequently, individuals or groups took extreme violent views based on their perceived legitimacy and group identity. Since the study was anchored on Islamic radicalization and by the fact that contemporary radicalization was hinged on Islamic political theory and praxis it was necessary to discuss the meanings, frameworks and foundations by which Islamic radicalization was anchored.
In this study it was useful to define the concept of radicalization in broad terms. So far there existed no consensus on definition of radicalization just as there so far there was no grand theory of radicalization since the concept evolved perpetually. Based on this reality the study was persuaded to analyze the definitions attempting to explain radicalization from operational needs of counterterrorism and counter radicalization.

Maskaliunaite (2015) blamed the insubordination of definitional concerns of radicalization to political ends, that is, countering terrorism. The need-based definitions were informed by urgent need for a solution often from populist regime and organizational sponsored perspectives. Historically, this approach had done a disservice to academic discourse. Perhaps Goede and Simons (2012); Newmann (2008) definition captured and were close to the point in the phrase “what goes on before the bomb goes off.” This represented studies that sought to underscore the mental processes and alterations that occurred in the minds of youths before attacks occurred. This definition captured necessary aspects of radicalization as a mental and an internal process.

The approach necessitated by Madrid, London and the 9/11 attacks on United States favored interrogation on political, economic, social and psychological forces on terrorism and political violence.

From this background this study began with the basic understanding that radicalization was the process that influenced youths to adopt extremist positions on religion, politics, economics and social dimensions eventually making *jihadi* terrorism an end-product of complex mental processes. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and policy-based definitions often perceive radicalization as a process of altering beliefs from mainstream to overtly inclined tendencies to promote ideological, religious, political or social change(s). This alteration of beliefs, feelings and behaviors occurred over time before violence was experienced (Striegher, 2015).
In fact, Tahiri (2013) based on Australian research report of 542 participants suggested that curbing terrorism must begin from preventing radicalization from taking root. But the misconceptions that existed on the continuum between radicalization, extremism and terrorism were still preventing conceptual breakthrough. Often a discussion on these concepts rarely needed dichotomization in contemporary religious violence unless the context demanded so. Etymologically, the term terrorism comes from the Latin *terrere* which means to frighten or to cause to tremble. The Chinese proverb, ‘Kill one, frighten ten thousand’ captured the gist of the word.

According to the Encyclopedia of World Terrorism Volume 1 there were four views which explained terrorism and the same views formed the approaches by which the concept herein was construed and applied. These included the academic view, the government view, the public view and the terrorist views. As much as these views competed for space in understanding terrorism the possibility of conflating ideological scrutiny was possible. For the purpose of this study and for accuracy concerns the academic view was adopted as an approach that was not influenced by partisan concerns of the other views, that is, the government, the public and the terrorists’ views. The academic view as adopted also helped probe into the bottom line and foundational issues of terrorism, which was, religious radicalization, an approach that suited this study. Islamic radicalization was the altering of the beliefs, feelings and behaviors of the youth through jihadist ideology or holy war against the infidels to restore the religious order. Embedded within the jihadist ideology were political narratives to support radicalization. Further, global terror networks and groups existed which supported the view of a global *jihad* and were engaged in perpetual recruitment, radicalization and training of Muslim youths for holy war objective. A concurrence with Mazrui (2006) that the holy war had been taken out of context by the West was
hardly convincing in the contemporary global violence that was perpetrated by terror networks. The impact of radicalization also involved the emergence of religious extremism and violent extremism. In the contemporary analysis terrorism represented the violence that emerged from religious radicalization of Muslim youths. The global terror networks that purport to create a caliphate through global *jihad* were evidence of the impact of religious radicalization processes. In order to consider the variants of Islamism it was necessary to point out that there existed a moderate view of Islamic faith traditions. As enshrined in any religious or ideological backgrounds people who consent with radical religious views and those who dissent from same was unavoidable. However, drawing a distinct line between radicals and moderates in the practice of Islam remained a huge task as religious ignorance existed on both proponents and opponents of violent variants of religious practices besides global political engagements on dealing with modern day violence.

Even in the academia there were those who identified radical beliefs with violence and those who found a distinction between cognitive radicalization and behavioral radicalization as Neumann (as cited in Rink and Sharma, 2018). Radicalization was a necessary religious tool which could occur at the mind level yet not necessarily at the violent extremism level. Often the bulk of scholarly work leaned towards a persuasion that radicalization justified violence for the objective of achieving goals but such a justification never meant participation in violence. Based on these realities the distinctions made by Gerges (2007) that militant Islamists or jihadists was distinguishable from moderate or mainstream branches of Islam possibly rested the controversy. The burden laid by the West on “Islam” or “Islamic” as a motivation for Jihadists since both extremists and moderates used Islam as a religion to justify their cause required objective analysis. But as Sperry (2005) argued that there existed spies and subverts in the name of
mainstream or moderate in the US political system compounded objective analysis thereof. Consequently, in order to understand Islamic radicalization in the recent past academic literature contrasted radical politics on one hand and Islamic extremism on the other. The basis for this approach explained the localized nature and the impact of Islamic radicalization in the Middle East prior to 9/11 attacks which made it possible to refocus on Jihadist radicalization as a Muslim threat to Western democracy (Springer et al., 2009).

The resurgence of religion in politics also introduced a new concept of radicalization into the arena of the practice of religion in contemporary times. The persuasions that radicalization was a political terminology was neither here nor there since other concepts as radicalism were as well active in politics. It was therefore necessary in this study to consider the psychological and theological processes which determined what the concept of radicalization came to stand for.

Whereas, before 2001, the term ‘radicalization’ had been used informally in academic literature to refer to a shift towards more radical politics (usually not referring to Muslims), by 2004 the term had acquired its new meaning of a psychological or theological process by which Muslims move towards extremist views (Kundnani, 2012, p.7)

Conversely, religious radicalization despite the controversies and debates that existed was termed as the altering of beliefs and behaviors through indoctrination based on reinterpretation of Islam. The centrality of religion in radicalization to existed so long as clandestine organizations managed to create cells to perpetuate the radical belief system of Islamist ideology. The global terror networks whose philosophy sought to replace the political and religious order that
supported democratic ideals of the West was a clear pointer of the religious nature of radicalization processes.

The religious ideology that propagated radicalization narratives was embedded within the philosophy of reinterpretation of sacred texts that promote political theory of Islam. A discourse of religious radicalization meant an attempt to strike a balance between radicals and moderates in belief system and practice of Islam. Disengaging the primacy of religion in radicalization processes appeared to the political theory of Islam was a mountainous task and an exercise in futility.

The radical clerics and laymen were found to invent radicalization from the vocabulary of Islamic radicalism inherent Islam. Eventually a militant political ideology that appealed to the masses through religion was advanced by radical extremists. The observation by Hansen (2013) that the discovery of such a violent Islamist ideology by the non-ulemas as a misuse of religion was persuasive. Arguably so, the basis for radical groups and networks as Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Qaeda in the Magharib (AQIM) were representations of the charged religious ideology, that is, religious radicalism and radicalization. In order to establish the basis for Islamic radicalization literature that focused on terror groups philosophies, radical preachers, Muslim diaspora communities and Islamic brotherhoods, were necessary. In recent years Islamic radicalization engaged Muslim youths through the alteration of their beliefs and practices on the sociocultural, political and economic fronts. A consideration of the literature on radicalization as a Muslim affair eventually captured the attention of scholars. In Kundnani (2012) scholarly work on radicalization though meant to unearth the frameworks of radicalization failed and the outcomes were biases palatable to official narratives than academic conceptualizing radicalization discourse(s). Even though, an upsurge of radicalization literature
was explained through the annual trends. From Kundnani 2012 figure 2.1 represented the literature in thirty peer-reviewed journals on radicalization from 1990 to 2011 which explained the focus on Islamic radicalization as occurred in 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. The literature concerning Islamic radicalization from 2004 had steadily increased based on the new threat from religious order.

Figure 2.1

*Trends in Radicalization from 1990 – 2011*

As the figure 2.1 shows there was a gradual and almost steady increase on the literature on radicalization. The discourse on Islamic radicalization has continued to evolve through the years.
The Kenyan experience in enacting laws to address terrorism was faced with challenges especially in balancing between national security preoccupations and human rights issues as contained in the Bill of rights. Apart from the controversial sections in the Security Laws (Amendment) Act (SLAA) of 2014 the previous Act (Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012) (POTA, 2012) inferred the concept of radicalization. In fact, section 40b (2) subsection (c) of the SLAA on the functions of National Counter Terrorism Centre mentioned de-radicalization which was the end or by-product of radicalization yet silent on the concept of radicalization itself. Petition no. 628 as consolidated with petitions nos. 630 of 2014 and no. 12 of 2015 by Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD), Human rights and Samuel Njuguna Ng’ang’a as 1st, 2nd and 3rd petitioners respectively versus the Republic of Kenya and Attorney General as 1st and 2nd respondents respectively mentioned the concept of radicalization. As a concern to this study the lacuna that existed in comprehending radicalization was the reason terrorism was hardly and exhaustively countered. This study sought to present a critical analysis to shed more light on a variety of issues of concern in pieces of legislation that were yet to steer controversy on matters security of the state (Appendix ii).

Orina (2016) as well considered that the challenges of curbing terror through the law were compounded by emerging issues but this study observed that there were competing interests and many a stakeholder inclinations. Suffice to say the legal frameworks in place as much as passionate as they were in awarding huge punitive penalties to convicted person(s) to a maximum of 30 years or even life imprisonment the space to understand the processes involved to an extent were elusive objective to many a stakeholder and mostly difficult and uncharted waters.
Article 3 clauses 1(a) and 1(b) of the (Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012) in Kenya which empowers Inspector General to determine and prosecute based on intent that an entity ‘…prepared to commit…attempted to commit a terrorist act’ (Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012) was by inference indicative that mental processes, beliefs and feelings had been altered. Therefore, the synergy of phrases and allusions such as what goes on before a bomb goes off in Goede and Simons (2012) and Newmann (2008) and the aforementioned Kenyan legal frameworks on the preparations and attempts to commit terrorism in the definitions of radicalizations were case scenarios this scholarly work built on in order to understand Islamic radicalization processes.

It was necessary to question whether religion really was a contributing factor to radicalization. As much as there were disagreements on the role of religion in radicalization arguments varied to a considerable degree. Kundnani (2015) apart from listing such scholars who questioned the centrality of religion in radicalization processes never considered the persuasions behind such allusions. It was concluded here that religion either was an agent or catalyst or even a cause of radicalization depending on the individual personality and the environment. In addition, and understanding of the role of religion separately as a radicalization agent hardly was possible in the multiplicity and complexity of factors that cause radicalization. Throughout the study it was established that arguments that relegated religion from radicalization failed to appreciate the emergence of religion in politics and the philosophies behind Islamic states, caliphates and global Jihad.

In summary, religious radicalization processes involved a highly charged ideological orientation on one hand and paramilitary training on the other hand. Incidentally, there are a variety of cells by which radicalized youths are attached for training. Overall, the Al-Qaeda command structure
(Figure 2.5) remained exemplary in the various tasks charged with responsibilities of discharging the mandate of the terror group whether it was leadership and command training, logistics cells, military wing or even the intelligence training wing and so on.

The model as presented by Shane (2009) gave the framework by which most processes of radicalization were executed. The effects of religious radicalization processes were understood through a consideration of associated concepts as extremism, violent extremism and jihadi or religious terrorism. A close scrutiny of these concepts and emergence of extremist groups painted a picture that a resurgence of a religious ideology was responsible in acts of violence globally. The word terrorism had a controversial background without consensus in its definition. In fact such lack of agreements on what it should stand for made it complex to address it.

2.1.1 Contemporary Approaches

The process definition of radicalization captured an aspect of the religious radicalization processes. Indoctrination into the philosophy of Islamism often required the time element for the feelings, attitudes and behavior to be altered. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) introduced complexities of the forces that promote radicalization factoring on religious radicalization processes in shaping a person’s feelings, attitudes and behaviors and eventually be recruited into a radical group (Table 2.6).

In the United States and Europe radicalization was defined from the context of debates on terrorism that involved the undergoing of a transformative process involving citizens who undergo a belief and behavioral changes prior to engagement in terrorism. Violence by citizens in the context of radicalization had been termed as homegrown terrorism. Based on Brooks
a minority of youths eventually committed violence but it was unpredictable who among the radicalized youths eventually committed violence.

It was hereby argued that studies on radicalization to establish the indicators of gradual transformation of individuals from normal behaving persons to radical extremists concurred with. Botha (2018) among numerous such scholarly persuasions affirmed on the slow and gradual process that took periods of time for an individual to become a terrorist. Issues as ideological resonance with an individual personality towards violence moderates and extremists were still theorized upon.

According to Schmid (2013), radicalization was a process of ideological socialization involving mostly the youths to cause violence to opponents for political reasons. Perhaps the objective approach to definition of radicalization was presented by Neumann (2008) by discussing the underlying factors and unknown mental processes going on in an individual’s mind and heart before a bomb goes off. This approach allowed for possibilities to want to probe the mindset of terrorist, internal and external processes within an individual or group that could be a reservoir for violent extremism and acts of violence, that is, terrorism.

The term radicalization as applied to Islamic tendencies towards violence began in 2004 as an inquiry into the psychological and theological processes that made normal individuals or groups shift to radical views. A survey of articles in thirty peer reviewed journals presented a growth in literature dedicated to the concept of radicalization from 1990-2011 (Figure 2.1). The popularization of the concept of radicalization occurred in references in the English language media from 2003 to 2007. The term was often captured in the phrase “what goes on before the bomb goes off”. Based on Madrid and London bombing there came a problematization of
radicalization and Europol (Europe Police) came to associate the terrorist threat in Europe with homegrown terrorism and self-radicalization of individuals to extremist groups.

It can be argued that the narratives that promoted the idea of a caliphate represented contemporary religious radicalization. Springer et al. (2009) held the same view that the caliphate concept of Al-Qaeda does not only represent territory but a utopian goal or an Islamic era without interference from corrupt secular regimes and the global *jihad* became an objective for radicalization on Muslim youths anywhere. The contemporary religious radicalization was thus based on what was termed as jihadist ideology which was a political bargaining for religious space by Muslim radicals and the existence of movements or religious extremist organizations as Hamas, Hizballah and Al-Qaeda among others was testament to that fact.

Throughout Bin Laden’s years in Sudan, that country served as a base for arms and fighters going not just to Bosnia, but also to terrorists in Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and even Qadhafi’s Libya. Sudan’s intelligence service and military supported the terrorists….During his first four years in Sudan, bin Laden had kept in the shadows…there were signs in 1995 of his money and support in Bosnia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Egypt, Morocco and in Europe. (Clarke, 2004, p.140)

Osama Bin Laden vision had proven to be unique with a global and political concern not only to fight enemies of Islam at home but also a clarion call for Muslims wherever they might be to support such a course and the plea of their brethren globally. This explained why his organization was responsible for recruits deployed to most lands as holy warriors called *Mujahideen* or *Muj* in other contexts. The role of sleeper cells in most parts of the world
represented a passionate pan-Islamic agenda of violent extremists (Riddell and Cotterell 2003; Saikal, 2003; Pirio, 2007) that cannot be further belabored.

Based on Saikal (2003) the post 9/11 US foreign policy created a political scenario in the Arab world that propagated radicalization against the West. The concept of *Ijtihad* which was an interpretation of Islam by moderates up to and even against Taliban and Al-Qaeda was weakened by policies that heightened the Palestinian problem. The blanket cover dealings with Islam on the war on terror, mass dealings, imaging Islam from extremists perspectives, among others, harbored feelings of hatred, dislike and distrust of the West and allies and therefore was counterproductive. Noteworthy puritanical approaches from terror networks who sought to purge the society and progressive approach by moderates required delicate balancing as a resort of its kind in managing contemporary violence.

It was observed that the publications that address Islam and its relationship to the contemporary world began in 2002. In particular Jenkins’s (2002) seminal work held that world politics in the 21st century were to be defined and determined by religion. Sympathetic with the suffering of Christians from the third world countries emerging from the rise of militant Islam mostly from Middle East, Africa and Asia, he suggested a re-looking into the US foreign policy based on the principle of love to intervene to alleviate such suffering. He noted that the eruption of worldwide Muslim extremists does not only threaten third world countries but also a declaration of a new *Jihad* against the West and more specifically the United States and its allies.

Riddell and Coterrell (2003) enumerated Post 9/11 moderate scholars in Britain to include Dr. Zaki Badawi, Dr. M. Sa’id Ramadan Al-Bouti, Zayn Kassam, among others. Closely associated were the organizations that stood in sharp contrast to extremism as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance in Britain,
among others. Their narratives revolved around the use of religion to advance non-violent ends often citing both Qur’an and Sunnah to rationalize their inclinations. Therefore, non-violent extremism amongst Muslims emanated from an emphasis on texts that promoted tolerance and of course the striking of a balance between conservatism and rationalism in the practice of religion. Often the challenge was drawing a line between moderates, radicals and sympathizers within the same religious community.

In East Africa and elsewhere Islamic radicalism restructured and reinterpreted Islam to return to salafist practices so as to conform to scriptural Islam as practiced by the prophet and ancestors. This notion spelled out the desire of Islamic radical doctrine the world over. In other words, it envisions a universal umma. The salafism narratives popularize political injustices, marginalization, interferences with their faiths and discrimination based on Western education that empowered the Christian faith at the expense of Muslims. In Kenya radicalization involved the empowerment of upcountry population in the social and political platform at the expense of coastal communities. These narratives were linked to new ulama exposed to the international Islam ideology of radical scholars as Sayyid Qutb, Shaykh Ali Shee, Shaykh Nasoro Khamisi, Al-Farsy, Shaykh et al. (Chande, 2000).

A hypothetical study in Eastleigh Sharma and Rink (2018) sought to establish the Macro, Messo and Micro – level factors in religious radicalization while (Ali, 2018) research in six unnamed and unspecified private and public universities in Nairobi sought to establish why young Muslim girls/women were radicalized and recruited by Al-Shabaab and ISIS. As much as appreciable these studies left much space for scrutiny that the objectives of this research sought to address. By the fact that emerging studies were in their infancy stages and not necessarily and purely geared towards satisfying scholarly concerns but peripheral objectives this study sought to
engage the ideological and philosophical frameworks by which contemporary Islamic radicalization stands and defined itself from the stated objectives and paradigms of this study. Worse still was what Butale (2017) observed as a preoccupation with studies on radicalized women joining terror groups focusing on Western or European nations with scanty if any of such kind of research having been conducted on women from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that have been affected by recruitment into violent extremist groups. This partially augured well with the findings of Ali (2018) that observed the lack of studies on women recruitment in universities in Kenya yet her study confirmed knowledge from most respondents that they were aware of a number of youths who had been recruited.

Botha (2014) also confirmed the wanting nature of empirical research in Kenya on the reasons and processes of radicalization into Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Despite the scope of this study limiting itself to the stated objectives, the location and the history of Isiolo County had as well radicalization leanings based on (Pirio, 2007). A study in Botha (2018) conducted in Kenya, that is, Nairobi, Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale and Lamu in 2013 revealed the political socialization as a factor in radicalization. In that case, the social construction of reality was determined by early paternal or maternal influences, among other factors, which conditioned the individual to political, social and cultural processes in a society. In particular, the socialization processes in radicalization revealed that a family member, a parent or sibling, or even a relative or friend was aware of the sibling joining Al-Shabaab but mostly friends pushing statistics to 73% of those who informed another person of intent of joining and eventually joining Al-Shabaab as shown in Figure 2.2. It was concluded in this study that based on this in-depth interview with Al-Shabaab and associates the level of community secrecy in Kenya on radicalization was fact.

64
Notably, the radicalization of youths bargained for space with the moderate view of Islam. Eventually one view was expected to weigh on the other creating a situation where the impact of radicalization was either extremism taking the lead or the moderate view taking over to influence youths though contested by (Sperry, 2005). This scenario was yet to be observed in the ongoing scramble for the minds and hearts of youths. The changing dynamics in social construction of reality based on how families (parents) were aware or involved in radicalization of youths was apart from (Botha, 2018) ‘first generation’ of Al-Shabaab parents less involved was conspicuous and a cause for alarm. The scenario of parental knowledge of radicalized Muslim youths was less charged in the Kenyan case as compared to a portrait of a terrorist in (Pape, 2005) where a parent
celebrated a son participation in Hamas suicide bombing in Palestine. This was rare occasions where both male and female parents celebrated the death of their children in religio-political tussle between Palestinians and Israel.

In conclusion it was observed that literature on radicalization of Muslim youths in Isiolo County was nonexistent at mot was scanty, and often without research-based analysis. This was in tandem with studies that confirmed the need for research in African and Asian continents as observed by Dolnik (2013) to address the growing threat of radicalization. The literature reviewed that was linked to contemporary approaches in radicalization were as occurred in coastal parts of Kenya, Eastleigh hypothetical study on determinants of radicalization, Six unspecified universities and one other study in the northern corridor counties which were presumed to be insufficient to exhaustively address radicalization (Rink & Sharma, 2018; Botha, 2018; Ali, 2018). However, this study was conducted from an academic point of view as a contribution to this glaring knowledge gap.

Additionally, Pirio (2007) was adopted to exhaustive on peripheral objectives of this study based on his analysis of the Jihad concept on the Horn Africa countries up to and including the cells that were planted in Kenya, Somalia and Sudan besides fluidity of radicalization processes. His preoccupation with the former North Eastern Province (NEP) as an epicenter of radicalization cell networks included Isiolo County youths. Therefore, the influx of recruiters and terror activities as discussed affected the youths from Isiolo County directly through recruitment and indirectly through ideological orientations.
2.1.2 Radicalization as Extremism

On extremism Davies (2009) pointed out that it thrived with notions that there was one right answer, truth or path and no alternatives. She suggested a critical education which accepted multiple identities, truths and being at ease with conflicting views as a basis for harmony in society. On the contrary, many a mind had been conditioned to receive purported religious truths uncritically.

From the onset establishing the authenticity of sacred texts as the source of violent extremism remained an elusive objective. In fact, variants of textual interpretations also bred radicalization. An apologetic approach projected by GilChrist (1999) however authentic especially on historical developments of Qur’an and Uthman’s order to destroy Zaid’s codex, among others, to unify the Muslim community, remained valid on scholars to situate contemporary violence on such instances. In fact, Nehls (2016) based on Jalalu’d-Din a-Sayuti concept of Qur’an abrogated texts amounting to approximately 500 passages were seen to have affected Jihad, inheritance, the Qibla, retaliation in cases of crime, night prayers, punishment for adulteries…(Nehls, 2016, p.282). From this standpoint it was possible for scholars to curve out their interpretations and application of variant texts to suit religious, economic or even political goals. Perhaps mention of progressive scholars as Mahmud Muhammad Taha (in Sookhdeo, 2013) as laying emphasis on Meccan texts as opposed to Medinan texts represented how scholarly engagement with sacred texts presented an extremist and controversial stand on religious matters. This argument favored how radicalization aided violent or religious extremism.

In the recent past there occurred a departure from concentration from extremism to violent extremism as a factor in radicalization to violence. In fact violent radicalization had also emerged in religious terrorism study. By the difficulty in defining extremism, violent extremism
and violent radicalization (Bryans, 2016) based on a United Nations (UN) report and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325, (2015) argued for space for UN member states to devise own definitions within the international human rights law. Apart from the observation that the media had apportioned blame to Islam through terror groups as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda among others, the argument was on the fact that violence was not a preserve of one religion. The fact that Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism had perpetrated acts of violence left space for the question as to why violence in the name of Islam had taken global cognizance. Bryans (2016) risked populism discourse in failing to situate contemporary violence to centuries of philosophizing of extremism in Islam.

The terms radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism defied common definition in scholarly work. The relationship that existed between these concepts made their use erroneously interchangeable. An approach that pointed out both a relationship and a demarcation was one that saw an individual’s justification of violence from ideological goal to be one who had gone through a process of radicalization, with violent extremism itself representing an ideology and terrorism as the act of violence in order to achieve the goal of that ideology (Strieghar, 2015).

Lugo (2010) on religion and public life presented a survey of 19 nations of SSA indicating that religious conflict was a concern both to Muslims and Christians. Even Muslims were concerned about Muslim extremism than Christian extremism with only four countries being concerned about Christian extremism than Muslim extremism. Slightly over 40% of 17 out of 19 countries were concerned of religious extremism especially in countries with high Muslim population. In Ghana, South Africa and Zambia, there was an exceptional concern over Christian extremism than Muslim extremism. It was also noted that Muslims were seen to support terror groups like Al-Qaeda, et al. A minority of slightly above 20% of these countries rationalize violence against
civilians in defense of their faith or religion. The link between ethnicity and religious conflicts amongst these nations was as well pronounced. These scenarios explained how the staircase model (Goede and Simons, 2012) of radicalization affected a small group of extremist as discussed in the figure below.

Figure 2.3 explained how radicalization processes were broad based at the bottom of the pyramid involving chunks of populations in the society that were aggrieved either by socioeconomic or political factors in the country. The process towards gaining relief involved identifying with extremist groups or radical groups that promised to meet their aspirations. In the process the pyramid narrows up to few recruits willing to sacrifice as radicalization took effect in their lives. Eventually at the top of the pyramid occurred religious terrorism or violent extremists.

Figure 2.3

*Staircase Model of Radicalization*

Adopted from Goede & Simons, 2012, p.322
Perhaps Bryans (2016) buttressing the prominence of four steps theory on violence that emanated from radicalization as a) pre-radicalization b) identification c) indoctrination d) action was necessary in radicalization to violence studies. There was an agreement in this study to the extent that these stages were distinct and intermittent but the point of departure was that extremism in this study also included processes in addition to steps or stages.

By extension radicalization as extremism also took a political route where alteration of mental processes caused change in attitudes, beliefs, feelings and behavior. This was the case where most problems encountered by Muslims globally had been blamed on America and the West. Kean et al. (n.d) observed a preoccupation by the likes of Qutb, a presumed philosopher of Islam, and a predecessor of Osama bin Laden’s ideas with religio-political perspectives whereby America was presumed to have attacked Islam and causing conflicts in the Muslim world, apart from being presumed as a ‘Jahiliyah’ system of government.

America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thus Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when Russians fight with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri Muslims, and when the Philippine government fights ethnic Muslims in the southern Islands. America is also held responsible for the government of Muslim countries, derided by Al-Qaeda as “your agents….” These charges found a ready audience among millions of Arabs and Muslims angry at the United States because of issues ranging from Iraq to Palestine to America’s support for their countries’ repressive regimes (Kean, n.d, p.51)
The Al-Qaeda network resentment on America’s policies and interference with Middle East affairs became an attack both on the US civilization and culture. It was more of a response to the political dominance in the façade on values and morals that the jihadists claimed to address but which was understandable in the premise of a Semitic faith tradition that blurred the line between the sacred and secular. Specifically, the religio-political approach that combines politics, economics and cultural issues may not be taken to be new to any Semitic religious tradition, Islam included.

McCauley (2004) confirmed that individual anger, insult and frustration rarely accounted for violence especially from the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on Twin Towers. Eventually, a consideration of group processes influenced personal choices as political characteristics of Islamist agenda. IHT/Pew poll also confirmed that US – foreign policy and support of perceived authoritarian and corrupt Muslim governments promoted more radicalization including 9/11 thereby made Islamic fundamentalist Mosques seek the ouster of perceived US puppet governments in the Arab world. This recent political leanings and interpretations shifted the argument from individual characteristics to group processes in the global Jihad incidents and violent acts. Aspects of individual anger, insult and frustration remained valid for deprivation theory arguments in the contexts of the Palestinian suicide terrorists.

Additionally, McCauley (2004) on the traits of Palestinian terrorists to be young, male, poor, and uneducated and the probability of these characteristics on the suitability for violent radicalization confirmed the political, economic and social characteristics in the radicalization milieu. However, the switch on radicalization discourse from unprivileged status for terrorist candidature occurred in the recent past as radicalization studies established that recruits emanated from all statuses of society.
The indicators of radicalization amongst youths were clear based on four studies commissioned by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Smith (2018) proved the indoctrinating nature and how Islamic radicalization can be used by Jihadists/Islamists to wedge violence in the United States. A series of overlapping and interlocutory research by the four bodies commissioned for the task of determining US youth social and behavioral processes into violence shade more light on the profiles of recruits.

The projects from universities as University of Massachusetts Lowell, Indiana State University, University of Arkansas and the Studies on Terrorist and Responses to Terrorism (START) sampled homegrown terrorism offenders who were either alone or group actors in extremist violence. By widening the survey of the sample over long periods of time it was possible to locate the ideology and motivations for terror activities.

In Table 2.1 the National Institute of Justice sponsored research on four projects whereby the teams sought to establish the risk factors and indicators to terrorism. Though the projects relied on open-source data and therefore with possibilities of overlap in analysis it was also agreeable that the process of radicalization was complex and often in terms of individual motivations and characteristics, group processes involved, the periods and personal history, that is, individual experiences.

Eventually, the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment, Consultative Version 2 (VERA 2) tool was seen necessary to supplement already existing tools for assessment on radicalization and terrorism. In the interest to this study the four areas assessed by the VERA 2 including beliefs and attitudes; content and intent; history and capability and commitment and motivation informed anchored the inquiry. In fact, based on Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) a groundbreaking of Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United
States (PIRUS) was a phenomenon on risk assessment and indicator assessment necessary in grounding radicalization studies. The ideologies which inspired these extremists were varied and some were inspired by terror network philosophy as in the table below.

Table 2.1

*Characteristics of U.S-Based Extremists*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Team</th>
<th>Lone Actors/ Group Actors</th>
<th>Ideologies Embraced</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Massachusetts Lowell</td>
<td>Lone Actors</td>
<td>Varied</td>
<td>This project included all 71 individuals who engaged in ideologically inspired violence in the U.S. in support of a broader group but who acted alone. The time period covered is from 1990 to 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana State/Victoria University</td>
<td>Lone Actors</td>
<td>Varied</td>
<td>This project includes all 98 individuals who engaged in terrorism but acted alone, did not belong to a group, and were not directed by others. The time period covered is from 1940 to 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Varied</td>
<td>This project randomly sampled 1,475 individuals from the larger population that met its inclusion criteria. It is the only project that also includes extremists who did not engage in any illegal extremist activity. The time period covered is from 1965 to 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Arkansas</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Varied</td>
<td>This project includes 1,373 individuals indicted for terrorism or terrorism – related activities in the U.S. federal court between 1980 and 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated by Smith, 2018, p.5 in Table 2.1 the group processes, individual processes and ideologies produced a variety of results. As some were radicalized into terrorism there were also those who never participated in violent acts. Therefore the characteristics of a radicalized person or youth were seen to be in the cognitive or at times behavioral level as well.
The role Global *Jihad* Movement explained the impact of *Salafi* ideology in radicalization of youths. Often the vision of the Global *Jihad* Movement (GJM) was understood by the scholars and leaders of terror groups but hardly conceived by recruits. The difficulty existed in establishing the Islamic background of youths involved in religious extremism as indicated below:

As a movement, the global *Salafi jihad* has a strategic religious agenda with the ultimate goal of recreating past Muslim glory…the establishment of a true Islamic state…whereas the global *Jihad* has a strategic religious aim, the backgrounds of the people who join *jihad* is not as clear-cut…not all *Salafi* Muslims support the global *jihad*… [But] a minority among *Salafists* (Silke, 2008, p.110)

The practice of *Jihad* as a political ideology attracted individuals from diverse backgrounds. The participants have been proven to come from a variety of backgrounds including economic, cultural, religious political and so on. Ideally the concept of a Muslim youth as used in this study in radicalization processes was aligned beyond the ordinary usage to include the youths whose minds have been altered to embrace political perspectives of Islam including *salafi* ideology. Additionally, Islamic radicalization was therefore the use of a twisted religious ideology to fight the lesser *Jihad* which had political undertones as opposed to the greater *Jihad* which were piety based.

An historical overview of the *Qur’an*, *hadiths* and *Sunnah* positioned the *Salafi* ideology of global *Jihad* by extremists. The claim by extremists on recovering the faith practices of the Islam
explained the presence of violence today. The dogmatic reinterpretation of texts promoted animosity against the perceived infidel West and allies.

In Springer et al (2009) Islam from its inception provided the vocabulary that supported political ideas and also integrated politics and religion. Such vocabulary provided a fertile ground for radical non-ules to agitate for change in the name of seeking justice, reform and social change. Islam also forcefully reinforced identity and in the Muslim world where religion shaped politics, economics and sociocultural settings the radical groups were forces to reckon with. This gave the rationale why the Middle East regimes had faced challenges from Islamic States proponents leading to unrest in Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Iran as states with limited participation from populace and inhibited with corruption, an ideal that Islamists capitalize to create mass support

2.1.3 Islamic Doctrine and Teachings

The pillars under which Islam rested comprising of the al Khilafah (caliphate) headed by a caliph called Amir al-Mu’minin in Arabic meaning ‘Commander of the Faithful,” the umma which is the community of Muslim believers and Sharia law as the basis for Islamic jurisprudence, belief system and practice provided the philosophical frameworks for both religious identity and religious radicalization under which the Umayyads, Abbasids and Ottoman caliphates flourished. A revival of the golden age of Islam had seen extremist ideas bargaining for political space in contradistinction to modernity.

Springer et al (2009) observed recent Jihadist conceptualization of the caliphate to involve a borderless Umma aimed at the recovery of the traditional system of Islamic belief system and practice all over the world. The global Jihad targeted uniting the umma all over the world to
deny the *jahiliyyah*, that is, ignorance of God or pagan society which was said to undermine the practice of Islam. Therefore, in a structured manner extremist organizations popularly known and led especially by Al-Qaeda narratives had established jihadist fronts presumably based on Islamic *Shura* or advisory council to combat the secular society (Figure 2.5).

Based on a critical analysis of the operations of the supreme consultative body the *Shura*, Roshash (2013) argued that no one, nor family nor monarch should impose himself or claim the right to head an Islamic state or caliphate apart from the deliberations of the *Shura*’s consultative nature and the intents of its founders in Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore, it followed that the strength by Islamic radicals against Islamic regimes which inclined themselves to repressiveness or associated with Western model of democracy found explanation in the intents of Islamic governing or consultative council, the *shura*, by default. Further, it was admissible that a recovery of the *shura*’s vision and ideology had been radically imposed by Islamists or jihadists to agitate for political change and violence both in Islamic lands and the world over.

A consideration of previous concepts of caliphate and how they thrived in the past perhaps work in contradistinction to the modern times. The dynamics, the times and presumed golden era of Islam in establishing the aforementioned caliphates or even a global *umma* in contemporary era was almost unimaginable. As much as *da‘wah* or outreach concerns of *tabligh* movements remained essential aspect of the Islamic faith and practice and a necessary component of religious propagation much was to be seen on global *umma* aspirations.

From an Islamic scholarly perspective Subh (2000) questioned the concept of Caliphate based on a critique of the book entitled *Caliphate* by Us amah At-Tugbi on his credentials and competence in coining a Pan-Muslim caliphate. Apart from the misrepresentation that such an approach gave to the global Islamic community and further undermining its propagation the place of a caliphate
that resembled the glorious moments of Islam and the nature of such a caliphate was utopian in the current society. The principles that paved the way for Islamic outreach concerns was based on the concept of a modern mind of a caliphate as articulated on two documents on Islamic constitution. The first document from the recommendations of the Eighth Congress of Islamic Research Institute in Cairo Dhul Qi ‘dah 1397 A.H (Arabic Hijri) Calender., October 1977 and the second document was the International Islamic Council at Islamabad on 6 Rabi ‘ Al-Awal 1401 A.H (10 December 1983). The two models represented the contemporary and recommendable path that Islamic faith and practice sought to engage other than the extremists and the radical approaches from the global terror networks. The principles laid out in the two documents which can be taken to be seemingly progressive Islamic constitution and based on the Qur’anic principles may not be presumed to embrace democratic ideals of the global community but a starting point to dissuade violent extremism. Further, the context and need of a caliphate that represented Islam and its objectives in the secularized and postmodern world were issues that made uncomfortable the global human community.

By extension Salaf (predecessors) approach seeking replacement of regimes through radicalized youthful populations appeared to be counterproductive and disruptive to economic, sociocultural and political dimensions. In that case the scholar must engage on the possibility of conservative religious traditions and narratives to suit the times without undermining religious principles of a particular faith tradition. As to whether religious principles can be made relevant and progressive in the era of democracy was a debate for perennial scrutiny especially in the context of militant Islam.
Muslims have their own issues that have no hope without a caliphate. These are human rights; freedom; universal fraternity; women; Palestine; scientific and economic backwardness; ignorance; disease; class distinctions; absence of legal, political and social justice; mutual consultation (‘ashura); tribal and ethnic prejudice; and problems of education, culture and arts (Subh, 2000, p. 421).

In the recent years Osama bin Laden became a passionate figure in restoration of the Islamic golden era in reference to the Ottoman Empire the period that was terminated by Artatuk in 1924. Osama Bin Laden envisioned a rebirth of a caliphate. His statement after 9/11 attacks were self-explanatory of the Caliphate hope.

What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation [the Islamic world] has been tasting this humiliation and degradation for more than eighty years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked, and no one hears and no one heeds [Aljazeera TV, 2001 in Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff and Weine, 2014].

The passion towards a caliphate by Osama bin Laden and his contemporaries took a political angle. In reference to the ills that Islam faced in the democratic period became a radicalizing discourse against the Western governments led by the United States of America, her allies and the developing world partners. Islamic identity under the caliphate might experience insurmountable huddles in the sociopolitical frameworks of the postmodern world but as to the
ability of the Islamic state or caliphate narratives radicalizing youths remained an agenda that cannot be wished off.

The role played by Islamic schools of thought in the constitutional theory of Islamic faith and practice further explained the preservation of conservative nature of Islamic belief system and practices. More so, the office of the Emir or Sultan was subordinated to the authority of Imam in circumstantial situations but in theory the caliph and imam was meant to be the same person thereby integrating the political and the religious system together (Rosenthal, 2009).

A discussion on Islamic radicalization processes was not complete without pointing out the role played by extreme interpretation of Sharia law. The Taliban in Afghanistan became a prime example of entrenching sharia law yet recognized by countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Actually, most Islamic radicalization rested on the basis of the Qur’an and extreme interpretation and application of sharia law to all areas of life.

Men were required to wear beards and cover their heads. Women had to be completely covered in public by the burqa or be beaten with long sticks. They were not allowed to work, to take part in sports, to be educated in anything other than Islamic theology, and were married off at the earliest possible age, often by force. Television, computers, and all forms of music were banned and images, including photographs and dolls, were prohibited. Thieves had their hands cut off, adulterers were stoned to death, and rape (except within marriage) and murder punished by death. Obedience to the moral code was ensured by the religious police, an innovation for Afghanistan, apparently copied from Saudi Arabia (Calvert, 2010)
Apart from the extreme interpretation and application of Sharia law in every facet of Arabic life as a way to mainstream behavior its radicalizing nature occurred where a pretext was drawn on other cultures especially Western perceived to be corrupt and therefore be eliminated. Waging a global Jihad by terror networks emanating from Arabic cultures to entrench Islamic values and deter the cultural conquest from the West became the narrative used to influence the Arab volunteers (Mujahideen). Consequently, an argument that religious radicalization processes emanated from merging the political, economic, sociocultural and religious imperatives cannot be avoided. As religion became the basis for political theory all radicalization was a possibility. More so, when religion gave rationale to political decisions and social ills in the society radical clerics, ulama and separatists disseminate their radicalization narratives to youths.

The use of the Islamic scriptures to justify a political course where Islam was dominant only proved the debate of masterminding of the sacred texts in radicalizing the mind. As the clandestine groups flourish on one hand by use of misinterpreted texts to suit their course, the political Islamic brand on the other hand sought to participate in politics as well using the same texts. From this prism it was necessary to consider the catalyst role of religion in both approaches to Islamic radicalization processes.

A reading of Shorrosh (1988) as an apologetic piece on Ahmed Deedat pointed to the direction of radicalization of concepts and texts. On Jihad, and apart from some sects as the early Kharjites glorifying the concept of Jihad to a six pillar of Islam, Khomeini, the ruler of Iran was cited preaching “the purest joy in Islam is to kill and be killed for Allah” (Shorrosh 1988, p.35). This phrase, among many others, was used by many al Jihad groups to cause violence globally.

Subh (2000) arguing from a defense of Islam perspective suggested that the Salafi practice and conservative attitude was responsible for the stagnation of Islamic civilization over the centuries.
pitting it against Western democratic ideals. The Salafist promoted the reading of the Qur’an alone and emphasized practices as cutting mustache and allowing Jilbab, that is, beards to grow, among others at the expense of studying other sciences set Arab faith and traditions at a stagnation mode as opposed to the progressive cultures especially of the West. But other than the salifist ideology textual reinterpretation and application created sharp divisions among some sects as Kharijites and Rafidites.

The selective reading of texts and misapplication he argued does not represent what salafī doctrine was meant to represent. The texts on Jihad and hatred/enmity projected to non-Muslims were misconstrued and misapplied and does not express what ancestors and the four rightly guided caliphs stood for. Therefore, the salafī doctrine as agitated for by extremists and global terror networks only promoted radicalization and misrepresented progressive aspect of Islamic faith and practice besides pitting populations against each other through the component of the lesser Jihad. Such texts read selectively and misconstrued have promoted the radical Jihad ideology as in Surat Al-taubah, 36 quoted below

“And fight the unbelievers all together even as they fight you all together, and know that Allah is with those who are pious” (Subh, 2000)

The vulnerabilities and likeliness of grassroots network Islamists being recruited resulted from ignorance on issues Islam and Saikal (2003) reported that the bulk of ordinary Muslims including the Taliban made decisions based on manipulated 9/11 narratives and the global plight of the Muslim community. Eventually radicalization based on Islamism of whatever brand was a reservoir to which youths drew and accepted to be recruited of course with accompanying
incentives from informed and judgmental Islamists and neo – fundamentalists all over the globe. The philosophical aspect of radicalization which was entrenched in political Islam was a preserve of the leaders and cell commanders. Bryans (2016) reinforced the idea of ignorance of new converts on Islamic faith as an aspect used by radicalizers in prison to “impress a distorted version of theology” to recent converts including perpetration of violent religious ideology on these novice(s) through misinformation and textual misinterpretations.

2.2 History of Religious Radicalization

Apart from taking radicalization discourse pitting most religious traditions to as far as 2000 – year history as enshrined in the Encyclopedia of World Terrorism (1997) the aspect that favored this research came partly from the past religious conflicts and mostly from the emergence of Islamist extremist trend. The violent religious traditions that had conquest and territory acquisition characteristics as Jewish zealots, Hindus thuggee and Muslim assassins of the past centuries besides being representative of religious-based violence with political objectives but which hardly locate the Islamist extremist agenda of recent times as a unique category. Traditionally, the conflicts that have pitted the Christian faith and Islamic practice over the years still bred animosity amongst these faith traditions. The crusades and counter-crusade conquests reflect how the Muslim community and Christians alike have a point of reference in terms of the use of religion to advance economic, political and sociocultural roles over the years. These religious dark past easily fueled radical ideas against faiths especially when the motivation was to stir acrimony and violence. A relapse into the past was a revisionist agenda and a periodization of history that was seen retrogressive from modernity standards.
The emergence of the religious extremism in the 1970s which was applied to political violence emanating from clandestine social movements especially from the Middle East was landmark in the history of radicalization and violence. Bhatt (2007) and the Encyclopedia of World terrorism Volume 1 represented works that had diagnosed the shift from politically instigated violence to religious based violence from 1990s. Notably the term radicalization as related to religious radicalization processes was popularized by the media between 2003 and 2007 mostly to explain the radicalization processes after 9/11 attack on World Trade Centre, Madrid and London bombings.

The use of historical and contemporary grievances from European colonization and post-1945 American domination as responsible for the underdevelopment and seeming backwardness politically, socially, economically and the cultural decay in the Arab world was to be considered contextually and cautiously. However, that the radical Islamists had successfully exploited these issues, among others, to promote Jihad in the charisma and philosophy of the likes of Sayyed Qutb, Bin Laden, and Ayatollah Khomeini and Hassan Abdullahi al-Turabi cannot be gainsaid. The neo-fundamentalist Islamist coalesced around a religious authority for ideological purposes. According to Bhatt (2007) and Charles (2005), Bruce Hoffman’s recent study, placed the emergence of religious terrorism to 1980s and had since grown in proportion. As from the 1990s to date religious imperative had become the most defining aspect of terrorism.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2000 Public Report stated that contemporary terrorism was motivated by Islamic religious extremism. At one point religious terrorists groups as Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad targeted Israel but the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York had made religious terrorism prominent. The climax was the 11th September 2001 that defined war on terror to be the pursuit of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. In Table 2.2 religious
terrorism had redefined its scope and therefore was more lethal than secular terrorism that was distinctive of its constituency and objectives.

**Table 2.2**

*Case Comparison on Religious versus Secular Terrorism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Quality of Violence</th>
<th>Scope of Violence</th>
<th>Constituency of Violence</th>
<th>Relationship to Existing System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Unconstrained scale of terrorist violence</td>
<td>Expansive target definition</td>
<td>Narrow, insular and isolated</td>
<td>Alienated “true believers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result: Unconstrained choice of weapons and tactics</td>
<td>Result: Indiscriminate use of violence</td>
<td>Result: No appeals to a broader audience</td>
<td>Result: Completely reconfigured social order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Constrained scale of terrorist violence</td>
<td>Focused target definition</td>
<td>Inclusive, for the championed group</td>
<td>Liberators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result: Relative constraint in choice of weapons and tactics</td>
<td>Result: Relative discrimination in use of violence</td>
<td>Result: Appeals to actual or potential supporters</td>
<td>Result: Restructured or rebuilt society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As presented by Martin, 2011, p.131, Table 2.2 clearly religious terrorism was meant to radicalize for the purposes of reconfiguration of the social order. This explained why violent religious extremism appealed to youths but also its lethality in terms of the vision to create Islamic state. The arguments given above presented an all-inclusive and objective scrutiny of contemporary violence. The complex boundaries that existed between radicalization, extremism and violent extremism, or terrorism in that case required situating the discourse as a religious engagement, in its current form. Particularly, there was no consensus on the definition of the
term terrorism. Scholars tend to differ on what it should stand for since the ruling regimes and factions, revolutionaries and clandestine groups have all in the past used terrorism to cause fear and panic to opponent groups.

The religious ideology from Islamic, Jewish and Hindu perspectives was prone to politicization. In particular and as concerns this study the Sharia-isation of Indonesia and Malaysia based on Davies (2009) in the recent years despite their previous multicultural history and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict issue not being a religious conflict but land, legitimacy, history and politics. The religious radicalization and indoctrination promoting extremism and violence in all religious traditions does not answer why Islamic fundamentalism is a threat today. In fact, as the Semitic religious traditions stand in their own class on merging the sacred and secular ideologies recent Islamic radicalization processes have cut a niche in global politics.

The antithesis of religious ideology in resource-based conflicts existed where the political, social and economic drivers as embraced by non-religious terrorists fall short of explaining the suicidal nature of religious extremists.

According to the Encyclopedia of World Terrorism (1997), during the assassination of Israel Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in November 1995 the Jewish extremist Yigal Amir was a religiously radicalized person. The statement from Amir that “I acted alone and on orders from God…” Sharpe (1997, p.210) suggested the self-radicalizing nature of religious ideology.

Initially, the concept of shura as enshrined in Islamic jurisprudence was meant to offer guidance on issues of the umma. In the context of Islamic radicalization the aforesaid concept still may play a crucial role in governing on matters of political, economic or social concern. In spite of Ollapally (2008) ranking global geopolitical identities slightly higher than the religious and ethnic identities in South Muslim Asia such a categorization does not necessarily eliminate shura
concerns from Islamic faith and practice. On the contrary the *umma* identity anchored itself in the geopolitical arena borrowing from the prophet and his close companions’ concept of *shura*, or consultation in the administration of an Islamic society.

Caliph Umar Ibn Khattab, like his predecessors, strictly observed *Shura* in his administration of the Islamic Caliphate. He used to frequently consult the companions on various issues pertaining to warfare, appointment of regional and state governors and allotment of the conquered land that had been annexed to the Islamic Caliphate in the course of war against, the then super powers and traditional enemies to the Muslims, the Persian and Roman Empires. Before his death, Caliph Umar constituted a six-man consultative committee…accordingly, the vote was cast in favor of Uthman, and was declared the third Caliph of the Islamic Caliphate (Roshash, 2013, pp.121-122)

From the 7th Century Islamic political idea merged both the secular and sacred as one and the same thing in what (Huntington, 2002) on one hand observed to be in contradistinction of the Western Christian separation doctrine of state and religion while (Gerges, 2007) on the other hand hardly noticed these distinctions between state and religion. The removal of Jihadist culture from religion to politics negated the argument that the Mosque in the Middle Eastern cultures represented what political activists were in the Western culture. In this discussion Islamists often thrived on controversial narratives including misplacing religion and politics by perceived experts. Often the populace favored jihadist narratives against renegade and perceived Western puppet governments. Often, analysts taking separation of state and religion and more so on
Islamic jurisprudence either lacked expertise on religion or were engaged in populations discourse analysis.

2.2.1 Religious Fundamentalism

Perhaps, the past violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims as the crusades and Islamic *Jihads* on one hand and the contemporary and controversial violence by Islamist Jihadist against the West on the other hand represented a resurgence of a historical religio-cultural conflict. In that case the former, that is, Christian-Muslim controversy of the past became the antecedent of the present, that is, political and cultural struggle between the West and the east. These onslaught(s) were religious and political in nature and the radicalization discourses of today cannot be taken to be anything new at least from a philosophical standpoint. In what George (2002) observed as a thin line that existed between Islamism or the general Arab culture on radical Islamic militancy that stood in sharp contrast to Western values and hegemony it was impossible if not a struggle to delink the past from present occurrences especially as Judeo-Christian traditions and recent Islamic revival movements competition for political and cultural space.

Islamic radicalization involving non-state actors discussed as extremists or jihadists stood in contradistinction with Islamic nationalist groups. Though the objectives were occasionally interlocked the Jihadist waged a political Islam agenda against autocratic regimes mostly in Islamic countries where as Pan-Islamic nationalists fronted a global *jihad* perspective. But striking a balance between extremists and nationalists was often complex. An example would be how global terror networks operated in a clandestine manner while the political movements as
Hezbollah even wielded political seats in the Palestinian parliament as a distinct group using religious claims in national politics (Gerges, 2002).

Figure 2.4 was adapted and edited from Schmid Typology of Terrorism (Post, 2005) since it suited this study. There were two types of terrorism that were not included in this figure which were unnecessary for analysis of radicalization process. From the aforementioned figure religious fundamentalism and extremism flows from political terrorism. However, this represented arguments that promoted the primacy of politics over religion analysis.

**Figure 2.4**

_Schmid Typology of Terrorism (Adapted and modified)_

In Post, 2005, p.54 Figure 2.4 clearly indicated that neo-fundamentalism and emergence of new religious groups had a direct link to political reasons. This argued against pathological and criminological theories of terrorism and thereby domiciled radicalization discourse in politics.
Terror organizations claim their legitimacy by presenting narratives against regimes injustices. The varieties of such terror organizations were motivated by a combination of political, religious or organizational factors in order to foster identity. Arguing from suicide attacks Merari (2005) explored the historical periods that nationalists, separatists, socialist, ethnic and Islamic radicals had been radicalized to cause violence (Table 2.2)

The pull and push factors, that is, personal grievances and identity issues have been known to promote radicalization processes. The upbringing of children determined the future engagements with radicalization narratives. Post (2011) established the nexus between parent-child relationships and how their parents either supported or did not support a certain regime with the creation of social revolutionary terrorists who sought to overthrow the regime on one hand and nationalists-separatists who promoted the preservation the status quo. Osama bin Laden was a social revolutionary terrorist who rebelled against his family which was beneficiary of regime and sought to overthrow Saudi government, the corrupt and secular world led by the US and Great Britain.

The context of parent-child relationship, regime-parent relationship and child-regime relationship showed that social revolutionary terrorists and Nationalist-separatist terrorism was a by-product of such relationship and systemic dissatisfaction. Social revolutionary terrorists aimed at overthrowing the regime and Nationalist-Separatists terrorists seek to preserve the status quo. Individuals who were loyal to their parents and whose parents were loyal to the regime never attained to terrorist status. Right-wing extremists, who broke from the relationship with their parents and charted a new behavior towards terrorist inclinations, were exceptionally distinct.
Table 2.3

*Generational Pathways to Terrorism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parents’ Relationship to the Regime</th>
<th>Loyal</th>
<th>Disloyal Damage Dissident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youths’ Relationship to parents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>National-Separatist Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disloyal</td>
<td>Social Revolutionary Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 2.3 as presented in Post, 2011, p.113, nationalist-separatists loyal to their parents who were disloyal to the regime tended to follow their parents and grandparents. Osama bin Laden was a social revolutionary terrorist who criticized the Saudi government for allowing US military in Mecca and Medina. He was a rebel against his family which was a beneficiary of the ruling regime. He wanted an overthrow of corrupt and secular world led by the US and Great Britain.

In fact, Botha (2018) study confirmed how the first generation failure in political socialization was the reason for the siblings joining Al-Shabaab. This was the Kenyan case scenario which stood in contrast to Osama bin laden political socialization. The place of deprivation theory in the Kenyan case was partly the reason for this scenario. Therefore, Table 2.3 represented the dynamics on parenting styles and its relationship to the production of what type of terrorism at any given time and place.

Vertigans (2009) distinguished militant movements that were motivated by the religious ideology for the preservation and perpetration of their Islamic identity. These included the Kashmir, Myanmar, Filipino, Uzbekistan, and Indonesia among others. In contrast the non–state actor radicalization was in addition to being propelled by the same religious ideology differed in terms of strategy and tactics. Similarly these groups were inspired by entrenching their Islamic ideology in politics as a means to counter a secularizing world but violent
extremists were preoccupied with a particular target and in most cases had to do with American hegemony. The point of divergence between Islamic militant movements in the Islamic world and extremist networks was on the interpretation of *Jihad*.

From the outset fundamentalist Islam maintained that motivations to violence were caused by both religion and politics since in Islamic jurisprudence there was no distinction between sacred and secular orders. Theologians are also jurists. Huntington (2002) presented the concept of clash of civilization to explain cultural contestations between the Middle East and the West especially the Afghanistan and Iraq invasion by Americans. The narrative of religion to support political violence that was fought for occupied territory by foreigners or infidels became relevant for jihadists. However, Moghaddam league of scholars contested Robert Pape’s league of scholars’ view that it was religious insight but not liberation of occupied territory that promoted violence.

The life of Osama Bin Laden had been suggested as a causal priority in the primacy of religion over politics thesis in radicalization process and suicide bombings (Brym, 2008). *Salafi-Jihadi* ideology is a violent off-shoot of *Salafi* doctrine which sought not only to return Islam to its former jurisprudence and practices as by the predecessors but also relieve the faith from domination from *jahiliyya* regimes. *Salafi*-doctrine to an extent supported Al-Qaeda’s attitude of violence against the Western democratic ideals which were seen to be corrupt and stifling Islamic practices but mostly Muslims residing in Islamic countries and regimes in the Middle East that were inclined to Western brand of democracy. According to Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff and Weine (2014) Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s second in command, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Ayatollah Fadlallah represented supporters of *Salafi-Jihad* doctrine for an Islamic caliphate that was to save the *umma*, safeguard its rights, freedoms and
restore Islamic renaissance. The *Salafi-Jihadis* are said to be a small but very lethal group of radical extremists that invoked even suicide to achieve its objectives.

Al-Shabaab, as a militant group had an objective to overthrow internationally backed government in Somalia so as to attain the global *jihad* agenda and vision of the global Islamic caliphate. Therefore, Al-Shabaab supported and shared the ideology of other radical extremists (Migue et al., 2014). Its link with the global *jihad* agenda puts it in the same platform with Al-Qaeda networks and informed how the two groups have closely cooperated both in ideology and operations to stage attacks in East Africa. The concept of *Salafism*, which is, the practice of Islamic faith as was practiced by ancestors was a religious dogmatism which gave the Somali fighter at home or in foreign lands an Islamic Identity. The objective of forging a war front against enemies of Islam anywhere at any given time was a shared goal amongst adherents of violent religious extremism. The clan dynamics which evaded most scholarly work influenced operations of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and elsewhere.

Hansen (2009) and Huntington (2002) cited religion to be responsible for creating radicalization discourse and cited the effect of the Iranian Revolution and Afghan wars as rallying point for the situation in Somalia using religion to foster political discourse which gradually created Al-Shabaab on one hand and fostered anti-Western attitudes on the other hand. Thus the role of Islam with vocabulary that promoted social justice and the use of religious ideology to politicize existential issues as poverty, suffering, insecurity and injustices cannot avoid scrutiny. In a nutshell, the relevance of Al-Shabaab terror group, as in any part of the Muslim world, was attributable to resurgence of religion in Somalia where all forms of governance systems failed and religious leaders came to prominence by filling the political and governance vacuum in the country.
2.2.2 Violent Religious Extremism

Further, policy-based definitions meant to Countering Violent Extremism as provided by (Stiegher, 2015) supported the idea of radicalization as a process of altering beliefs from mainstream to overtly inclined tendencies to promote ideological, religious, political or social changes. But Schmid (2013) argued that apart from being a process radicalization was also an ideological socialization mostly of the youths to cause violence to opponents for political reasons. The limitations of the US-based post 9/11 analysis of the complex issue of extremism as widespread through South Asia was attributed to the absence of theoretical and historical content to address the complexities of in politics and history of the region. Ollapally (2008) confirmed and argued for the issue of ethno-religious and political identities as the basis for violent extremism in South Asia and of course with international politics at play.

The definition of religious radicalization processes in this study meant the use of an extremist Islamic ideological socialization as fronted by a global religious agenda to alter the mind, feelings, attitudes and behaviors of youths towards adopting extremist views that promote violence. By extension Rink and Sharma (2018) supported an approach towards religious radicalization from a Kenyan context study as an inclination to defend one’s belief system against perceived hostile outsider group members of other faiths. This was in tandem with the rise of global militant jihad ideology which sought to score political goals through religious narratives. It was argued here that the definitions emanating from policy orientations tend promote more radicalization and terrorism as the narratives of “Us” verses “Them” are propagated by extremists to their advantage.

Martin (2011) and Springer et al. (2009) on violent religious ideology inherent radical Islamic scholars of the 13th century and beyond only was necessary in as far as locating violent religious
extremism was concerned. For the avoidance of religious prejudice it must be noted that religious fanatics have existed throughout human history across religious traditions and therefore contemporary Islam on violence was only a factor based on a theologized, philosophized and internationalization of violent religious extremism. As much as the religious ideology bred charged feelings on encroachment to Islamic moral values by the West the divide that existed amongst Muslims on use of violence in advancement of Allah’s cause cannot be downplayed in Islamic radicalization processes. White (2008) underscored how theological motivations created an atmosphere to justify violence by claiming protection of religious values, self-determination and nationalist ideals.

How Islamists have penetrated the globe and held society at hostage invited the question: what made the Jihadi radicalization potent and appealing to the masses? Notably, the answer to such a question required a probing of historical developments of violent religious groups. Even though, the ideological or philosophical argument on the part of Islamism as the first recourse remained convincing yet not conclusive in determining the global distribution of religious terror networks which left space for further inquiry. As much as Kean et al (n.d) provided information on UBL and his Al-Qaeda network as a global Jihad mission, it was also agreeable that his presence in Sudan by support from Hassan al Turabi partly explained the cells and groups that came to exist in most parts of the world up to and including in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The global Jihad ideology and the ingenious of Islamists also partly explained the penetration of Islamic radicalization to the global context. The recruits in countries with networks interlinked with global networks to spread Islamic Jihad.
Al-Qaeda’s objective stood distinct in its bylaws with the holy war being the main preoccupation. This objective made the terror group lethal in its design. Initially, charities and relief or operating under the cover of NGOs Islamist movements were used by extremist and terrorist organizations. Later, Al-Qaeda terror group came to perceive engagement in social services as a distraction from the main concern, the global jihad (Springer et al., 2009 & Pirio, 2007).

Osama Bin Laden declared the West to be a jahiliyyah, that is, ignorant of God. The defining aspect of most terror groups was the promotion of a pan-Islamic agenda by political ideologies achievable through dogmatism and religious piety against the West. The global salafi agenda of a caliphate as championed by Al-Qaeda network required a philosophizing of its objectives. Figure 2.5 was an organizational structure that underpinned the group’s philosophy and operations.
In Figure 2.5 as adopted from Shane, 2009, p.102, the mission and objectives of Al-Qaeda were distinct. The concept of Shura had been redefined to support an organizational structure similar to conventional leadership and command with operational capabilities. From this prism it was conceivable why the violent religious ideology presented a kind of indomitable face.

The idea of a caliphate that was purely governed by Sharia law was the foundation by which Islamic practice as advance by terrorists rested. By this understanding Osama Bin Laden radically reinterpreted Islam by introducing Jahiliyah concept and a Jihad to defeat infidels led by America and her allies. The philosophy of Al-Qaeda presumed that Islamic ideology was
undermined by foreigners and the perpetual secularization of society was to be combated by faithful Muslims anywhere at any given time and place.

Amongst the radicalization networking process a discussion on Al-Shabaab as a terror group, an insurgency and a radicalization agency was chosen for several reasons. First, its proximity and impact on radicalization of youths in East Africa made suitability for scrutiny. Second and most importantly, as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda it gained scope and ideological philosophy. More so, Al-Qaeda’s credence on crafting and importing a global Jihad ideology to most parts of the world including creating a philosophy that embedded other groups as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Al Qaida in the Maghrib, among others, made it necessary to study religious radicalization of either terror group as representative of others. However, though the international ideology counted in fanning religious networks local factors were also at play. The study considered the diaspora and international networks of radicalization of the Al-Shabaab terror group.

Islamic radicalization had so far succeeded to an extent in creating two fronts of religious terrorism that was the Islamic nationalistic movements as the Hamas, PFLP, Chechen rebels on one hand and global Jihadist agenda groups as Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Al-Qaeda and its networks on the other hand. The former is domestic in nature and the latter pursued the establishment of global caliphates and Islamic States.

Rosenthal (2009) discussed the nationalist and Jihadist agenda of these terror groups based on their domestic and international incidents. In table 2.4 nationalist movements as Hamas and PFLP terror attacks ranked high in percentage as compared to Jemmah Islamiya and Al-Qaeda terror incidents which rank high internationally in relation to domestic incidents.
Table 2.4

Nationalistic and Jihadist Agenda of Terror Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Domestic Incidents</th>
<th>International Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechen (RSMB)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Islamiya</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As adopted from Rosenthal, 2007, p.62, religious extremist violence had a growing global imperative in regard to violence. The violent scope in the international scene was conspicuous.

According to Hansen (2013), Al Shaabab was classified as a terrorist group by countries as the United States in 2008, Australia in 2009, the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada and the United Nations (UN) Resolution 1844, and organizations as EU’s (European Union) EC 356/2010 directive. In most cases the global implications of its activities were felt globally. The diaspora support, its link with Al-Qaeda, suicide bombings and tactics, training and indoctrination cells and camps, Jihadist worldview, among others, were the parameters that defined the group and therefore qualification for such classification. The terror group had inflicted harm especially in East Africa to individuals, hotels, universities and military installations, among others.

Al-Shabaab’s philosophy emanated from its global affiliate group Al – Qaeda. However, its local dynamics including its clan struggles and historicity of Somalia as a kind of pariah state fed into
strengthening of the Jihadist ideology in Somalia. The religious radicalization process of Somali youths included Al-Shabaab’s ability to weave global narratives as Islamism and anti-West governments’ involvement in domestic politics. In short, the religious ideology was able to crystalize fighters and foster identity and hope to Somali youths.

Hansen (2013) pointed out the complex Islamic radicalization process amongst ethnic Somali youths. Apart from existential issues he identified the Salafi-Jihadism, that is, a conservative and traditional way of life and warfare in defense of beliefs and practices of the umma, as the key defining factor in radicalization. The concept of Takfīr, which meant the declaring of a fellow member of the umma an infidel, also featured in his analysis of Islamic radicalization in Somalia. Radicalized Somali youths in Minnesota have been identified to have come and fought alongside the ranks of Al-Shabaab basing their motivations to humiliation of Somalis globally and invasion by Ethiopia in 2006. The role of clan dynamics, presence of foreign fighters and connections to Al-Qaeda in radicalization in Somalia have often been neglected and downplayed by writers on the Somalia Islamic radicalization processes.

In an interview with Kamal el-Said Habib, a former terrorist and a renown Islamists responsible for political violence in Egypt who perpetuated the top down reformation of society (Gerges, 2007) introduced the journey that Jihadists can take in search of identity, restorations of Islamic values and political engagements with perceived infidels in authority pitting Al-Shabaab, that is, youth with Muslim governments deemed to support Western cultural values and brand of democracy. His role in assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt for the support of Western ideals and failure to implement sharia law represented the political leanings that Islamic radicalization had taken in the past and in the recent years. As earlier intimated on broad or political radicalization processes (Clarke, 2004) pointing out the expulsion of Osama been Laden
from the Middle to Africa puts the genesis of Al-Qaeda as an extremist and terrorist movement that planted and exported the violent Jihadist ideology to most parts of the world where Muslims appeared a minority and subjected to suffering.

The 9/11 bombing of the twin towers by Jihadists perhaps introduced an aspect of radicalization into the lesser *Jihad* in the global arena. Upon reflection on the development of theology and ideology about the spread of Islam through the sword seemed to be perpetrated by neo-kharijites a revival of kharijite militant sect that pursued to purify religion through execution of perceived *shirk* or apostates.

Corduan (2012) cited Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terror group to be informed by Wahhabi-Qutb ideology which sought to entrench global Islam and bargain for political space for the practice of Islam. These radical ideologists clearly have an emphasis on an aspect of *Jihad* that promoted violence as opposed to adherents seeking to promote the greater *Jihad* as a non-violent brand. It was noted that violence by extremists can only be downplayed for global detrimental results. Bin Laden had been critical to Saudi prince on American presence in the holy land and calling for action from devout Muslims

If he has betrayed the first and the two Qiblas (directions to face in prayer) and the third holiest mosque [the Al – Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem], and thus aborted the cause of an entire nation [Palestine] motivated by the lust for power, there is nothing surprising about that. After all, he betrayed the two holy mosques [Mecca and Medina] before when he allowed the Americans to violate the land of the two holy mosques. He did that through the lie, which he and his brothers told the nation; namely, the need to enlist the help of the Americans for a period of three
months only. But, that period has extended to this day, in which we enter the 13\textsuperscript{th} year of the violation of the land of the two holy mosques by the infidels (Corduan, 2012, p.158)

In the United States, the National Consortium for the Study and Responses to Terrorism (START) in tandem with the U.S department of Homeland Security recounted the death of 3,140 American deaths between September 11 attacks and 31 December 2015. These deaths were linked to radicalization and American response to Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 and the growing anti-Western tendencies from Islamists (Miller & Jensen, 2016). The post 9/11 effects on the growth of terrorist related activities and the rise of homegrown terrorism found explanation in Islamic radicalization.

Modern day religious violence had become more sophisticated both in ideology and weaponry. Aggressive militancy driven by religious zeal from Islamism complicated religious extremism in our day. Additionally, the desire to create a caliphate had proven to be the big picture in the entire matrix of religious warfare today. Technology and globalization also promoted radicalization into religious extremism.

Karagiannis (2012) observed that few scholars attempted to handle the issue of Jihadi converts, that is, those who were involved in what had come to be termed as violent radicalization whereby the converts eventually undertook terrorist activities. Though a considerable probing into the general area of jihad converts can be sparsely cited the unpublished data impedes scholarly analysis thereby inviting perpetual scrutiny. In the aftermath of 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2001 also referred to as 9/11, 33 converts were arrested linked to jihadi activities in the European Union countries and Switzerland accounting for 5\% of jihadi terrorists. These converts were
purely inspired by their religious inclinations as opposed to any other motivation. At least 48 European converts were linked to *jihadi* activities in 10 European countries between 1990 and 2010 as indicated in table 2.5 below.

**Table 2.5**

*European Jihadi Converts*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>N – 48</th>
<th>Estimated number of converts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12,000-100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5 from Karagiannis, 2012, p.104 showed the linkage(s) between conversion, radicalization and *Jihadi* terrorism. Despite the fact that the figures seemed minimal the amount of havoc caused on human lives and property was significant. The figures presented were only
illustrative since conversion in a secular society as the West which had been predominantly Christian for centuries moved away from traditional and conventional worldviews. In that case the practice of Islam in these countries can be hard and thus conversion can be highly secretive and religious practices done undercover.

In fact, Bryans (2016) also confirmed the prison environment to play a role in conversion and radicalization of inmates. A prime example in radicalization was the prisoners at Mogadishu central prison in Somalia where Al-Shabaab leaders weighed in and converted and radicalized youths to become Al-Shabaab members. In fact, the circumstances surrounding prison favored and promoted inmate radicalization even in Lebanese prison system. The consensus that existed between conversion and jihadi terrorism was that not all conversion led to violence.

We had one (terrorist) prisoner who was a top-end proselytizer...He’d get someone vulnerable...and offer him protection and support through religion. He’d build a rapport over a long period...and then from that, influence his idea of what it means to be a Muslim...recruiting in the yard...urging people to join the fight in Afghanistan (Rose, 2012)

Al-Qaeda had sought collaboration with other radical groups globally. The thread that tied these religious radicalization groups together was their commitment to the global Jihad agenda. The global jihad agenda of most Islamist movement revolved around a common theme of perpetual struggle against perceived enemies of the umma. This is a shared philosophy by the radicals, sympathizers and supporters of global Jihad for a Caliphate.
2.2.3 Nexus between Islam and Fundamentalism

Davies (2009) considered that religion was not the root cause of extremism and terrorism but also submitted that it had been used by global terrorist organizations for recruitment agenda. His perspective perceived that the cause of extremism and terrorism was power and control where fundamentalists have used religion in their struggle with democratic regimes seen to be repressive and domineering. Statistics show that whether in the US, UK, Israel, Chechnya or Sri Lanka, terrorists agitate for withdrawal of military forces from their homeland. It had been established that stronger religious convictions breeds less tolerance to people with other persuasions.

In Martin and Barzegar (2010) Sayyid Qutb was credited by Western writers in the phrases as the “philosopher of terror,” the “Marx of global Jihad” and an “ideologue of Islamism” in the wake the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the events of September 2001. From these analogies it was evident that the nexus between violent religious ideology and fundamentalism was undeniable. But Sayyid Qutb represented the recent philosophizing of violence and obviously not the originator of violent ideology in Islam.

The grounded theory of Silbner and Bhatt (as cited in Schmid, 2013) helps in locating the centrality of religion in discussions of religious radicalization processes. The study for New York Police Department (NYPD) explained the stages of radicalization all of which involved the place of Salafi Islam in radicalization processes. The place religion played in radicalization was a divisive area with both proponents and opponents in the debate. Often religion played a major role in Muslim dominant countries though in that case religion never was the only factor. According to this view, jihadi militants have been said to embrace a twisted ideology of Islam that was based on misinterpretation of religious texts. The countries that forged counter
radicalization programs as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Singapore among others perceived the Jihadists to be a deceived lot that had been fooled by false interpretation of Islam (Vidino, 2014).

Further, in order to understand the locus and the current state of violent radicalization that emanated from religious undertones it was necessary to consider a kind of paradigm shift from politics to religion as the focus of local and political engagement. Therefore, cognizance of the fact that religious extremism replaced political radicalism in the last decades of the 20th century became necessary in contemporary radicalization. To that effect and specifically, contemporary religious radicalization represented the shift of focus from political radicalism to Islamic radicalism (Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, 1997).

Haberfeld and Hasell (2009) also observed a resurgence of new religious extremism in the 20th century as a result of merging radical religious ideas and political Islam in the Middle East aiming at a caliphate or pure Islamic states. A Sunni Islamist movement group that claimed to restore caliphates, Al-Qaeda, was begun by Osama Bin Laden (UBL) in 1988. His claims revolved around anti-US foreign policy, modernization, secularism, military occupation of Saudi and parts of Holy land, and so on. He argued that the US undermined Islamic ideology and practice of religion. Therefore he formed a formidable force against the US and her allies, also referred to as infidels, with the 9/11 attacks being a shock to the world. His organizational structure comprises of all the segments that forms a conventional fighting force in defense of Islam (Figure 2.5).

The emergence of Islamist violence as compared to violence(s) of previous secular and domestic religious-based extremist groups made it necessary to consider left-wing and right-wing terrorist
groups. Often the characteristics of these groups were overlapping such that aspects of Jihadist violence shared either with secular or religious extremist groups.

Smith and Damphouse (1998) comparative analysis of the ideological basis, economic views, base of operations, tactical approach and targets of US left-wing and right-wing terrorists though not directly linked to Jihadist approaches but highlighted necessary characteristics as shown in Global terror networks in Jihadist perspective often employ same focus in their operations and engagement with perceived enemies except that their ideology was based on religious narratives (Table 2.6). The Jihadist ideology was anchored on theological basis or doctrine to support economic views against the West while their base of operations was global urban areas. They also operated in underground cells and groups targeting capitalist government interest. In addition and in the specific interest of this study, Smith and Damphouse (1998) reported on such characteristics as terrorists being youth (18-35 years), predominantly male, of middle to upper social class status and also well educated.
Table 2.6

*Characteristics of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Terrorist Groups in the U.S*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF GROUP</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTIC</th>
<th>LEFT-WING</th>
<th>RIGHT-WING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political focus; primarily Marxism</td>
<td>Religious focus; ties to Christian Identity Movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Views</td>
<td>Procommunist/socialist; belief in Marxist maxim “receive according to one’s need”</td>
<td>Strongly anticommunist; belief in protestant work ethic; distributive justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base of operations</td>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Approach</td>
<td>Cellular structure; use of safe houses</td>
<td>National networking; camps and compounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>For funding: prefer armored truck robbery</td>
<td>For funding: prefer armored truck robbery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorist (symbolic) targets: seats of capitalism or government buildings</td>
<td>Terrorist (symbolic) targets: federal law enforcement agencies or opposing racial or religious groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from Smith & Damphouse, 1998, p.140

Supporting views from Tahiri (2013) the events of September 11 and London 7/7 bombings had perpetuated the notions amongst Australian Muslims and non-Muslims as elsewhere that Islam had been linked to radicalization, extremism and terrorism. The global preferences of such
Islamic-linked narratives were yet to be settled by research findings. Often the place of Islam in radicalization was a controversial and divisive issue with both proponents and opponents. The claim that Islam had been hijacked by religious terrorists in George (2002) based on a mediaeval Muslim scholar Al Ghazali explained how religious radicalization was a Jihadist agenda as opposed to entire Islam as a religion. The fundamentalist nature of extremist ideology on the lesser Jihad explained violent extremism. From an outsider perspective the challenge became on how to draw a line between Islamists and moderates. As much as such a distinction was necessary between the moderates and religious terrorists in an analysis of radicalization narratives again much remained to be understood within populations especially when it comes to striking a balance or treading the thin line that existed between radicals and moderates in Islamic faith and practice. The doubt was caused by conflicting narratives and bargain for ideological space by the two extremes in Islamic faith and practice. The discussion on Islamic radicalization processes must situate the two extremes, that is, the violent extremists on one hand and the Islamic moderates on the other hand.

The modern face of Islamic fundamentalism, that is, Islamism continued to engage the world with contemporary violence. Of more concern was the way the extremists exert pressure on Islamic governments seen to entrench moderate approach and practice of Islam as regards the West and allies. The debate of extremists claiming that their position on Jihad was genuine and the moderates’ governments as renegades represented the conflicts emanating from Islamic community. The democratic principles presumed to represent Christianity were seen to be a dualism as opposed to the Islamic monistic culture on matters politics and religion.
2.3 Islamic Radicalization as a Process
Before any meaningful engagement with radicalized Muslim youths can emerge a critical analysis of what Islamic radicalization entailed had to occur. Eventually such conceptualization led to a possible profiling method on individual, collective and group processes that influenced youth behavior. Therefore, in order to trace conceptual frameworks under which religious radicalization was founded one was to consult the structure of Islamic religious and political system besides the physical and mental characteristics that were deemed to be covertly pro-radicalization amongst some pockets of human populations who tend to be volatile in nature.

By definition religious radicalization in this study aligned with Schmid (2013) model which considered radicalization as the process of socialization of youths into violence for political or religious goals. The process analysis-approach had been established and agreeable among scholars. In that case, radicalization became the process of winning the minds and hearts, especially of youths into extremist narratives through a reinterpretation concept of Islam thereby assigning relevance to violence as a religious duty.

The term Islamic radicalization as employed in this work connoted the twisted aspect of Islam yet contested by (Sperry, 2005) but mostly considered by outsiders and moderates as a manipulation of religion. It had been contended that terrorism may not be the end result of radicalization but the pinnacle of it. It was argued that it was difficult to study radicalization separately without examining religious extremism and terrorism since they are overlapping events and processes (Schmid, 2013).

Based on Schmid (2013) radicalization theorists as Sprinzak, Moghadam, McCauley and Moskalenko, Silbner and Bhatt have considered the different approaches to the concept of radicalization processes. The tendency had been to present radicalization as a process that may
take some individual’s to extremism and yet radicalize some only at the cognitive level and not the behavioral level. The apex of radicalization often involving suicide bombers or violence belonged to the behavioral level which was quite minimal in most studies. The grounded theory of Silber and Bhatt conducted for New York Police Department squarely fitted into the study of religious radicalization processes since it considers the effect of Jihadi-Salafi Islam in the radicalization process.

Mugambi (1996) lecture notes on construction of reality though removed from the mainstay of this study highlighted few items on religion as a social construction tool. Therefore it was necessary to define the use of the word ‘processes’ based on social construction theories as a means to discuss and curve out a working definition of radicalization processes and eventually Islamic radicalization processes. In that case, processes were seen to be social constructions and the religious nature espoused hereby was persuasive as those social constructions were interrogated in the premise of Islamic theological and philosophical orientations espoused by violent extremists. From this perspective it was possible to discover the main processes of Islamic radicalization. The procedures and methods to lure youths into violent religious networks occurred at the cognitive level but occasionally at the behavioral level.

In concurrence with Mulcahy et al. (2013) a certain degree of radicalism and radicalization was not always negative unless it became disruptive and destructive to the established societal order. Since the end result of radicalization was only conceived at the behavioral level, that is, when a bomb goes off, group level radicalization depended on altering individual mental processes as an initial process. Arguably, cognitive radicalization was the initial process and violent extremism was part and parcel of a complex psychological, socioeconomic and political processes. In that
regard a process was the journey made by innocent Muslim towards adopting a radical religious, political, social and economic ideas that rejected the status quo interpretations and worldviews.

### 2.3.1 Struggle for Cultural Identity

Ollapally (2008) recounted that the presence of jihadists was extending from Afghanistan to Pakistan and from Sri Lanka to Bangladesh as resonating with the American post 9/11 analysis thereby indicating the need for context-based analysis. The 9/11 attacks reinforced the religio-cultural identity issues. It also affirmed Huntington’s clash of civilization theory since the Al-Qaeda based jihadists attacked the heart a world cultural and economic center. The anti-Western argument that encroachment by the West on Muslim affairs, land and value systems fitted into Islamist extremist agenda and therefore a clash between cultures or civilization (Huntington, 2002).

The struggle was also seen through the 9/11 attackers 15 of 19 were from Saudi Arabia and wealthy which shifted the previous debate anchored on deprivation/poverty to cultural identity premise (Saikal, 2003). Further, probing inter-civilizational issues on religious extremism and political issues as the reason behind World Trade Centre was necessary to comprehend issues of the contemporary identity struggle between liberal Western versus conservative Islamic culture of the Arab world.

Karagiannis (2012) observed that European converts to Islam had a hand in terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and the 2010 Moscow metro bombings. Therefore, the estimates of native Europeans embracing Islam caused a proliferation of books covering European conversion to Islam (Appendix vii). Converts involved the process whereby a person gave up one perspective or worldview for another which often included changing group, membership and
religious identity. In that case the use of the word convert and new Muslim were identical and interchangeable in the studies of European converts. Further, inter-faith, also called total converts were the ones who changed from one religion to another and also show greater interest and involvement which was the case of some of those who changed from Christianity to Islam. Often the critics of Huntington theory on clash of civilizations promoted nationalistic ideals of the Muslim society. However, as much as these ideals celebrated the defeat of Taliban on one hand these religious extremists claimed to represent a minority that was passionate to preserve a religious culture. As much as the clash of civilization theory may not answer the ultimate presence of religious violence exhaustively anywhere it represented an objective view as to why jihadists embark on a revisionist stance that sought to reinvent Islamic golden era against Western influence. Therefore, the discussion on radicalization considered the profiling criterion of violent extremists, the moderates and the possibility of progressiveness in facing modernizing tendencies. Further the radicalization discourse also domiciled itself on a perpetual and contextual scrutiny either to reinforce popular debate that was pro-Huntington theory on the presence of Jihadists or introduce new paradigms to understand youth radicalization. In other words what Huntington (2002) claimed to be cultural antagonisms in the view of this study were defined and comprehended through contemporary religious radicalization and the attendant violence in the struggle for unique cultural identities.

Often a mixture of individual and group radicalization processes can work together in some instances. Springer et al (2009) considered Quintan Wiktorowicz studies on al-Muhajiroun movement’s structured and intensive socialization processes. The key element in the socialization processes was the formation of religious lessons and study groups to condition the individual to fully embrace Islam. The ultimate goal was to entrench the Muslim identity after
which the candidate may be recruited as a potential fighter, logistical asset, investigative or intelligence gathering asset. In fact, friends and social connections only work when there was a predisposition towards joining an extremist group.

The politicization of religion ideology concerning existential issues, that is, struggle for resources, had successfully been used for radicalizing and indoctrination of youths. In this respect religion had been used to spur religious identity which was essential for radicalization. As individuals were made to belief that it was their faith that was under attack they pledged their loyalties to such religious overtones and authorities. This fostered perpetual conflict amongst faith groups.

Rahnema (2008) explained the most recent events from geopolitical perspectives that have pitted two competing cultures against each other. On one hand the West had been accused of fighting the war on terror from a blanket cover perspective that Islam was the source of today’s evil with a Christian right and crusade mentality projecting its head again in global politics. On the other hand Islamic revivalism rode on perceived atrocities and domination from the Western culture which threatened Islamic practice globally to be an appealing narrative to segments or whole populations of an aggrieved Muslim community. The competing scenarios were backed by ideologues from both extremes resulting in a kind of Huntington’s clash of civilizations debate bargaining for space with both proponents and opponents. Perhaps the recent past debate fronted by S-P movement complicated the war on terror from cultural war perspectives which blamed the U.S hegemony to be responsible for global Al-Qaeda terrorism (O’Reilly, 2006).

Based on McCauley and Moskalenko’s theory of mechanisms religious radicalization processes took after the three pathways and levels of radicalization (Table 2.6). In this study, the individual religious radicalization processes involved a youth identifying with religious ideology as a self-
introduced apprentice or a one-on-one while group radicalization involved two or more Islamist recruiters indoctrination the youth and thirdly mass religious radicalization involved radical narratives projected to populations so as to create a base for recruitment purposes. Therefore, the concept of religious radicalization processes involved the use of religion so as to fill the void created by sociocultural, economic and political injustices in the society. In that case, religion catalyzed the process by giving reason and identity to Muslim youths. In conclusion religious radicalization process was a complex one whereby some youths were radicalized at the cognitive level while others journeyed all the way to behavioral level, which was, becoming a mujahideens or holy warriors.

Striking the balance between antagonisms of conservative Islam and the West was also evident in the way violence was widespread even in Muslim dominated lands. The sectarian violence that existed between Sunni Arab insurgents, Al-Qaeda jihadists and Shiite militias in Iraq as portrayed by Baker and Hamilton (2006) represented the complex nature of political radicalization in contrast to the global Jihad agenda of religious extremists. The case of Iraq explained the struggle for cultural identity which often pitted the Arab world against United States and allies as the common enemy but also explained intra-conflicts and competing interests between Sunni insurgents, Shia militias and Al-Qaeda Jihadists. Arnove (2006) as well observed scenarios where Islam in Muslim dominated lands produced several sectarian interests as the Sunni Arab insurgency on one hand and the shias militancy on the other hand notwithstanding the violent religious extremist agenda of global Jihad as espoused by Al-Qaeda and affiliates.
2.3.2 Psychological Trauma

The only consensus that existed in definition of radicalization was that it was a process. It involved a change effected on feelings, attitudes, worldview and behavior over a period of time towards agitation for social or political change in society. Based on Mulcahy et al. (2013) view radicalization was a process that sought to effect political and religious change through violence. Further studies on Pakistan youth radicalism after 9/11 affirmed that the term radicalization was amorphous and could mean different things to different people (Yusuf, 2014).

A special report in 2008 by the European Commission’s Expert Group on violent radicalization while observing the complex process of radicalization engaged on cognitive radicalization and violent radicalization as possible pathways of individualized radicalization process. The emphasis on psychological processes more than sociological in radicalization was evident in the report. The report downplayed environmental factors which were also necessary in radicalization. It must be noted here that overemphasis on personal factors which concentrated on psychological issues other than sociological factors only confirmed the approaches that different players gave the subject of radicalization. However, it was understandable since the report sought to explain radicalization on European Muslims based on an array of personal factors as the search for identity, anger, discrimination and relative economic deprivation. Often both cognitive and violent radicalization were concerned with disrupting and replacing the status quo or the mainstream societal order seen to be in sharp contrast to religious ideals of extremists (Vidino, 2014).

The staircase model Lopez and Pasic (2018) of radicalization suggested that before some youths, for example, decided to engage in violence, there were always deep-seated trauma based on identity, feelings of isolation and discrimination. As these feelings were fueled by a jihadist
ideology the youths gradually move to the level of expression and venting anger. Eventually, few of these youths may choose to engage in violence on their own behalf or representing the group’s interest.

In Figure 2.6 the recent and emerging approach to radicalization dubbed as “violent radicalization” or “radicalization leading to violence” studies by the Council of Europe considered the trajectories that European youth took in becoming violent to immigrants and refugees. The paths taken were not uniform thus complex processes and motivations were depicted on violent radicalization.

The staircase presented by Lopez and Pasic (2018) represented the steps to and fro that different youths took but an affirmation that committing violent acts as a result of forming radical beliefs cannot be said to obvious since some youths could disengage in the process of moving up or down the staircase model. The model also gave rationale as to why disillusioned youths could be seduced into violence as recourse to personal frustrations and fixing social order. Recruitment into a violent group occurred at the fourth floor where the model presented what had been termed as secret-intra socialization and promotion of dichotomous thinking of “Us against them” or an isolationist mind.
As adopted from Lopez & Pasic, 2018, p.24, figure 2.6 explained the factors involved before a person was a fully fledged victim of radicalization. The “Us versus Them” syndrome from the perspective of this study was seen to be achievable only through perpetual persuasion and sustained indoctrination processes.

The personality resonance, psychological factors and a complexity of reasons evaded scholarly scrutiny despite a consensus on the absence of pathological implications as a characteristic or motivator for radicalization. The argument on the selective inclusion of psychopaths for merciless tasks of terrorism in McCauley (as cited in Stout 2004) and which was based on the psychopaths’ characteristics of moral blindness only confirmed the fact that terror organizations hardly and rarely included recruits with psychological problems within their ranks. Therefore,
the state driven narrative on criminological implications of terrorism presented a lacuna and latitude for radicalizers to operate in production of more terrorists. From this prism, criminological and delinquency theories of the past have yet to augur well with the emerged concept of Islamic radicalization of the contemporary times.

In Agnew and Brezina (2012) religion did not always inhibit delinquency in adolescents since there were other factors that shaped youth behavior. The relationship between religion and delinquency in their argument was said to be conditioned by what they termed as ‘third variables’ which included the social environment of the adolescent. To the extent that radicalization was to be discussed in the context of these criminological approaches to behavior was an academic and intellectual dishonesty especially in this study.

Khashan (2003) discussion on an empirical research conducted on 342 Southern Palestinian refugees in the summer of 2002 was a case in point in understanding the psychological effects of religious radicalization. Having experienced long periods of civil war South Lebanon became a sanctuary of extreme religious ideas which promoted violence. The findings showed that political Islamic teaching increased a disposition toward suicide attacks by 63.47%, damaged self-concept intensified a disposition towards suicide attacks by 64%, lack of trust 61.57%, and optimism 67.65% among others. Poverty strongly influenced disposition toward suicide bombings and disposition towards violence was also a function of age. The findings of the study indicated that there was a pattern in suicide attacks caused by variables as political Islam, poverty, frustration, among others.

Mulcahy et al. (2013) on Social Movement Theory (SMT) considered the role of identity in fostering group cohesion towards a desired objective or goal. Having been applied to social science studies the theory had yet to be applied to radicalization processes. Aspects of
dissatisfaction with social structure on governance or distribution of rewards, shared beliefs and opinions of a significant portion of the population and strained environmental conditions, among others, which were applicable to SMT was yet to test existential factors on religious radicalization processes.

Due to complexity in drawing generalization as to the motivations of those who engage in religious violence aspects of a terrorist mindset were examinable. The individual and group motivations vary considerably. The solo crusaders who were motivated by philosophies against governments included Theodore Kaczynski and Timothy McVeigh (Haberfel & Hasell, 2009). Though it was impossible to profile and generalize the thought processes of lone extremists it was obvious that there was a desire to belong to a group or movement that defended a common cause. Despite Stout (2004) exertion that lone wolf terrorists could possibly have psychopathological leanings for their acts examining the differences in motivations between lone wolf terrorists and religiously radicalized suicide bombers in the Middle East was a necessity so as to distinguish individual processes from group processes.

….there are certain aspects of the terrorist mindset that can be examined. These include: the reasons for joining a terrorist movement; the relationship between individuals within a terrorist movement; the strength of terrorists’ beliefs; how the developing psychology of a terrorist group affects the way terrorists operate; and how terrorists justify their acts….A terrorist group offers members a counterculture, with its own norms and values into which it indoctrinates new recruits. (Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, pp.244 & 247)
Terrorists’ acts were presumed to be justifiable to the group but seen from the outside as cowardly and criminal, especially from political class. Often the cowardice or even criminal classification of extremist acts especially denied an opportunity to understand terrorist’s mindsets and thus undermine engagement of religious extremists from a constructive perspective. As Napoleoni (2003) cited the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ approach from the view that terrorism was a crime to a war complicated objective analysis thereof yet the interrogation of individual and group processes that conferred self-esteem and worth to the human person were seen to inform both lone actors’ activities and extremist networks that this research proved.

In the prison environment individuals experience crisis and trauma thereby weakening their judgment which led to being vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization. Mulcahy et al. (2013) reported that 80% of conversions to Islam in 2003 occurred in the US prisons as an adaptation to the new environment. Therefore the Transformative Learning Theory (TLT) stated how inmates go through a crisis called Transformative trigger in the new prison environment after which he or she faced a distortion for lack of making meaning of new environment thus reaching a point of critical reflection. The critical reflection point introduced alternatives as turning to religion as a coping mechanism and radical extremists used this for radicalization and recruitment (Mulcahy et al., 2013).

Bryans (2016) on the Mogadishu central prison identified vulnerabilities, emotional strain, chronic stress based on what he termed as ‘harsh prison environment’ and threats from inmate Al-Shabaab leaders to recruit youth and weak inmates. These kinds of environments were example of how psychological trauma experienced weakened the resolve to abstain from radicalization.
Post (2005) suggested that there was no single psychological motivation for terrorists. The reason behind this came from the fact that there were myriad of terrorist organizations with unique motivations and philosophies. He thus endorsed the term terrorist psychologies when discussing motivations. Adoption and modification of Schmid’s typology to explain terrorists’ organizations as presented in Figure 2.4 cannot be overemphasized in the training process. Schmid (2013) blamed the growth of radicalization on dissatisfaction with regimes and systems of governance thereby eliciting a staged process of radicalization. Sprinzak (as cited in McCauley, 2004) suggested an apocalyptic, slow and gradual process that any individual can follow, called a trajectory to terrorism of three stages including first, a crisis of confidence involving disillusionment in political systems, second, a conflict of legitimacy where political systems were seen to be entirely corrupt and finally a crisis of legitimacy where the political system was demonized, dehumanized and targeted for violence.

It was imperative to note that religious radicalization processes thrived based on economic, political and social inequalities in a society. Aggrieved parties tended to identify with alternative ideologies that resonated with their aspirations. The fault lines that existed between governance issues as marginalization, disenfranchisements, unequal distribution of strategic resources as education, infrastructure and other developmental issues promoted radicalization. The process of wooing youths through narratives by radical Islamists and jurists occurred at locations as the home, the Mosque, the internet, the school, terror cells inter alia.

2.3.3 Factors and Methods of Religious Radicalization

The factors and methods of religious radicalization in Islam tradition followed the path of entrenching a religious identity on one hand and the process of brotherhoods on the other hand.
Vikor (2001) and Lewis (1994) analyzed the issue of brotherhoods in Africa and in Somalia respectively. In that case the factors of Islamic radicalization in this section probed the specific factors and methods that were unique and which aligned with formations of identities through brotherhoods.

Bux (2007) considered the role played by myths in Muslim radicalization in the US and found factors as the war on Iraq to have contributed to the 7th July 2005 London bombings. He also argued on how policy influenced radicalization of Muslims youths in Britain and globally. Importantly, the complexities of the factors that cause radicalization into violent extremism and lack of a terrorist profiling criterion that had been successful so far made violent radicalization a subject of perennial scrutiny and debate. Establishing the causes, methods and impact of religious radicalization processes were necessary as renowned scholars of terrorism studies as Walter Laquer were hedging on upcoming radicalization discourses. The House of Commons in particular admitted how intelligence and security committee did not fully comprehend radicalization of British citizens and the complexity of the phenomenon.

Yilmaz (2009) observed how radicalization affected indigenous-born, native-speaking Muslims in Britain. Specifically, Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) radicalizing group’s philosophy on re-establishment of a caliphate had radicalized Muslim youths through Al-Khilafah publications, HT print media centre, leaflets and analysis of world events which were entirely anti-West and democracy. The use of religious facilities as Mosques and Madrassas for teaching youths on religious extremism had also been reported by the media in Kenya. Crack down of Mosques had been conducted to curb radicalization and recruitments through such venues and Methods
…some Mosques are centers of radical fundamentalist teaching. They attract likeminded people and persuade still others. For example, during the 1990s, the North Central London Mosque in Finsbury Park became infamous as the “Finsbury Park Mosque” due to the fact that a variety of militants, including individuals associated with al-Qaeda such as Richard Reid, attended services there led by its radical imam, Abu-Hamza al Mazri (Springer et al., 2009, p.10)

Closely linked to radicalization through Mosques and international organizations was the funding of terror network groups. The amount of cash stashed out by immigrants and *tabligh* movement to fund Islamic radicalization was huge with Osama Bin Laden having contributed huge sums of money for global *Jihad* pursuits.

According to Ali (2018), there was a growing concern and intention of recruitment and training of Kenyan female suicide bombers as from 2015 by especially Al-Shabaab and ISIS and such incidents of university female students recruitment was perpetuated partly by a desire to become *Jihadi* brides on their part but the citing of ideological manipulation and patriarchal system seemed to be the mainstay for these female recruitment. It must be noted here that the training processes involving the inclusion of female participants by the religious based terror groups were nothing new in the unfolding and ever mutating strategy of these terror groups. It was hereby held and affirmed that religious terrorism in the recent times had been perpetrated by an ideology or doctrine that got twisted to malign innocent and ignorant youths.

Based on Davies (2009) a study on suicide bombers by a Gaza community health project established that the motivations for such violence were experienced or witnessed trauma and a philosophy of revenge. The conflict that existed between the Palestinians and Israelis was based
on the fact that Al-Qaeda militants have declared war with the West and its allies. Islam had become the catalyst in the narrative that God sanctioned annihilation of Western political, economic and ideological systems.

Al-Qaeda organizational structure contained methods, tasks and responsibilities that were geared towards recruitment and training of youths. Recruitment methods varied from abduction, befriending, radical preaching by religious leaders, luring through monies, among others. Closely related with these methods of recruitment were agents of recruitment who included but not limited to peers, religious leaders, terror groups (cells), jihadists, teachers, trainers, committees, parents and charity organizations. The places where recruitment occurred were schools, homes, prison, mosque (Madrassa), internet and training camps. Above all the Al-Qaeda organizational structure was elaborate on the various tasks assigned to subcommittees. Shane (2009) indicated training subcommittee and camp administration subcommittee represented the movement’s method of radicalization of youths (Figure 2.5).

Al-Qaeda operatives have targeted foreign embassies as the US and Israeli in 1998 and 2002 respectively. The great number of casualties in East Africa, especially; Kenya and Tanzania have been the local populations and scores of foreigners affected (Haynes, 2005). However, after the perceived incursion of AMISOM forces to Somalia the operatives conducted successful campaigns against Ugandan, Burundi and Kenyan forces causing great mayhem. El Adde in Gedo region and Kulbiyoh attacks goes into Kenyan dark history in post independent era. The kidnappings of locals but especially foreigners from Canada, Pakistan, Norway, Spain, Britain and Cuba from Kenyan soil had been the recent impact of radicalization of youths. These occurrences were used to create narratives that promoted recruitment of youths into global extremist groups.
There was an overlap of methods whereby radicalization occurred before or after recruitment. This was possible in cases where youths were abducted and later subjected to Islamic radicalization in foreign lands or Islamist training camps. Abduction as a method of recruitment occurred where youths were duped and unwillingly transported to terror group networks. Maskaliunaite (2015) identified self-recruitment through the internet or friends as a method of joining extremism. In this brand of recruitment, often a charismatic leader played the role of coercing or motivating youths to join terror groups. Clarke (2004) blamed the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for hardly linking most global violence to UBL. This was in addition to a counterintelligence failure on clandestine and secrecy of Al-Qaeda as an organization that sought to restore theocratic models of governance in Islamic golden era, the caliphates.

By the virtue that the policy-based definitions are counter-radicalization based, the underlying causes of religious radicalization were often overlooked. Such lack of objectivity in conceptualizing radicalization processes made it difficult to tackle the problem of violent extremism exhaustively. Eventually, the counter-radicalization narratives meant to address Jihadists movements fail to address the mutating nature of terror ideology.

The study on Islamic radicalization considered through making a distinction between mainstream Islam and global Jihad networks. The difficulty of establishing the aforesaid distinction between moderate and violent brand of Islam based on the presence of a mass of sympathizers as observed in the pyramid theory cannot be gainsaid. To the end that an apocalyptic cause seemed to be the driving factor of Islamic violence had been established so far.

A study of the 9/11 four-page terror document by Makiya and Mneimneh (as cited in McCauley 2004) were indicative of the religious leanings and motivations of the attacks. The terrorists were not motivated by individual nor group frustrations but aloof factors as acting on a cause to please
God with the Qur’anic story of Ali Ibn Talib response after being spat upon by an infidel as an example on waiting upon sanctions from Allah before striking.

The Algerian case with Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) represented a case in point on how Islamists have capitalized on a typical state failure in support of youth welfare to play a key role in radicalization and recruitment of youths. Mostly, Jihad against what Goytisolo (2000) referred to as “corrupt leaders” and “Frenchified intellectuals” had become so appealing to youths as the only messianic hope provided by Islamists in Algeria. The narrative built around weak political systems was made to justify confrontation against the government.

Apart from Kenya and Somalia sharing the border an aspect that favored radicalization was based on physical and mental characteristics of both the Kenyan Somali youths and Somalis youths from Somalia. In addition lineages and clan relations also apply as a factor in radicalization. As much as the physical and mental characteristics of these two nationals do not necessarily point to radicalization and violence per se the unintended can possibly occur. Based on obscurantist nature that similar identities and characteristics can confer, militants can take advantage of that fact.

Lewis (1994) identified both physical and mental characteristics which by extension this study presumed to be covertly pro-radicalization. As much as the physical characteristics promotes insertion within a population of similar physical features without notice mental characteristics align with the Somali social structure identified by (Lewis, 1994) as agnatic in nature with no sense of public responsibility to report criminals or wayward members of ones kin. Often such paternal kinsman identity laid the fertile soil for underground radicalization without notice.

The recent change of tact to recruit and radicalize women/girls in higher institutions of learning based on a research by Ali (2018) also confirmed the complex nature of radicalization process
based on an interview of Zuena Yunis and Adams who were radicalizing a long love relationship lines. Often, the radicalization of women/girls took marital and patriarchal constructs in a conservative religious culture also enshrined in the prophet’s hadiths. The religious nature of radicalization of women included putting pressure on women to get married by a certain age as a means of gaining status in addition to security. This radicalization by the use of marriage incentive and pressure on women was coined from a reference to a hadith as indicated (Appendix ii).

The recruitment of women and supposedly subordinated status on religious matters played a key role that extremists take advantage of. Often, an easy route towards gaining the requirements of the faith including marriage and protection acted as an inducement. The holy warriors needed women to offer supportive roles as they engaged in combat. Therefore, women were a factor in radicalization.

Often extremists groups coalesced around combining religious, sociocultural, economic and political reasons to rationalize their zeal and objectives. Similar indoctrinating narratives from Al-Shabaab recently in political propaganda against the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) as an incursion force to Somalia have been used to create hard feelings amongst youths. Global religious networks have all interpreted the geopolitics of the contemporary society to fuel radicalization into extremism and terrorism. The separation of the sacred from secular, religious from irreligious, the church and state, and so on were seen as Western doctrine that did not befit the practice of Islam. Western scholars as orientalists and Arabists in the past neglected or rather failed to grasp Islamic studies as a religious culture and do not conform to standards of religious studies as Judaism and Christianity. Specifically, the idea of Islamism as a modern engagement was still elusive.
Perhaps the violent nature of Islamists in contemporary society can be understood based on integration of the secular and sacred order where the West had succeeded in portraying the dichotomy that existed between politics and religion. Bhatt (2007) attested to the fact of continual struggle by Salafiyya Islam through Jihad to purge society, the state and restore Islamic religious culture.

The concept of Jihad had been interpreted in a variety of ways both by moderate Muslims and religious extremists. The former emphasize it as a struggle to preserve one’s soul from passions and impurities of life and the latter promote religious violence and thus terrorism. This was often employed to pressurize and intimidate governments’ policies and action besides creating of purely religious states.

The religious ideology and indoctrination was responsible for radicalization networks that scaled to global proportions. Elu (2012) enlisted religious organizations acting on convictions from religious ideology to include Hamas, Taliban, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, Abu Nidal, Algeria’s Armed Resistance Group, and the Lord’s Resistance Army, among others. Williams (2016) also gave emphasis on religious ideology in conflict in Africa by considering religious groups in Nigeria, Algeria, Somalia, Central African Republic, Ugandan and Rwanda. These countries and groups involved in violence explained religious radicalization processes from a religious ideology background but also from political dimensions. Bhatt (2007) explained the religious contributions to radicalization as being embedded within the transcendental and theological demands further buttressing the mixture existing on religious and political aims before a radicalized youth commits a violent act.
Deckard and Jacobson (2015) represented the scholars who have sought to establish the link between poverty or even affluence in radicalization in the Western European communities. Though such connection can exist either on poverty or affluence the argument affirmed the complex nature of the studies of radicalization. The presence of religious ideology forcefully remained to play a pivotal role in radicalization since it explained otherworldly and abstract concerns of human life.

Ridell and Cotterell (2003) identified the nexus between radical religious groups and methods of recruitment and radicalization. These militant groups as al-Muhajiroun, Hizb al-Tahrir, Global Jihad Movement (GJM), Al-Qaeda networks, Hamas, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), among others radicalized and recruited youths through methods as issuing press statements, communiqués, gatherings and public rallies as the key methods of recruitment and radicalization. The use of cells as a method of radicalization was used by radical groups to recruit and train Muslim youths. Of great concern was where cells were exported to other parts of the world. Despite the Bush administration resolve to pursue Jihadists in his war on terror campaign Al-Qaeda network was elusive since it had established radicalization cells in some 60 (sixty) countries around the world (Saikal, 2003). The potency of cells came from their ability to breed homegrown terrorism in such respective countries.

In late 2001, al-Qaeda cells had been identified or were suspected in wide-ranging locations, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Uzbekaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia…Malaysia, the Philippines, Uruguay, Equador, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Radicalization through creation of cells all over the world was a recruitment method that resonated well with radical groups led by Al-Qaeda’s philosophy. The religious radical groups always existed in other parts of the Middle East but Al-Qaeda only popularized the global *jihad* agenda and thus its prominence. The internet sites for radicalization include but not limited to *Khilafah.com, azzam.com* and *www.qoqaz.co.za*. These sites propagated a violent religious ideology against the enemies of Islam led by the United States.

An example of radicalization through a parallel religious school system, *madrasas*, as opposed to government education system in Pakistan did prompt the need to work on curriculum in *madrasas* and register them with the state based on an accounts by (Riddell & Cotterell 2003; Lutz & Lutz, 2013). In the era of globalization, online communications remained one of the most effective tools for radicalization. The local Kenyan dailies in the recent past reported youths, including university students, nabbed by the police en route Libya after being radicalized through the internet. It also emerged that a student used schools fees to purchase air ticket.

The religious radicalization processes in this sense was supported by a command structure as indicated in Figure 2.5. Noteworthy, the command structure operated in clandestine manner that was not easily cracked down but ready to fulfill the radical *fatwa* declared by Osama Bin Laden in 1998 that Muslims all over the world should engage in killing and destroying Americans both civilian and military wherever they were found and as long as it was possible to liberate the holy Mosque Al aqsa and Mecca and restore religious order in the world (Shane, 2009). The command and cell structure comprising of intelligence component, military committee, financial
committee, media and propaganda committee established by Bin Laden and Azzam eventually made Bin Laden, companions and successors emirs. This strategy pointed to the fact that Islamists agenda had an ambition in world affairs other than Afghan Jihad (Kean, et al, n.d). Fiery Islamic preachers have made literature in soft copies and books that engaged in extremism to convert youths. Often information was disseminated through video dens and lone gadgets as laptops and computers to watch messages at home. Further, the attack on troops as occurred to AMISOM forces in Somali including the running over of KDF camp in El Adde Gedo region in Somalia produced propaganda material that Islamists used to campaign for their legitimacy and prowess. The agents were deployed to various cells to recruit fellow youths. Once a member was radicalized and recruited, he or she was encouraged to recruit other friends, colleagues and even family members on behalf of the terror group and so on.

The prison environment was had been seen to be conducive place for radicalization to take place. Its very nature of being secluded and isolated made individuals want to probe and do introspection in such an environment. Often Islamists used narratives of unjust regimes who craft laws to punish prisoners as a radicalizing narrative and recruitment stratagem (Lutz & Lutz, 2013). Aggrieved individuals in any background including the home, school, institutions, and the Mosque were targeted of radical extremists either by being identified or indoctrinated by one-on-one basis, the Internet, Television, cell groups and global networks. Thus the transformative learning theory (Mezirow, 1996) addressed the issues of identity-seeking and meaning in life as promoting vulnerability to the process of radicalization, recruitment and training indicative of McCauley and Moskalenko mechanisms and pathways to radicalization. The levels of radicalization especially effecting change were experienced at the individual level before influence from group factors.
The pyramid theory which formed the theoretical basis under which this study was conducted considered a wide range of areas but the psychological effect was a key factor in radicalization. In Table 2.7 it was conspicuous that grievances fueled the individual, group and mass levels of radicalization. In that case any method presented to the youths at any level of radicalization was potent in producing results, that is, recruitment. The table below explained what happened when an individual was personally victimized or through political grievance whereas complex identity and belongingness needs also played a role in radicalization.

### Table 2.7

*Mechanisms and Pathways to Violence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of radicalization</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 01 Individual           | 1. Personal victimization  
                          2. Political grievance  
                          3. Joining a radical group – the slippery slope  
                          4. joining a radical group – the power of love  
                          5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups |
| 02 Group                | 6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat  
                          7. Competition for the same base of support  
                          8. Competition with state power-condensation  
                          9. Within-group competition-fissioning |
| 03 Mass                 | 10. Jujitsu politics  
                          11. Hate  
                          12. Martyrdom |

Adopted from McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p.418
Radicalization proponents pursue political, religious or ideological goals as argued by Hoffman (as cited in Mulcahy et al., 2013). Figure 2.7 presented the dynamics of four models of recruitment and radicalization including a) The Net b) Funnel c) The Infection d) The Seed Crystal. This explained almost all the components of radicalization and recruitment which involved some members responding, others denying, still others exiting the group but a small number goes to cause violence.

**Figure 2.7**

*Four Models of Recruitment*

In Gerwehr & Daley (as cited in Mulcahy et al., 2013, p.9) the net pattern of radicalization in (a) represented a radicalization method where a homogenous group was approached with the same tool of radicalization as a book, video or message. The funnel method in (b) below involved increasing the level of content administered to recruits preferably a right motivation to recruits.
The infection method (c) involved inserting an agent in the target population to target dissatisfied members in the population. Finally, the seed crystal pattern (d) involved a case where accessing the target became difficult (Figure 2.7). Al-Qaeda espouses such models of recruitment in prison environment.

Cumulatively, radicalization of Muslim youths or communities took the dimension of claims of being marginalized, disenfranchised and discriminated upon by regimes in Africa, Asia, United Kingdom and elsewhere. The ability of radical clerics to weave their arguments around already existing sociopolitical, cultural and economic inequalities made radicalization of youths possible. This included the radicalization of the diaspora in the UK and elsewhere with second generation of Muslim youth’s denial to integrate into the democratic ideals of the Western society (Kaba, 2000; Chande, 2000). Perhaps the most lethal effect of radicalization was the importation, support and creation of radical Islamist militants and networks across global borders.

Emerson (1998) observation of the existence of radical Islamist militant groups in the U.S. with links and support bases from the Middle East was a case in point. These groups included Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Salvation Front, Islamic Liberation Party, Jamat Islamiya, Islamic Jihad, The Turkish Welfare Party and the Muslim Brotherhods yet these groups also established bases with both operational, support and funding Headquarters in the U.S. soil.

Global tensions and political systems that appeared to disenfranchise and marginalize youths coupled with personality factors as push and pull factors influenced youths in the long run. Further, beliefs, feelings and behaviors of ordinary peace-loving citizens got altered based on exposure to violent religious ideologies and acts. The apex of terrorists who were hidden in the population presented challenges, as the US bombing of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, Muammar Qaddafi’s missed target hitting civilians in Libya and probably the recent killing of an
Iran’s Army General Soleiman, among others, served as narratives that terrorist employed to strengthen the pyramid. Perhaps a discussion on recruitment cannot be over before considering the psychologies involved. McCauley (2004) considered these psychologies under the prism of the events of 9/11 into an appealing cause, comradeship, crisis and the slippery slope perspectives. Similarly, cults also isolated recruits to ensure bonding occurred. Underground terrorist groups also cut off an individual from social ties as family, co-workers and friends so as to submerge a recruit to the new group that fostered and caused a terrorist identity to emerge.

The recruitment involved the use of Islamic institutions, international religious extremist groups, literature and ICT enabled propaganda. Riddell and Cotterell (2003) attested to this fact by example of Britain’s al-Muhajiroun and Supporters of Sharia (SOS) movements which used radical preachers in Mosques, Madrasas, the internet and specialized radicalization websites, publications and financial support as modus operandi in religious radicalization processes.

The religious, economic and political factors prompted the emergence of Boko Haram. Injustices from the government neglecting masses, unemployment, corruption, poverty, among others had been blamed for causing insecurity. Boko Haram which stood distinctly as a religious terror group opposed to Western education influences and targeting Christians and churches had in the recent past interacted and embraced the global Jihad idea from Al-Qaeda terror group (Ugwu, 2015; Lutz & Lutz, 2013).

In Kenya, the MRC from time to time had threatened secession from the Kenyan republic because of perceived marginalization and discrimination by central government. Therefore, social and historical injustices often undermine democratic ideas of the nation and caused insecurities. When such narratives were projected to an already dissatisfied population of youth radicalization, recruitment and deployment took shape.
As much as Rink and Sharma (2018) sought to establish the determinants of radicalization in Kenya based on existing historical tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) had been accused of targeting and rounding up the Somali immigrants in Eastleigh and these kinds of acts had the potency in promoting religious radicalization. Often a balancing act between the security concerns of the state was difficult as the security apparatus were in a dilemma of choices since it was also impossible to locate victims in a community if that community became secretive and with agnatic characteristics. The issue of *mijadala*, the Kiswahili word for *street debates* also compounded radicalization and created space for religious tensions between Christian and Muslims to flourish.

### 2.3.4 Islamic Radicalization Processes

Radicalization as the process of altering mind processes through sociocultural, political and economic factors was occasioned by an ideological base that was based on religion. As the objective of such Islamic radicalization was training and deployment of youths based on Goede and Simon (2012); Neumann (2008) it was necessary to explore the Islamic nature of the processes involved. The place of the disciples of *sunni* and *shia* religious traditions, that is, sunni radicals and shia theologians perpetuated the revisionist *Jihad* and defensive *Jihad* respectively.

Qutb, Faraj, and Azzam, all radical Sunni Muslims, were important forebears of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Al-Qaeda. At the same time, radical Shia theologians were sketching the basis for defensive *jihad* as well. Notable was Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual mentor of Hezbollah, whose ingenious reinterpretation of the Qur’an provided the basis for suicide in the service of *Jihad*,
despite prohibition against suicide, which is quite explicit in the Qur’an (Ali & Post, 2008, p.621)

Consequently, religious radicalization process always involved unorthodox reinterpretation of religious texts to promote political, economic or sociocultural ends. Therefore, the dilemma that faced scholarship on radicalization was on how some youth psychological travel all the way into embracing the ideology of violent radicalization.

In that case, the argument would be that the first phase and processes of radicalization occurred at the individual level first before behavioral change occurs eventually leading to a youth joining a violent religious group. Further, the need for probing to produce enough literature to address what (Borum, 2011) claimed limited literature was needed to address the question as to why and how individuals move from mainstream religious or ideological beliefs and behaviors into violent extremism. However, consensus continued to gather momentum that radicalization as a process existed at the individual level, group level, and mass movement level. Noteworthy, Social Movement Theory of the 1940s or Strain Theory by sociologists hardly addressed radicalization process of the present age.

Based on Williams (2016) the absolutist, divisive and irrational nature of religious beliefs and practices explained why religion was a radicalizing agent in any given society. He also situated Islam to be the cause of most conflicts. He defined religion to involve beliefs, practices and experiences of the people and communities which coalesce around religious ideology but also effecting inner change or transformation. Eventually, the religious radicalization settled on the premise of altering the beliefs, feelings and practices of youths through a sustained exposure to indoctrinating ideologies and organizations which pursued to confer and affirm new identities on
the individual and community level over time. This explained why contemporary violence in Africa and elsewhere was commonplace.

Intellectual figures and laymen argued against the regime and declaration of a fatwa which portrays the ideological potency of Islamic Jihadist ideology. An apostate regime was defined by a lack of enforcing sharia law in governance and therefore merited a fatwa. Upon the declaration of a fatwa to an apostate ruler Jihad was justified but perhaps the invention of the idea of takfir, as the process of classification of the umma versus infidel reinforced and justified Jihad terms against corrupt regimes. The idea of takfir, meaning the process by which a fellow Muslim or state was declared to be an apostate had been advanced by radical Islamists and theologians.

Ibn-Taymiyyah was the first to issue a fatwa against Muslims when he declared that the Mongols….were apostates due to their failure to implement sharia law…

“when the enemy has entered an Islamic land…it is obligatory on those closest to the land to defend it…if with the Kuffar (unbelievers) there are pious people from the best of mankind and it is not possible to fight these Kuffar except by killing them, then they are to be killed as well.” This argument has been adopted by groups like Al-Qaeda (Springer et al., 2009, p.29).

Ibn-Taymiyyah represented radical clerics and laymen alike who had used Jihadist ideology to entrench the concept religious radicalization from an Islamic perspective. The successors of radical jihadist ideology including the presumed philosopher of terror Sayyid Qutb have all developed radicalization ideologies and global extremist organizations dedicated to the service of
Allah. Based on these facts the misconstrued approach to Islamic concepts as *fatwa*, *takfir* and *kuffar* were influential in altering beliefs, feelings and behaviors.

In the recent years there occurred a reinterpretation of the concept of defensive *Jihad* by some Muslim clergy and scholars targeting perceived enemies of Islam. As much as this was a clear departure from the conventional understanding of *Jihad* in Islamic jurisprudence the parameters and the scope widened to target not only military targets but also civilians through issuance of *fatwas*, or pronouncements for combat. Notably, Khaled Abou El Fadl pointed out the rhetoric of belligerents responsible for and capitalizing on existing population’s dissatisfactions of what he termed as ‘an already radicalized discourse’ in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, to foster *Jihad* narratives (Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff & Weine, 2014).

Before considering the political implications inherent radicalization, indoctrination process must consider proselytization, admissions and memberships procedures in Islamic faith and practices. Such an approach identified the potency of the processes in creating passionate disciples that could be candidates for violent radicalization if exposed to the violent ideology. Vikor (2011) affirmed the indoctrination process in Africa to have created Islamic brotherhoods.

Perhaps understanding Islamic radicalization as a process required that a consideration on how individuals were initiated into Islam. The process itself was hardly unique to Islam but to socializations to any faith practices or groups. Again Islamic processes were considered here so as to understand contemporary violence. In Islamic thought patterns of brotherhoods (learners coalescing around a religious authority) were responsible in entrenching the Way (a distinct religious faith and practice) of Islam to the Muslim saint. The nature of brotherhoods favored radicalization into mainstream religious ideology or violent extremism notwithstanding the fact that such brotherhoods do entrench unique identities.
The uniqueness of identity and the strength thereof was affirmed in (Botha, 2018) research in Kenya on how unique identities held personal choices captive. The issue of getting married to a person of another faith was abhorred and 96% of Al-Shabaab agents were on the negative with 73% hating other religions. By this fact, the entrenching of unique identities also planted hard feelings about out-group members.

The main brotherhoods in Africa included the Qadiriyya, Khalwatiyya and Shadhiliyya, among others. They later turned into orders or organizations linked to lineages, ancestries and scholarship identities. The concept of brotherhoods or *tariqa* in *Sufi* traditions was important in radicalization because the relationship between a *shaykh* or a teacher and followers (*murids*) involved disciples forming around a religious authority. Brotherhoods also conferred identity and a sense of belonging to the religious community formed thereby. The taking of regular rituals of the brotherhoods, as at *mawlids* (births) and *hawliyya* (death) ceremonies, among others, gave distinctness to different brotherhoods. Often these brotherhoods were interlinked to gain control of the *Umma* whereby Sheikhs held regular gatherings domestically or otherwise. The *Mugaddams*, or initiates helped in the growth of the *Sufi* tradition in that they in turn become midlevel leaders or authorities of the Way which helps propagate the brotherhoods (Vikor, 2001).

The proselytization or conversion into Islam followed after many a religious tradition. In Somalia, for example, a presumed pariah state after the fall of Siad Barre Islamic processes was a complex mutation from Islamic Court Union to Al-Shabaab. But before the ragtag militia group formed up there already was the issue of Islamic orders.

According to Lewis (1994), Islamization in Somalia followed after the orders of Qadiriyyah, salihiiyyah, Ahmediyyah and Rifaiyyah orders. As much as these orders do not present any
violent radicalization issues except for the self-proclaimed Mahdi Haagi Mohammed Abdullah who proclaimed a *jihad*, that is, holy war, against infidels the Salihiyah order was opposed to his Mahdi status. By implication, such lack of consensus in the application of religious knowledge explained the minority status of Jihadists.

Perhaps His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the non-efficacious nature of conversion or proselytization in itself also affirmed the prolonged conditioning process involved in religious radicalization (Lama, 1999). The philosophical underpinning of religious practice remained the vision of extremists to be attained through a discipleship processes. Eventually, the transformative nature of religion became both an individual’s exertion but also group manipulation from extremists towards behavioral violence.

From these traditions, *Sufism* had preserved various identities of various brotherhoods overtime and had the ability to coalesce around a religious narrative which was seen to be suitable for radicalization purposes. The organizational structures of the brotherhoods were seen to promote identities in the ethnic, regional and social fronts to occasion *jihads*. Noteworthy, the brotherhoods or *Sufism* existed for core functions of piety, scholarship but by extension for political expediency.

Admittedly, the radicalization processes were a complex phenomenon that involved several stages, pathways, networks, methods and means to alter the beliefs, practices and behaviors of youths. The time element was necessary since the process may take short or long time to radicalize, recruit and deploy youths for mission. With distinct and phased pathways model as fronted by (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008) the study domiciled itself therein since it was possible to develop the argument from mechanisms approach to processes of Islamic radicalization approaches (Table 2.7).
First, individual radicalization processes involved personal exposure to indoctrination ideologies that eventually altered the belief and value systems on the individual concerned. Often it was a one-on-one interaction where a radicalizer targeted the youth with a reinterpreted Islamic ideology. Closely related is the self-radicalization process whereby an individual exposed oneself to online radicalization networks thereby getting entangled with jihadist ideology. Secondly, it could be group radicalization processes where several agents target a particular youth with information about a militant group. Thirdly, it could be a mass radicalization processes involving a small or huge portion of population inducement to support Jihadist ideology. It was evident that the mass radicalization processes involved sympathizers as the pool by which radicalization networks used to radicalize, recruit, and train new members. Additionally, the mass provided the base by which recruiters optimized in order to maintain their numerical stability and perpetuation of the global Jihad agenda.

A three-staged process of radicalization emphasized on the role the individual or group played in radicalization. At the basic level personality resonance with indoctrination ideology made some individuals move from cognitive radicalization level to behavioral or violent radicalization level. The personality resonance concept still eluded many a stakeholder analysis in radicalization studies.

Radicalization is also seen in general as a staged process, and one where some group dynamics are involved; for some models a radicalizer, a person doing the indoctrination, is involved, while other theories rather focus on an individual trying to find like-minded fellows (Hansen, 2013, p.11)
Schmid (2013) adoption of Silbner and Bhatt grounded theory analysis was essential in situating Islamic radicalization process in religious framework. The four phased radicalization included pre-radicalization phase (an individual’s situation before exposure to Jihadi-Salafi Islam), Self-identification phase (internal or external triggers lead to exploration of Salafi Islam), Indoctrination phase (adoption of Salafi Islam ideology) and finally Jihadization phase (acceptance of individual duty to become holy warriors or Mujahideen). Silber and Bhatt studies discovered that the first three stages of radicalization processes can take up to two to three years but jihadization can take weeks or months.

However, the testing of the Silbner and Bhatt NYPD aspects of radicalization by the recent Brandeis university research findings that many but not all aspects were supported by 135 biographical data on homegrown terrorism casted shadows to what the indicators of radicalization could be thereby delaying the possible profiling of homegrown terrorism in the US and similar contexts. The literature research and pilot study findings backing some aspects of the previous NYPD phased or staged process explained radicalization trajectories as indicated in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8

*Behavioral Indicators of Stage Progression in Radicalization Trajectories*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Pre – radicalization</th>
<th>Detachment group of like-minded</th>
<th>Peer Immersion &amp; Training</th>
<th>Planning &amp; Execution of Violent Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Searching behavior indicative of cognitive opening</td>
<td>Detachment from previous life, e.g., by spending inordinate amounts of time with online extremist peers</td>
<td>Leaving home to become closer to a peer individuals</td>
<td>Attempting or enacting violent action – or joining a terrorist group abroad or attempting to join a group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This could include:</td>
<td>Expressing of disillusionment with world affairs or with religious or political authorities</td>
<td>Actively seeking to get closer to new authority figures or proselytizing online or in a real life</td>
<td>Attempting to go abroad to join an organization or a network to live as prescribed by the ideology</td>
<td>Actively supporting another person carrying out violent action on behalf of the ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavior indicative of a personal crisis in response to personal events, e.g., a family crisis, drug addiction, incarceration, or being arrested</td>
<td>Experiencing a revelation or making changes in lifestyles such as dropping out of school or work</td>
<td>Behavior indicative of a desire to permanently join the militant community, e.g., by finding a spouse (or spouses) through the extremist community</td>
<td>Issuing threats online, in real life, or in other ways</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pre – radicalization

Seeking out information in venues outside the individual’s established social milieu, either online or in real life, from new authority figures

Detachment group of like – minded

Picking fights with the local Mosque or teachers, colleagues, and family – or otherwise trying to convince others to change by starting a blog or a website

Peer Immersion & Training

Seeking out ways to demonstrate commitment to the new ideological community and its mission, e.g., by acquiring practical training in the use of firearms or other skills considered important to the mission of the extremist community

Planning & Execution of Violent Action

Joining a foreign terrorist organization or taking practical steps to carry out an attack, e.g., by acquiring materials needed to fabricate a bomb or purchasing a firearm

Adopted from Smith, 2018, p.5

It was argued here that radicalization processes only became religious radicalization processes when religion took the catalyst function in radicalization. Further, in the radicalization processes the last phase which was Jihadization or a commitment to wage a religious war or an inclination to violence based on religious convictions, made it religious radicalization process. Therefore, it cannot be overemphasized how religion can become an overarching concept to support political ideas in the global Jihad narrative of Islamists.

The complex nature of radicalization processes and need to craft policy of counter radicalization had made scholars engage on particular aspect of radicalization. Often studies done by policy insiders in government agencies produced literature and findings without contextual and conceptual integrity as the Carothers study on Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. Consequently, distinct aspect of radicalization processes as stage analysis approach, policy analysis, social movement theory approach among others do not exhaustively handle radicalization processes
and thus McCauley and Moskalenko’s mechanisms or pyramid theory was closer to understanding radicalization processes. It was reiterated that the processes of Islamic radicalization were complex and often overlapping and at time intertwined.

The recruitment process occurring in the recent past was evidenced by the presence of operatives of Al-Shabaab commanders both of Kenyan and Somali nationalities in the country. The coastal and Northeastern counties made it possible and easy for recruiters to indoctrinate and sometimes abduct youths or tourists and crossover to Somalia. Based on British, American and Kenyan intelligence reports after abduction of Cuban doctors on 12th April 2019 (www.standardmedia.co.ke) the evidence of radicalization captured Kahale Famau Khale a Kenyan Somali operative and commander had been influenced by the late Saleh Nabhan, an al-Qaeda operative. These cases represent the first rank recruiters to have joined Al-Shabaab. Further, Rink and Sharma (2018) reported by the Washington Post termed Eastleigh “Little Mogadishu” because of the huge immigrant Somali community and therefore as “an incubator of Jihad” and a base for extremist radicalization and recruitment.

Islamic radicalization processes was a complex and overlapping staged process involving individuals, befriending and teamwork. Often the recruiters employed a variety of methods. The stages included spotting the youths, assessing, development and recruitment stages as shown in the Figure 2.8. Perhaps the stages under which a youth was targeted before he or she was radicalized, recruited and declared as a member of a religious radical group that can be deployed as a Jihad fighter (Figure 2.8) helped understand radicalization processes.
In the assessment of recruitment processes Figure 2.8 from Springer, et al., 2009, p.135 helped analyze the stages in indoctrination of youths. The first stage, which was spotting, involved identifying the potential recruit by gathering background information about the targeted youth. Assessment stage involved a one-on-one or a team work approach to delve deeper into the suitability of the recruit in the group. Development stage was about building a relationship with the potential recruit by use of one member or replacing with another more appealing member who may deepen the relationship and win the recruit. Often information was shared sparingly at this stage. Recruitment stage involved the recruit being accepted and himself or herself owning the group’s philosophy as a prerequisite to acceptance. Lastly, admitting a new member in the
group which had conditions to follow established norms and values by which the group operates and an apprenticeship process began. The stages were as indicated in Figure 2.8 above.

With the establishment of cells all over the world by terror groups and organizations, there occurred an infiltration process targeting the youths. In military parlance, infiltration was the process by which an enemy entered stealthily within the rank and file. In relation to radicalization processes youths infiltration referred to how radicalizing agents found their way into the lives of individual youths and groups through a raft of means and methods including but not limited to the porous border or the internet.

As recruiters infiltrated into the population and created cells homegrown terrorism obviously became an offshoot of these radical underground cells. Perhaps the narrative on infiltration on Mogadishu central prison based on extremist network was identified in (Bryans, 2012) where pamphlets, lectures and cellphones were used for propaganda inside the prison. Further, Jerry (2005) presentation of Mohammed Alamoudi case as a convict for infiltrating the US political and military system as a spy and subvert, and working in connection with Al-Qaeda network was as well revealing on infiltration processes. These examples were an articulate means of understanding infiltration.

The issue of cells especially by Al-Qaeda operatives and affiliate groups had become a key strategy of infiltration process. Most youths who were radicalized and joined cells all over the globe portray how infiltration process had been used in global religious radicalization processes as captured in Riddell & Cotterell (2003). A striking example touching on cell creation and infiltration of youths in Kenya included the 1998 bombings of US embassy in Kenya and the NE infiltration and IPK radicalization of political narratives in the Mombasa. The process of
infiltration had been compounded by the Al-Shabaab militants and cross-border activities by this terror group ((Hansen, 2013; Migue et al., 2014; Pirio, 2007).

The growing nature of attacks in Kenya linked to radicalization was to a large extent caused by infiltration of militants amongst the ranks of youths. Further, the issue of homegrown terrorism was an indicator that youths had been infiltrated and influenced by radical terror groups and narratives. After the ouster from Somalia Siad Barre infiltration increased as the refugees from Somalia found good neighborhood in Kenya. Infiltration process often used a chain of networks across the border and jihadists were encouraged to transfer foreign fighters to Iraq from neighboring countries. The use of nodes, that is, person or persons who transfer information, facilitate travel and operations was a stratagem that global terror groups used. The figure below illustrated the cell structure, interactions and information flow.

The radicalization cycle as discussed in Figure 2.9 also portrayed aspects of how agents within a population engaged youths for membership into radical cell groups. The argument on the clandestine nature of infiltration was also present in the 9/11 terrorists (Appendix ii) whereby pilots and hijackers were able to converge from different parts of the world to execute WTO bombings. However, it was pointed out that once radical leaders identified potential targets for radicalization a portion of the population of youths eventually accepted to join rank and file of extremists while a significant portion denied the ideology as illustrated by Gerwehr & Daley in Mulcahy et al (2013). Often the success in infiltration process depended on the nature of the population while push and pull factors also played a role.
Figure 2.9 was adopted from Springer, *et al*, 2009, p.107 and explained how an underground or clandestine cell operated. This also anchored infiltration processes.

In Kenya, infiltration took the shape of the radicalization that targeted Muslim dominated communities mostly in the NE and Coastal regions in Kenya. The attacks that occurred in Lamu and Garissa Counties following an established trend of attacks between December and February, also causing teacher unrest in Garissa were indicative of how the violent ideology had infiltrated the country. Speaking on a local Daily Television an assessment of Garissa County MP Aden Duale’s remarks and the senator of the aforementioned County Yusuf Haji confirmed that a cell of twelve youths was terrorizing the county (Appendix ix). From the comments of these political leaders the fluidity of the process of radicalization was an undeniable fact. The counties of
Garissa, Mandera and Wajir, as stated from the leader’s comments clearly were indicative of an infiltration processes had taken place in these frontier Counties.

The overall effect of Islamic radicalization was evident through the loss of lives and property or what can be termed as collateral damage. McCauley (2004) observed the intention by terrorists to cause a burden of funding war to occur and thereby made governments, especially, the US refocus democratic ideals to security concerns than economic development and advancement of civil liberties. Terrorism also sought to rally mass publics against the government itself by fanning narratives that communities were victims of profiling and victimization, targets of miscalculated policies on war on terror, and wrong war targets, among others. In the end the charged narratives on political, social and economic fronts created a database of youths willing to join terrorist groups and by so doing helped terror organization raise their base support. This was how Islamic radicalization processes created a logistical support from masses to sustain their vision, mission and goals.

In conclusion it was hereby observed and argued that Semitic religious traditions, which incidentally happened to be world religions, mostly represented religious political antagonisms that existed today. However, the Islamic fundamentalist religious ideology had a global imperative in radicalization and religious violence. This global nature of Islamic indoctrinating, recruitment, training and deployment of youths for jihad made it conspicuous for a discussion on religious radicalization processes in world today and therefore made it self suitable for philosophizing, theorizing and conceptualizing for contemporary violence.
2.4 Theoretical Framework
As much as scholars as Vidino (2014) among others argued that there was no single and acceptable theory on radicalization and coupled with the multiplicity and the complexities of factors involved, this study adopted (McCauley and Moskalenko’s, 2008) pyramid theory which identified stages and phases involving the individual, the group and masses. The theory contained three levels and twelve mechanisms of radicalization.

The theory was chosen because it was academic in nature and therefore analyzed radicalization in a functional and descriptive perspective based on an individual and group process. The key to this theory was a commitment to inter-group conflict. The argument from the theory was that there was an apex of the pyramid composed of terrorists in this case Jihadists while the progression to the higher levels of the pyramid was decreasing in numbers but increasing in radicalization of beliefs, feelings and behaviors. The base of the pyramid was composed of sympathizers and supporters of the terrorists.

2.4.1 McCauley and Moskalenko Theory of 2008
The theory stipulates that “Radicalization means change in beliefs; feelings and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify inter-group violence and demand violence in defense of the in-group...twelve mechanisms of radicalization are distinguished” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). On the same prism the term mechanism was adopted from psychology as “the manner in which something is accomplished. Thus, the mechanism of vision includes the physical stimulus and the physiological and neural processes involved” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The theory though in its infancy was proposed by (Clarke, McCauley, Sophia & Moskalenko, 2008) in their paper that dealt with political radicalization and the pathways that led to terrorism.
Terrorists particularly hope to elicit a violent response that will assist them in mobilizing their own people. A terrorist group is the apex of the pyramid of supporters and sympathizers. The base of the pyramid is composed of all those who sympathize with the terrorist cause even though they may disagree with the violent means that terrorists use…In the Islamic world, the base of the pyramid is all those who agree that the United states had been hurting and humiliating Muslims for 50 years. The pyramid is essential to the terrorists for cover and for recruits….Al-Qaeda might still hope to profit by perceptions of a crusade against Muslims if the United States extends the war on terrorism to Iraq, Iran, or Somalia (McCauley, 2004, p.51)

2.4.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of Pyramid Theory

The theory was all encompassing since it tackled the key aspects of the study which included the beliefs, feelings and behaviors. But most importantly the theory sought to explain the gradual progression of individuals, groups and masses to conflict and violence. It was also developed to address non – state actors to violence which was the preoccupation of most stakeholders and also the threat of our times. The functional aspect of the theory that the way a state acts on individuals or groups was also addressed and therefore the sociopolitical and economic implications that cause alienation of non-stare groups endeared this study to the theory.

Based on Rink and Sharma (2018) the complex and the sensitive nature radicalization studies as conducted only addressed the micro-level, meso-level and macro-level theories to radicalization aligned with aspects of McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) theory of radicalization. On the other hand this theory was in its developmental stages to be exhaustive from the view of this study.
The theory was hardly developed to tackle Islamic radicalization processes per se and the whole issue of contemporary violence. The theory was chosen in the midst of limited theories of radicalization and scarce empirical radicalization studies.

2.4.3 The Suitability of the Pyramid Theory

The theory explained the progression by few ordinary youths towards violence. In what McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) termed as the *apex of the pyramid* a small number of terrorists were willing to sacrifice for jihadist cause while the middle were the radical groups and the base of the pyramid involved a mass of supporters who presume themselves to be in conflict with out-group who were not members of the group. Therefore, the theory favored Islamic radicalization processes to the extent of cultivating beliefs, feelings and behaviors against non-members especially the West and its democratic ideals. Specifically aspects of the mechanisms considered the current Islamic radical groups.

Palestinian suicide terrorism represented conflict based on political Islam and rivalry against the state of Israel and the theory also cited Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri on the intended effect of 9/11 attacks on U.S. Terror groups and organizations as Al-Qaeda, PFLP (Palestinian Front for Liberation of Palestine) and the Taliban and the use of *Jihad* were also discussed in the theory besides the use of Martyrdom. As earlier indicated the mechanism did not single out the aforementioned groups but these were necessary in the analysis of Islamic radicalization processes. Further, individual radicalization following the slippery slope strategy involved personal grievances involving push and pull factors which led others to find solace in terror networks. The theory was supported by European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalization which affirmed that a relatively small number of individuals engaged in violence.
The theory concluded that it was a small group of individuals that reached the peak of the pyramid to be called terrorists or violent extremists who were ready to cause or actually caused violence (Schmid, 2013).

Maskalinaite (2015) despite observation on underdeveloped theories on why people radicalize also argued based on internal and external motivations on how violence prevailed. In the former case violence was used as a means to effect change in the society for political reasons thus confirming the potency of altered beliefs, feelings and behaviors. Based on the strengths and weakness of the pyramid theory (Section 2.4.2) this study proposed a theory to fill the gaps and weaknesses thereof (Section 2.4.4)

2.4.4 Gap in Literature Review

From the literature reviewed this study established that there were gaps in three areas. One, there was a gap on literature regarding Islamic radicalization processes. In this case most literature dealt with radicalization as a single process. It did not envisage that Islamic radicalization was done in processes. This study proposed that there were five processes of Islamic radicalization thus breaking new ground in research and scholarship. Two, the study established that Islamic radicalization affected youths in Isiolo County a discovery that no other study had confirmed. Three the study therefore proposed a new theory titled ‘Religious Radicalization Processes Theory’ for the comprehensive understanding of the problem. The new theory was necessary due to the inadequacy of the existing pyramid theory fronted by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008).
2.4.5 Religious Radicalization Processes Theory

Since the pyramid theory anticipated the development of radicalization theories beyond the twelve mechanisms this study argued for a theory that was anchored on religious radicalization processes and on the role of religion in the contemporary conflict and violence. In this respect the religious radicalization processes theory dealt with the stages, steps, and phases of radicalization. In that case this study proposed a religious radicalization processes theory as complex overlapping multi-staged processes that altered the beliefs, feelings and behaviors of some youths into violence through a reinterpreted version of Islam as fronted by violent religious extremists. The ‘Religious Radicalization Processes Theory’ (RRPT) hereby proposed was anchored on aspects of theoretical development by (Agnew & Brezina, 2012) and Morgan (as cited in McAllister & Schmid, 2013).

The religious radicalization theory was similar to the pyramid theory in that not all indoctrinated or recruited or infiltrated or trained youths were finally deployed. The point of departure was that all the processes were necessary for religious radicalization. Further, the religious radicalization processes also overlapped and were interwoven. In contrast the processes theory were hereby discussed and Figure 2.10 was designed to explain the proposed religious radicalization processes theory.

In Figure 2.10 religious radicalization processes theory involved five overlapping processes that engaged youths with the extremist ideology. At the bottom of the pyramid was a critical mass of sympathizers/supporters who often identified with the course of terrorists. They included underground business people and organizations committed to supporting or funding terrorists and their agenda. At the indoctrination process level were well-versed agents with extremist ideology and who spotted vulnerable youths. In most cases they also acted as intelligence
gatherers and in the case of Al-Shabaab, the _amniyat_ was the intelligence wing that also indoctrinated disenfranchised youths.

At the recruitment process level were both radicalizers/recruiters who were charged with transporting youths to various underground cells within the country or outside the country. The infiltration process level was where operatives stealthily made an access to the country, communities, schools, homes and Mosques to mobilize youths.

The infiltration processes was fluid in that operatives were planted in geographical locations to establish underground cells. Infiltration process was strategic, deliberate and took even long periods of time. In fact, infiltration was the starting point where agents or the violent ideology was introduced to the youths. The emphasis was also put on ideological infiltration in contrast with agent’s infiltration to factor in online radicalization. Eventually, the other processes followed but not necessarily in a sequential manner since some processes could be skipped based on time, logistics and urgency of the task to be assigned. Therefore, it was possible to start at any process once infiltration had occurred depending on those logistics, time and circumstances.

The training processes were conducted at paramilitary training camps or even cells. At this level youth recruits were introduced to weapons and battle tactics before they were deployed. Training was an ongoing process that involved indoctrination so as to internalize the political, religious and cosmic philosophy of the violent religious extremists. There were also varieties of trainings depending with the task that youths were to be assigned.

Finally, the deployment process involved assigning youths to a variety of duties within the country or outside the country. The deployment of youths was the ultimate goal of agents, radicalizers and recruiters.
This religious radicalization processes theoretical framework explained the conceptual framework (2.5). In addition to the effects of Islamic radicalization processes it filled the research gap. By the foregoing religious radicalization processes was presumed to be comprehensive and a development of the theory in understanding perennial violence today. It was unearthed from the philosophical frameworks in Islam. The theory situated the discourse on
contemporary violence in religion as opposed to conflated and populist approaches in the contemporary theoretical analysis.
2.5 Conceptual Framework

The independent variable based on objectives of the study was the resurgence of Islamic radicalization in the global arena. This caused Islamic radicalization processes to take root as a stratagem to create a pool of fighters to engage in the pan–Islamist agenda of terrorists, that is, establishment of a global *umma* that was to wage war against Western democracy and value system. The global response to contemporary radicalization processes was an intervening variable that fueled more radicalization. Eventually the dependent variable became the assessable effects of youth radicalization. The dependent variable only tested the effects that were possible to assess.

2.5.1 Independent variables

The study was able to establish five Islamic radicalization processes. These were also discussed in detail at the proposed religious radicalization processes theory (2.4.4). In this conceptual framework the processes as indoctrination, recruitment, infiltration, training and deployment of youths took the dimension of a paramilitary approach but which anchored on religious texts to lure youths to its narratives.

At the base of the independent variables was indoctrination since it was necessary to influence the minds and hearts of youths with a religious agenda that resonated with their identity and existential issues. At the apex of the processes was deployment which was occasioned by the proven fact that a handful of radicalized youths became jihadists. In summary the independent variable comprised of the spread of Islam in Isiolo County, the processes of Islamic radicalization as discussed and the characteristics of a radicalized Muslim youth.
Figure 2.11

Conceptual Framework

Independent Variables
- Spread of Islam
- Islamic Radicalization processes
- Characteristics of Radicalized Muslim Youth

Intervening Variables
- Governmental policies
- Terrorism due to radicalization
- Islamic religious beliefs and practices

Dependent Variable
- Effects of Islamic radicalization processes on youth
2.5.2 Intervening Variables

In the process of tackling contemporary violence that was enshrined in religious processes the unintended effect of more radicalization occurred. In this case the intervening variables that fuelled more radicalization of youths included but not limited to reinterpreted sacred texts, that is, the Qur’an, global war on terror, US foreign policy, personal and political grievances, family backgrounds and de-radicalization programs. As radicalization was a complex socialization process it was not possible in this study to establish direct linkages between the effects by particular variables. In other words the intervening variables acted at an individual or on groups simultaneously thereby producing the effects on youths. However, the main intervening variables in the conceptual framework included governmental policies, terrorism due to radicalization, and Islamic religious beliefs and practices.

The policies by respective governments were deciphered by terrorists and given charged narratives where such policies were construed to be targeting and profiling communities. In the process of building narratives around governmental policies, for example, the war on terror policy, the global terror networks mobilized religious communities against a war that was given a face of fighting the Muslim community. Further, the post 9/11 approach to terrorism was compounded to mean that it was a war against Islam by the West and allies. In that case, youths were mobilized to counter governments that promoted Western democracy and which were seen to craft policies against religious communities. Eventually, the outcome was terrorism based on radicalization.

Terrorism due to radicalization aided Islamic radicalization processes by recruiting youths based on painting a picture that terrorists had the ability to check repressive governments through attacks that had occurred in East Africa. The proximity of Kenya to Somalia made her
experience the rather of terrorists whereby both her soft and hard targets had been attacked. The presumed victory of terrorists and in this case Al-Shabaab, against conventional armies, as occurred globally, during AMISOM forces in Somalia, was used build narratives for more youth recruitment. The paramilitary nature of terrorists made them use propaganda as well to recruit more youths.

Islamic religious beliefs and practices played into the gallery of intervening variable in Islamic radicalization processes. As discussed in this study, the political Islam had received a reinterpretation of sacred texts to foster global Jihad agenda. Apart from the reinterpreted texts there was also the issue of Islamic concepts some of which were being reinvented to aid Jihad agenda. The revisionist goal towards Islamic golden era of caliphates, the mobilization of umma for global Jihad, and the campaign to have Islamic states that were purely governed by sharia was the apex of such political Islam philosophy. Global terror networks weaved the sacred texts and concepts as a political stratagem to cut a niche and undermine democracy, secularization and modernity. Further, the narratives from a religious perspective were appealed to the void of human suffering especially youth disempowerment in most African contexts. The concept of fatwa, that is, declaration of war against perceived infidels was a concept that informed the pan-Islamist agenda.

2.5.3 Dependent Variables

Generally, the dependent variable was effects of Islamic radicalization processes on youths. At the apex were a few numbers of youths who were willing to engage in violence. Violent religious extremism was a variable that sought to intimidate global policies on one hand but also a means to rally for global Jihad for the caliphate vision by radical extremists. There occurred
psychological trauma on youths and families affected by radicalization. Due to Islamist attacks the sociopolitical, economic and religious instability was experienced in both global and local contexts where youth radicalization had taken place. The effects of Islamic radicalization processes on youth were found to be numerous and only those assessable were dealt with in this study. In other words, a discussion of the effects on youths was a preoccupation that required perennial scrutiny including indicators of radicalized Muslim youths whereby the study established a matrix to that effect.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

Both qualitative and quantitative research designs were used for data collection and analysis. In the qualitative design grounded theory of research was adopted because it enabled the collected and analyzed data to allow formulation of a new theory for understanding Islamic radicalization processes (Charmaz, 2013). The purpose of using qualitative design was to assist unearth the spread of Islamic radicalization amongst youths in Isiolo County and increase the knowledge base on radicalization in Isiolo County. The advantages of using this design in this study were personal contacts, natural environment and one-on-one interview, among others. The quantitative designs were also used to supplement the qualitative design by using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software to generate results for analysis. The study also made use of both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and data analysis.

The location of this study was generally Isiolo County. Subjects of the study were from Isiolo Sub-County but more specifically from Isiolo Central Sub-Location. This scope of location allowed the study to get data from Isiolo urban areas which were perceived to be the hotspots of Islamic radicalization.

Sampling involved identification of target population and the sample for study. To facilitate this process specific sampling techniques and procedures were adopted to ensure that a good representative sample was acquired. Certain research instruments including questionnaires and interview schedules were verified through piloting of instruments to ensure validity and reliability.
For data analysis certain qualitative methods including content, narrative, and descriptive analyses were used to deal with the views, opinions, documentary evidence, assertions, claims, and stories brought about by respondents. Further, SPSS software was employed to generate response rates, tables, and figures for analysis.

The study dealing with Islam as a religion and Islamic radicalization of youth had sensitive information to process. For this reason interviewing human subjects required high level ethical consideration which included providing anonymity, confidentiality, and permissions in the process of undertaking the study.

3.1 Research Designs and Methods of Data Collection

In this section designs and methods used for data collection was discussed. These included interviews, survey, Focus Group Discussions, observation and documentary methods. A triangulation of methods and designs was also utilized.

3.1.1 Designs

The study employed a descriptive qualitative research design because of its ability to describe, explain, and present data from observation, interview, and discussion. It further made it possible to acquire written materials, narratives, topics, and themes from respondents. A quantitative design that dealt with numbers and figures was used to supplement the qualitative design. The quantitative design was applied so as to manage the collection of quantitative data.

This research design was known to allow the study to have contacts with participant’s thereby getting in-depth knowledge of social phenomenon through conversations and interviews (Kothari, 2004). Islamic radicalization processes and their effects on Muslim youths being a social occurrence required that interaction with youths was necessary to collect data.
3.1.2 Methods

Arising from the use of descriptive designs the study utilized methods such as interview, focus group discussion, and observation for data collection. The data was collected mainly through interviews and small group discussions of five (5) to eight (8) participants. The interview and small group discussions methods were favorable for generating data based on the assumption that youth had been radicalized in the recent past. The interview and group discussion methods helped the study by allowing respondents to give detailed information on their understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization of youths within the target audience.

(a) Interview Method

The interview method required that the researcher asked questions and received answers from interviewees. According to Clutterbuck and Warnes (2013) the face-to-face interviews were suitable for government and security officials and thus the method was adopted in this study to interview such experts and key informants. It helped the researcher to understand the views, opinions, behavior, and experiences of other people. The interview method used both semi-structured questionnaires and interview schedules. Further, the semi-structured interview whereby a mixture of fixed questions, oral questions and answers was also employed in this research. The unstructured interview where the researcher used open-ended questions and was able to ask supplementary questions to clarify information was also adopted.

The interview method was suitable in this research to help gain in-depth knowledge of Islamic radicalization through questioning, reframing questions, and observation of the respondents. An in-depth probing into personal lives and experiences was necessary to understand victims and their proxies experiences. The interview method was applied to teachers, parents, Imams, prison
wardens, and government officials so as to understand the Islamic radicalization processes and their effects.

The semi-structured interview accorded the researcher more information as clarifications which were possible on one-on-one interview method were done. There was always an opportunity to rephrase questions in order to get to details of the concept of radicalization of youths. Personal interviews based on the busy schedule and working environment demanded that the researcher booked for such an interview and appointment with the concerned respondents. The subjects included government officials, security experts and consultants, intelligence service personnel both at county and national governments. Clutterbuck and Warnes (2013) enumerated some of the benefits of interviews and more so interviewing government and security officials towards gaining original primary information and experience based-knowledge that can be used in counter terrorism ends.

Face to face interview with the respondents was done and data recorded instantly and verbatim in most instances. Again, a one-on-one approach with the respondents was chosen because it allowed the researcher probe deeper and seeks clarifications from any ambiguous responses from the interviewee. Creating rapport with respondents was a necessary skill in the process of interviews.

(b) Survey method

The research used a survey method. This was through the use of a structured questionnaire that applied Likert scale. This method enabled the study to assess the views, opinions, and knowledge base of respondents on the extent of Islamic radicalization of Muslim youth in Isiolo County.
The survey method was used in secondary schools where sampled students were asked to fill in structured questionnaires that contained choice based Likert scale questions. The survey method was not used in primary schools for the reason that the concepts were beyond pupil’s comprehension but instead small group discussion was used for data collection.

Other respondents who used structured questionnaires included parents, teachers, religious leaders, security officers, prison wardens, government officials, and youth who were out of school. The survey method helped to generate numbers and figures to explain all the objectives by supplementing the qualitative methods of data collection.

(c) Focus Group Discussion Method

The Focus Group Discussion method was used to collect data from students both in sampled primary and secondary schools. The process of Islamic radicalization often involved group interactions and therefore assessment using focus group discussion method aided this research in data collection process. The focus group discussions were used to collect data from standard eight primary school pupils and form four secondary school students. For primary school pupils discussions involved simple question and answer while for secondary school students discussions were done by providing each group with a topic for discussion. A total of 43 focus group discussions in four secondary schools were conducted (Appendix v). In primary schools a structured discussion was conducted in two schools where whole standard eight classes became focus groups.

The study was able to find out their opinions, attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, and ideas on a range of subject on Islamic radicalization processes. Therefore, focus groups discussion method was beneficial in this research in establishing the occurrence of radicalization based on small group
orientations. Further, the attitudes of individuals were understood through participant’s discussions whereby each individual responded freely. These opinions were often expressed through triggering thinking and igniting emotions within the group in process of conversations. Focus groups discussion method also encouraged participation whereby youths were given ample time to express their views on the subject.

This study concurred with Smith (2014) on the subject of encouraging participants of focus group discussion to trigger their thinking and make the debate more robust thus revealing sincere emotions, feelings, opinions, and beliefs. Due to the sensitivity of the questions and topics of discussion the groups were allowed to reframe or restate the questions the way they understood them thus providing flexibility in tackling serious Islamic radicalization issues. The settings of group discussions was a relaxed environment so as respondents perceived themselves as peers and thus were able to express their own attitudes and opinions freely. The data in focus groups was recorded by the researcher or research assistant.

(d) Observation Method

Observation method was a reference to the method of data collection through passive recording on paper of focus group discussion members’ behavior. In observation method the study sought to understand the phenomenon of pupils and students behavior when discussing sensitive Islamic radicalization processes. Observation was done by the researcher or the research assistants and no mechanical objects were used so that the participants were not antagonized by cameras or videos.
The observation method was used to supplement data collected through the focus group discussion. The method was preferred because it was employed to collect feelings, ideas, opinions of pupils and students in their natural environment unaware of observation. The observation method considered a number of pre-radicalization indicators (Appendix viii) some of which were eventually present as characteristics of a radicalized youth (Table 4.8)

(e) Documentary Method

The documentary method sought to analyze religious texts, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012, and Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 in order to identify wording, terms and concepts that are commonly used to describe radicalization. The religious texts were mostly from verses dedicated to *Qital* in the Qur’an and the laws of Kenya (Appendix ii).

The documentary method was to provide factual information that countered the propaganda circulated through all types of media regarding Islamic radicalization processes. Most of the subjects of this study were Muslims and they resented the association of their religion with radicalization or terrorism. Therefore, the method provided raw data to either confirm the popular notion that Islam was associated with radicalization or exonerated it from association with either radicalization or terrorism.

3.1.3 Triangulation of designs and methods

Triangulation was used to mitigate the inefficiencies of individual designs and methods. Triangulation means the use of different perspectives or methods to assess the phenomenon under study. In the triangulation of methods based on Flick (2014) investigator triangulation (use of different interviewers as a strategy to detect or minimize the researcher’s bias) and data
triangulation (use of different data sources) were chosen for this study. In this study the former involved the use of research assistants and the latter involved widening the scope of the research beyond pupil’s and students to include the professionals and the general populace. Triangulation was adopted for its cross-sectional nature and its ability to be used in what Flick (2014) referred to as sampling in triangulation, triangulation in data collection, triangulation in analyzing data, among others. The study adopted aspects of triangulation to supplement and validate the results in the qualitative and quantitative designs.

3.2 The Location of the Study

The location of the study was Isiolo County as a devolved unit created by the 2010 Constitution. The county was among ASAL (Arid and Semi-Arid Lands) in Kenya comprising mostly of nomadic communities. It had cosmopolitan characteristics whereby other Kenyan ethnic communities also live in Isiolo County. Briefly, the face of Kenya was easily observable in the county.

The geographical position of Isiolo County made it a frontier zone in terms of Islamic radicalization and also a transit County in terms of its communication network. Isiolo was the gateway to the Northern Kenya Counties of Marsabit, Moyale, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa Counties which are dominated by Islamic religion. Isiolo town is almost in the middle of Kenya making it ideal trade and communication transit route. Geographically, The county has three administrative Sub-Counties (Isiolo, Garbatulla and Merti). The Sub-County of Isiolo comprises of six divisions, six locations and twelve sub-locations with an area of 3,269km² (Appendix iii) and this study was conducted specifically in Isiolo central areas of Ngaremara, Checheles,
Kiwanjani, Tulu Roba, Kula Mawe and Town area. The researcher was conversant with the terrain of the county.

The County of Isiolo was predominantly Islamic based on current religious demographics. The Cushitic communities mostly embraced Islam while the Christian faith was mostly embraced by non-Cushitic peoples of Kenya. It was chosen as a case study as a gateway to Northern Kenya with unique religious characteristics. Arguably, the spread of Islam in the county with a philosophy of radicalization from violent extremists placed the county at a vantage point for the study.

Arguably, the northern part of Kenya had experienced perennial marginalization but was also a hotspot of Islamic radicalization. In the recent times some youths who carried out terrorism acts were associated with Isiolo County. There also occurred truancy in schools sector for Muslim youths. There were reported disappearance of youth and claims of joining terror groups. The location was also chosen because of the infrastructures as the schools, homes, Mosques, among others, that were targeted by Islamic radicalization narratives.

Perhaps Pirio (2007) on the disintegration of Somalia in 1991 which caused the refugee influx from the Northern region as factor in radicalization cannot be assumed. The Northern corridor of Kenya with a history of radicalization placed Isiolo County as an epicenter and gateway to radicalization of youths. Further, the terrain of the county had been used as transit zone with routes that linked the country to the porous border where operatives capitalized to lure youths.

3.3 Sampling

The reason why Isiolo County was chosen for this study was because of its perceived association nationally as one of the key Islamic radicalization hotspots. Additionally, the County was
presumed to have Islamic dominance in terms of religion, had more youths who had Islamic radicalization characteristics, and possibly the effects of Islamic radicalization on Muslim youths were more pronounced. Therefore, a representative sample was taken from Isiolo Sub-County to represent the whole population of Isiolo County.

Sampling was the process of selecting the representative sample from the target population (Kothari, 2013). It ought to represent the larger population to avoid bias and also help to generalize results. The target population was from Isiolo Sub-County. In this Sub-County the study choose respondents from all the locations and sub-locations. The respondents included youth, men, and women who were deemed to have deep knowledge and experience in handling Muslim youths.

For youth the study chose through purposive sampling six secondary schools where form four students were sampled for interview. It further, sampled four secondary schools where form four students were chosen for focus group discussion. In addition, the study using purposive sampling technique chose youth from two primary schools where standard eight pupils were interviewed. For men and women the study picked respondents who were parents or guardians, teachers, religious leaders, prison wardens, intelligence agents, police officers, and government officials. Through snowballing technique (Clutterbuck and Warnes 2013, Kenney 2013) some key subjects whom the study had chosen through purposive technique were able to suggest other potential respondents for interviews.

The whole Isiolo Sub--County had a population of 121,066 according to the 2019 Kenya Census (Appendix iii). Out of this population of Isiolo Sub-County the study chose Isiolo Central Sub-Location which had 56,065 people as the target population. Through purposive sampling the study chose 593 respondents as the sample size.
3.3.1 Target Population

The entire population of Isiolo County as per the 2019 Census (Appendix iii) was 268,002 people who were residents at the time in Garbatulla, Merti, and Isiolo Sub-Counties. Out of this number there was a target population of 121,066 people of Isiolo Sub-County. In Isiolo Sub-County the study focused in collecting data from Isiolo Central Sub-Location which had 56,065 people and comprised of Ngaremara, Kulamawe, Checheles, Tulu Roba, Kambi Garba, Wabera, and Bulapesa wards (Appendix iii). Isiolo Central Location was purposively chosen because that was where Isiolo town was located. Isiolo town had been perceived nationally as the hotspot of Islamic radicalization. Therefore, the study collected data from youths in school particularly those who were about to complete their education at standard eight and form four levels. It further interviewed other youth, men, and women from homes, schools, mosques, prison, security barracks, police stations, and government offices.

In the following paragraphs the study described and explained the various categories of respondents. These were youths aged 10 to 35 years who were targeted by radicalization narratives. This age cohort comprised of 29 percent of the target group of 54,623 youths by 2017. By 2020 projections the age dynamics in the county were expected to have remained the same and thus the reason to sample the ages as indicated herein. The youths who were sampled mostly came from primary and secondary schools in the county. In that case there were 30 public primary schools and 15 private primary schools whereby the study sampled youths from six secondary schools and two primary schools.

The stakeholders were those who were directly involved with youths but also affected by radicalization of youths. These included the parents, religious leaders, government officials and
agencies, teachers, among others. These groups were sampled to provide informed data that assisted in conceptualizing the problem of radicalization in the county.

A sampling criterion to include institutions, faith communities, organization and administrative units was necessary in this study. This helped in sampling schools, youth organizations, NGOs and ethnic groups in the county. In that case there were 280 registered youth groups operating in the county, 142 ECDE centers (29 private), 15 secondary schools and three tertiary institutions (Ministry of Devolution and Planning, 2013). There were also three Muslim sponsored primary schools and one Muslim sponsored secondary school in the sample. Through these institutions and organization it was possible to locate youths who have disappeared and joined terror groups.

In Isiolo County Islam and Christianity were the main religions. This demographical information was not captured by Ministry of Devolution and Planning 2013 but was of interest in this research. The Islamic religious community incidentally was predominant in the sample. There were 39 Mosques in the sample. These Mosques were distributed within the Isiolo central area where the research was conducted.

The county was a cosmopolitan centre with almost all Kenyan communities represented. In terms of population capacity the main ethnic groups were the Somali, Turkana, Samburu, Meru and Borana. The Somali and Borana community were bent on Islam while the Turkana, Samburu and Meru were inclined to the Christian faith.

In summary the target population represented youth groups, primary and secondary schools, youth organizations, Faith Based Organizations, Community Based Organizations and NGOs. Islamic religious leaders as Sheikhs, Imams and Maalims were targeted to establish the role of madrasas in radicalization of Muslim youths. The target population probed the existence of radicalization cells, the effect of radicalization and tracked radicalized youths so as to critically
analyze causes, factors and methods of religious radicalization processes in Isiolo County all of which served the stated objectives of this thesis.

3.3.2 Sample Size

The sample size for this study was 593 respondents who included interviewees and members of focus group discussion. The sample size was determined through purposive sampling of 600 respondents who were either given questionnaires to fill or were interviewed through an interview schedule or provided data through focus group discussion. Out of the 600 proposed respondents only 593 were able to provide the required data while 7 were not able to return the questionnaires as expected. It was difficult for the researcher to find the seven respondents to pick the data. Therefore, the study relied on data provided by the 593 respondents which was 98.8% of the expected responses. This high response rate was deemed sufficient to provide the required data for analysis. The sample size was determined by distribution of respondents in various locations, schools, homes, mosques, Barracks, Police stations, NGOs, and government offices. Table 3.1 indicated the sample size total to 593.
Table 3.1

Sample size Selection/Determination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Source of sample</th>
<th>Number of sampled respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Isiolo Barracks Secondary school</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Isiolo Girls Secondary School</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>St. Pauls’ Kiwanjani Secondary School</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wamy Secondary School</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Waso Day Secondary School</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Waso Day Sunshine Secondary School</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bula Waso Secondary School</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Al-Falah Primary School</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kambi Garba Primary</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>School of Infantry Mosque (soldiers)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>School of Combat Engineering Mosque</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Masjid Noor Mosque (youths)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Defense Headquarters’ Mosque (Chaplain/maalims)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ass. County Commissioner</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Prison Warden Isiolo Prison</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Directors of NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Teachers trained on VE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Imams, Sheikhs, and Maalims</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Police Officers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Centre (Staff)/DMI</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Muslim youths out of School</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>County Government Officials</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Parents of youths who have dropped out of School</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parents of youths who have joined terror groups</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>593</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.3 Sampling Techniques and procedures

(a) Purposive

This study was in concurrence with Kothari (2013) who proposed that purposive and stratified sampling helped in arriving at a sample with homogeneous characteristics. The dominance of the Muslim community in Isiolo was deemed to be favorable for the study of Islamic radicalization processes. The purposive technique targeted specific locations in the County where radicalization of youths was claimed to be prominent. It further helped to identify youths who were out of school for interviews. When applied to institutions, purposive sampling helped to reduce the number of secondary and primary schools to participate in the research. Schools that had higher Muslim populations or were Islamic schools were given priority.

Parents of youths who were claimed to have joined the international terror groups were purposively chosen. Teachers were picked for this study depending on their knowledge and experience with students who had Muslim radicalization characteristics. Imams, Sheikhs, and Maalims were purposively picked so that those with greater exposure to youths with Islamic radicalization were interviewed. The anti-terror security agencies were also picked through purposive sampling because some had more knowledge and skills to deal with radicalized Muslims youths. Prison wardens and police officers who had dealt with Muslim youths who had returned from violent extremist groups were interviewed.

(b) Snowballing

In this study a mixed sampling based on Kothari (2013) of purposive sampling was enhanced by (Kenney, 2013) snowballing sampling as favorable to research on Islamic radicalization processes. Purposive sampling was used to identify initial respondents with vital information on
the effects of radicalization on Muslim youths. This sampling technique was supplemented by snowballing technique where respondents proposed to the researcher more informants who enriched the study. Snowballing led back to purposive sampling because the researcher had to scrutinize the proposed informants to ensure they fitted to provide data for the study.

Further, Walliman (2012) principle of enlarging the sample to gain a representative sample was also adopted in this research. The idea of enlarging the sample was buttressed in Bhatt (2011) arguing that larger samples were likely to be representative of the population. The mixed sampling techniques of purposive and snowballing approaches were informed by population distribution dynamics in the County. The techniques were taken to minimize or reduce sampling error and avoid bias in selection of the sample.

(c) **Survey**

The technique was applied through the distribution of closed-ended questionnaires to sampled respondents to collect views, opinions, information, and ideas. The technique was particularly useful in collecting views from Muslim youths and other Muslim stakeholders who did not want to have direct interviews. The technique worked well with most of the respondents but a few either destroyed the questionnaires or refused to hand them over all together.

(d) **Documentary**

This technique included searching for archived documents, extracts from religious texts, and pieces of legislation dealing with spread of Islam, radicalization processes, characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths, and effects of radicalization on youths. Once the texts and legislation
were acquired they were categorized, numbered, and stored in electronic format ready for coding and analysis.

### 3.4 Research Instruments

The instruments for collecting data were informed by designs and methods. They were meant to collect specific data that shed light to study problem. The instruments used in this research were a questionnaire, interview schedule and documentary diary.

#### 3.4.1 Questionnaire

The study had two types of questionnaires that were closed-ended and open-ended questionnaires. The first was the closed-ended questionnaire which utilized the Likert Scale to survey views, opinions, ideas, and information about the objectives. This type of questionnaire was distributed to sampled respondents who filled them and later on they were picked for data compilation. The second type of questionnaire was the open-ended questionnaire that the researcher and the research assistants used to conduct interview with selected respondents. Here the questionnaire had open-ended questions which required the respondent to provide a longer answer. The respondent then wrote the longer answer in the space provided in the open-ended questionnaire. All the questionnaires were either collected by the researcher or the research assistants for data compilation.

#### 3.4.2 Interview Schedule

The interview schedule was a list of shorter questions which did not require a yes or no answer. Instead the respondent provided a longer answer to each question. In case a question was not
clear the researcher or the research assistant provided a supplementary question or comment to make the question clearer. When the respondent provided the answer the researcher or the research assistant recorded it in a separate paper from the questionnaire document.

3.4.3 Documentary Diary

A documentary diary was kept of the extracts of religious texts, pieces of legislation and archive documents. Each document was categorized, coded, and stored in electronic format for future reference during data analysis. Religious texts included portions of the Qur’an while pieces of legislation were from relevant Kenya Acts of Parliament dealing with de-radicalization and Counter Terrorism (CT) measures. Archived data was classified information from the County Commissioners’ media interviews.

3.5 Validity and Reliability

In this section validity and reliability of instruments was discussed. The pre-testing of instruments was presented.

3.5.1 Validity

Validity helped the study to have appropriate questions that provided relevant data for the study. Therefore, a pre-test assisted the study to reframe the questions in order to provide maximum data for each objective. According to Hicks (2009), a pre-test, was essential to validate the research instruments which included the questionnaire and interview schedule. After the pretest the questionnaires and interview schedule were revised accordingly to ensure all questions were clear to the respondents. Further, some questions were removed since they were difficult to understand and others were added because they provided further information to the study.
Piloting of instruments allowed for modification and refining to eliminate ambiguities, spelling errors and attain to accurate wording of the questionnaire. The piloting of instruments was undertaken with twenty five (25) Muslim youths from a Mosque in Isiolo Central Sub-County and five key respondents from the Muslim community was conducted with a view to ensure the tools fitted well to the target population. This Mosque where the piloting took place was not included in the final locations where data was collected. In short, the questionnaire and the interview schedule were redesigned to ensure they attracted the attention, interest, consideration, cooperation, and honest responses of the study respondents.

3.5.2 Reliability
Reliability in this study was attained through three instances of piloting instruments in Isiolo town where general public were issued with closed-ended questionnaires which they filled and returned, and in a Mosque where Muslim were youths provided with both closed-ended and open ended questionnaires which they completed appropriately. The third piloting of instruments was conducted in one of the secondary schools where students were observed in a focus group discussion. During the piloting reliability testing was essential to determine the data collected was dependable (Flick, 2014, Kothari, 2013; Walliman, 2012).

The results of piloting of instruments indicated that questionnaires and interview schedules were well framed but a few corrections, modifications, deletions and inclusions of questions were essential for validity purposes. Pretesting and piloting showed that the instruments were reliable to reproduce similar data for the study.
3.6 Methods of Data Analysis

Data analysis meant making meaning from the data that was collected. As Bhatt (2011) defined classification of data in terms of qualitative and quantitative before tabulation was done Kothari (2012) approach involved editing, coding, and classification of collected data before analysis was done. The process of classification of data was the initial and preliminary steps of analysis that laid the ground for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. For data analysis to take place there was need for data presentation, analysis and interpretation. In the process of editing, examining, categorizing, coding, and tabulation data distilling and cleaning was done. This was meant to detect and eliminate errors. The raw data was analyzed through several methods that included descriptive, content, and narrative analyses. Further numbers and figures were generated through the SPSS software version 23.

3.6.1 Descriptive Analysis

Descriptive analysis was done through explaining, describing and discussion of data. The respondents provided diverse views, opinions, expressions, and information that required classification, description and elaboration so that results of analysis made sense (Smith, 2014, Mugenda, 2008). The descriptive analysis method was essential for structuring analysis due to vast data collected. It further provided the study with coherence as the flow of information moved from data to analysis, and finally to interpretation. The data collected was categorized so that there was logical progression of thought.
3.6.2 Content Analysis

Content analysis was an extremely important method of data analysis because it probed the data for substance (Flick, 2014). It was necessary to label, code and categorize information into themes, subthemes, topics, and subtopics. The themes and topics were discussed in view of the research objectives and questions. Content analysis therefore assisted the study to pick up ideas, patterns, and processes for radicalization of Muslim youths.

3.6.3 Narrative Analysis

Narrative analysis was a reference to the examination of stories, remembered history and accounts provided by respondents. The stories provided during the in-depth interview, the remembered histories recounted during answering of open-ended questionnaires, and the accounts of parents, teachers, Imams, and other stakeholders on how youth were lured into radical groups were scrutinized for meaning. Each story had its own meaning but when compared and contrasted to similar accounts implications of radicalization on youth emerged. The stories and accounts of how youths were recruited into radical violent extremist groups at first seemed harmless but after narrative analysis it became clear that the processes of radicalization had long started before deployment. The implication for narrative analysis was that stories were sometimes deliberately changed by respondents to cover up the real situation of the effects of radicalization.

3.6.4 Documentary Analysis

Qualitative documentary analysis was the interpretation of verbal and written texts to make meaning of experiences and views. Flick (2014) referred to subjective and social meanings of the
phenomena which needed to be understood when considering the immediate and broader context of texts. Several documents that were searched including religious texts, legal documents and archived materials contained raw and related information but documentary analysis assisted to order and inter-textually related one document to another. In documentary analysis the study looked at the internal textual structure for immediate meaning of texts. It further, examined the external context of each text to determine the intended meaning of each piece of legislation, archived information and Qur’anic messages.

The immediate context of texts had their own semantic value but when examined using documentary analysis the wider context of such texts provided the study with implications of taking the text literally, symbolically, and figuratively. When texts were taken literally their application had sometimes misinterpretation which led to serious effects on youths.

3.6.5  SPSS Analysis

In this study transcription of field notes and answers to questions were at first recorded in MS word before they were transferred to the SPSS software version 23 for analysis. Eventually, the data management was done through SPSS to generate a dataset for further analysis. The process of distilling and data cleaning was done by lumping variables together and assigning more codes to make it palatable to the data management system. Often, data sorting was part and parcel of data cleaning.

The software was essential in the process of keying in the specific variable for analysis and meaning making in terms of generating computerized information and summaries. The data managing, tabulating, and categorizing process was able produce numbers and figures for analysis. An index that classified themes and subthemes as per the objectives and questionnaire
was applied as a data management method (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). The quantification of data through the aforementioned software was in terms of numbers, tables and figures. The graphical presentation of information (Mugenda, 2008) was used in supplementing the explanation of information, topics, themes, and discussions.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

This study on Islamic radicalization processes and their effects on Muslim youth was highly sensitive to the subjects, government, and other key stakeholders. Due to this sensitivity the study considered confidentiality of information, anonymity of respondents, and requisite permissions extremely important before and during the study.

3.7.1 Permissions

Before the study was undertaken the researcher sought and obtained necessary authorizations and permissions from the relevant academic and research bodies. These included mainly Kenya Methodist University (KeMU), the National Council for Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), and Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (SERC). Further, permissions were given by the ministry of Education, relevant departments of the national and county governments. Specifically, letters of approval were provided to allow the study to be conducted within Kenya. Special approval was provided by my employer in the Ministry of Defence.

When collecting data each respondent or category of, schools, mosques, prisons and security agencies were verbally requested to grant permission to collect data. Each of these category of respondents were explained why their permission to use their information was necessary. By making the respondents aware of the reasons and functions of the research and by assurance of
their personal rights and protection of their privacy ethical ends were achieved and maintained even when the attitude of some respondents was highly skeptical, reserved, and unfriendly to the researcher and his assistants.

Perhaps the ethical issue hinging on the researcher’s security was when such unfriendliness to the research topic was hostile in words and gestures which were quelled through tact, diplomacy and the researcher’s background and training. The hostility and unfriendliness of some respondents was nothing unique to the research context since the sensitivity of the concept under scrutiny had also bedeviled many a researcher in this hotly contested area Ranstorp (2013) research in the Middle East on terrorism studies confirmed the field challenges of these kinds of studies which informed why there were few researchers involved in the field. The researcher also observed the restrictions and prohibitions from various highly secretive institutions. Official letters of recommendations from the work place were written to other organizations but the researcher was subjected to more panels in these organization/institutions.

3.7.2 Confidentiality

Confidentiality was a reference to not revealing sources of information where the respondents would be identified by others. It was also a reference to making data available in formats that did not betray the individuals who provided it. Confidential and prejudicial information was unpublished especially as pertaining to institutional and organizational identities. At personal level names, profession, experience and involvement in radicalization processes were considered for confidentiality reasons not to be availed without coding. Respondents who were thought to belong to proscribed groupings were assured of confidentiality so that the general reader of the results of the study could not identify them easily.
At the beginning of data collection each respondent was informed that the exercise was voluntary and no monetary benefits were accrued. Indeed all respondents were willing and enthusiastic to offer information without expecting rewards of anything.

As Walliman (2012) suggested on ethical issues of honesty, frankness, and personal integrity on one hand and the ethical responsibilities to the participants on the other, this research undertook to uphold these values in the process of conducting this research. The data collection process endeavored to avoid misreporting of information in the process of data gathering, sorting, coding and analysis such that the ideas generated represented the actual situation on radicalization of youths on the sampled population.

Tact and skillfulness was a necessity since the field dynamics at some point were not conducive for the research process. The need to strike a balance between Muslims who were supportive and those unsupportive, of course, with a sense of loss and mixed reactions was necessary thereby called for the researcher’s sobriety and interpreting such respective feelings in perspective.

Often, the researcher encountered suspicion amongst some respondents who were keen to know the reason for conducting such a research and whether sampling was sanctioned by County authorities and as an ethical aspect such suspicion, caution, and reluctance in release of information was acceptable just as other scholars such as (Kenney, 2013) also encountered this scenario in dealing with government officials, incarcerated traffickers and Salafi militants in their research contexts.

Echoing what Ranstorp (2013) testified about some researcher’s subjectivity, that is, ability to become “naive” and losing both focus and impartiality in the process of interviews thereby either sympathizing and adopting terrorists narratives on one hand and/or accepting the state’s official
counterterrorism policies and narratives on the other hand, this research sought to tread on the middle ground of impartiality as an academic objective.

### 3.7.3 Anonymity

Anonymity was the art of providing a veil to cover explicitly naming names of respondents, linking sensitive information to individuals, and identifying institutions or groups who provided sensitive information. In that case, respondents were at liberty to share only the information they were willing to share and their names and identities were also held in confidence.

Data was coded to protect respondents and maintain confidentiality by assigning people code names/numbers. Further, security agents, Mosques, schools, homes, and prisons were also given code names/numbers for easy referencing in this study but to disguise being identified by people who will read the findings, for example, all respondents/key informants and institutions were coded from Qcode1, Qcode2, Qcode3 up to the last coded respondent number (Appendix vi). In fact, the codes assigned to respondents secured their persons and identities in the context the sensitive nature of this research. Further, names of all respondents in this study were cleared to be displayed in the published report by the respective respondents and institution.

### 3.8 Chapter Summary

The study employed designs, methods, techniques, procedures and ethical considerations that were favorable for data collection and analysis. The overarching design and methods were taken from the qualitative approaches but were supplemented by quantitative methods. Data collection tools were designed to collect qualitative and quantitative data so that the four objectives of the study were fully addressed. In so doing, the validity and reliability of the instruments were
pretested and piloting to ensure the questions were right and the results they collected were assured.

The methodology adopted for this study suited the topic, objectives, and questions on the Islamic radicalization processes and their effects on Muslim youths in Isiolo. Data was collected from respondents who mainly were acquired through purposive sampling because the other forms of sampling were deemed unreliable to pick radicalized youths, parents, teachers, Imams, prison wardens, and security agents who had directly or indirectly dealt with radicalization processes. Due to the sensitivity of the research area care was taken to ensure permissions were granted at all levels, confidentiality was maintained in all situations and anonymity of respondents, data, and institutions was guaranteed. Collected data was categorized, coded, and presented in tables and figures for analysis.
CHAPTER FOUR  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter collected data was presented in prose, tables and figures to enable sufficient data analysis and interpretation. In data presentation qualitative data of methods of data analysis which included descriptive, content, narratives, and documentary analysis were employed. These methods were supplemented with the presentation of numbers and figures analyzed through SPSS software version 23.

This chapter discussed the data that was collected from all categories of respondents. Each cohort represented a particular characteristic(s) that provided critical data for analysis. The data collected was sorted according to specific variables representing the objectives. All objectives received attention in data presentation, analysis and interpretation to ensure results were available for discussion. In data presentation the general description of the respondents and study samples was undertaken through response rates. The discussion of the results centered on the synthesizing the data collected, the literature reviewed and research objectives and questions. In this chapter results of the study were critically examined to find the nexus between Islamic radicalization processes and their effects on Muslim youths in Isiolo.

In order to establish the extent of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo it was necessary to find out where Islam had spread, the institutions where youths were influenced, and radicalization processes that youth were required to go through before deployment. Data emanating from such institutions as homes, schools, mosques, prison, and government agencies underscored the assumption that Islam was dominant religion in Isiolo. It also indicated that radicalization processes did not follow a linear progression because a recruit would not necessarily follow all
steps before deployment as indicated in the conceptual framework. The same data showed that there were distinct characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths in Isiolo. It further indicated that indeed there were serious effects of Islamic radicalization processes on Muslim youths in Isiolo. A total of 600 questionnaires were distributed to a consortium of respondents and 593 of them returned which accounted for 98.8% return rate. There remaining 7 respondents who did not return the questionnaire accounted for 1.2% of the sample. Table 4.1 represented the specific questionnaire return rate.
Table 4.1  

*Questionnaire return rate*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Source of sample</th>
<th>Questionnaires Distributed</th>
<th>Return rate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Isiolo Barracks Secondary school</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Isiolo Girls Secondary School</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>St. Pauls’ Kiwanjani Secondary School</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wamy Secondary School</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Waso Day Secondary School</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Waso Day Sunshine Secondary School</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bula Waso Secondary School</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Al-Falah Primary School</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kambi Garba Primary</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>School of Infantry Mosque</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>School of Combat Engineering Mosque</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Masjid Noor Mosque</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Defense Headquarters’ Mosque</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>County Commissioner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Prison Warden Isiolo Prison</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Directors of NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Imams, Sheikhs, and Maalims</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Police Officers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Centre NCTC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Muslim youths out of School</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>County Government Officials</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Parents of youths who have dropped out of School</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parents of youths who have joined terror groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>600</strong></td>
<td><strong>593</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.8%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high return rate of the questionnaire was not without drawbacks. The emotive nature of the study made the researcher devise a *modus operandi* to sample youth through a measurement scale while at the same time optimizing responses through structured and focus groups discussions. This necessitated the researcher to devise a measurement scale in line with grounded
theory (Section 2.2.3) as the main instruments with youths to mitigate hostile responses from youths. The likert scale in Table 4.2 indicated that not all secondary school participated in filling the likert scale. This was due to the fact that some of them were not willing to engage in the exercise. They either moved out during the exercise or decided not to fill the scale. There were those who totally destroyed both the scale and questionnaire. By the figures shown above 90.7% was an achievement in the overall analysis of respondent rate from the sampled secondary schools. There were 10 respondents who filled the questionnaire who were staff members from those schools which made the total number of the likert scale questionnaire from schools to arrive at 357 respondents.

**Table 4.2**

*Secondary School students who responded to Likert scale Questionnaire*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the School</th>
<th>No. of students</th>
<th>Likert Scale participation</th>
<th>Percentage(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wamy Isiolo High School</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo Girls High School</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waso Secondary School</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawaso Sunshine Mixed Secondary School</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul’s Kiwanjani Mixed Secondary School</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo Barracks Secondary School</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>347</strong></td>
<td><strong>315</strong></td>
<td><strong>90.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The respondents were classified according to their ages for the purposes of analysis and overview of the sample out schools and respondents from homes/villages, mosques and the general public. The characteristics of respondents also enabled the researcher make classifications and inferences of the information given. The mean age was 1.54 (N=366) which placed the common age cohort in the study to approximately 2.0 that was the range of between 19-24 years meaning that the active population targeted in this study presented the dynamics favored by recruiters. This age cohort related with an Israel study of ages 17-22 years as suitable for radicalization based on identity issues as reviewed (Section 1.1.1) and who engaged in suicide terrorism.

Age cohort 13-18 years was the highest in a sample of 357 whereby 259(72.5%) were youths since the study was largely conducted mostly in secondary schools in Isiolo County. However, two primary schools were sampled. Ages 19-24 years at 59(16.5%) were few secondary school students in the final years in school and school leavers who were reached out in the course of the study.

The research also consulted both working class and unemployed youths of 25-29 years in the sample comprising of 17(4.8%) some of whom were in their early careers and were exposed to the encroachment of youth radicalization. Ages 30-39 years in sample was 10(2.8%) some of whom were undergoing training on CT and who worked with key security apparatus who also gave data for critical analysis. However, stakeholders as parents, teachers, and civil servants also fell under the same category.

Finally, the age cohort of 40 years and above comprised of 11(3.1%). Often these were respondents in leadership positions and who were well-versed with radicalization concept and thus were consulted to mitigate the gaps on the issue of misinformation and ignorance on the
general area of radicalization among the populace and mostly the youths. A summary of age cohort characteristics were listed in Figure 4.1

Figure 4.1

Respondents by Age Cohort(s)

A total of 458 students from eight schools (both primary and secondary) were interviewed with few staff members. The data presented below reflected those who successfully filled the measurement scale. Some students chose to participate in group discussions but were unwilling to fill the questionnaire. Further, in two primary schools as indicated the classes participated in group discussions but were not required to fill the scale.
The head teachers willing to fill the scale were allowed to do so. A deputy principal in a school which was not investigated gave valid information for inclusion in this academic piece especially on infiltration routes and characteristics of radicalized youths. The respondents tagged other(s) represented college and university students who also participated in filling the questionnaire and interviews. The students, teachers and principals who participated in the exercise were as shown in Figure 4.2 shows a sample of 357 youths, teachers and key informants who participated in the interview process as captured in the filling of measurement scale.

The listings based on the frequency and percentages in the likert scale from the highest to the lowest showed that 91(25.5) were from Isiolo Barracks Secondary School, followed Waso Secondary School 79(22.1%), then Bula Waso Secondary school 48(13.4%), Isiolo Girls High School 45(12.6%), St. Paul’s Kiwanjani Day Secondary School 43(12.0%), Wamy Secondary School 17(4.8%), administrator and a teacher from Al-Falah Primary Schools represent 1(0.3%) percent each. The rest of the sample 32(9.0) represented a sample of key informants. The pupils from the two primary schools, that is, Al-Falah and Kambi Garba, were never subjected to likert scale because the concepts in the questionnaire were beyond their comprehension. Instead they were involved in focus group discussions.
In order to ensure the sample reflected the geographical dynamics in Isiolo County the respondents’ residences were sampled out. Since not all respondents identified their localities in terms of residences or home areas there was assigned a variable of other(s) as long as indicators were present that the informant was from Isiolo County. There were cases of respondents from surrounding counties which also were lumped into the other(s) category since they either schooled or worked in Isiolo County thereby presumed to understand the radicalization discourse in the county. In that case a sample of 357 respondents reported that 55(15.4%), 46(12.9%), 40 (11.2%), 40(11.2), 23(6.4%), 17(4.8%) and 13(3.6%) came mainly from Bula Pesa, Isiolo town,
Tulu Roba, Kiwanjani, Kula Mawe, Kambi Garba and Mwangaza areas respectively. The respondents from other sub-locations within Isiolo and neighboring counties were 70(19.6%) but who were sampled and admitted as valid based on their understanding the dynamics in the county up to and including radicalization. Generally the distribution of respondents covered the entire Isiolo region as objectified and studied (See Table 4.3).
Table 4.3

Geographical Distribution of Respondents by Home Area(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Area</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kula Mawe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulu Roba</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambi Garba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo town</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambi ya juu</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiwanjani</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngaremara</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bula Pesa</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checheles</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwangaza</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mater care</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambi Odha</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milimani</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacred Heart</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asharaf</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maili Tatu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maili Saba</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taqwa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gafarsa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisima</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wabera</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(s)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>357</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was necessary to sample the occupational profiles for in-depth analysis of the sample. Government officials, religious leaders, educationists/teachers, military officials, civil servants, businessmen, prison officers, among others, were the professional sub-sample. The students formed a huge chunk in this category but expert and informed views and opinions was presumed to come from key informants as indicated in Table 4.4. The purposive sample of 10 Sub-sets of occupational characteristics showed that out of 367 respondents 321(87.5%) percent were students and pupils from primary and secondary schools respectively, 7(1.9%) police officers, 10(2.7%) sheikhs/Imams and educationists/teachers each category, 5(1.4%) civil servants 6(1.6%) and the remainder represented military officers 8(2.2%), prison officer(s) 1(0.3%), businessmen 2(0.5%), and others 6(1.6%) (13).

Table 4.4

Respondents by Occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Educationists/Teachers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student(s)</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officer(s)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military officer(s)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant(s)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(s)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>367</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The sample was comprised of primary and secondary school education level with college and university level of education to a lesser degree. The college and university goers were children and youth handlers, teachers and principals. In Figure 4.3 with a constant of 357 respondents 324(90.8%), 8(2.2) and 25(7.0%) represented data from secondary schools, colleges and university graduates respectively. Of course primary schools cohort was consulted separately apart from the statistical analysis as presented.

Figure 4.3

Respondents by Education Levels
In summary the profiling of respondents according to their respective characteristics made the research to exhaustively consider the discourse of radicalization in the county. Eventually, the religious background and its vulnerability to youth influence were mapped. It was necessary to situate, analyze and address the notion that Islam was vital in radicalization. To the extent that extremists use religious, that is, Islamic ideology albeit from an altered perspective cannot be gainsaid. Profiling the respondents in this study projected the big picture about the county and the researcher was able to collect rich data from an array of respondents and key informants. The youths from schools and school leavers often portrayed a degree of knowledge about their fellow youths who were on the verge of radicalization and even those who have crossed over to foreign lands. The data presented by youth(s) as a category and target of indoctrination was ground breaking in measuring and attaining the objectives of the study. As parents, teachers, educationists and youth handlers were engaged in the interviews it became apparent that the problem of youth recruitment was complex and emotive. Apart from the sample characteristics majoring on youths in secondary schools the need to control respondents’ bias and prejudice was contained through having several groups. First, the presence of both Muslims and Christians in the sample was a necessary occurrence for cross-checking and mitigating data bias. Secondly, the information given in schools was also controlled and analyzed alongside information given by security and intelligent agents. Finally, interview with former Muslims who had converted to Christianity was a necessary control group that provided handy information on how sacred texts, tenets and concepts were used in Islam and by recruiters. Coincidentally, these former Muslims, some of whom were government officials, were as conversant and objective in reporting and their knowledge base was well-balanced similar to those Muslims working with intelligence and security apparatus to counter terrorism.
4.1 THE EXTENT OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN ISIOLO COUNTY

Before the objective of extent of Islamic radicalization was established the study surveyed how far religious communities were distributed and spread in the county. In fact the objective of the extent of Islamic radicalization was measured by religious dynamics in the county and the scope of Islamic radicalization thereof. The institutions that promoted Islamic radicalization were also analyzed in the study. The agencies and means of radicalization as the media, abductions and reinterpreted sacred texts were also examined in the overall analysis of the scope of radicalization in the aforementioned county.

4.1.1 Muslim Population in Isiolo County

As much as religious distribution in Isiolo County represented main faith communities the predominance of Islam was undeniable fact. This was established by sampling respondents based on their religious affiliations and their family religion. Consequently, the distribution of Mosques in the county also evidenced the widespread of Muslim population in Isiolo County. This distribution of faith communities especially in schools portrayed a kind of unintended imbalance in this purposive sample.

In a sample of students in their final year both in primary and secondary schools presumably conversant with school environment and trends in terms of truancy linked to radicalization 357 students 230(64.4%) and 127(35.6%) were Muslims and Christians respectively. The statistics based on secondary schools were as indicated in Appendix ii sample 1. The sampling of primary schools separately at Kambi Garba primary school confirmed that 30 of 39 representing 76.9% were Muslims and 23% were Christians while at Al-falah primary school all were Muslims. The latter was primarily a Muslim oriented school.
These statistics in both primary and secondary schools reflected the population dynamics and the religious distribution in the county and thus were pointers to the direction that Muslim population was huge. It was also presumed that the school was the ideal place to sample representative population dynamics of the county. This conclusion was arrived at since both public and private schools were sampled in the study. The two schools that were purely Muslim were Al-Falah Primary school and Wamy Secondary School.

The same religious dynamics also reflected in terms of the number of Mosques and family religion in Isiolo County as presented in Appendix ii sample 2. Noteworthy, the predominance of Islam in Isiolo County was not construed as radicalization but population dynamics occasioned by human migrations and settlements. As to whether such migrations and movements eventually align with European history dating from 1887 BCE) to produce a handful of holy warriors (Table 2.5) was beyond the scope of this study as per now but remained to be seen but possible in the light of contemporary radicalization narratives. The data on Appendix ii sample 1 explained the predominance of the Muslim population in schools in Isiolo County.

The data set of the family religion also reflected a Muslim majority in this purposive sample. The testing of family religion was to check whether it was a communal affair as opposed to personal and private within the surveyed communities. By this fact it was possible to link contemporary violence from these faith communities to individual persuasion or communally instigated. The interplay of religion as a private or a communal affair especially as it related to politics and family ties was in the historical purview of Semitic religious traditions. The merging of private life, communal life and public life was seen to promote fundamentalism especially in the clash of civilization theory (Section 2.2.1). Coincidentally, both Christians and Muslims confessed that their faith background reflected their family religion in equal measure.
Statistically, 233 of 357 representing 63.5% were Muslims; while 133 of 357 representing 36.2% were Christians while one individual from other faiths, that is, Hindu representing 0.3%. A contrast of the findings from Appendix ii sample 1 and Appendix ii sample 2 were construed to be non-coincidental but established the fact of Muslim population predominance in the sample and the county by extension. Therefore, the figures and percentages arrived at by measuring both the Muslim and Christian religious practices in the county grounded the fact of Islamic predominance as indicated in Appendix ii sample 2.

The sampling on the distribution of Mosques within the county was occasioned by several reasons. First, the ignorance and assumption that existed in the populace on Mosques as hotbeds of radicalization in global contexts invited objective scrutiny of Mosque facility. Second, the unintended occurrence(s) that most respondents from schools were Muslims also necessitated the sampling of the Mosques within Isiolo County. Third, the exploration of sacred texts and concepts as used by radicalizers endeared the study to the Muslim community perceived to be conversant with the Qur’an, hadiths and the Sunnah. Fourth, an engagement with religious authorities as Sheikh, Imams and Maalims prompted the study to probe the Mosque environment. However, as the reasons stated made the Mosque suitable for study the main concern was a determination of the population of Mosques in Isiolo County which also informed the Muslim population by extension.

In a constant sample of 357 responses from Muslims 36(10.1%) were from Jamia Mosque, 16(4.5) from Al-Hidayah Mosque, 15(4.2%) from Al-Rahma Mosque, 14(3.9) from Quba Mosque and 8(2.2%) from Al-Rahim and Taqwa Mosques each. Again, the variable tagged “others” 177(49.6%) represented those that indicated the response ‘Mosque’ without being specific. The generality in response to the variable “other” was an indication of fear since the
Mosque had previously been associated with radicalization. The rest of the Mosques scored below seven participants accounting for remaining percentages. The Mosque capacity in Isiolo County reflected the religious dynamics and psychology of the community with a total of 39 Mosques in the sample as shown in Appendix iv.

An aspect of sampling the religious distribution also involved Mosque loading in an area. An approximation was determined by data given that the balkanized population of Isiolo County also had a characteristics of Mosques densely distributed in Muslim dominated areas like Tulu Roba, Wabera, Checheles, Bula pesa and town area among others. The areas without Mosque representing 18.6% were Christian dominated areas but also involved muted responses. The sample also reported few cases of distribution of Mosques in areas outside Isiolo County. In Appendix ii sample 3 the data presented explained such dynamics.

After determining the religious distribution in county it was possible to measure Islamic radicalization as reported by youths and the general populace. The data on Islamic radicalization was based on the knowledge that the youths presented to the researcher on how youths were radicalized in the county. As much as mixed reactions was reported in the sample based on perceived encroachment to religious space of a faith community a high rate response was also registered. The analysis of the responses indicated that Islamic radicalization of youths existed in the county. The preliminary part of questionnaire and a likert scale addressed the extent to which Islamic radicalization had occurred in Isiolo county. A discussion on the spread of Islamic radicalization was reported through the history and positioning of the county, conversions and institutional frameworks abetting radicalization (Section 2.3.4)
4.1.2 Spread of Islamic Radicalization in Isiolo County

Despite the many extremists groups globally the East African context seemed to grapple with the emerging effect of Al-Shabaab as the West African context grappled with Boko Haram and the Northern parts of the continent especially Mali in the recent years reported the presence of ISIS. Generally, the extent of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo County was effected through extremists group Al-Shabaab in the region. However, the global interconnectedness of these terror groups especially through the digital superhighway and a shared philosophical ideology reaching far and wide included to lesser degree the Taliban, Hezbollah and Hamas, among others. Arguably, the extent of Islamic radicalization from the statistics showed that regional dynamics portrayed unique characteristics and enhanced Islamic radicalization in particular zones.

In short Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda and ISIS were the populous radicalization agencies in Isiolo County and the data from youths on the extent of radicalization proved this fact. Additionally, youths also admitted that there were underground radicalization cells in Isiolo County but hardly giving the zones where recruitment took place for fear of repression and victimization.

In Figure 4.4 the youths were aware of Al-Shabaab activities not only in the county but as a global phenomenon in recent years. There was enough literature reviewed that confirmed the presence of Al-Shabaab underground cells in the country. Specifically Kenya was mentioned as one of the countries where Al-Qaeda had planted radicalization cells by 2001 (Section 2.3.3). It was also confirmed in a study conducted in Kenya on how Al-Shabaab had influenced the social structure in Kenya (Figure 2.2)
On a scale assessment in Figure 4.4 there were strong sentiments from respondents that Islamic radicalization was almost at equilibrium whereby those in agreement that Islamic radicalization was high was almost equal to those who felt the opposite. In 357 respondents 62 (17.4%) and 82(23.0%) strongly agreed and agreed respectively that recruitment of youth into violent religious groups in Isiolo County was high on one hand while on the other hand 62(17.4%) and 79(22.1%) strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively that recruitment of youths into violent religious groups in Isiolo County was high. The undecided part of the sample stood at 62(17.4%) a considerable amount to shift results significantly to either on agreement or disagreements.
Generalizations were drawn from previous responses that those who felt that radicalization was high in Isiolo County were those who had known cases of youths joining the terror group Al-Shabaab or its affiliate(s). It was also observed that those who had strong sentiments against Isiolo County being a hotspot for Islamic radicalization did so in defense of the perceived association of Islamic radicalization with Islam a notion that was also prevalent during group discussions and interviews. In the context of global Islamic radicalization the feeling of loss was
evident especially by moderates that the likes of Osama bin Laden and violent extremists had hijacked Islam (Sections 2.2.3 and 1.1.1). In a significant way such sense of denial of reality of radicalization hardly helped tackle the problem of youth radicalization anywhere at any given time.

### 4.1.3 Radicalization in Institutions

As a social phenomenon an assessment on institutions such as homes, schools, prisons and Mosques were consulted and the findings showed that Islamic radicalization affects these institutions at varying degrees. Again, the clandestine nature of radicalization was seen to affect the responses given. However, the information minted was useful in the analysis of radicalization in these institutions. It must be noted that the sensitivity of the subject only permitted the release of percentages of radicalized Muslim youths in the specific institutions as the homes, the schools, the Mosques and prisons.

The extent of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo County was comprehended through a measuring tool, that is, likert scale was applied to the aforementioned institutions. The ratings were high on homes and villages with 42(11.8%) strong concurrences on youth radicalization and 94(26.4) agreeing on the same. First the likert scale analysis was in tandem with the notion from a one-on-one interview (Qcode358) on homes and some key villages were known for youth radicalization. The second place that favored Islamic radicalization according to this report was the prison 28(7.8%) with strong sentiments and 55(15.4%) on agreement. Third, the institution of the school also favored youth radicalization with 26(7.3%) and 54(15.1%) strongly agreeing and agreeing respectively. Fourth, the Mosque(s) was rated with 29(8.1%) strongly agreeing while 43(12.0%) agreeing.
The strong sentiments against Islamic radicalization in the latter institution 132(37.0%) strong disagreements and 93(26.0%) disagreements were recorded since the issue was emotive and a presumed encroachment and hijacked Islam narrative (Section 2.2.3). The respondents also registered high rates of disagreements on schools being involved in radicalization with 96(26.9%) strongly disagreeing while 119(33.3%) agreeing. Like the Mosque(s) strong anti–radicalization comments from the schools argued their positions as centers of learning and not necessarily Islamic radicalization. As much as these sentiments were valid the findings also suggest that Islamic radicalization as a social process had the tendency to encroach or infiltrate any organization whether religious, centers of learning, government institutions, among others, and therefore the results and findings therein remain valid as well.

The cumulative mean score stands 12.975% as the average level of Islamic radicalization of youth in institutions as discussed herein. The institutional analysis mean score hardly captured the psychology of the community since deviations existed where respondents were cautious to release information as expected. In that case the mean score on Islamic radicalization in the county could be higher than projected. Further, the grounded theory confirmed the results as valid by piecing together bits of information and thereby measuring through the likert scale. Based on the results the study related the findings to the existence of radicalization cells in the country but specifically on the Northern part of the country. Based on the field operations cell structure (See Figure 2.9 in Section 2.3.4) radicalization of youths in the county was occasioned by historical underground groups and networks. Table 4.5 confirmed the fact of radicalization in the county.
Table 4.5

Radicalization in Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOMES/VILLAGES</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOLS</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOSQUES</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRISONS</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCALE**

SA = Strongly Agree
A = Agree
SD = Strongly Disagree
D = Disagree
Undecided
In the recent years Islamic radicalization had gone a notch higher to involve covert Islamic radicalization processes whereby Islamic radicalization ideologies were getting integrated within the religious institutional framework. In clandestine manner radical clerics, peers, foreigners and parents abetted radicalization. A sample of 14 youths in the county in Isiolo town during an NGO counter terrorism initiative spearheaded by a CBO/FBO confirmed the role of clerics, peers, foreigners and parents (Sections 2.1.1, 2.2.1 and 2.3.3) in covert radicalization processes. The discussion on the radical sheikhs 6(42.8) as poor or bad leaders or elders within the community and fellow youths 6(42.8%) who had been radicalized presented the highest number of agents of Islamic radicalization. The role of parents 6(7.2%) which was minimal was reported to be emanating partly poor parenting but also to direct involvement with Islamic radicalization as had occurred in contexts as suicide terrorism by Hamas in Palestine (Section 2.1.1) The aliens or foreigners 6(14.2%) through infiltration, the ICT (internet) and phone calling were also involved in radicalization of youths. The county as a frontier zone was seen to be accessible from neighboring terrorist cells and thus the effect of foreigners through the porous border was felt. Sample 8 in Appendix ii illustrated how mainstream frameworks abetted radicalization.

The sampling of the institutions such as the school, home, Mosque and prison in the measurement scale was for the purposes of giving an overview of extent of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo County. These institutions were specifically analyzed separately to understand how Islamic radicalization entrenched itself in these institutions as representations of the entire population in Isiolo County.
a) Radicalization in Homes and Villages

Analysis of the extent of Islamic radicalization also discussed separately the institutions as homes/villages, the Mosque and the school system as crucial socialization venues. Apart from the homes or villages in some areas prone to Islamic radicalization the social process of radicalization rarely situated radicalization as a geographically static occurrence. But that homes and villages had both homogenous and heterogeneous characteristics that favor socialization of youths was undeniable and by so being influenced youths through indoctrination. By this fact it was no coincidence that the statistics supporting Islamic radicalization on the higher side in homes/villages than the other institution were recorded. The social setting of the home and villages allowed for friendships and bonding to occur as youths with similar characteristics and leanings interact. The respondents conversant with their home and village environments were able give data and situate radicalization based on what they knew and understood about the activities that youth were involved in. The specific villages were mentioned by respondents as hotspots of radicalization as discussed herein. The mean score of radicalization in homes and villages stood at 19.05% based on the likert scale’s strong agreements on one hand and agreements on the other hand (Figure 4.5).
b) Radicalization in the Mosque(s)

The Mosque was sampled out as an institution that had in the recent times attracted attention and supposedly deemed prone to youth radicalization. As much as statistics towards institutions as possible radicalization venues point to all directions the intensity of feelings on the Mosque were relatively low yet significant in the analysis in this research. Ideally, recruiters rarely target entire populations for recruitment but selected few that qualify to serve the best interests of violent extremist groups. Generally, the respondents expressed their feelings on a percentage of youths
in Mosques embracing radical groups but were never required to be specific on particular Mosque thereby removing the stigma associated with aforesaid institution.

By the feelings of respondents, the Mosques were least on radicalization and obviously so by the sample holding a considerable amount of respondents especially students whose leanings supported their faith and feelings. But that did not mean the Mosque environment was less or more hotbed of radicalization in comparison to other institutions because radicalization as a social phenomenon went beyond religious, ethnic and sociocultural boundaries.

In Figure 4.6 the mean radicalization score on the measurement scale in Mosques as possible radicalization venues stood at 10.07%. The statistics as shown reflected the feelings of Muslim youths who formed a chunk of respondents in this research. The Kenyan case in the recent past expressed that radical clerics were responsible to youth radicalization. In an interview with youths in a Mosque in Isiolo County a youth incidentally responded to a group discussion question: The Researcher: “Ni nani anafundisha vijana vurugu na uchochezi wa kidini? (Who teaches youths to embrace violent religious extremism?) A youth: “Masheikhs” (Sheikhs) before she was scorned at by others.

Apart from the answer given by the teenager hereby classified as a youth there is much ignorance that shrouds the area of radicalization especially on Mosque. As much as the respect of the Mosque must be upheld realities not only in the case of Isiolo County abound where radical Islam misrepresented the Mosques for extremist brand of Islam especially in global contexts (Section 2.1.3). The Kenyan case scenario might not have taken the serious dimension of Mosques being centers of radicalization but caution needed to be taken that radicals hardly infiltrated this institution for their recruitment. It was also noted here that the feelings that research on terrorism targeted Islam remained a far-fetched mindset that rarely captured
scholarliness in theory and praxis. Often radicalizers, agents and recruiters capitalized on the community’s ignorance to fan sympathy from the minds and hearts of the less informed in the society. In Figure 4.6 the mean radicalization score in the Mosque(s) were deduced.

Figure 4.6

*Radicalization Score in the Mosque(s)*

![Bar chart showing radicalization scores in mosques.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radicalization of youths occurs mainly in Mosques</th>
<th>Prozent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>16.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>26.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>36.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>12.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>8.12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SA  Strongly Agree    SD  Strongly Disagree
A    Agree            D    Disagree        Undecided

**c) Radicalization in the Schools**

The school environment as a social setting also contained characteristics of bonding and student influence through peer groups and pressure. As in the homes and villages the level of
conditioning and adopting extreme beliefs and behaviors in schools as well was affirmed by this research. In this study the phrase pro-radicalization behaviors was used to discuss youths who never distinguished between mainstream Islam and violent religious extremists. In that case the pro-radicalization behavior including animosity and uncooperative attitude to the researchers were indicators of their mental processes that made them susceptible and inclined towards extremist narratives.

In this analysis it was also observed that agents of radicalization targeted public and private schools for radicalization. Specifically, the madrassas were targeted which confirmed the issue of Boko Haram and the abduction of Chibok school girls in Nigeria (Section 1.1.3). But specifically, the Al-Qaeda network through Sudan’s National Islamic Front charities to Islamic party of Kenya to Mosques, Islamic schools and Madrassa (Section 1.1.3) were instances where the school system was singled out for radicalization. But in stage progression to radicalization trajectories it was also observed that dropping out of school was a detachment phase towards joining terror organization (see Table 2.8).

Based on these findings it was always necessary to consider even curricular in religious schools and from time to time since they could turn into hotbeds of radicalization. This claim was also confirmed by a Pakistan case (Section 2.3.3.) where a religious system created a parallel curriculum that propagated radicalization. A deputy principal in a school confessed that there was a teacher who was radicalization youths in the school but was discovered and transferred (Appendix ii sample 1)

Specifically, the mean score on youth radicalization in schools based on the measurement scale was 11.2% (Figure 4.7). These findings established the outcry by parents especially in one of the schools tagged as recruitment cell to be a possible fact. The data from parents, a deputy principal
and the security experts was undeniable to that end. A deputy Principal from the same school was also cooperative. There were clips by parents complaining that their children disappeared from schools and were located outside the country already recruited and operating within file and rank of Islamists militants as was analyzed within this research. Figure 4.7 explained the sentiments of youths.

**Figure 4.7**

*Radicalization Score in School(s)*
A confession Qcode387 who was a soldier in a military barracks was even revealing on youth radicalization in a school. She recalled of a day during her initial years in the military that the security measures were tightened based on leaflets from Al-Shabaab that they were attack the camp. Later on an investigation was done and it was discovered that they were school boys linked to the terror group as illustrated in Appendix ii sample 1.

The scenario of radicalization in schools was also confirmed by a deputy school principal. He also confided to the researcher that the issue was real since even one teacher in their secondary school was implicated in radicalizing students. Another teacher also gave this data on 27th January 2020:

The problem of radicalization is still going on since by the end of last year (2019) three more youths were recruited and taken to Somalia. They called and said they were not coming back. It seems there is or are influential people/persons in the county recruiting youths to Al-Shabaab (IR1)

Radicalization in schools as elsewhere cannot be ruled out nor gainsaid. Perhaps a confirmation from a Primary school teacher also anchored the issue of radicalization. He confided to the researcher and research assistants thus:

About 5 youths in a location Qcode398 [designated in this study by phonetic Tango] between the end of 2019 and early 2020, that is, in January, were recruited to Al-Shabaab. The threat of radicalization is real.
As much as radicalization had been said to be irrespective of ethnic groups, religion and social status, among others, this research also proved that its existence in Isiolo County affected person(s) even in the traditionally closed-up institutions. In fact, the point of concern in this case was not the institution itself and personnel but families. Information minted from a long-serving staff member made it evident that radicalization was unquestionable in Isiolo County:

Radicalization in Isiolo is real. It can be traced up to even sensitive government institutions. Some disappearances from a secondary school (mostly) was linked and proven to be an Al-Shabaab influence. When I was in Isiolo a mother came to report that her boy schooling in the school said he was visiting her aunt in Wajir. The boy never went to her aunt. Upon police investigation the boy had gone to Somalia and unfortunately died there. Radicalization is real in Isiolo. *Hiyo kitu ni real* (That thing is real). Mombasa more real but *ilihypenyepenya mpaka Isiolo* (it infiltrated up to Isiolo). The leaflets issue was also real and it raised alert but was also a psychological warfare. But there was another case when I was in Kamanga for 2 years. A rich contractor was linked to being a sympathizer of Al-Shabaab yet he was friendly and approachable. *Alikuwa ananunulia watu soda sana na watu walimpendea hiyo na hata askari wakampenda.* (He used to buy people lots of sodas and people loved him for that even soldiers loved him because of that generosity) (Qcode391)

The data presented by Qcode391 grounded and confirmed the issue of leaflets as reported by Qcode387. The two had also served in Isiolo for a long time. The authenticity of their
data was essential since they weren’t aware of the study as undertaken and therefore innocently provided data for analysis herein.

By the foregoing, this research affirmed that the outcry by parents that the disappearance of their children was linked to recruitment into terror groups as a fact. Based on these preliminary findings on youth radicalization in schools the characteristics of some youths bordering on indiscipline and uncooperativeness in the study process can only be said to be suggestive. The line between indiscipline, waywardness and association with radical networks was very thin but required safety precautions from youth handlers.

In a nutshell radicalization being a social phenomenon thrived on social settings in the institutions as discussed that is, the school, homes/villages, prison and mosques. In conclusion the historicity of radicalization in the county reflected a global phenomenon that was interlinked, interwoven and complex process that thrived through creating global networks. In this study it was discovered that no much work had been done at least from the researcher’s view to study religious radicalization processes in the institutions as mentioned. To the fact that the study conducted was ground breaking on the extent of Islamic radicalization processes in the county was objectified by the findings.

In Summary, the extent of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo County was considerably snowballing within the community at a rate that required attention (See Table 4.5). Specifically, institutions as the homes/villages, schools, Mosques and prisons were key targets by recruiters. The cumulative mean score on youth radicalization in the county stood at 12.975% as measured by the likert scale. Beginning from homes/villages on the lead mean score of 19.05% (Figure 4.5), followed by the prison with a mean score of 11.6% then the schools with a mean score of 11.2% (Figure 4.7) and finally the Mosque with a mean score of 10.05% (Figure 4.5). This proved that
there already existed operatives within the institutions to woo youths to terror groups. The radicalization scale (Table 4.5) was arrived at and the mean scores were based on both the knowledge and feelings that the youths had on the extent of religious extremism in the county. The scores remain binding but not static based on the increased activities of violent extremists groups in the region. The statistics as presented in the study rated the extent of Islam radicalization in the county to be taking shape in a clandestine manner.

4.1.4 Islamic Approaches to Radicalization

From a panoramic view Islamic radicalization considered the methods and factors that promoted radicalization ab initio. The reason was to lay the philosophy underpinning the approaches taken by extremists in inducing youths to violence. In this section inducement, abductions, the internet, sacred texts and concepts as the madrassas and jihad, among others, were proven by the data provided to have laid the ground by which recruitment and Islamic radicalization processes were anchored.

a) Inducements

A sample of youths affirmed that the youths who joined extremists groups received tokens, promises or monies. Additionally the internet was reported by youths as playing a pivotal role in youth radicalization. In this research inducements and the internet were the overarching methods of radicalization. Additionally, terror groups’ activities, alteration of religious concepts and texts were as well involved in the aforesaid processes and therefore necessary in the discussion of the processes.
Analysis of data from expert provided by key informants suggested that extremists capitalized on the fault lines in the society to radicalize youths. Qcode358 (Appendix vi) reported that apart from historical injustices and political marginalization unemployment was the reason violent extremist tokenism prevailed on youths. The same reasons were given in a slight manner by Qcode360 (Appendix vi) that recruiters made the youths feel neglected by government, parents and other religious groups and therefore promises of good jobs abroad was the alternative. Qcode361 (Appendix vi) who was also an employed youth working on youth social work with an NGO cited underlying societal problems as frustrations, poverty and marginalization camouflaged to religious ideologies fanning the recruitment.

In a one-on-one interview with a parent in a Mosque in one of the military establishment in Isiolo County it also became clear that money played a key role in manipulation of children into joining terror groups. He pointed out clearly that the promises to lure youths often appeared lucrative from the beginning but eventually turn into a gimmick which most youths were naïve to detect. He confided:

Radicalization is about money. A child is given Kshs10, 000.00 (ten thousand) only to make him or her accept to be recruited. The only other payment to a parent is a call either from the child to say goodbye daddy or mummy or from the agents that your child is dead. The child is made to believe that the 1st enemy is your parent. The other problem comes from parents because they do not sensitize nor take care of their children. The radicalizers capitalize on this existing weakness form bad, poor or lack of parenting in its entirety (IR4)
The nexus between recruitment and money was not a farfetched consideration in Islamist radicalization processes. The presence of recruiters was a fact. In fact another concerned resident with characteristics of a recruiter also reported of an incident of an Isiolo County resident arrested by authorities in a foreign country. His exact wordings that “two days ago or three a boy from a location Qcode398 [designated in this study by phonetic Tango] was arrested at Philippines in a five star hotel with lots of money with grenades guns and assorted weapons…” Yet probing him further with questions like; “Did you know the youth? Had you met him before? Which media aired the news?” His reply was emphatic “…Don’t you worry…usitake kujua zaidi” (stop inquiring too much). The researcher also was privy to the fact that the respondent was mysterious in that he kept on disappearing from time to time and was always concerned on matters radicalization. Obviously he appeared more of an agent even as he was probing others. The linkage between the radicalized boy and the cell that Osama Bin Laden had planted and supported in the Philippines (Sections 2.1.1 and 2.3.3) was beyond the scope of the study at this point but yet established the extent of Islamic radicalization in the county.

The monetary gains that youths were promised softened their resolve and thereby became prime candidates for recruitment. Often there were respondents who possessed all the characteristics of sympathy in the sample. As much as socioeconomic parameters were reported as the cause for youth radicalization the complex process itself was also deeply sociocultural, political and ideological in nature. Further, on the concept of inducement which acted as an existential reward women were accorded and pressurized to get married as Jihad brides for security and provision of needs (Section 2.3.4). Conversely, as radicalization of women in universities was through inducement and pressure the boys were as well promised cash and women as they joined terror organizations. The issues of monetary gains in radicalization was also linked to the funding of
local groups and the *tabligh* movement was associated with Osama bin Laden stashing monies for global jihadists (Section 2.3.3).

As violent religious extremists capitalized on fault lines in the society and inducements through a perceived alleviation of suffering were established by the study as a method that aided processes of Islamic radicalization. This fact was true whether we talk of issues as marginalization; discrimination and limiting of strategic resources like education, employment and so on (Section 2.3.2).

The sample indicated that 31(8.68%) of 357 youths confessed to have known a youth induced through tokens or monies or promises while 105(29.41%) also reported that the aforementioned youths joined the extremists voluntarily without inducements except promises. The huge chunk of youths 221(61.90%) who never responded to this question also happened to have responded on the negative of any knowledge of a youth joining any terror group. In the overall interpretation of this data the process of luring youths into terror groups remained clandestine in part yet also was emotive evoking caution on the respondent’s honesty and objectivity in reporting The sample was aware of a youth who joined a terror group through tokenism, promises and a variety of inducements as shown in Appendix ii.

In summary Islamic radicalization to a large extent involved the youths receiving tokens. More often these tokens in the form of money or cars or other religious related promises effectively made the youths alter their beliefs, feelings and behaviors such that they were ready to leave the members of their family and faith to join terror groups, especially, the Al-Shabaab. Obviously, existential circumstances and a search for belonging and identity weakened the resolve of some individual youths who took the violent extremists options readily and quite easily especially as conferred by brotherhoods (Section 2.3.4).
b) Internet

The percentage of youths and the general respondents as having significant consensus on online radicalization was more than half of the sample. In the recent years there occurred wide network coverage and the liberalization of the digital superhighway impacted greatly on matters of radicalization in general. The use of social media was also an avenue that violent religious extremists used.

An Imam who was a chaplain also confided to the researcher the role played by the internet as a method of youth radicalization. The military chaplain confessed that the youths access online material through their phones. This was occasioned by accessibility and affordability of smartphones in the market. Even as the parents would wish to monitor and control the usage of phones by youths it was an uphill task since somehow the youths accessed these devices. Though he did not specify the radicalization sites his responses were revealing.

The internet especially radicalization sites, the use of print and social media, CDs/video tapes, befriending were responsible to youth radicalization. The narratives peddled online as Muslims were oppressed, marginalized and denied rights, caused alienation which fostered the feeling and belief in implementing the Sharia as the recourse…zamani (in the past) you could not be allowed to learn from a book without a teacher today people learn from the internet thus not able to differentiate the truth from error for lack of guidance (Qcode158)

As already reviewed the findings in this study established that online radicalization was not a factor unique to the sample. There were internet sites which were devoted to youth
radicalization. Despite the fact that this study hardly was specific on the sites the literature as reviewed confirmed specific radicalization sites (Section 2.3.3).

The findings in the sample of 357 youths 95(26.6%) and 91(25.5%) strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the internet was effective in youth radicalization and recruitment. The total sample of agreements comprising 186(52.1%) reflected more than half of the sample. The data was in contrast to disagreements 53(14.8%) and 52(14.6%) totaling 105(29.4%) which is slightly over a quarter of the sample yet the undecided sample of youths 66(18.5%) were quiet below a quarter of the sample. The high level of online radicalization was attributed to how youths were prone to self-radicalization or lone wolf terrorism besides operatives prowling youths in the community.
Figure 4.8

Online radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>26.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>18.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>14.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>14.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>25.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Noteworthy, abduction occurred as method similar to pre-radicalization stage findings but very essential in setting the youth concerned for eventual radicalization process. The highest method of radicalization was through inducements whereby youths in Masjid Noor Mosque said that monies 15(83.3%) of 18 entries in the radicalization list accounted for abductions and youth disappearances. The results reflected the high levels of poverty and unemployment confirming deprivation aspects in the context of the study. The developing parts of the world were seen to grapple with existential issues in combating violent extremism. The findings in the study towards those ends were telling on Islamic radicalization of youths.

The youth who were abducted or tricked into joining Al-Shabaab was confirmed in this study. The ever evolving stratagem of Al-Shabaab in processes of radicalization was seen to evade the security innocence of the populace. Recently, the tactics as posing like herdsmen had borne fruits to recruiters. It was confided to the researcher that three of youths were malign and captured and only one escaped to tell the story. The story on abductions as an approach to Islamic radicalization was narrated and indicated in data sample 1(Appendix ii).

The Al-Shabaab operatives were innovative to devise every method including abducting youths for radicalization. As the sample provided data on disappearance of youths through abductions or trickery into Al-Shabaab or other terror networks it was clear that agents in the county were active in influencing youths by all means possible. The concept of abduction of youths was not easily related to any reviewed work and therefore was unique to the sample. The closest other radicalization contexts came to trickery was on planned or pressurized marriages (Section 2.3.3). The study was also privy in this particular context whereby inter-faith marriages ended up in a partner being abducted by extremists and classified as possible abductions through the power of
love. In that case the study related with the pyramid theory where the power of love was a radicalization scheme as well (Table 2.7).

On abductions the findings of the sample of 367 representing 60(16.3%) and 102(27.8%) were strong agreements and agreements respectively. The strong disagreements and disagreements were 45(12.3%) and 64(17.4%) respectively. The undecided sample was 96 representing 26.2%. The results argued for abductions as a method that propagated radicalization but it was not possible to determine the exact number of those abducted in relation to those who voluntarily self-radicalized and gave in to terror groups. This was because disappearance in itself had other implications such as voluntary disappearance to terror networks. The mean score of the strong sentiments for abductions/disappearances stood at 22.05% as indicated in sample 5.

c) **Caliphate or Islamic States**

The restoration of Islamic golden era of caliphates inspired extremists in parts of the Middle East to reinstate states that were purely governed by *sharia* also called Islamic states. It was determined in the sample that different contexts reorganized the *umma* or Islamic society in different ways. While responding to the question of *salafism* Qcode368 reported the following:

*Salafism* is practiced in Saudi Arabia which is supposed to be Islam in its purest form. They believe in purification and strict adherence to the texts. They also believe they are the holy ones. They want to revive caliphates or the Islamic state as practiced during the prophet times. Caliph does not exist today. The concepts of Grand Mullah exist in Tanzania and Grand Mufti in Iran. In Kenya we have *Kadhi* whose jurisdiction and jurisprudence is limited to marriage, divorce and
inheritance. Before a ruling is made these Islamic authorities are guided by negotiations, arbitrations and a kind of cabinet (council) decisions and in Iran’s case the final stage of fatwa can be declared by grand mufti after deliberations and consultations have been done (Qcode368)

On sampling of respondents based on their knowledge of the overarching Islamic utopian zeal and vision that drove global radicalization discourses a considerable amount of data provided was on the positive. The data showed that 59(16.5%) of 357 and 165(46.2%) were on the affirmative and negative responses respectively. The remaining section of the sample representing 133(37.3%) was undecided as shown in data sample 6 (Appendix ii). The percentage(s) which were on the lower side on Islamic states/caliphates confirm the political nature of radicalization as perpetrated by top leaders and commanders who happened to the ideologues of concept itself. Data sample 6 in Appendix ii represented the views from the sample.

Islamic jurisprudence therefore was said to have structures that ensured that resolutions were arrived at in harmony through consultations. The data presented suggested an orderly way of making rulings. The violent extremists by extension also involved having authorities and consultative councils and a clear military structure headed by an Amir who was advised by the council or shura to declare fatwas against perceived infidels. Therefore a masterminding of sacred texts, concepts and structures to support a political Islam brand explained the violent religious extremist ideology today. By the data presented by Qcode368 it was evident that Islamic concepts were reinterpreted and applied accordingly but the fact that Salafi Islam sought to restore the golden era was a separate argument from the Qcode368.
The caliphate concept was also of key importance to the research since terrorists narratives have always sought to create ideal Islamic states. The other religious characteristics sampled that played an indoctrination role had to do with the an reinterpreted concepts of the *umma, shura, fatwa, takfir* (mostly unknown to most respondents) and a rediscovery of *jahili/jahiliyah* as used in the polytheistic ages in Arabian peninsula. A revamping and reinvigorated aspects of these concepts by violent extremists groups played into the gallery of violent religious extremists.

**d) Sacred Texts and Concepts**

The reinterpretation of sacred texts by philosophers of political Islam in this study was discussed as politicization of religion or integrating politics and religion (Section 2.1.2). Often the merging of sacred and the secular by *Salafi* Islam to purge society (Section 2.3.3) was discovered in the study as a philosophical idea that was beyond the comprehension of youths and many a stakeholder analysis of the concept as well as adherents of the faith. In that prism of thought it was necessary to explore levels of knowledge and the use of sacred texts and concepts in youth radicalization. This was tested by checking attendance of early childhood religious institutions as Sunday schools and *Madrassas* as conditioning institutions that also entrenched beliefs and values to youths. The *Madrassa*, Qur’an and *hadiths*, were sampled to determine the knowledge base of youths and how their thinking and social processes were shaped at an earlier age. It was presumed that a thorough knowledge of one’s belief system informed decision making processes and under this section cushions youths from radicalization in the event that the effect of these sacred texts, concepts and institutions were ingrained in their personality at an early stage in life. An Imam sampled under Qcode158 (Appendix vi) among others, argued vehemently that
religious-based violence prevailed due to ‘ignorance of the religion’ as evidenced also in a prison environment (Section 2.1.3)

A misconception of Islamic concepts and texts by ignorant Muslims was the reason radicalization thrived. One of the indicators of radicalized youths is that they are narrow minded about Islam based on one aspect like dress only or politically yet Islam looks at life from broad perspective as a complete way of life. Since Islam does not have a central authority like Christians radicalized youths may not be blamed because they were guided by those with their own objectives through propaganda and the translation of concepts and texts based radical persuasion. The lack of taking Islamic teaching from authentic sources was the reason for radicalization (Qcode158 Appendix vi)

Obviously ignorance was a factor in youth radicalization. The researcher also encountered three instances where perceived expert of religion were not aware of some Islamic (Arabic) concepts used in youth radicalization indicative of some prison environments where radicalizers distorted Islamic teachings (Section 2.1.3).

First, the concept of ‘takfir’ (classification of people into Muslim and non-Muslims) was confused with ‘takbir’ that is, God is great similar to Allahu Akhbar by an elder running an NGO in Isiolo county. The aforementioned Director was a renowned and respected Muslim elder also running the NGO dedicated to youth work and was widely acclaimed on matters Islamic religion. In what appeared to be a reinterpretation of sacred texts and coining of Arabic terms the lack of knowledge from the part of the elder was presumed to be based on a reemergence of highly
philosophical and Arabic terms dedicated to contemporary violence. However, the place of religious ignorance was not as well ruled out.

Second, a contrast based on a religious leader’s seminar in Isiolo County where one of the delegates as a Muslim confessed that he had not heard of most of the radicalization concepts that were presented raises a point of concern on some religious concepts as used by radical clerics and violent extremists. Third, Qcode372 (Appendix vi) also confessed that these terms meant different things to different people in different place. From these deductions the researcher realized the gaps created by misconceptions of sacred texts and concepts in different contexts in tackling the problem of youth radicalization. There was an agreement on the concept of *takfir* between Qcode158 and Qcode361. This perhaps was based on passionate search for knowledge as the two were both an Imam and a knowledgeable youth leader respectively.

*Takfir* is one Muslim declaring another Muslim as non-believer. Majority of scholars oppose this doctrine. Historically, *jahili/jahiliyyah* was a period of ignorance whereby the Arabs practiced uncouth cultures, for example, female infanticide, wars etc. (Qcode361 Appendix vi)

The use of sacred texts and concepts was proven by this study as one of the emotive and controversial areas pitting the Muslim community (moderates and radicals) against each other. The main texts responsible for radicalization into violent extremism involved but not limited to a misinterpretation and misapplication of texts in the areas of *Jihad, Umma, shura* and Islamic state or caliphate. Further, the use of concepts as *takfir, jahili/jahiliyyah* and *fatwa* had been reinterpreted to support youth radicalization and violence. In this context of the reinterpretation
of sacred texts, concepts and a kind of invention of religious terms by extremists made this study argue on the basis of moving beyond the current populism on discussion of violent extremism in radicalization as violent extremism (Section 2.1.2) to violent religious extremism as the mainstay of objective scrutiny of radicalization.

In short, the popularization of VE (Violent Extremism) discourse by stakeholders dissuaded the locating of contemporary violence in what this study termed as Violent Religious Extremism (VRE). The latter was the preoccupation which obscured the former discourse towards objective theoretical analysis of contemporary violence.

Based on the aforementioned realities it was necessary to sample youths to determine those ends. In the sample youths portrayed a level of knowledge on the Qur’an as the main sacred text that informed beliefs and value systems and therefore 221(59.4%) read the Qur’an while 145(40.6%) in the sample never read the Qur’an was indicative on the varying levels of religious knowledge the youths possessed (Figure 20) The latter section of the sample represented both Christians and Muslims who identified with Islam and neither read the Qur’an texts. In a constant of 230(64.4%) Muslims and 127 (36.5%) Christians in the schools sample it was evident that a minimal of 9(5.0%) of Muslims never read the Qur’an as indicated in Figure 4.9.

Therefore, the perceived ignorance (Section 2.1.3) on the part of religion opened space for violent religious extremists to cajole youths by the altered religious ideology. Obviously deep theological meanings were beyond the grasp of the populace and such alteration evaded youths but only a preserve of the philosophical class.
The classification of sacred texts in this sample of respondents led the study to investigate the place and role of Hadiths in religious formations and the effect on radicalization. Knowledge on religion was measured and discussed as hadiths and Sunnah on the traditions and customs of Prophet Muhammad and his companions on one hand and the words and the deeds of the prophet on the other hand. Scholars who perceive that Muhammad established Islam in the polytheistic and pagan Arabian Peninsula by the sword cite hadiths and Sunnah as the epistemological foundation(s) for violent religious extremism.

In the event that recruiters capitalize on the level of ignorance to influence youths based on sacred texts, concepts and institutions, the analysis of hadiths and Sunnah revealed high levels of
ignorance which represented how some prison context were radicalized based on ignorance (Section 2.1.3). However, as much as the role of hadiths and Sunnah may not be authoritatively engaged with herein and further referral of such engagements on the Islamic theory and praxis to the Ulema and Muftis be made, the research established high levels of ignorance (Section 2.1.3) on the youths as appertains the readership of the hadiths and Sunnah. In that case, the sample proved that only 82(23.0%) were conversant with the aforementioned while 275(77.0%) never read the hadiths. In this respect therefore any narrative formed around these sacred texts pavilion evaded innocent and ignorant populace. The study also discovered the nexus between recruitment of girls in institutions of higher learning (universities) through the use of hadiths (Section 2.3.3) was a factor in youth radicalization.

In the statistics shown in Figure 4.10 the youths who attended madrassas were high while the remaining sample were mostly Christians who attended Sunday school classes at the early childhood religious formation. Therefore in school sample of 357 reported that 210(58.8%) attended Madrassa(s) while the sample of 133(37.3%) attended Sunday school classes with 14(3.92%) neither attended both Sunday nor madrassa. In terms of religious knowledge the minimal sample that never was religious socialized at an early age was easily manipulated by radicals but as already established the religious concepts as philosophized by extremists were complex to all and sundry.

The sampling of early childhood formation was meant to establish character formation on one hand but also determine the depth of religious knowledge necessary in the analysis on the other hand. The findings that ignorance on religious matters was the lacuna that terror organizations maximized in influencing youths to violent religious ideologies was never an overstatement (Section 2.1.3).
Despite the fact that religious orientation was through early age attendance to madrassas or Sunday school for that matter the former emphasized on religious instruction at the expense of secular knowledge in most contexts. Such an approach developed personalities that were imbalanced in approach to life and mostly modern political and governance systems. Figure 4.10 showed the religious formation of youths from an early age.

In fact Jihad was the main objective of violent extremism with intentions of sending a strong signal to opponent’s especially Western democracy system. Figure 4.11 indicated that a big chunk of youths were never aware of the concept of Jihad which made them vulnerable for radicalization.
The concept of *Jihad* and the Caliphate were objectively engaged with in this study since it was shrouded with controversy. In fact, violence divided the *umma* as there were those who abhorred it completely, others embraced it and others sympathized with violent religious extremists. Upon sampling the concept of *Jihad* it was realized that the level of understanding on its ramifications on radicalization was relatively low.

**Figure 4.11**

*The Concept Jihad on Youth*

The data from 357 respondents was 105 (29.4%) was on the affirmative and 155 (43.4%) was on the negative while 96 (26.9%) were undecided. An error margin of 0.4 was reported. The concept of *Jihad* was an end result to radicalization but was riddled with competing interpretations (Section 2.2.1) which was also confirmed in this study.
In an overview the processes of Islamic radicalization were domiciled on the methods such as inducements and abductions on one hand and sacred texts and concepts on the other hand. The internet also was a factor while Islamic state was the vision of radicalization. The processes as discussed in the ensuing subheadings as indoctrination, recruitment, infiltration, training and deployment process were anchored on the methods, texts and concepts.

The methods discussed were the main that were used by contemporary religious militia. The inducements using monies, promises, cars, women and even eternal dividends were suitable in the struggling economies of the developing states though other contexts hardly were affected by affluence or vice versa. The internet or online radicalization was reported to spur radicalization in significant way(s). Generally, social media in itself conferred freedoms to individuals to explore the world and the youths in their very identity seeking nature were prone to negative influence of all sorts in the digital superhighway including joining global terror networks. Abductions also influenced the processes of Islamic radicalization.

Finally, the discussions on the processes of radicalization were aloof without the complex interrelationship that existed between methods, texts and narratives. Perhaps a sample of 63 key informants also confirmed the potency of reinterpreted sacred texts and concepts on radicalization of youths.

In Appendix ii sample 9 the specific sacred texts and concepts by extremists were analyzed and classified based on a total of 63 key respondents. 1(One) key respondent representing 1.6% who also had undergone violent extremist training was the only one that brought the concept of *qisas*, that is, which was retributive justice and practiced in religion in the context of ‘eye for an eye’ for a criminal offence in Islamic law. 13 (20.6%) cited reinterpreted Qur’an texts as the basis of radicalization, 4(6.3%) cited the Bible as well as a sacred texts used by extremists, 15(23.8)
percent sampled *Jihad* texts, 3(4.8%) said that the 72 virgins and the paradise narratives respectively were responsible for youth radicalization. But still 11 of these respondents representing 17.5% said that there were multiple texts and concepts that influence youth radicalization while 13(20.6%) percentage of the sample were noncommittal in their responses. From these sacred texts and concepts by violent extremists it was concluded that the radicalization process was a complex mind conditioning process that involved religious altering on one hand but capitalizing on existential concerns of youths on the other hand. The former was also analyzed separately and extensively in the processes of radicalization objective section.

In the context of global contemporary violent radicalization the sampling on the Bible as a sacred text was only construed to have been sampled by youths who were inclined on defense of Islam but who were also ignorant on the distinction that existed between violent extremist on one hand and mainstream Islam on the other hand. The argument does not exonerate Christianity as one of the Semitic faiths from historical violence that dogged these faith traditions but only argued objectively based on contemporary Islamic extremist violence that was global in nature.

As the study embarked on the processes of Islamic radicalization the methods and factors already discussed above, that is, inducements, abductions, internet, sacred texts and concepts were seen to be the pillars by which the processes anchored. In other words the processes of Islamic radicalization were anchored both on a philosophy of political Islam supported by texts on one hand and methods on the other hand. In short it was a structured process. This empirical study stood silhouetted from scarce or rare studies to have engaged sacred texts and concepts as the philosophical and theological foundations by which Islamic radicalization processes flourished today. This was confirmed by African and Asian contexts as prime examples lacking terrorism studies empirical work (Section 1.9)
4.2 PROCESSES OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION

Apart from the global dynamics of radicalization it was discovered that regional implications of youth violence emanated from domestic or local terror groups. In the Horn of Africa, for example, the Al-Shabaab posed serious security threats as youths got indoctrinated and maligned to join the group. Therefore, the bulk of analysis on the processes involved in the African continent considered the three main religious extremists groups as the Al-Shabaab in East Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria and West Africa and ISIS in Mali. The question on youth’s knowledge of at least a youth or persons joining these groups was investigated partly to unearth the processes but also the effect of radicalization. Again, the social orientation as a definition of the processes of radicalization and as espoused herein was evident in the sample.

The processes of religious radicalization sought to develop McCauley and Moskalenko theory (Section 2.4) beyond the mechanisms to the processes that youths followed in joining terror groups. The processes in this study were seen to be fueled by a religious ideology while the mechanisms as well were at play in a complex radicalization scenario. The religious radicalization processes theory (Section 2.4.4) anchored on phases, steps and stages that followed either intermittent or linear or even overlapping paths but which led some youths to violence with a possibility of youths being deployed because violent extremists operated as paramilitary organization. Therefore, the religious radicalization processes theory (Section 2.4.4) partly patterned pyramid theory where few youths were involved in voluntary violence but goes beyond to involve youth contingents deployed for attacks involuntarily.

Perhaps exhaustive analysis on the processes of radicalization required probing on the period of time taken by youth(s) to embrace violent extremism. This approach was in tandem with previous instances where much time elapsed before a violent act occurred in the country and
elsewhere through proselytizing (Section 2.2.2). The data provided by the sample was indicative on how processes of radicalization were gradual, slow and took long periods of time.

In Appendix ii data sample 13 it was deduced through the 63 standard sample of key respondents that 5(7.9%) were convinced that it was possible to recruit youth(s) in a day. This rarely occurred (Section 1.1.1) but was possible. The ratings on 1 (one) month and above on one hand and 1(one) to 6(six) months was 2(3.2%) and 2(3.2%) respectively. The ratings of 1(one) to 3(three) months and the 6(six) to 12(twelve) months were 4(6.3%) and 6(9.5%) respectively. Eventually, the undecided part of the sample including the part that responded ‘it depends’ was 11(17.5%) and 26(41.3%) respectively. Finally, it was also discovered that recruitment could take many years as indicated by 7(11.1%) sample. The conclusion was that whichever the direction the data analysis pointed to it was factual that recruitment was a slow and gradual process with minimal exceptions to the rule.

4.2.1 Recruitment Processes

The activities of terror groups were measured in the county as they informed the recruitment process. In that case the respondents were engaged on their knowledge of the activities of Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and ISIS as the populous radicalization terror groups. Specifically, the process of youth recruitment was established through the youth who had joined terror groups. It was noted that the psychology of the community under investigation was also to a degree reserved in the release of information which might have affected the results (Figure 4.12).
The overall analysis of Figure 4.12 showed that 60(16.1%) of 357 youths confirmed that they knew youth(s) who had joined religious terror groups while 264(73.9%) of the aforementioned sample responded on the negative on any knowledge of recruited youths(s). The undecided portion of the sample was 33(9.2%) which was quite minimal to significantly sway the results. As in almost all discussions on processes of radicalization the magnitude of youths who joined or did not join violent religious extremists wasn’t more of a concern than that the problem existed within the community however minimal the numbers. Additionally, secrecy and caution was observed in the sample regarding release of vital information and this was seen to affect the figures given. However, an upward trend was objectified in the study. The staircase model (Figure 2.3) supported these findings on the basis that minimal numbers were involved in joining terror organizations. Having known that recruitment of youths occurred in the county a shift to violent religious extremists groups was of a necessity to discuss the processes of Islamic radicalization

a) Al-Shabaab Activities

In the East African region the Al-Shabaab from Somalia had been known to conduct violent activities in the countries of its vicinity yet reports of its global links (Sections 1.1.3, 2.1 and 2.2.2.) had gained traction in the recent past. The terror activities in the region and especially Kenya were no longer opinions as this research also established its operational capabilities in Isiolo County. The study investigated the terror group’s activities and effect(s). The historical cell in East Africa (Section 1.1.3) correlated with the results of the study in that the percentages of recruitment of youth by Al-Shabaab were higher in the county (Figure 4.12) than the counterpart radicalizing groups.
The activities of Al-Shabaab terror group in Figure 4.12 below indicated that 222(62.2%) of 357 youths said that they were aware of Al-Shabaab radicalization and recruitment activities with another sample of 48(13.4%) disagreeing with the knowledge of same statistics. A sample of 87(24.4%) never gave their view on radicalization of youths in the county. The latter undecided sample was minimal than the former which was on affirmative and was high suggestive of the fact that Al-Shabaab activities fueled recruitment of youths as shown in Figure 4.12. Additionally, data presented in Appendix ii sample 11 proved that Al-Shabaab was prominent in recruitment in comparison to MRC and multiple terror groups that acted on youths.

Figure 4.12

Al-Shabaab Terror Group Activities
The Al-Shabaab terror group acted on youths based on existential factors. It was also observed from the data that youth recruitment was influenced by multiple interlocking factors. It was argued that these causal factors were complex but influenced youths depending on the issue around their lives up to and including personality, socio-cultural and economic needs. So far, it was determined that no single youth was automatically influenced apart from the complexities of the recruitment process.

It was determined that the recruitment of youths followed a pattern that combined religious concepts and narratives with both temporal/eternal rewards on one hand but which tied personality needs to existential, political frustrations and grievances on the other hand. In that case recruitment was a complex process that gave some youth identity and a sense of belonging and therefore fueling radicalization. Further, to the extent that terror groups presented alternative livelihoods was also discussed in the ensuing study. The lacuna presented by socialization of youths especially through parenting which resulted into idleness and proneness to recruitment was also determined to abet the process.

b) Al-Qaeda Activities

Al-Qaeda reigned on recruitment as a pan-Islamist global Jihad agenda network. In fact, even the East African Al-Shabaab terror group gained its philosophical underpinnings and operational strategies from this group. Its affiliates and cells are global and can be termed as the mother of all Jihadists or Islamist extremists since by 2001 it had planted cells in most parts of the world including the Horn of Africa and East Africa (Section 2.3.3).

Coincidentally so, in Figure 4.13 Al-Qaeda was the second radicalizing group known to the youths in the county with 111(31.1%) affirming and 160(44.8%) negating knowledge of the
group’s activities. The slightly high rate of those negating the knowledge of Al-Qaeda activities in the county as opposed to those who affirmed Al-Shabaab activities was evidence of radicalization since both groups were affiliated by the latter was not proximate to the country. The remaining 86(24.1%) undecided to comment still hardly obscured the processes of Islamic radicalization in Isiolo County.

**Figure 4.13**

*Al-Qaeda Terror Group Activities*
c) **Boko Haram Activities**

Boko Haram, that is, Western education system was evil, was also sampled based on its recruitment activities. In Figure 4.14 a sample of 357 youths in schools 107(29.8%) confessed of knowledge of Boko Haram as a radicalizing group while 160(44.6%) were on the negative leaving a subset of 90(25.1) youths undecided. In fact, the activities of both Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda were seen to be almost equal. This was indicative that both terror groups’ activities were hampered by distance (Figure 4.14). But the mainstay of the recruitment process was not necessarily on the magnitude or numbers or followers but its presence because the objective of extremists could always be lethal even with a small number of adherents.

**Figure 4.14**

*Boko Haram Terror Group Activities*
In the context of the global village the possibilities it was evident that youth were in touch with continental and global networks. It was rarely coincidental that those youths had knowledge of popular terror groups and those within the African vicinity as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram yet Al-Qaeda terror group an ally and historical affiliate of Al-Shabaab was an obvious phenomenon known by the sampled out youths.

A key informant Qcode368 (Appendix vi) cited the social media, homegrown recruiters, friends and peer groups, abductions after brainwashing as a recruitment process that youths underwent. In most cases almost all key informants reported that recruitment was a slow, gradual and complex process involving incentives, social groups and social media and existential issues, among others.

In the interest of this research the recruitment processes of youths either through inducements, social media/internet and social processes as friends, teachers, rogue religious leaders and peer groups; was a phased and animated process that came in all shapes. This was what Qcode358 (Appendix vi) reported as a lack a particular factor since several factors including branding and expert opinions were used. The process of recruitment of youths was a phased one with at some point pre-radicalization phase, exposure phase, identification with social groups and eventually recruitment into terror groups. This recruitment was dependent on a variety of factors including sociocultural, political, economic and psychological issues acting on the individual progressively and or cumulatively and therefore a complex process.

The issue of Islamic radicalization cannot be taken to be an overstatement in the context of even Muslim leaders admitting that there had been in the recent past youths who had adopted extreme views on Islam. Instructive to this fact were the words of Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) chairman ambassador Nzibo during Ramadhan 2019 Special Issue sponsored by
Standard Group. The initiative was meant to present the mainstream view towards practice of Islam. During the Kenya Television Network (KTN) News interview an excerpt was captured

…Islam has always propagated like their neighbor Christianity has done, care for the neighbor, care for the needy unfortunately of recent years there has been youths who have been taking the wrong teachings of Islam, propagating Jihadism which is against the teachings of Islam because Islam says and the Prophet says and the Qur’an says life matters whoever takes the life of one individual is like you are taking the life of the whole community and you know where we have come from you know even during the prophet Medina where he took refuge there were Jews there were Christians he signed treaties protected the minorities and even when the Muslims were being persecuted he urged them to run to the African Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia in Ethiopia Muslims were welcomed treated (KTN Reporter)

As much as the excerpt from the chairman of SUPKEM ambassador Nzibo captured the mainstream aspects of Islamic faith and practice admission towards youths embracing the global Jihad ideology represented the perpetual religious tussle existing between the mainstream Islamic ideology and the emerging extremist ideology. The primary data as discussed herein affirmed the concept of religious violence from underground activities by terror groups. The recruitment processes mean score of Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab were measured and stood at 41%. These statistics were based on the knowledge and strong sentiments on the activities of the three terror groups sampled that youth were aware of. The percentage
given was based on youths known to have disappeared, abducted or cajoled into joining terror groups. The place of the internet in recruitment of lone wolfs, that is, those who voluntarily self-radicalize online was held at constant. The statistics proved the outcry in the county.

It was also discovered that a consortium of causes made youths accept to be recruited into terror groups. The reasons as to why the youths adopted violent religious views or even joined extremist religious groups were compounded by weak structural mechanisms to address immediate human needs. In the views of caretakers, stakeholders and expertise analysis 30 of 63 (47.6%) blamed recruitment on a combination of factors, 8(12.7%) gave religious narratives prominence, 6(9.5%) were convinced that the influence of terror groups as Al-Shabaab or ISIS contributed to recruitment. On existential concerns temporal and eternal rewards represented 4(6.3%) tally in the above sample. Ignorance/curiosity, personal frustrations, poor parenting, Idleness and identity crisis represented 3(4.8%), 3(4.8%), 2(3.2%), 1(1.6%) and 1(1.6%) respectively. The undecided portion of the key informants only stood at 5(7.9%) concluded to be an attitude issue but which insignificantly affected the results of sampling (Appendix ii sample 10).

On sampling the role that politics played in radicalization of youths there were indicators which proved this fact. As Qcode367 and Qcode368 confirmed that politics was the main driver of youth radicalization and recruitment data analysis from key informants was also in agreements. Specifically, underlying issues in politics that fueled recruitment included youth incitement 6(9.5%), marginalization 5(7.9%), divisive politics 4(6.3%), financing/funding by sympathizers 2(3.2%), job promises 2(3.2%), geopolitics & local politics 2(3.2%), exclusion and bad governance 2(3.2%) and political Islam 2(3.2%). The score on corruption, hate speech, clan strife, community profiling and religious bloc voting each represented 1(1.6%). The frequencies
and percentages above were also cited by those who sampled multiple factors 11(17.5%) which tilted the findings on each variable to the higher score than already given. The unspecified sample 17(27%) was slightly higher in the score which affected the results to a degree. It was concluded that since most of the key informants were from government agencies and security personnel the noncommittal attitude was understandable based on the apolitical nature of these organizations. Poor role modeling 5(7.9%) was as well provided as a political aspect in youth radicalization. These results were as indicated in Figure 4.15.

**Figure 4.15**

*Political Factors Promoting Youth Recruitment*
Closely related to the role of politics in weakening youth resolve and thereby promoting them joining terror groups was the policies that were crafted by governments hinging on youth welfare. The findings from the sample suggested that the policies adapted by the government in the recent years were counterproductive in terms of countering terrorism on one hand and proactive measures on the other hand. The sample of key respondents in the sample were evenly distributed citing unemployment 7(11.1%), CVE policy which was seen to be profiling some communities 6(9.5%) and marginalization/exclusion which stood at 5(7.9%) of the sample of key informants. Discrimination and lack of public participation in government programs stood at 4(6.3%) and 4(6.3%) respectively.

Measures towards Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), Nyumba kumi (community policing concept), refugee(s), returnee(s) reintegration and registration of person(s) were cited as policies falling within push and pull factors on recruitment of youths. The highest score was at the multiple influences based on policies at 21(33.3%) which held sway to the direction of higher frequencies and percentages on the role of governmental policy in promoting youth radicalization. Again, the sample that was noncommittal stood at 8(12.7%) indicated the caution taken by government apparatus in appearing critical to the system (Appendix ii data sample 12).

It was concluded that youth recruitment was anchored on the influence from terror groups but which was cultivated based on existential narratives. These explained push and pull factors as capitalized upon by agents and recruiters. Therefore, it was argued that fault lines in the society and weak structures were the gaps that contemporary terrorists had identified to lure youths into their ranks and file. Additionally, though the processes of radicalization were overlapping, the recruitment process was seen to be the basis of all other processes such that even indoctrination also discussed here as radicalization was comprehended through the initial stages of recruitment.
Upon recruitment and membership there was an ongoing process of indoctrination to make youths to fully embrace and internalize the philosophy of violence.

4.2.2 Indoctrination Processes

The study investigated existence of sleeper cells (under cover terrorist hideouts) where members were prepared for radicalization action in the county. The philosophy of cell recruitment was based on a terror group planting an agent or operative within the community to recruit and indoctrinate youths. Often, the intelligence wing of Al-Shabaab, amniyat monitored homes and schools for potential disenfranchised youth(s).

Perhaps a key informant focused the meanings of indoctrination on sacred texts. Being a passionate Muslim and widely read and informed elder he directed indoctrination process to the sacred text(s). In this case brainwashing was present in indoctrination

Reading and reciting extreme Qur’an verses-repeating verses to a certain level – prolonged reading of the Qur’an changes the mind. These very powerful verses and concepts on war, Satan, rain, women, 72 virgins, paradise, luxurious jannah, that is, Janah Tul-Fardos, the highest paradise, alters the mind processes and makes earthly benefits not really matter Qcode372 (Appendix vi)

The definition of radicalization as pertaining to violent religious extremism found meaning in the context of submissions by the key informant Qcode372 (Appendix vi). In contrast a sense of loss and duress especially from the Muslim faith community tended to dissociate sacred texts from
recruitment. The changing of the mind processes through eternal bliss promises grounded the religious nature of radicalization processes (Section 2.1.3).

The preoccupation of the study limited itself to proving the existence of the problem beyond any doubt. A constant sample of 357 20(5.6%) respondents strongly agreed and 37(10.4%) agreed on the issue radicalization cells while 93(26.1%) and 74(20.7%) strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively on the existence of indoctrination cells in Isiolo County. The 133(37.3%) held the sway either way of the scale had they responded. The mean indoctrination score based on sleeper cells was 16% which was extremely minimal in the sample. The explanation to this figure was based on the undercover nature of indoctrination of youths. Further, the cell structure (Figure 2.9) required that indoctrination was a one-on-one engagement thereby extremely undercover exercise. In that case, the indoctrination of youths through cells was proven based on the data provided by youths as indicated in Figure 4.16
As in recruitment processes indoctrination also had instances where youths were tricked, maligned and abducted. The overt radicalization processes was instances where a religious ideology was used in radicalization on one hand whereas covert Islamic radicalization involved agents of Islamic radicalization in indoctrination youths. Both the ideology and agents played a complementary role in maligning youth.

The Islamic radicalization ideologies and concepts tested in the study as predominantly effective in indoctrination of youths included the Islamic Jihad (Figure 4.11), the Caliphate in Appendix ii
data sample 6 in Appendix ii, the global *umma* narrative (Section 2.2.1), 72 virgins and paradise (Section 2.3.3) among others which were all purely anchored in Islamic texts and tenets. As much as some key informants from the Islamic praxis argue that the use of Qur’an terms by pundits alienated and annoyed the general Islamic population anywhere a critical analysis hardly enjoined violent extremists to moderate Islam but sought to situate indoctrination process. In another sample of 52 youths from Isiolo town key religious concepts were tested to find out their religious implications on indoctrination of youths.

The data in Table 4.6 clearly pointed the role of Islamist ideology 34(65%) reigning supreme in indoctrination of youths. The other aspect on indoctrination was the vision of an Islamic State or a caliphate 6(12%) as understood by respondents. Often the Islamic term *caliph* for a Muslim leader or commander of the faithful was misunderstood in the sample as representative of a caliphate. This was attributable to the fact that this cohort represented a population that was still forming a religious identity and grasping of theological terms.

Prima facie, the youth tender and innocent notions in comprehending religious ideologies were realized as the weak link that recruiters identify and engage for radicalization. Further, an understanding of the call for a global *umma* 10(19.2%) was an idea reminiscent in Islamic faith and practice yet with diverse understanding by mainstream Muslims versus extremists. Lastly, the place of paradise 2(4%) was also narrated as an ideology used in radicalization of youths yet not fully conceived by youths. This affirmed theories that hold that a minimal number of Jihadists had been experienced in the studies of radicalization (Section 2.4.3). The discourse that underpins the sociocultural, economic, religious and political narratives in radicalization was from the exposed chunk of population including religious leaders, political leaders, government officials and those dealing with youths.
Table 4.6

Overt Islamic Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Ideology</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>N = 52</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caliphate/Islamic State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global <em>umma</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradise</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A high ranking county official gave the following data on Islamic radicalization based on beliefs/practices. A zeroing in to agents and religious function in promoting radicalization was given. Further, the exact venues/environments where radicalization took place was identified in the response:

Islamic radicalization is the ideological belief related to Islamic religion but an alteration of the teachings of the Qur’an to achieve a dangerous goal. The beliefs that when one die fighting for the right course or Allah he/she will go to heaven. Rogue religious leaders alter the teachings of the Qur’an. Radicalization takes place in schools, Mosques and the internet Qcode367 (Appendix vi)

From the above data Islamic radicalization ideology involved taking the sacred texts out of context at least from a mainstream Islam perspective. The involvement of Islamic community in
radicalization involved the rogue leaders who themselves identify with radical brand of Islam emanating from the Middle East and perpetrated by terror groups and networks. Such radical clerics have been reported in some Mosques in the country to perpetrate the radical Islamic ideology.

A renowned Islamic leader heading an NGO Qcode368 (Appendix vi) an executive director had reservations on the development and popularization of religious extremists. His responses portrayed a conservative and passionate desire to guard his faith tradition from mudslinging, misinterpretation and misapplication. The need to separate radicals from moderates was evident in his answer.

Islam stands for peace. Labeling religious extremist as Islamist or jihadists is a Western term that promotes radicalization. By giving them a name equals giving them a platform and publicity. Therefore, the use of the term or word is wrong. Religious radicalization is the use of religious narratives wrongly that there are rewards or heaven. The wrong narrative especially on Jihad has been used to convince young people. But Jihad means to strive against passions and desires yet used wrongly, misinterpreted and misapplied by the so called religious extremists or jihadists. Villages, towns and slums in Qcode401 [a location designated in this study by phonetics Bravo Papa], Qcode402 [a location designated in this study by phonetics Kilo Oscar] and Qcode403 [a location designated in this study by phonetics Kilo Bravo] where poverty/drugs and unemployment being a contributing factor are the places where radicalization takes place in Isiolo county Qcode368 (Appendix vi)
The clarity on how radicalization was a dividing ideology even amongst Muslims was deduced from the respondent’s remarks. However, the publicity given to extremists by media and Western ideological analysis by name-tagging as responsible for more radicalization must be proven beyond doubt but which fell on the periphery of this research. An empathetic attitude to protect a religious identity from being defiled or misused the respondent represented a category which sought to prove to the world that Islam was not responsible for contemporary Islamic violence in the society.

A young Muslim Qcode361 (Appendix vi) leader of 26 years of age working with the county agencies to help young people against radicalization expressed reservations on how radicalization was addressed. His comments despite tackling the peripheral issues in Islamist radicalization accommodated the youthful nature of the young people involved in countering religious extremism in the county.

There is no standard definition to the term Islamist. Radicalization is caused by other than beliefs and practices but destitution and lack of hope drives youths into extremism. The wrong understanding of texts in the holy book, for example *Jihad* is responsible for youth joining terror groups. Initially we thought Islam was the key in radicalization but religion only comes to justify already existing problems responsible for radicalization. It is social media and mainstream media contents that promote radicalization. Mainly radicalization takes place online or through peers/friends who have already crossed over to Somalia Qcode361 (Appendix vi)
The study established indoctrination process to be a complex of issues including reinterpreted texts on one hand and sociopolitical and economic issues on the other hand. As the respondent above indicated existential issues bear heavily on youths in Isiolo County. The argument for deprivation theory as a factor in the Palestinian suicide bombers (Section 2.1.2) correlated with the findings of this study as Kenyan context in contrast to 9/11 suicide bombers from affluent backgrounds (Section 2.3.1). Therefore, the argument for or against deprivation theory, as a motivation for indoctrination to violence, was more of a context relative idea than a universal constant. In that case indoctrination process was also a complex concept but which found a fertile ground in the underground sleeper cells.

The indoctrination process also involved inducements whereby youths were incentivized to join a particular group. In the context of weak economies where survival, livelihoods and human dignity was wanting youths were vulnerable to radicalizing narratives. The incentives that youths were given often involved monies, cars and women, in this case, what had been termed as in some contexts as jihadi brides (Section 2.3.3). Apart from the multiple incentives discovered in the sample results the 63 experts sample indicated that monetary gains/jobs was an higher incentive to youths at 8(12.7%) while the 72 virgins and promises of prosperity were at 3(4.8%) each. False promises and propaganda; Martyrdom/shaheed and jihad/holy war incentives all were rated at 2(3.2%) each in the sample. The paradise 1(1.6%) and revenge attitude 1(a.6%) were ranked low based on the findings. However, the ratings on incentives were higher than indicated above on each rating since a sizeable chunk of data cited multiple incentives at 36(57.1%). The unspecified data was 5(7.9%) as indicated in Figure 4.17.
The incentives as discussed appeared lucrative to disillusioned youths but also appealing based on bad socio-economic times. It was reiterated that none of the incentives acted on youths separately but was a complex and concerted effort to brainwash some youths towards extremism. Often, religious inclined incentives only catalyzed the process but ruling out on affluent youths as in other contexts embracing radical beliefs was never an overstatement (Section 2.3.3). The data given from youths in Isiolo town (Sample 8) was buttressed by key informants but yet introduced a compound of factors in relation to the previous covert radicalization. The study
findings on those who influenced youths to extremism partly affirmed covert radicalization processes as indicated discovered additional parameters in youth radicalization.

In a constant sample of 63 informants it was evident that religious tutors accounted for 10(15.9%) indoctrination. Religious tutors were those who operated in the precincts of the Mosque environment in contradistinction from scholars or ulama 2(3.2%) and school teachers 1(1.6%) who were also involved with youth indoctrination from a religious standpoint and the school environment respectively. Violent terror groups, Al-Shabaab sympathizers and agents/recruiters accounted for 9(14.3%), 5(7.9%) and 4(6.3%) respectively. The rating of peers/friends and social m/mainstream media was found to be standing at 2(3.2%) and 1(1.6%) respectively. The findings were expected to rate higher for the portion of the sample that reported multiple actors and unknown data 26(41.3%) and 3(4.8%) respectively (Appendix ii sample 14).

The discussion on indoctrination process was presumed to be conclusive by interrogation of the claim that Islam had been misinterpreted and misapplied by extremists. To this end the research discovered such notions also existed in the sample similar to what had been hinted on hijacking of Islam (Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.1). As much as such claims were valid based on data findings it was the preoccupation of this research to classify such notions to be grounded on a reinterpreted version of Islam as a philosophical basis of entrenching violent extremism in religion. The findings anchoring such claims were based on religious slogans 3(4.8%), reinterpreted texts/concepts 9(14.3%), the rise of VE movements 16(25.4%), false preaching/teachings 8(12.7%), political Islam 5(7.9%) and multiple means 3(4.8%) and lastly the response tagged ‘others’ 19(30.2%) represented unfilled questionnaire (Appendix ii sample 15).

Eventually indoctrination was seen to anchor on perceived altered sacred texts from mainstream Islam on one hand and a compounded approach to beliefs/narratives/teachings on the other hand.
Therefore, a sampling of such sacred texts and narratives was meant to give a holistic view of indoctrination process. Based on the key informants of the study Jihad beliefs 10(15.9%) were the main teachings that anchored indoctrination. This also affirmed the findings on revenge based on perceived injustices as a revisionist approach to the concept of war and as opposed to struggle for piety in the path of Mumin.

The concepts and teachings on the 72 virgins, brainwashing/indoctrination and anti-government propaganda scored 3(4.8%) each. The score on paradise as a motivation to violent actions scored 5(7.9%) while misinterpreted texts was rated at 4(6.3%). False promises, alternative employments and eventually pull and push factors accounted for 1(1.6%) in the sample. As in most of the results the multiple narratives 25(39.7%) significantly influenced the outcomes as indicated in the frequencies and percentages herein. But still 7(11.1%) as well gave responses that were not possibly classified in the matrix (Appendix ii sample 16).

A discussion on indoctrination also required an interrogation as to why the resolve of youths to go to Somalia or countries with issues on terrorism took a determined perspective. A discussion with a respondent proved that once youths had been indoctrinated a recovery stratagem was an uphill task. The comments below proved those ends.

There were children of four of our staff staying at the quarters. Two of them had crossed to Somalia but two were recovered at Mandera border post by a police officer who happened to know them having worked in Isiolo. He called their parents and the hearing of their case was held in a designated court for the sensitivity of the matter. The two boys were remanded for two years by authorities but later released on a bond...As we speak they have already crossed to
Somalia or unknown destinations to join terror groups. There must be a cell here where youths were perpetually recruited and indoctrinated. There is a location in Isiolo renowned for its notoriety and criminal activities. The place is so unsafe that even some criminals fear operating there. It is so hostile and insecure to outsiders which might be the hotspot of radicalization which so top secret and hidden. The recovery of lost youths had always involved high level mediations between elders who are required to pay ransom before children were released. Even at that the resolve of youths to go back was disturbing (IR5)

From the above submissions indoctrination processes almost irrevocably altered the mental processes of youths. In that case the beliefs, feelings and attitudes of youths were changed and formed up for joining and serving the interests of terror groups. Perhaps the sleeper cells and insecure locations in Isiolo plus key agents up to and including influential people were involved in the process of recruitment and indoctrination. It was concluded from the study that indoctrination processes targeted the hearts and minds of youths in what interviewee (IR5) referred in the phrase “in most cases youth are influenced through confusing their minds till they willingly accepted to join Al-Shabaab. The latter statement was articulate on the practical definition of indoctrination.

4.2.3 Infiltration Processes

On the ability of violent religious extremists to infiltrate the county and the country at large respondents were aware of specific hotspots. The report from the general populace and schools was contrasted and measured with information from key respondents as government officials and
NGOs as well. Eventually the infiltration process and routes was established in the county and the country at large.

Arguably so, though the processes of radicalization were interwoven and overlapping infiltration process was construed to be the agency by which all other processes were attained. In other words infiltration whether in terms of agents or recruiters or radicalizers on one hand or infiltration in terms of religious ideology whether online or publications on the other hand opened a door for the other processes to emerge.

The analysis on hotspots of radicalization sentiments were almost heading to an equilibrium point upon an assessment of agreements and disagreements. The low level of the undecided sample 48(13.4%) kind of allowed the responses to distribute across the measurement scale or would otherwise sway the scale either side had respondents chosen to do so. The score stood at 40(11.2%) strong agreements and 84(23.5%) agreements in contrast with 85(23.8%) strong disagreements and 84(23.5%) disagreements on a constant sample of 357 respondents. The margin of 12.6% between agreements and disagreements were seen to be minimal compared to the margin differences from other variables sampled. The cumulative implication of this almost balanced view of responses was indicative of how terror agents had infiltrated the county thereby advancing radicalization objectives (Figure 4.18). The cumulative mean score on infiltration was 18.18% in the county.
A series of questions helped establish infiltrations of radicalizing agents into the country. These questions included the countries of origins of these recruiters, the routes they use to access local youths and the places in which cells existed and the attacks executed so far. The key informants comprising of government officials, military intelligence officers, police officers, the county commissioner’s office, directors of NGOs and the informed members of the general public were all consulted to determine infiltration process.

Qcode358 (Appendix vi) reported that Somalia was the country of origin of radicalizing agents. The routes to which they access the country from the sample county include Isiolo to Marsabit to Moyale to Mandera on one hand and Isiolo to Merti to Garissa, on the other hand. The overall infiltration process spilled over to Mombasa, Kisii, Lamu and Nairobi, according to this key
informant. Qcode359 (Appendix vi) identified Iran, Somalia, Kenya and Europe as the countries of origin of radicalizing agents based on media through funding and providing reading materials. According to the respondent the route to access youths in the county was Mandera to Moyale to Isiolo on one hand and Mandera to Wajir to Isiolo on the other hand. He also cited refugee camps as Daadab as a hotspot zone. Being a registrar of persons official the key informant identified areas affected by infiltration process as Nyeri, Nyandarua, Kiambu, Nairobi, Muranga, Coast region, NE, Meru, Isiolo and Marsabit.

Qcode360 (Appendix vi) only identified Somalia and Syria as countries of origin of agents and infiltration process to have affected ‘mostly the North Eastern, Coast but also in all other counties’ thereby highly trustworthy as a key intelligence officer in the county except that he appeared economical with information (as a government official). This was suggestive that much on infiltration process was still underground.

Qcode362 (Appendix vi) said that the country of origin of agents was Somalia and previously used Moyale to Modogashe route. From the County Commissioner’s office Qcode367 (Appendix vi) reported that agents come from Somalia through Modogashe to Mandera to Lamu and Wajir route. Qcode368 (Appendix vi) stayed aloof by citing social media, corruption and the porous Northern frontier border as not being safe but also reported the Kamanga training and the lack of continuity of the incentives of £500 to trainees thereafter made the ex-military formation for Somalia to feed into Al-Shabaab campaigns.

Qcode371 (Appendix vi) and Qcode372 (Appendix vi) an intelligence officer and a retired colleague were handy and in-depth in reporting. The retired colleague was a resident of Isiolo County and was in touch with most occurrences in the county while the intelligence officer was
in charge of intelligence gathering in the county. In fact based on grounded theory (3.5) their data confirmed most of the information already at hand. Qcode371 gave three routes and precise information on how foreigners have influenced youths in the country. Qcode371 as a key informant cited the routes as shown in Table 4.7

**Table 4.7**

*Infiltration Routes in the Country*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a)</th>
<th>Mandera</th>
<th>Moyale</th>
<th>Isiolo</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>Liboi</td>
<td>Garissa</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>Kiunga</td>
<td>Lamu</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The infiltration process based on the countries of origins of agents/recruiters radicalizers, the routes and the presence of hotspots zones clearly indicated that the infiltration process involving both personnel, that is foot soldiers of violent terror groups and the violent religious ideology through improved means of communication defined contemporary infiltration process Qcode371 (Appendix vi) also reported on the countries of origin including Tanzania, Somalia and Kenya. However, the entire process of infiltration was summed up as follows:

Aliens/foreigners have found way to Isiolo County and they have assimilated into the accommodative society. Through the peoples hospitality they have accessed the vulnerable youths (Qcode371 Appendix vi)
The assimilation of foreigners into the community occurred through ethnic and clan factor. In most cases the Kenyan Somali and the Somalis from Somalia shared physical, religious and linguistic characteristics. Apart from complex clan dynamics the sociocultural and religious features served and neatly favored assimilation to occur. Arguing from the data provided by a deputy principal in what he termed as ‘a population within a population’ (4.3) the features promoted insertion of foreigners in the country. It must also be noted that such assimilation was not always equated with radicalization but provided a conveyor belt for those with ulterior motives to stealthily access the youths in the county.

A senior retired government official (Qcode372 Appendix vi) also affirmed the countries of origin of recruiters to include Somalia, Kenya and Eritrea. The routes included Moyale road, Wajir, Garissa, Mandera and all these routes led to Al-Shabaab camps. He also reported that aliens/foreigners influenced youths by inciting them against the system (government) which neatly explained the coastal population claim that they were victims of historical social and political marginalization (Section 2.1.1).

A one-on-one interview with a long-serving deputy principal gave revealing evidence on Islamic radicalization processes. He also confided that businesses, rich men and some CBOs and NGOs pausing as benevolent organizations have a reason to be linked to radicalization. Qcode391 (Appendix vi) confessed of a business man who was a contractor but linked to Al-Shabaab. In fact the narratives that there were businesses in the county that were extremely suspicious was common. The businessmen were either sympathizers or agents of radicalization but possibly benefited from Al-Shabaab activities and relationships. However, the deputy Principal (Qcode396) on infiltration process had this to say:
I have served and worked in this region for over 15 years. Isiolo had been a transit route that connects recruiters with towns like Maua, Marsabit, Garbatulla, Moyale, Garissa, among others, as they proceed to Nairobi and other destinations. Vehicles transporting Miraa have been used to ferry people with questionable characteristics from these zones to Nairobi. Police road blocks are evaded by colluding with drivers who pretend to stop over in suspicious centres to allow suspected recruiters/foreigners go through outlet roads or ‘panya routes’ to be picked ahead thereby escaping police checks. This does not exonerate some corrupt traffic officers and the porous border in allowing Al-Shabaab into the country (Qcode396 Appendix vi).

The comments from Qcode396 (Appendix vi) exposed the systemic weaknesses and an unpatriotic culture and society. It also exposed the endemic corruption which exposed the country to recruiters and global terror networks. It defeated logic how foreigners manipulated the whole system from the police, the citizenry and civil authority. Therefore the observations from the deputy principal explained how infiltration process was abetted.

The discussions on infiltration were hardly exhaustive without a consideration of the effect of Operation Linda Boni (OLB) as a direct intervention to safeguard Kenyan border from the influx of extremists from Somalia. The argument that the entry of Kenyan troops into Somalia under the African Union Mission in Somalia mandate having occasioned the infiltration of the Somali extremist militants in the country had yet to be measured for its validity. As a fact, the research as undertaken herein confirmed that the radicalization processes had promoted infiltration in terms of personnel and ideology.
During the year 2016 and 2017 Al-Shabaab activities intensified in the Boni Forest with increased sightings of Al-Shabaab fighters comprising of diverse nationalities from Kenyans, Somalis, Tanzanians and other foreigners. The study was privy of the existence of a recruiting cell in an Island based on intelligence briefings and reports on one hand and from time to time instances reported by locals including sightings of Al-Shabaab militants at times in military uniform and occasionally posing as herders on the other hand. The recent Kenyan and US attacks at an airstrip in Manda was indicative of infiltration and rise in homegrown radicalization. The locals reports of youths speaking fluent Kiswahili and threats to hide their identity as they marched to attack the airstrip was an evidence to infiltration, homegrown radicalization and terrorism. The infiltration routes as at 2017 from Somalia were the Indian Ocean coastline of Kiamboni, Kiunga, Lamu area, southwards to Mombasa where access was possible to other parts of the country (Table 4.7)

The study was able to prove that infiltration in the country was growing and therefore the future required that advance measures prioritized to address infiltration. The question on why the Kenyan coastline and NE parts of the country were prime infiltration routes was urgent debate if safety and security of the country was to be assured. Infiltration process as the other processes in the study perpetuated the trend of radicalization and violence and the need to check the porous border especially along the Somali-Kenyan border, the Kenyan Coastline and NE Kenya was never an overambitious project.

Perhaps the discussion on the countries of origin of agents of radicalization was a key factor in infiltration. The findings indicated that agents came from all over the globe. In instances where Kenya and Somalia were cited independently, the research classified such data separately but most respondents cited many countries which were classified herein as multiple nationalities.
Somalia 8(12.7%), Kenya 3(4.8%) and the rest representing countries from the Middle East, Europe, USA and other African countries stood for 34(54.0%). There was unspecified data at 18(28.6%) (Appendix ii sample 18).

It was also necessary to sample and measure the role of violent extremist groups as an aspect infiltration. The most populous group in infiltration was the Al-Shabaab representing 35(55.6%) of 63 responses, MRC 1(1.6%) and multiple groups as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, among others, scoring 15(23.8%) of the total sampled results. There were 12(19.0%) unspecified results which were minimal but significant (Appendix ii sample 19).

A summary of infiltration processes was determined through geographical routes and ideological platforms were as provided herein. The infiltration routes included 4(6.3%), online and social platforms 4(6.3%), Boni forest 1(1.6%), North Eastern region 2(3.2%), Border points/towns/cities 4(6.3%), Upper Eastern 2(3.2%), social amenities 1(1.6%), by air 1(1.6%), beelines/panya (rat) routes 2(3.2%) and Multiple routes 26(41.3%). The unspecified data stood at 16(25.4%). The summary of these routes were classified as geographical as involving physical routes through land or air, ideological involving socio-economic and political narratives, technological as in involving social media, social as involving interaction through social amenities and regional routes which had to do with marginalized counties and areas (Appendix ii sample 17).

An interview with a respondent (IR7) from the office of the County Commissioner Isiolo indicated how dire the situation was such that the country was unsafe from what he termed as aliens being many in Kenya. The involvement of security agencies in the lapse was a great risk in fighting youth radicalization in the Country. The data presented from a consortium of respondents who were sampled out in the processes of conducting the study was alarming and a
grave danger in the country. In conclusion, the study argued out that infiltration processes were the mainstay of the rest of radicalization processes.

4.2.4 Training Processes

This research established that the training process occurred through sleeper cells in the country. Further, online training spurred the process and youths were connected to specific sites where they were accessed by recruiters and radicalizers. The sample also confessed on the two key methods of training to include the aforementioned sleeper cells and the internet as an effective way to lure and train youths (Figure 4.16 and Table 4.10). The kind of training that youths were subjected to included military or combat training, intelligence gathering, weaponry and how to handle guns, grenades, and attack tactics, among others.

The kind of training that youths received was either in terms of ideology and therefore the training process overlapped with indoctrination process whereby recruiters sought to alter the minds of youths from orthodox worldview to a terrorist mindset. Further training also involved acquiring psychomotor skills to be used in combat. As the former was ideological based training the latter was combat based training. It was of necessity to engage government officials as Muslim chaplains on one hand and military personnel on the other hand so as to understand both the software skills and hardware skills that youths received during training. The data provided on training of youths was similar in most instances Qcode360 (Appendix vi) a commander of the ATPU gave information that was both combat based and intelligence oriented. This was in tandem with the day to day operations of the officer. He confided as follows:
The kind of training that youths were given included weapon training that was necessary for them to engage in combat. Additionally the youths were also trained on collection of intelligence Qcode360 (Appendix vi)

Qcode367 (Appendix vi) a top ranking official in the office of the county commissioner of Isiolo gave information that was religious based as the initial training but were later youths were subjected to more training. In that case the initial part of training was false information based on religion. Eventually, after inducement through religion the youth were ferried across borders. The comments were as follows:

The youths received no training but through false interpretation of the Qur’an and were taken to neighboring country of Somalia for training Qcode367 (Appendix vi)

Qcode359 (Appendix vi) a registrar official enumerated the kind of training that youths get. The training included “combat, suicide bombings, camouflage, armorer training, discipline and loyalty, intelligence service, leadership and espionage”. Similarly, Qcode358 (Appendix vi) a police officer confessed that ‘recruited youths were exposed to militia training the mostly was characterized by brainwashing.’ Both Qcode359 (Appendix vi) and Qcode359 (Appendix vi) responses were what exemplified paramilitary training that was defined as training that was military based by an organization that was not military. An NGO director Qcode362 (Appendix vi) also said: “paramilitary training is the major one I know.” Perhaps based on Qcode373
Appendix vi) a more revealing data was given based on a Kenyan-Somali military officer who had been in Kismayu:

I was in Somalia, specifically, Kismayu. A certain clan of almost 250 people for example was trained on intelligence gathering by foreigners. They join others as intelligence wing ‘amniyat,’ Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) experts, combat and infantry (Qcode373 Appendix vi)

Qcode371 (Appendix vi) a military intelligence officer conversant with the terrain of study introduced a segment of thought that was unique on training of youths. Other than the paramilitary, military or ideological training there was also preparation of the next generation of recruiters. In that case the respondent gave informative information as follows:

The youths get religious training, violence against ‘non-believers, winning more followers (Qcode371 Appendix vi)

The duties that youth were trained on and assigned in sleeper cells and training camps were many. Information received from key stakeholders revealed the diversity of trainings and assignments radicalized youths were accorded as the experts on CT shared. Qcode151 (Appendix vi) an educationist in monitoring and evaluation said that youths were assigned duties based on “different cells depending on deployment, that is, sleeper cells, command cell or mobilization cell” while Qcode359 (Appendix vi) a chief registrar was specific that the youths were trained and assigned duties in “terror cells in villages.” An NGO director Qcode368 (Appendix vi)
enlisted a number of duties youths were trained as “spies, suicide bombers, cell group leaders, intelligence gathering(s) (Amniyat) on families, military and government installations.” A military intelligence officer Qcode371 (Appendix vi) confided that “over 10 in number radicalization cells exist in Isiolo during the time I have lived in Isiolo.” Perhaps a resident elder (Qcode372 Appendix vi) in Isiolo County a staunch and controversial Muslim confessed that “clandestine radicalization cells exist in Isiolo” These confessions were clear indications that cells dedicated to various functions existed in Isiolo County.

The quantitative data provided by respondents enhanced the qualitative data analyzed so far. In this regard the respondents gave specific information through a questionnaire on the different types of training common from extremist groups/recruiters. This was analyzed as the basis of quantifying the training process.

Specifically, paramilitary training, that is, a training similar to conventional military training conducted by nonmilitary organization, was rated high in the data provided by the key informants comprising of 21(33.3%) of 63. Ideological and religious training was 9(14.3%) while violent extremist training involving idolizing on the concept of holy war, that is, defensive Jihad, was 4(6.3%). Suicide bombing training was rated at 3(4.8%) as intelligence gathering was almost unknown to most respondents scoring 1(1.6%) and understandably so, since this was the most clandestine method in the radicalization matrix. Cumulatively, the aforementioned training processes were also present in the variable tagged multiple trainings 17(27.0%) in the sample. The unspecified responses accounted for 8(12.7%) of the data given. The details were as provided in data sample 20 in Appendix ii.

The training of youths was an interlocutory since aspects of other processes were present. For instance, the data on who teaches or influences youths in Appendix ii sample 14 on one hand and
data on the narratives involved in Appendix ii sample 16 represented the overlapping nature and the linkages that existed in radicalization of youths. Therefore, the training that was common to all youths was paramilitary in nature as the overall objective of Islamic radicalization processes. In summary the training process was a comprehensive strategy meant to transform the youth psychologically, spiritually, socially, economically and politically for the ultimate objective of serving in terror groups as Al-Shabaab, among others. Further, the training process qualified to be classified as paramilitary in that it was organized in similar ways that conventional armies anywhere received. The training process was designed to prepare youths for deployment yet as already discussed in the other processes training was also an ongoing process and therefore both short-term and long-term objectives training objectives were envisioned.

4.2.5 Deployment Processes

In order to determine the deployment process that the youths were subjected to the respondents who had knowledge of youths who returned home after being assigned duties in different parts of the globe were sampled. The deployed youths in rank and file activities was the most clandestine activity but which was reported by both youths and key informants. Often, some of the returnees had been captured in the media some of whom escaped the militant groups or abandoned the group after returning home. As much as some of the returnees were themselves in a dilemma whereby the extremists intelligence wings sought to eliminate and occasionally eliminated some the government’s re-integration processes activities hardly received acclaim from returnees and their families, an objective beyond the scope of much scrutiny in this research. The sentiments as presented by youths confirmed the pyramid theory. The trend of radicalization was held at a constant as probabilities of more radicalization altered the sentiments as time and
space unfolded. In the sample 18(5.0%) of 357 youths and 50(14.0%) of the same sample were aware thus strongly agreed and agreed respectively that there were returnees from areas of deployments. Again, the undecided 120(33.6%) of 357 part of the sample held the sway had they participated actively in the sampling process. The strong disagreements 90(25.2%) and disagreements 79(22.1%) of the sample accounting for a total of 169(47.3%) were classified under the suspicious variable present in the entire of the sample frame.

Figure 4.19 with a cumulative mean score of the sentiments and knowledge of returnees at 9.5% was relatively low compared to the sampling of the previous processes of radicalization. The low returnees’ rate was occasioned by a complexity of factors including those that had succumbed to death in the battle fields or those disowning their families completely. Deployment process and the low returnee rate confirmed the philosophy of pyramid model from most studies on terrorism (Figure 2.3).
The ATPU under the intelligence agencies Directorate of Criminal Intelligence Office (DCIO) data recorded a figure of 20(twenty) known cases. Noteworthy, the returnees also were lumped into two categories, that is, those who sought to recant the group and those who came to attack. Qcode360 (Appendix vi) gave these revealing remarks on the returnees:

Many youths left home and called parents when already in Somalia. The youths came from mostly in the North Eastern, Coast but also in all other counties. Many
youths left to join terrorists and came back to attack in Kenya (Qcode360 – Appendix vi)

Qcode358 (Appendix vi) a police officer reported on deployment process in Isiolo County. The information in the police station on missing and deployed youths grounded the deployment process in the county. As cautiously reported herein the information both on media and on the ground correlated in an convincing manner

Examples are many…Most recent is the case that hit the Kenyan front page of dailies in Merti in Isiolo county…More than 10 youths had joined terror groups as stated by their parents who reported at the station about their missing children. Records are there and clearly indicate from our station though restricted…Trained recruited youths are assigned duties in their country of origin or even to other counties depending on their flexibility in language and intelligence (Qcode358 Appendix vi)

The deployment of youths for terrorism was the apex of radicalization processes. Recruits were deployed within the locale or outside the country. Often, the institutions of homes and schools were affected and were the first line to realize of disappearance of these children. The youths who disappeared made calls while outside the country committing that they were not willing to return home. It was evident that youth radicalization in Isiolo County especially through monetary gains represented the counties that have recruited youths into terrorism. The reports by
parents, youths and authorities proved this fact. The former Isiolo County Commissioner George Natembeya stated in a video clip:

Isiolo is one those counties in this republic that has been identified as a hotspot for terrorism. And indeed it is true that it is the source of radicalized youth that have found their way to Somalia and these other countries that are having issues with terrorism (https://ww.nation.co.ke)

The sources indicated that the influence of Al-Shabaab on youths in Isiolo County utilized the weak links in the society to advance their recruitment agenda. The youths disappearing from schools and homes have found themselves in both the neighboring countries as Somalia and as far as the Middle East where Islamist agenda thrived. This proved that deployment of youths had occurred and hardly required overemphasis as the data provided was analyzed (Figure 4.20). From intelligence sources Qcode371 informed the researcher that after training youths were assigned duties at various destinations. This confirmed that there was an array of duties and places where youths were deployed. The paramilitary nature of the training was very clear from the data confided. This was also a response on youth deployment:

Assigned duties within the country to perpetrate violence against government or civilians leave the country for Somalia, Libya, Mali or Syria and are also inserted in Mosques, schools and other social places to recruit more into the terror outfit (Qcode371 Appendix vi)
These responses further explained the disappearance of youths. As the parents, teachers and youth handlers expressed pain the data provided here confirmed the outcry to be anchored on facts. The processes of Islamic radicalization were hereby determined.

It was expedient that this research probed the kind of duties and locations where youths were assigned such task/responsibilities/duties. The data provided was in tandem with the objectives of deploying agents. It was determined that the preferred locations were high target areas 15(23.8%) where maximum casualty rate and destruction was possible. This was aligned to Jihad objectives. Geographically, foreign countries deployment was 10(15.9%) while home countries 4(6.3%) reflected and gave rationale why incentives were lucrative in the context weak economies and structures. In terms of real time and operational imperatives assassinations scored 2(3.2%) and sleeper cells duties stood at 5(7.9%). On multiple duties and targets 14(22.2%) involved those cited all the tasks already mentioned as well and therefore suggested that the findings were on high than indicated above. Global neo-fundamentalists groups (Section 2.1.3) and creation of cells by Al-Qaeda through infiltration (Section 2.3.4) confirmed how deployment of youths was linked to the global Islamic radicalization phenomenon. Figure 4.20 explained the results as discussed.
The deployment was also evident based on the coastal and Northern parts of the country having experienced youth radicalization in the recent past and abducted tourists (Section 2.3.4) including the recent Cuban doctors to Somalia by Al-Shabaab operatives. The Al ijtihad group had in support of Al-Qaeda from 1992-2002 targeted Kenyan youth for radicalization and deployment (Section 1.1.1). The deployment of youths can therefore be termed to have had a historical implication and which explained how the objectives of radicalization were also long-
term. The radicalized youths were known to be deployed to local destinations as Somalia, Kenya but also countries grappling with terrorism.

In summary the deployment of youths for combat and related functions was a deliberate end product process that had exhaustively altered the minds and hearts of youths towards embracing the violent religious extremist ideology. The key informants in this study reported of an array of countries around the globe where youths were deployed for the *jihadi* terror activities. The assignment of duties within country and outside countries as discovered in this thesis included but not limited to Somalia, Kenya (North Eastern and Lamu belts), Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Libya, Mali, Syria and other parts of the world.

### 4.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF RADICALIZED MUSLIM YOUTHS

To the extent that radicalization was a criminal act on one hand or a cause of war on the other hand were the theoretical premises that made radicalization thrive. As much as determining this was in purview of criminological theories (Section 2.3.2) it was not immediately determined in this study that radicalization was a crime and neither was *jihadi* terrorism since these ends were still contested despite the ‘war on terror’ taking a warfront dimension to contemporary terrorism. In that case characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths were derived from the sample based on partly observation and also data presented by key informants, students and pupils on what they knew of the beliefs and behaviors of radicalized youths. Eventually, the indicators of radicalization were discovered in this process.

The data to prove characteristics of youth radicalization was from both the questionnaire and observation of youths. In the sample there was a clique of youths who were suspicious and hostile to the questionnaire and the researchers. In fact the sense of loss and anger against this
research was an indicator the youths were radicalized or were operating in ignorance (Section 2.1.3) Just as the war on terror was forged from a religious front there were youths who did not differentiate between violent extremists and Islam (Sections 1.1.1, 2.1 and 2.3.3). The methodological gaps as anticipated in this study were numerous but were addressed as proposed in the limitation of the study section (1.7).

A number of respondents were so concerned about the final storage of the questionnaire and whether the researcher was linked to government agencies. A head teacher also questioned how the schools were sampled suspicious on whether the county had sanctioned the research (Qcode2). The behavior of such suspicious and uncooperative respondents in the sample made the research categorize such behavior and tendencies as abetting radicalization. In that case the behaviors were enlisted as a characteristic of radicalization under what was termed in this research as ‘pre-radicalization behavior(s)’. The rationale for such classification was based on clear sympathies and indicators that such respondents inclined more to Al-Shabaab narratives (Appendix viii). The sampling of pre-radicalized behavior/indicators was anchored on radicalization as a phased process in this study (Section 2.3.4) that began with personal grievances and a sense of alienation

Further, to the extent that the sense of suspicion was a characteristic of courting pre-radicalization (Appendix viii) tendencies or whether such attitudes were informed by fear of repression was also a grey in this study. Additionally, since extremists maximize on masses’ opinions, dissatisfaction and the sympathizer attitude to recruit youths in the community this research inclined on the affirmative. The hypersensitivity, fearfulness, cautiousness and meanness by some respondents were characteristics that suggested that some youths had been
pushed to the limbo of society. The concern from the sample that Islam had been misinterpreted to support *Jihad* confirmed the moderate characteristic of a large portion of the sample (Section 2.2.3).

There was an agreement among Muslim youths towards radicalization effecting a change in feelings and behaviors by such understanding of Islam. For example youths from Masjid Noor Mosque, Fatma Nur, Rahma Mosque, Ramadhan and Al Noor confirmed this fact. Generally, there were youths who were aware of the existence of radicalization and its processes in the county but whose honesty, willingness and sense of fear undermined the release of such relevant information or only reported carefully thus minimizing information.

On the flipside, there were youths who were yet to understand radicalization in the community. Therefore, one-on-one interview and filling questionnaire with respondents in the general public was more informative and useful in the research to mitigate for the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths (hypersensitivity, fear, cautious and suspicion) with the tendency of sympathy and secrecy.

A secondary school teacher’s remark in the process of the class filling the questionnaire ‘*how dare you write your names on the questionnaire?*’ made one of the students make another remark to his fellows ‘*mtakamatwa*’ (you will be arrested). Such alarmist notions coupled with perceived alienated community already with almost natural tendencies of secrecy impeded scholarly work even though minimally. As already stated these behaviors were envisioned thus mitigated as proposed (section1.7) but discussed here as characteristics preceding radicalization based on staged or phased processes of radicalization (Section 2.3.4).

A research assistant shared that after the research some pupils in a primary school (Qcode2, Appendix vi) raised alarm that ‘*mtakupiwa mbona mlikubali kujojiwa*’ (you will be arrested
because you responded to the interview session). These attitudes as fear, suspicion and secrecy apart from impeding scholarly work on radicalization also undermined the fight against radicalization. Most importantly such attitudes proved how youths feared and were alienated from their society, government, and therefore prone to radicalization and recruitment. An in-depth discussion with a deputy principal in the school that became inaccessible to the researcher highlighted the unique characteristics of a community prone to radicalization. The aforesaid deputy principal having served long in the region confirmed that it was easy for militants from Somalia due to similar physical and linguistic features with the Kenyan Somali and Cushitic characteristics to insert themselves within the community without being identified. The physical and social features that were identified were by design or default responsible for the upsurge of business communities in the North-Eastern and Upper Eastern frontiers which favored the aforementioned insertion in what he termed as “a population within a population” without notice. The high level of secrecy in the community based on agnatic lineages (Section 2.3.3) only can be ignored at the risk of peace and security.

As the physical, mental, linguistic and social characteristics of the Somali community both Kenyan Somali and those from Somalia were so typical and identical that insertion was unnoticeable it was necessary to consider how agents could thrive within the community without notice. In section 2.3.3 the plight of the Islamic community for a caliphate was entrenched in their cultural identity that was presumed to be at risk. In the four models of recruitment (Figure 2.7) we see the infection method was used to insert an agent into the population for radicalization but the insertion of agent into the population in with agnatic characteristics (Section 2.3.3) was easy based on features and clan dynamics. Ethnic and clan dynamics in the Somali community.
were factors that helped youths assimilate, create identity, empathy and sympathy which were manipulated by agents of radicalization.

Based on a resurfaced complex scenario of strong clan ties and bonds (Section 2.3.1) on radicalization a discussion with a fellow clergyman of Somali origin, also a Maalim within chaplaincy during an AMISOM tour of duty in 2014 proved that Kenyan Somalis and Somalis in Somalia were linked by these agnatic lineages, that is, strong kinship ties. As he was responding to what Al-Shabaab might do to him in combat if they realized his lineage he responded that they might not inquire of his clan because it might bring division among them. Arguably, family ties, the traditional and social structure of the Somali person(s) bargained for loyalty between kinship and patriotism at any given situation in time and space. The ethnic, clan and agnatic factors in radicalization were areas with limited literature and studies. Based on these agnatic lineages, pre-radicalization leanings aligning with physical, mental and social features were implied on a case to case basis and though not generalizable played some key role as a characteristic in radicalization.

Another feature included what a school principal (Qcode83-Qcode126) and a deputy principal from another school called a culture of defiance as characteristic of the school children making it impossible to locate and draw a line on the issues of indiscipline and radicalization. Obvious the line between a radicalized youth and an indiscipline case was very thin calling for a case by case basis analysis. The culture of defiance was as well reported by a principal of a different school as emanating from hands off culture from parents who never took initiative to correct or even discipline their children.

A one-on-one discussion with a head teacher of a school in Isiolo County who questioned the role of religion (Islam) in promising virgins in heaven upon death as a martyr proved interesting.
Why is it even necessary to have virgins in heaven while there’s a possibility of getting virgins on earth? She claimed that religion can be ambiguous to reason. By the foregoing recruiters blend the existential issues with religious ideology to lure youths. Drawing a line between youths who purely engage in violence for religious reasons and those engaging for monies was blurred. Perhaps analysis of the late Sheikh Aboud Rogo’s son Khubeid Rogo’s sentiments explained the characteristics of a youth embittered by the death of his father which he linked to the government. According to the interview between his son and Citizen TV reporter, the late Sheikh was associated with support of Terrorism. The sentiments as presented were hardly proven but served as valid in the study objectives. The statements made by the youth were mixed with feelings of angst, bitterness and revenge

Waliniambia kwa uso mimi tutamalizana kwa field kama mzee…walinipiga, walinitishia maisha, walinewekea bunduki, wakaniambia tutakumaliza vile tulimumaliza babako…nawasema wazi wao tutamalizana na nyinyi safari hii, mambo ya Koti imeisha, tunakutana na nyinyi kwa kiwanja stori ii ishe hivyo ndio navyokwambia…sina uchungu hati nitawamaliza wale, ule uchungu walivyonifanya vitimbi juu ya babangu, juu ya familia yangu hata waniambie kwa siku million hamsini nawambia sina haja niwache na umaskini wangu

TRANSLATION: (They told me that we’ll finish you as we did the old (his father)…they beat and threatened me, pointed gun on me, they told me they will finish me as we finished your father…I say to them I’ll finish up with you this time round, court issues are over, I’ll meet you in the open field so that the story ends, that is what I tell you, am not bitter because I will finish them, the bitterness
of what they did to me, the comedy because of my father, my family even if they say anything for fifty million days I tell them to leave me with my poverty

The bitterness from the aforementioned youth explained the nature of what characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths looked like. The emotions as expressed by the son of the slain Sheikh Aboud Rogo were rarely classifiable as characteristics of radicalization but were necessary sentiments that militants favored. Generally, such sense of loss and bitterness was traumatic and was classified in this research as feelings and behaviors that favored radicalization (Appendix viii). These characteristics served as the initial stages that may or may not precipitate into future radicalization and violence.

The nexus between rage and bitterness on one hand and suicide bombers was a proven fact (Section 2.3.2). The psychological trauma that victims of alienation underwent was known to weaken resolve and judgment. This does not mean that any violence was justifiable but a stating the fact that different personalities, youth included, engaged with loss and pain differently. The progression towards violence was a stage process that narrowed along the staircase model (Figure 2.3). The psychological trauma was also an effect of radicalization discussed in detail herein (4.4). The characteristics of radicalization provided by the sample were summarized in Table 4.8.
### Table 4.8

**Characteristics of Radicalized Youths**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTIC</th>
<th>BEHAVIOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance</td>
<td>Antisocial/expressed strong sentiments against other religions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudden change in behavior</td>
<td>Abandoned friends and family and previous social circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness with life</td>
<td>Statements like ‘even if I die I will go to paradise, the government does not care, we’re abandoned…’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentimental/Judgmental/Argumentative</td>
<td>Muslims are suffering because of the west/Christians/government etc…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatist attitude and a façade of calmness</td>
<td>Avoidance of socializing and too much quietness with signs of living in his/her own world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignorance and rigidity</td>
<td>Claim for theological insight without guidance from the ulama/experts of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitterness/revengeful/violent</td>
<td>Withdrawal signs evidence by blaming and swearing to revenge against perceived enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyper religious</td>
<td>Seclusion reading and memorizing texts for long periods of time even locking up oneself in a room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online addiction on violence literature</td>
<td>Searching, reading and following social sites that are dedication to radical literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonely and Self-isolated</td>
<td>Disregarding socialization from perceived out-group members to concentrate on intended goals and aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean-spirited on other’s people’s lives</td>
<td>Abhorring the lifestyles of others and name calling and tagging the rest as shirk and kafir/kuffar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellious and disobedient</td>
<td>No respect for parents, elders and those in authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearful/suspicious and resentful of authorities</td>
<td>Hyper suspicious and hatred for security apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impatient/anger tantrums/ sensitive on religion</td>
<td>No space for dialogue and quickly ignited by ordinary comments on religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogant</td>
<td>A ‘know it all’ attitude evidenced by arguments and quarreling and praise of one’s faith against others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal interpretation of sacred texts</td>
<td>Application of texts out of context and creating own spaces based on biased knowledge of texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARACTERISTIC</td>
<td>BEHAVIOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme exclusivism</td>
<td>Claims that their religion was the only one from God the rest have been defiled. NB: This is a common persuasion to most religious people including other faiths. It is a factor of extremism inherent all religious traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of dress</td>
<td>Wearing clothing that represented particular extremist persuasions or like-minded groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of friends</td>
<td>Acquiring new company that approves one’s interpretation of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of religion</td>
<td>Converting to another religion and becoming radical about it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme piousness</td>
<td>Spending much time reading the Quran alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inquisitive about violent terror groups</td>
<td>Prompting discussions on terrorism and violent extremist organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological trauma</td>
<td>Often expressing feelings of discrimination against own group or even the plight of Middle East Muslims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3.1 Extremist Beliefs

From a violent religious viewpoint, the belief system proving that youths were in the verge of being influenced or had already embraced violent extremisms as was probed in the sample. In a constant sample of 63 informants Jihad or the popular belief on martyrdom was highest at 11(17.5%) but the lumping of responses under multiple beliefs 14(22.2%) was indicative that even the Jihad percentage was higher than already rated. This was true of the ratings of the jannah or paradise 2(3.2%), the divisive nature of sects as ‘Us versus Them’ at 3(4.8%), violent extremist behavior 3(4.8%), 72 virgins 3(4.8%) and defense of community at 2(3.2%). Belief in brotherhoods and the concept of takfir, that is, classification of people into infidels, was 1(1.6%) each. Abstentions, that those who never responded to the questionnaire was high in this variable which stood at 23(36.5%) also tagged as ‘others’ in the coding of results. Further, the code on multiple beliefs 14(22.2%) was also high.
It was concluded that the level of reservations and dishonesty was possible in the measurement of belief system as an indicator of radicalized youths. In spite of this observation it was also factual that the popularity of *Jihad* in most violent extremist acts was proven by the data presented.

**Figure 4.21**

*Radicalized Beliefs*

Apart from the voluntary and involuntary radicalization in Isiolo County the forceful nature of radicalization appeared to be unique to the context under scrutiny. The misinterpreted concepts of *Jihad*, *Umma*, *Salafi Islam*, *Jahiliyah*, caliphate or Islamic state, *Shura*, *Fatwa* and *Takfir*
proved to be in use both in mainstream Islam and fundamentalist interpretations. Radicalization also involved those maligned through promises which most respondents cited unanimously as promises of money but specifically respondents indicated with phrases as promises of ‘huge amounts of money or lots and lots of money or a lot of money or money that will never end’ respectively.

The paradise appeared to be the common Islamic radicalizing ideology used by Islamists. Apart from temporal and earthly dividends dying a martyr and gaining eternal dividends was glorified. In this study it was discovered that aspects of radicalization that existed in the sample were voluntary or involuntary affairs on one hand but as an existential and heavenly (paradise) aspects of radicalization on the other hand which gave a clue towards the complex sociopolitical, economic and religious nature of radicalization.

4.3.2 Radical Behavior

Since violence was a contested view in religion the research also measured the place of Islam in radicalization that led to violence or what had come to be popularized as behavioral radicalization as opposed to cognitive radicalization (2.1). It was also expedient to analyze this religious aspect from an indicator perspective since there was an argument towards mainstream Muslim community claiming that terrorists had hijacked their religion (Sections 1.1.1 and 2.2.3). It was discovered that what mainstream Muslim community termed as a hijacking of Islam on one hand was a reinterpretation of Islamic texts and concepts by extremists on the other hand. In the key informants sample of 63 the hijacking of Islam by extremists was occasioned by the rise of violent extremists movements 16(25.4%). Eventually, a domino effect occurred whereby texts and concepts were reinterpreted 9(14.3%), radical and false preaching/teachings 8(12.7%),
political Islam 5(7.9%) and religious slogans 3(4.8%). However, 3(4.8%) believed that Islam was misrepresented in so many ways. At least a third of the sample comprising of 19(30.2%) never gave their responses which was characteristic of this kind of research. This sample dynamics were as seen in Figure 4.22

**Figure 4.22**

*Violent Religious Views*

The discussion on radicalized Muslim youths interrogated the specific indicators that were either observable or were portrayed by youths before, during and after being radicalized or having been recruited. The highest was on multiple indicators 36(57.1%) which involved psychological adjustments, use of drugs, religious obsessions and violence, among others. Specifically, sudden
behavior change 10(15.9%) ranked second in the matrix while joining violent religious extremist groups 3(4.8%) and signs of loss/trauma 3(4.8%) were also discovered. Indicators as substance abuse, religious obsession and change of religion scored 1(1.6%) each. Abstentions tagged ‘others’ were minimal in the sample rating at 8(12.7%). Again, the frequencies sampled on specific indicators were seen to be on the higher side since multiple indicators were also unevenly spread in the sample as indicated in Figure 4.23.

**Figure 4.23**

*Indicators of Radicalized behaviors*
The paradise and the issue of dying a martyr death (Sections 2.4.3 and 1.1.1) was an issue that radicalized youths embraced. It appeared that during indoctrination the Muslim person deeply internalized this concept such that youths were prone to violence because of the dividends of the afterlife. A secondary school principal pointed to a case where a security detail trying to curb unrest in a school in Isiolo County whereby a boy said “shoot me even if I die I will go to heaven.” Further, doctrinal issues, as eschatology of the soul, which Jihadists had majored on in youth indoctrination, required theological scrutiny and analysis yet the debate on handling terrorism to an extent had taken a populist approach where all and sundry had sought to cut a niche.

4.3.3 Socio-Cultural Traits

The research also sought to determine whether the preoccupation of recent radicalization on gender issues was a characteristic of recruitment. The notion that violent terror groups preferred males to females was disproved by the data provided. To the fact that gender was a characteristic to radicalization was measured based on the number of males and females that were targeted by Al-Shabaab terror group. In the sample of 63 key informants 12(19.0%) confessed that males were targeted while 2(3.2%) cited females as targets as well. But the sample was high on both genders as target 28(44.4%). The remaining portion of the sample that was noncommittal was 21(33.3%) which were undecided since they weren’t informed on gender radicalization as a trend.

These results were as well confirmed by a study that probed the need for jihadi brides (Section 2.3.3) by terror groups. In fact, despite the low level of awareness in the sample on gender issues in radicalization, the change of tact by violent extremists remained an elusive concern even to
intelligence apparatus from time to time. The data on gender as an element of radicalization was indicated in Appendix ii data sample 21.

The study also established landmark findings on the targeted communities for radicalization. This also allayed the previous misconceptions that radicalization was a certain community affair. The socio-cultural features on community as a target for radicalization unearthed that any community on one hand and specific tribes/regions on the other hand tallied at 19(30.2%) respectively. Islamic communities scored 5(7.9%) while marginalized communities was 1(1.6%) of the sampled results. There was slightly high number of unspecified results 19(30.2%) which never significantly affected the findings.

The results were seen to reflect the parameters of radicalization since the key informants sample was comprised of experts from a variety of religious backgrounds (Appendix ii data sample 23). The discussion on the Somali/Muslim community as being targeted for radicalization on one hand and Al-Shabaab terror group as having originated from Somalia on the other hand historically located Islamic radicalization to Somalia and by extension a presumption that radicalized youths were mostly of Somali origin (Section 2.2.2). As much as such an argument was valid based on persuasions the findings pointed to all directions as possible community radicalization, that is, any community was a target.

Previously studies sought to link age bracket to radicalization (Section 1.1.1). In this study it was discovered that age was an element of radicalization. In this regard ages 14-35 years scored highly 12(19.0%). This corroborated with the basic age characteristics of youths (Section 2.2.3) but also confirmed the youth nature of youths embracing the violent extremist religious ideology. It also aligned with the definition of a youth in this study. The remaining sample indicated that ages 11-35 years scored 1(1.6%), ages 12-15 years 3(4.8%), ages 16-40 years and ages 20-40
years tallied at 8(12.7%) respectively and ages 18-40 years was 7(11.1%). The respondents that were noncommittal were 24(38.1%). It was concluded that age was a factor in radicalization and therefore a characteristic of youth radicalization. The data for these results was contained in sample 24 (Appendix ii).

The overall index of characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths was evidenced through the presence of a compound of traits that were lumped under the mental, socio-cultural, emotional and physical characteristics. In that case physical characteristics scored 3(4.8%), mental, 1(1.6%), emotional 7(11.1%) and socio-cultural 8(12.7%). These characteristics were significantly affected by a huge number of respondents who cited multiple characteristics 32(50.8%) as present in the radicalization into violence scenario. There were unspecified results 12(19.0%) which never obscured the findings of the research. The sampling of these characteristic was contrasted to the findings in agnatic societies (Section 2.3.3) as suitable for radicalization of youths (Appendix ii sample 25).

4.3.4 Anti-Establishment

On existential issues youths also felt alienated and disenfranchised and the data provided was analyzed based on codes already assigned. Perhaps this was the most emotive aspect of radicalization that was capitalized upon by recruiters. The aspect on marginalization shared in common with narratives/beliefs and teachings (sample 16) projected on youths as a stratagem for radicalization.

The concern in this section was the extent to which youths developed characteristics that evidenced a sense of loss of faith in their governments and regimes. Belief in marginalization was discussed in order of ranking from highest to lowest under unemployment or
underdevelopment 13(20.6%), multiple responses 10(15.9%) involving an array of alienated feelings by youths, anti-government grievances 9(14.3%), violent extremist propaganda 7 (11.1%), historical injustices 6(9.5%) and community profiling narratives 4(6.3%). There were unspecified responses 14(22.2%) which was presumed to have insignificant effect in the results since most data proved marginalization feelings as a characteristics of radicalized youths. The data on marginalization as a characteristic of radicalized Muslim youths was provided in sample 22 (Appendix ii).

4.3.5 Online Terror Addiction

Radicalization through social media was frequent in most of the data given. The distribution of such data was present throughout the questionnaire. This information was categorized and summarized based on coded data in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9

Views of leaders on online addition in radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>Specialization/Occupations</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QCODE128</td>
<td>A police officer</td>
<td>Online recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE145</td>
<td>A security officer</td>
<td>Online platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE147</td>
<td>A security officer</td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE359</td>
<td>Chief Registrar Isiolo County</td>
<td>Social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE360</td>
<td>ATPU Commander Isiolo</td>
<td>1. Online materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Everywhere they can meet their peers and online material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE361</td>
<td>AN NGO Official Isiolo Peace Link</td>
<td>1. Online contents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Sympathizers and online recruitment, among others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Online radicalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE362</td>
<td>An NGO Executive Director Isiolo Peace Link</td>
<td>1. Online addiction – extremists online sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Internet as they visit those sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE368</td>
<td>An NGO Administrator Star of Hope Association</td>
<td>Social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE373</td>
<td>Elder Military Mosque Isiolo County</td>
<td>Social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE378</td>
<td>NGO Director NI WETU</td>
<td>Extreme use of social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE384</td>
<td>A University Student Isiolo Town</td>
<td>Through social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCODE389</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Officer Defence Headquarters</td>
<td>Religious centers such as Mosques and social media are mostly used to access youths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data from these key informants indicated that social media was highly used for radicalization. The main point of concern was where radicalized youths were addicted to online platforms. It was presumed that online was an independent radicalization route apart from the geographical routes that recruiters accessed youths. Noteworthy, key informants and students from secondary schools cited in internet as key in contemporary radicalization.

Based on group discussions in schools it was also confirmed that there were youth who were addicted to radicalization sites. A contrast of data from two secondary schools that sited online addictions was sampled. The students narrated of their knowledge of youths who were influenced or lured through social media platforms. The data was as presented in Table 4.10 confirmed that online terror addiction was present amongst youths.

### Table 4.10

*Views of students on online Addiction in radicalization*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the School</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wamy Secondary School</td>
<td>GROUP F</td>
<td>We have witnessed youths learn how to use firearms through social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo Girls Secondary School</td>
<td>GROUP C4</td>
<td>Most of them (radicalized youths) influence each other through social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GROUP C11</td>
<td>The males are influenced through social media or their friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waso Day Secondary School</td>
<td>GROUP A6</td>
<td>Addiction to social media influences youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GROUP A7</td>
<td>It is addiction to social media that teaches and influences youth to violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GROUP A8</td>
<td>The youths join terror groups as Al-Shabaab through addiction technology, that is, social media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The summary on addiction to violent social media sites was confirmed by expert information and youth data from both secondary and primary schools. Often, the use of technology involved phones which were accessible to youths. In a nutshell online terror addiction was discussed based on data provided under topics like the internet, technology, social media, online platforms and mass media in general. Group A5 from Waso Secondary School and Kambi Garba Primary School gave data that was revealing on the use and addiction to technology as a characteristic of radicalization in data sample 31 and 32 respectively (Appendix ii).

4.4 THE EFFECTS OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION PROCESSES

In this study both intended and unintended effects of Islamic radicalization emerged in the overall analysis of effects thereof. The intended effects of radicalization were to assess how the processes of radicalization had influenced Isiolo youth community but the unintended effects as community trauma, fear of repression and victimization were unforeseeable yet serving the objectives of the study.

Further, the unintended effects were a risk in conducting the research as a normative expectation in terrorism studies in most contexts (3.6). A minimal section of the sample expressed reservations as to the objectives of this research especially during one-on-one interviews. To that effect a respondent among many such others had this to say:

Where will you take the findings of this research? Will you take them to the government? Are you a soldier? Mtafanya nini na hii makaratasi? Mbona mafanya utafiti kwa shule? What will you do with these papers? Why are you conducting research in schools? (Qcode182)
The effects were discussed based on the objectives of the study and research questions. The data collected from likert scale and the questionnaire were handy in the process of analysis of the effects of Islamic radicalization on youths. In that regard the sample presented sociopolitical effects, psychological effects, security, political and economic effects, and fundamentalist effects. These effects affected the youths, families, Mosques, Schools, the umma and the general public, Islam and the State.
Ordinarily, the effects of Islamic radicalization on youths took the shape of establishing the extent to which youths had been convinced and recruited into global terror networks. Though establishing the exact number of youths who had disappeared as a result of radicalization proved difficult estimates and reports to that effect were available (Appendix ix).
Additionally, sympathizer effect also was deduced from a community presumably facing alienation and probably wrongly so targeted. This chapter on assessable effects of Islamic radicalization determined the psychology of the community and classified the effects into six major categories with subsets within each classification. The effects were discovered to be political effects, economic effects, sociocultural effects, security effects, legal effects and psychological effects. Eventually, the casualty rate in Kenya was presented as the end product of Islamic radicalization of youths.

4.4.1 Psychosocial Trauma

The psychosocial effects that occurred on youths in the processes of radicalization emanated from the alteration of mental processes and the general outlook to life. Of concern was the mental health of youths as they engaged with terror activities. In this case mental health had to do with the preoccupation of youths with joining terror groups than with noble tasks and activities.

The long civil war in South Lebanon which promoted suicide terrorism (Section 2.3.2) was equated to the youth in the sample who already were inclined to terror groups against conventional learning and progress in life. An unconfirmed report Qcode395 (Appendix vi) was that half of the school leavers per term left for Somalia. The respondent also confessed of some families, especially, mothers living lavish lifestyles confessing that their sons were sending them money from abroad and this she attributed strongly to have links with terror groups. In a situation where school youths rarely concentrated and engaged effectively with learning mental health dimensions which in this case divorce the traditional clinical approach had to a large
extent to do with adjusting cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains to character development and formation.

On the extreme psychological effects had to do with the trauma that youths and affected families went through during youth indoctrination and recruitment. The trauma in the community victimized of terrorism and suspected linkage with terrorists had been evident in the sample. Similar psychological trauma of 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation Muslim youths in Africa, Asia, UK and Europe (Sections 1.1.3 and 2.3.3) with feelings of discrimination by successive regimes the sample felt that the war on terror targeted the Muslim community. Often the role played by Islamic non-integrationist culture to democratic ideals was not considered by the diaspora community. This represented what this study concluded as a community psychology under trauma.

Additionally, the overrunning of Front Operation Bases (FOBs) by Al-Shabaab militants including Burundi, Uganda and recently the Kenyan El Adde caused combat casualties/trauma. But the issue of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) amongst soldiers who survived combat had also been reported as an area of concern besides young families left behind by their breadwinners and loved ones who succumbed to death in the line of duty.

The mechanisms and institutions to address combat stress in the African context were yet to emerge as an exposure to the militants cause psychological trauma to soldiers and their families. A group discussion with chaplains in the KDF revealed that there were conspicuous deep wounds to personnel who survived the El Adde incident that yet required enhancement through therapeutic initiatives to the individual soldiers and families. Psychological trauma associated with combat was a long term if not life term effects not only to radicalized youths but also to young soldiers succumbing to attacks and their families having to live with hard realities of life.
Qcode1 (Appendix vi) a secondary school teacher trained on violent extremism reported that apart from loss of lives there was separation in families (Qcode2 (Appendix vi) said that youths run away from their homes similar to Qcode128 (Appendix vi) and Qcode136(Appendix vi) who reported on disappearance of youths from home and joining Al-Shabaab and other terror groups. Qcode142 (Appendix vi) considered increase in school dropout as an outcome of radicalization which was echoed by Qcode143 (Appendix vi) as termination of studies by youths.

In the overall the psychological trauma was experienced by youths, their families, friends and schoolmates. Separation of families for example based on disagreements by parents based on a member joining terror groups affected all members of the family including siblings. Truancy also affected the school community since youths develop bonds in school and their friends were as well affected. On the psychological trauma on youths depression and anxiety was common both to youths who felt alienated and exposed to radicalization but on all members in the social bracket of the affected youth. Perhaps the loss of lives caused by attacks by youths or alternatively youths succumbing to death in battlefronts was the main traumatic experience to youths and affected families under psychological trauma effects.

4.4.2 Truancy and School Dropouts

The outcry by parents and the school system was confirmed by this study. The willful absence of pupil’s and students from school was linked to joining terror groups. A respondent Qcode376 (Appendix vi) an Imam admitted that a school in Isiolo County was prime recruitment center where school leavers already knew that they were destined for terror groups. There were youths who were said to have made calls back home while already in Somalia or elsewhere serving in
the ranks and file of terror group. Their willingness to return home portrayed that they were either satisfied being in terror groups or were coerced to make those kinds of calls. Perhaps, a discussion on incidents of interceptions by security agencies alongside border towns also added value to how truancy was an effect in schools. A case in point was reported of school boys intercepted and efforts to return them to continue with education eventually became futile an indicated in IR5 (Appendix vi). Closely linked was the youth who ran away from schools and used buy their school fees to buy air tickets or bus fare. A respondent reported of friends who were unwilling to continue with education for the sole purpose of joining Al-Shabaab (IR6) (Appendix vi). The exact confessions from the responded were as recorded hereunder:

I had schooled and known a self-proclaimed Al-Shabaab boy and girl. At school the girl used to declare that she’d gladly join Al-Shabaab. Later she passed exams but denied joining university. She went on to establish business but not heard of her of late. The boy disappeared and was in support of Al-Shabaab ideas and was unfriendly to those against his stand on terrorism. I also find it difficult why my fellow siblings and friends decline job opportunities after finishing universities only to stay at home in Isiolo without employment. I don’t know what it is about Isiolo (IR6)

The issue of students dropping from school and absenting themselves without parents or teachers permission was indicative of the effects of Islamic radicalization as narrated by respondents. Further, since confirmed reports from the county already were on the affirmative on youth recruitment in the County there was reason to link school abseentism to possible influence from
radicalizers. However, these kinds of observations required a case by case analysis since truancy was as well caused by many other factors, including, but not limited to youths undergoing developmental and identity crisis issues.

4.4.3 Sleeper Cells

The discussion on sleeper cells or training hideouts was established as an effect of Islamic radicalization in the county. Globally, sleeper cells were established as the framework by which radicalization was perpetuated (Sections 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.3.4). In this study sleeper cells were known to exist through intelligence apparatus and agents.

The key informants including security and intelligent agents, heads of NGOs dealing with youth and social work and ATPU among others were economical on the issue of cells in the county. The referrals from the office of the county commissioner were useful to the researcher in as far as accessing other key informants who were willing to further give leads. An intelligence officer in the military Qcode371 (Appendix vi) confirmed the existence of over 10(ten) radicalization cells in Isiolo County while another retired military officer Qcode372 (Appendix vi) confessed of the cells but also reported of their underground nature making them unknown to the public.

However, a response from a police officer Qcode358 (Appendix vi) that “those that were there have been cleared/wiped out” confirmed the issue of sleeper cells where indoctrination took place. In fact, cells operations were so complex that claims to wipe them out were rarely anchored on solid understanding. Therefore, the statistics on radicalization cells in the county were anchored on solid facts and a stratagem of recruiters and radicalizers. A discussion on sleeper cells was contained in Fig. 4.11. Since sleeper cells were meant to enhance the processes of Islamic radicalization it was also a training center for various violent extremist activities.
These trainings included paramilitary, suicide bombings, intelligence gathering cells, command cells and operation cells as indicated in Sample 16 (Appendix ii).

Specifically the issue of different kinds of cells depended on the vision and mission to be executed by violent extremist protégés and initiates. Qcode151 (Appendix vi) identified the wide variety of such different cells which were designed to execute certain operational ends as gather information, mobilize resources and training to assume leadership and command roles. These concerns were confirmed by key informants as Qcode359 (Appendix vi) Qcode368 (Appendix vi) Qcode371 (Appendix vi) who emphasized different aspects on the wide array of sleeper cells. These sleeper cells also proved how youths were assigned duties either with as operatives or agents and was linked to an international global terror network(s) (Figure 4.25)
4.4.3 Conversion of Non-Muslims to Islam

During an interview with a victim parent it was confided to the researcher that a son had converted and was wayward to parents especially the father. The parent also shared frustrations that there were youths who were converting to Islam and the trend was worrying because of radicalization of youths. It must also be agreed that not all conversions led to radicalization but was pointer to that direction especially as these cases increased beyond normal trends and in this era.
It was determined that the phenomenon of Islamic radicalization does not affect whole populations but few individuals confirming the pyramid theory dynamics (Table 2.7). The discourse surrounding radicalization of youths in the Islamic faith with a history of populations dissatisfied with ruling regimes in Kenya as elsewhere was sampled. Additionally, there are socioeconomic aspects of radicalization that as well push other non-Muslim youths to radicalization. Arguably, radicalization as a socialization process probed the already radicalized youths in this study whether from traditionally Muslim inclined communities or otherwise by an assigned Muslim identity as a key factor in interrogating religious radicalization processes.

It was now clear from the study that those people who were not born in Muslim homes but later converted to Islam are increasing in a greater rate. The converts were former members of Christian religion. The conversion was not an indicator of Islamic radicalization but was a pointer to the extent Islam had pervaded Isiolo County. The assertion was supported by a respondent rate, religious affiliation and family religion (See Appendix ii sample 1) and Figure 4.21.

Perhaps an aspect of conversion of a great concern was its linkage to violence. As much as most conversion does not correspond to violence a minimal rate based on European *Jihadi* converts was observed (Table 2.5). In the sample it was clear that some youths have engaged in violence in the country but linking the terror attacks case(s) to conversion was an ongoing task.

The study was in tandem with global trends in radicalization where proselytization was the initial step towards onward socialization into violent extremism (Sections 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.3.2 and 2.3.4). These global contexts were unique since there was a high linkage of proselytization to *Jihadi* terrorism the situation that had yet to be established in the developing nation’s contexts where empirical work was yet to commence or at infancy. The proselytization involved alteration of
the minds of youths through beliefs/teachings/narratives that promoted the violent religious ideology as contained in sample 16 in Appendix ii.

A discussion with a *nyumba kumi* (ten houses), elder revealed that radicalization was a clandestine affair that involved local youths but which was hard to determine. The interview sought to establish whether *Ngaremara* area in Isiolo County had experienced radicalization issues. Appendix ii sample 1 explained how homegrown radicalization occurred. The study was also privy to conversion cases in the county but in process of establishing whether such conversions eventually led to radicalization into VE as long-term concern.

### 4.4.4 Domestic Terrorism

Perhaps the effects of youth radicalization in Isiolo County can hardly be exhaustive without considering the confessions of youths who had joined or participated in terror group’s objectives. But before such an analysis was presented the caliphate theory with the global imperatives of radicalization cannot escape mention and analysis. Often, the overarching objective of global terrorism revolved around the global *Jihad* agenda perpetrated by ideologues, leaders and commanders of terror networks. It was reiterated that most other recruits and foot soldiers were hardly aware of the global implications of political violence. Therefore, domestic terrorism also known as homegrown terrorism was an offshoot of the global *jihad* movement.

Responding to the question as to whether the creation of Islamic states or caliphates was the ultimate goal of global terror groups and extremists the information presented to the study was useful in this objective. By the very nature of global implications of radicalization and the philosophy thereof the creation of an ideal state in this case Islamic state(s) or caliphates based
on Islamic theocratic parameters was political in nature. Such a recovery of Islamic golden era of caliphates was understood by a section of the sample (16.53%) in this thesis.

Arguably so, the establishment of states that were purely religious for the advancement of a theocratic agenda on earth had preoccupied the mindset of many a jihadi terrorist networks (Section 2.1.2). Qcode(158) an Imam and chaplain was categorical that the Caliphat agenda was engineered by theorists and philosophers of political Islam but the ordinary radicals and extremist fighters including youths were not aware of the caliphate agenda. The data on the political vision of a caliphate was known and presented by youths for analysis

On the role that caliphate politics play in creating stable or disenfranchised communities key informants gave useful data to prove that youths were purely manipulated. The beliefs, feelings and behaviors of youths were maligned by recruiters with suggestions of an alternative life thus fueling push and pull factors and therefore convinced them in favor of a caring theocratic order. The capitalization on weak government schemes that hardly addressed existential needs of youths formed the background by which youths were indoctrinated into a caliphate agenda

Politics creates an environment where radicalization thrives. It reinforces the grievances of the youths and incite them, that is, inform the community of having been profiled, sidelined or marginalized by the governments making them turn against the government (Qcode367 Appendix vi)

Qcode368 (Appendix vi) who was also a director of an NGO dealing with youths was emphatic and elated on the question of the role of politics in radicalization. His response was that ‘in fact the whole thing is about politics…it is the main driver of radicalization.’ He was able to link
youth radicalization in any place with global politics citing Iraq, Libya and Syria, among others, as prime examples that pulled youths in the Middle East together against international political double standards. He also cited local politics and marginalization especially in the North Eastern Province as contextual cases where radicalization against government took place.

The literature also correlated the results that the Northern parts of Kenya were historical hotbeds of radicalization (Section 1.1.1). Additionally, another Muslim elder, a former government official (Qcode372 Appendix vi) said that ‘poor people rebel regionally as being not part of the system as they are treated badly or discriminated upon.’ Qcode370 (Appendix vi) a former victim of state interrogation and a teacher retorted that ‘profiling all Muslims as Al-Shabaab impact youth to voluntarily join already existing cult.’

A total of 59(16.4%) of 357 respondents reported that the future of radicalization was caliphate – oriented and 165(46.0%) reported on the contrary yet 133(37.0%) of the same sample were undecided. To the extent that Islamic states or caliphates were to be realized or not depended on how the Western democratic order created stable states and societies by preventing fault lines that can be capitalized upon by Jihadi terrorists for youth radicalization. Unmistakably, there was in the sample as expected anywhere Muslims who despite preoccupation on political objectives abhorred violence (2.1) as a strategy to political objectives (sample 6) as indicated in Appendix ii. It must also be held in view that the political and the religious vision of Islamic jurisprudence were monistic in nature (Section 2.2.3) that is, there were no sacred versus secular spheres of life and therefore the caliphate agenda was appealing to some youths.

The dynamics of the caliphate theory in the contemporary settings therefore was in contrast with previous caliphates or the golden Islamic age. The political vision of contemporary Islamic states as reported by respondents fed on issues albeit from an extremist point of view as
marginalization, discrimination, alienation, unemployment and ethnicity, among others. All these existential threats fed the Jihadi terrorist narratives on a theocracy as the ultimate solution to all types of injustices.

Being a fluid process radicalization of youths had produced domestic, national and global violence. Often youths indoctrinated and recruited in a certain county posed a threat to counties of origin or outside other counties and countries. In the Kenyan case the movement of youths and cell networks generally impacted on national security concerns. The relations between security forces and pockets of the Kenyan population had been frosty from time to time based on presumed linkage of youth disappearance to government agencies. The implication of this allusion or fact reflected negatively on security work as Jihadists find a soft spot on the populace to advance their agenda. The concept of recidivism, that is, youths who completely delinked from terror groups, based on governmental amnesty was hampered notwithstanding communities’ resilience becoming weakened and more youths joining terror organization.

In fact, the linkage of the attack on a Kenyan-US military establishment at Lamu on 6th January 2020 to local youths as participants remained an issue of concern to security apparatus of the state. The assorted weapons and firearms which were used by the attackers was a matter of grave concern as to how such arsenal found its way into the nerve centre of the country from time to time. As a matter of national security concern the effect of violent religious radicalization needed not be elusive to the security apparatus despite the underground nature of recruitment and indoctrination. As much as the Kenyan culture required introspection on matters security the effects of radicalization were seen to be a national security threat. The questions as to who funded the youth and how they acquired weapons and how they traversed the country with these weapons unnoticed was a national security concern.
Table 4.11 analyzed the attacks based on prevailing data that hardly reflected the official government records and statistics but factual. The preoccupation was to mainstream and assess the effects. The incidents and violent attacks listed hereunder were not meant to be conclusive nor accurate in terms of official figures since the objective was to survey and report the effects of youth radicalization as a national security threat.
Table 4.11

_Incidence of Terrorism in Kenya Linked to Radicalization_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/NO</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>Terror Group</th>
<th>Deaths/Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>1980 (New Year’s Eve)</td>
<td>Nairobi, Norfolk Hotel</td>
<td>An Arab group</td>
<td>20 people killed and 80 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>7th August 1998</td>
<td>Nairobi, United States Embassy</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Jihad</td>
<td>Approximately 212 people killed and estimated 4,000 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>28th November 2002</td>
<td>Mombasa, Paradise Hotel</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>10 Kenyans and 3 Israelis killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>24th March 2011</td>
<td>Nairobi, a grenade hurled in a bar</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>1 person killed and more than 20 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>24th March 2011</td>
<td>Nairobi, Machakos Bus Terminus</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>5 people killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
<td>Nairobi, Bus Station</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>6 people killed and over 60 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
<td>Mombasa, Grenade at a popular Bar Garissa, two churches</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>1 person killed several injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>July 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17 people including 2 policemen killed and guns taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>21st September 2013</td>
<td>Nairobi, Westgate Shopping Mall</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>67 people killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4th May 2014</td>
<td>Nairobi, near Homeland Inn on Thika Road and Thika Road Mall (TRM)</td>
<td>Not confirmed</td>
<td>2 people killed and 53 injured in two bus explosions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>16th June 2014</td>
<td>Mpeketoni in Lamu</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>More than 60 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2nd April 2015</td>
<td>Garissa University College</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>147 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>15th January 2016</td>
<td>Somali, El Adde Attack on KDF troops</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>4th May 2018</td>
<td>Mandera, Shimbir Fatuma Area</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>4 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>14th January 2019</td>
<td>Nairobi, Riverside Dusit 2 Hotel</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>21 deaths (5 attackers) and 28 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>6th January 2020</td>
<td>Lamu, Manda Bay (Kenya-US Forces) attacks</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>3 people (Foreigners) plus 5 militants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The discussion on youth radicalization as a national threat was not conclusive without interrogating the sample on the youths who had participated in terror attacks in Kenya. The scale that measured the national security threat based on youths radicalized from Isiolo indicated from the sample of 357 youths that 35(9.8%) had strong agreements and 76(21.3) youths agreed in contrast to 69(19.3%) and 58(16.2%) who strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively. Further, a third of the sample 119(33.3%) was undecided. The measurement of strong sentiments and weak sentiments on both sides of the spectrum made agreements and disagreements to be almost at equilibrium.

Qcode372 was seen to be a key informant based on his passion on the subject of radicalization and therefore made these revealing comments on the effects of radicalization on youths in the county and the nation at large. His remarks were revealing of the attack that occurred in Dusit Hotel. Specifically these were the comments:

The effects of radicalization from Isiolo County included the Dusit hotel in Nairobi. Many youths have joined terror groups but exact number unknown because it was an underground thing whereby cells exist in Isiolo County and other towns but you cannot tell where but the government must be aware. Some families report that their sons have been killed in Various Al-Shabaab camps in Somalia, Libya, Syria, Al-Qaeda in Syria and Boko Haram in Nigeria (Qcode372)

From these kinds of comments it was conclusively determined that the recent effects of radicalization in the country were caused by homegrown terrorism by radicalized youths. The
sample confirmed that the youths who had participated in recent attacks in Kenya were youths from the country who had embraced the violent ideology.

Figure 4.26

*Radicalized Youths as a National Threat*

The radicalization and recruitment of youths was concluded to be posing a national threat since the data clearly linked youths from the target audience to have participated in terror activities. The elusive nature of these attacks to security apparatus suggested that they were either extremely clandestine or homegrown terrorism had taken root in the county and the country at
large. In the meantime a discussion on the findings on general effects shaded more light on these issues.

Locating the youths who had committed such acts in the meantime was beyond the scope of the study since determining the participation in violent acts by radicalized youths was the preoccupation as at now. From the sample (Figure 4.27) the mean score of the youths who held sentiments that youths from the county had planned and participated in violent acts was 15.6%. These statistics were as indicated in Figure 4.27

4.4.5 Violent Religious Extremism

The youths who have joined violent religious extremism in the recent past had caused a concern amongst stakeholders. As earlier indicated these youths join regional and global outfits for acts of Jihadi terrorism. A trajectory of radicalization of youths in Isiolo County as sampled in this research was measured based on evidence(s) of youths known to have joined terror groups on one hand and the specific terror group that the youth joined on the other hand. The percentages presented affect families, individuals and society at large.

Key informants were consulted to give the figures of youths who have joined terror groups. The figures given varied from a low of 3 (three) to a high of over 20 (twenty) known youths. Information from the civil authority, NGOs and security forces was sampled as coded and reported. On the question of how many youths they were aware or heard of who joined terror groups, the following was reported by key informants comprising of government officials, security forces, chaplains, teachers, religious leaders (imams/maalims) and the civil administration.
Qcode371 (Appendix vi): Youths numbering over 20 during the period I have lived in Isiolo town had joined terror groups.

Qcode372 (Appendix vi) said: So many joined terror groups the but exact numbers not known.

Qcode370 (Appendix vi) said: Ali, dead

Qcode361 (Appendix vi) said: Quite a number

Qcode359 (Appendix vi) said: Three aware and tens heard of.

Qcode360 (Appendix vi) said: About 20 (twenty) with ‘pepe’ as an example of disappearance from school/home.

Qcode358 (Appendix vi) said: More than 10 (ten) youths as stated by their parents who reported at the station about their missing children. Records are there and clearly indicate from our station, though restricted.

Qcode367 (Appendix vi) said: Don’t know the exact number but few reported cases including around 4 (four) cases reported from schools.

Qcode362 (Appendix vi) said: About 15 (fifteen) and 4(four) from Isiolo boys secondary school.

Senator Yusuf Haji said on Citizen TV media interview: A group of Al-Shabaab numbering about twelve people were terrorizing our region.

But sources as Qcode371 (Appendix vi), Qcode358 (Appendix vi), Qcode360 (Appendix vi) and Qcode367 (Appendix vi) were highly reliable since they were members from the security and intelligence apparatus. The information was also based on known and documented data in the county. Qcode362 (Appendix vi) data was also highly authentic since the NGO was directly concerned in youth empowerment which included combating radicalization. Perhaps the registrar officer Qcode359 (Appendix vi) data was credible as an instrument directly linked to personnel
registration. However, that does not mean the information from the other key informants was lacking in any way but was not confirmed.

The targeting of youths as discussed in the sample corresponded with previous studies that have identified terror groups which target youths. Such examples included Hamas, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda among others (Section 1.1.1). Often the identity crisis issues were capitalized in the process of youth recruitment. In fact the cumulative mean score of the study of this sample was between 19-24 years as the prime age targeted by terror groups directly correlating with an Israel study that had the age cohort of 17-22 years as the target for terrorist recruitment (Section 1.1.1).

Based on these comments there was a clear indication that youths were targeted and had succumbed to recruitment. The security effects on youths also affected families and friends since they were as well victims of psychological trauma (Section 2.3.2).

In Figure 4.27 on a subset of youths who knew at least a youth who was radicalized showed that 60(16.8%) of 357 had joined violent religious extremist groups and 264(73.8%) never knew a youth who had joined violent extremist group. Further, a classification of 33(9.2%) of 357 who were undecided for obvious reasons in the sample as the fear of victimization or repercussions of such knowledge yet the concern of research was purely academic.
The former Isiolo county commissioner George Natembeya reported of about 27 students joining terrorism in Somalia. The official position from the government served the purpose of affirming the data from respondents. However, both the government information and the sample reporting were yet to arrive at accurate figures of youths who had been radicalized into terrorism. The
aforementioned County Commissioner data was presumed factual and therefore was archived as classified information (Appendix ii).

The casualties and deaths incurred directly linked to historical radicalization in Kenya indicated a perpetual and growing trend. However, entry into Somalia under the banner of AMISOM gave global al Jihad narrative space to recruit more youths into Al-Shabaab militia group. Apart from the myriad effects of radicalization which could escape assessment in this research terror activities perpetrated in the country captured this concern convincingly. A one-on-one interview with a respondent clearly situated the effects of radicalization on youths.

Vijana wengi wamepotea from Qcode398 [designated in this study by phonetic Tango]. Hii mambo imemaliza vijana wengi na wakifuatiliwa, hawapatikani na ripoti ya vifo, mateso inarudi hata ijapo waliahidiwa maisha mazuri BT: Many youths have disappeared from Qcode398. This radicalization has finished many youths and follow-ups do not locate their whereabouts and reports of deaths, suffering comes back and yet promises of good life was initially given to youths

The ultimate effect of Islamic radicalization on youth was suffering and death. The youths were radicalization to become martyrs but some other youths were coerced and deployed into the battlefields against their wishes through manipulation and promises of earthly and eternal rewards (paradise). In the end they succumb to death or become casualties of combat.

The attack on a Kenya-US military installations comprising of the Kenya Naval Base Manda and US Camp Simba on 6th January 2020 represented the recent militant campaigns by terror network Al-Shabaab. The photo in Appendix ii was the collateral damage caused by youths who
participated in the attack. The five who were felled down were found in possession of assorted weapons, medicine, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), ammunitions, among others. The loss of lives and property were evident by the five youths from Al-Shabaab fighters.

The effect of radicalization on youths in the county and the country was confirmed by the informants both the youths in homes, schools and the general public in the county on one hand and official government report and responses from leaders/elders on the other hand. The figures given on youths who have joined Al-Shabaab only confirmed the effects of radicalization on youths. The security effect of youth radicalization was evident in the way these youths were deployed to attack specific targets both the hard target that is the military and soft targets that is the civilian population.

Perhaps the casualty rate of the militants was comprehended through the capacity and casualties killed during an attack. The tactics of terror group fighters which attacked AMISOM bases in Somalia was said to come in waves which explained the number of youths who died in the process. An expert in detonation of bombs narrated his story:

I have encountered 13 IEDs as from 2016 onwards at Eldin, Tabaqa and Fafadun. These IEDs are not locally improvised but are as a result of foreign intelligence. The dispersion of Somalis after the collapse of the state in 1991 exposed them to outside world and making improvised bombs. The Al-Shabaab manage to overwhelm AMISOM troops because they come in thousands…in waves…commanders remain at the rear ranks pushing front rank fighters…approximately 5,000 Al-Shabaab fighters till the final wave comes to take over after ammo diminishes or fatigue takes toll on soldiers due to prolonged
fight and their slaughter in thousands. The Vehicle Bound Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) suicidal fighters are brainwashed about eternal dividends and others pressurized to fight or detonated against their will or remotely detonated by a fellow fighter or commander.

The data provided by those who experienced combat incidents showed that the effects on youths were many but including succumbing to combat, that is, death. Since the mainstay of the study on this objective was on the effects on youths casualties were reported but the exact number was at the periphery of the study. Islamic radicalization had impacted negatively on youths and that their human security had been compromised was also established in this study. The findings on the effects of radicalization on youths was anchored by two separate studies, that is, an hypothetical studies conducted in Eastleigh on one hand and another study conducted in six unnamed universities in Nairobi (Section 2.1.1). This study also was corroborated by European Jihadi fighters (Table 2.5) who converted and later became jihadi fighters. Perhaps the point of departure from the latter was that in the sample there was also manipulation and capitalization on existential issues as opposed to the affluent Western countries where deprivation was not a major factor in radicalization.

4.4.6 Economic Effects on Youths

An argument that attacks affected the economy and youth unemployment was based on closure of tourist destinations as travel advisories were issued against presumed terrorist destinations. The tourism industry for example in the Coast curtailed opportunities of youths working in Hotel industry. Travel advisories have been given by US and foreign embassies in Kenya in the past
based on impending threats. In such scenario tourism being amongst the mainstay of economy was affected in the process.

The recent attack on a military establishment occasioning a suspension of air travel services was just a recent incident that impacted negatively on the economy. By extension the loss of human life and property, especially, costly military equipment was an economical effect and concern to the government. Being a tourist destination the 6th January 2020 attacks on Kenya – US installations in Manda airstrip Lamu was an economic effect since just as four years ago such sanctions on tourism and travels was again imposed by the KCAA Director-General Gilbert Kibe though lifted in the afternoon. It was noted that any disturbance(s) caused by terror activities affected the economy which directly impacts on Muslim youth especially in the coast but also affected the youthful Kenyan population in general.

The scramble for youths by competing interests including Al-Shabaab impacts negatively on the economy. In the midst of scarce employment the radicalizers had sought to fill the gap by offering youth’s employment opportunities to cater for their families and livelihoods. As they join terror networks the youths received financial incentives in most cases as bait which cannot be said to offer any sustainable livelihoods to self and family. Obviously, the losing of the productive chunk of human resource, that is, the youths was an economic effect needing prompt interventions. Further, terrorist’s activities were known to bring businesses and all activities to a standstill. Such moments hamper on the economy but still the destruction of property was an economic effect which also affected youths.
4.4.7 Socio-cultural Effects

The social fabric in Isiolo County and elsewhere in the country had been affected by radicalization. The sociocultural effect was discussed based on the fact that Islam was both a culture and religion as evidenced in most Islamic contexts where religion was the culture of the communities especially where theologians were also jurists (Section 2.2.1). Mostly, the data from religious leaders during National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) training in Isiolo County confirmed the fault lines that existed in the society based on either processes of radicalization or Counter Terrorism (CT) measures. To that effect the religious leaders interacted with the question as to the effect of religious violence on religious communities in Isiolo County. Qcode128 (Appendix vi) reported that ‘some people, tribes, faith or religion has perceived the war as being targeting’ even as Qcode130 (Appendix vi) cited parental or family isolation as a social effect. Qcode136 (Appendix vi) saw suspicion and disharmony in the community as a sociocultural effect similar to Qcode138 (Appendix vi) that religious violence ‘kills peace and creates suspicion and disunity.’ Key informant Qcode141 (Appendix vi) observed the church community being warned of attacks besides some youths feeling targeted while Qcode142 (Appendix vi) and Qcode139 (Appendix vi) and Qcode140 (Appendix vi) all cited fear of repression as a social effect. Perhaps Qcode145 (Appendix vi) on sociocultural effect was to the point as he reported that religious violence created enmity between Christians and Islamic faith based on terror groups. The youths have been sidelined according to their religious beliefs and teaching, and they see security as targeting them and Qcode151 (Appendix vi) said that suspicion thrived creating animosity between Muslims and Christians besides suspicion of youths who engaged in other crimes other than terrorism.
The cumulative sociocultural effect as observed from the key informants was clear that religious violence had caused fault lines within the faith communities albeit pronounced only during crisis and hardly peacetime. The feelings of alienation and discrimination were a recipe for hard feelings, divisions, hatred and conflict during risky moments. Apart from the fault lines that existed amongst faith communities there was fear of repression from government agencies dealing with counter terrorism (CT) and authorities were distrusted by the communities affected that their children/youths were targeted to an extent of not willing to share information. But Qcode157 (Appendix vi) reported a dual effect that apart from youths targeting police and army there was also extrajudicial killing of youths. Eventually, the stigmatization of youths as a sociocultural effect and chasm (gap) that existed between authorities and youths, planted fault lines in the society which played into the gallery of terrorists.

The sociocultural effect on youths was partly observed in light of other cultural contexts either as the Islamic community in diaspora failed to integrate in Western cultural value system (Section 2.3.3) or as orientalist scholars’ failure to understand Islamic culture as a religious culture and therefore affecting all facets of life (Section 1.1.1). In this context the data from the sample also observed fault lines in the communities in Isiolo County due to these sociocultural dynamics.

4.4.8 Legal Effects on Youths

The legal effects in the sample were measured by youths known to have been convicted by authorities. Often the youths were either convicted based on evidence in participating in terror attacks or were intercepted in the process of crossing borders to join violent groups. Much of the dynamics concerning convicted youths was in the process of being unearthed through court processes.
The data from the sample confirmed the impact of the recent enacted laws in Kenya to combat terrorism in the country (2.1) despite the fact that the legal framework on the security laws in the country was undeveloped especially on radicalization concept. In fact the concept of radicalization in the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 (SLAA, 2014) does not mention the concept of radicalization in the entire act but by inference in Part VI Subsection 40B Clause 2(c) which states “develop strategies such as counter and de-radicalization” as an NCTC role in interagency coordination and counter terrorism measure(s). De-radicalization was only but an effect of radicalization and this study argued that the legal framework was yet to develop to tackle radicalization processes before any meaningful engagement with contemporary violence from religious perspectives emerged.

In this study the measuring scale indicated that youths were aware that the youths who had been radicalized had been convicted by authorities. Therefore, 48(13.4%) of 357 youths strongly agreed that the authorities had convicted the radicalized youths 65(18.2%) of the sample agreed that youths who joined violent religious extremists groups were convicted. The undecided portion of the sample was 119(33.3%) while strong disagreements 66(18.5%) and disagreements 59(16.5%) were almost at an equilibrium with the affirmations on the part of the authorities having convicted the radicalized youths as shown in Figure 4.28 below.
The legal effects in youths were buttressed by the recent conviction of two of three accused of Westgate Mall attacks in 2013. In the ruling delivered by chief magistrate Francis Andayi on 7th October 2020 where of the accused persons by the name Liban Abdullahi Omar Mustafa was acquitted while Mohammed Ahmed Abdi and Hussein Hassan were found guilty under section 23(4) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 (POTA). While the two were sentenced the real attackers were said to have been killed on the fateful day of 2013. The convicted were said to have aided the attackers based on witnesses and the telephone communications with the attackers.
and also found to have been in possession of materials linked with terrorist activities contrary to section 30 of the Act (Appendix ii).

The comments from the public on the convictions of the accused persons apart from serving justice for the affected persons and the country at large were also said to have delayed. The verdict based on section 23(4) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act was indicative that the effects of radicalization on youths had made the two convicted persons conspire and aid terror groups. It was also evident that the conspiracy also involved possessing radicalization articles which were foundational in altering the minds and hearts of the youths towards violence. It was also observed that the legal provisions to deal with radicalization awarded maximum sentences on the guilty youths. In conclusion the legal effects were severe to radicalized youths.

4.4.9 General Effects on Youths

The sample provided effects that were not possible to assess in this limited space. In that case the study chose to discuss several of such effects under general effects but listed the remaining as shown in Appendix ix. The proliferation of radicalization material within the target audience, self-isolation and assorted weapons was discussed herein. The general effects were deduced from expert report by key leaders/informants in the county serving in various capacities and thereby were able to accurately give information that was useful in this research. A total of 21 (twenty one) general effects were discovered in the sample (Appendix ix) but few are hereby discussed.

a) Production of radicalization materials

Apart from inducements through money, promises and women there was an increase in radicalization materials in the sample. The materials included pamphlets, videos and tapes and
extremist literature, among others. Qcode158 gave examples of print and social media, video Compact Diskettes (VCDs) and tapes as the radicalization material that were used to lure youths into violence. It was observed within the respondents that both soft materials defined herein as online material and hard materials, as print media increased considerably. The parallel in the proliferation of materials for radicalization was in Britain where al-Muhajiroun and Supporters of Sharia (SOS) used specialized websites and publications for religious extremist propaganda. The Global Jihad Movement (GJM) and other terror networks had used press statements and communiqués (Section 2.3.3).

This scenario represented how literature for radicalization was useful tools towards indoctrination and recruitment of youths and was an effect that was conspicuous. In Figure 2.7 the four models of recruitment also use tools as a book or video to radicalize youths. It must be noted that where videos were used video dens also played a role in radicalization processes in the sample and across terror networks. In section 2.3.1 there was also literature in terms of books that was growing to respond to European constituency that was converting to Islam.

b) The Increase of Self-Isolation among Youths

The sample also reported of youths who were apart from becoming antisocial were also extremely isolating themselves from others. Self-isolation was occasioned partly by extreme indoctrination, that is, intense reading of Qur’an on one hand but also by feelings of alienation and strong sense of group identity (Table 2.7). This was corroborated by what was termed as dichotomous thinking, that is, ‘Us versus Them’ explained in detail in Figure 2.3 (Section 2.3.2). Qcode372 (Appendix vi) explained the phenomenon of extreme indoctrination as follows:
Reading and reciting extreme Qur’an verses-repeating verses to a certain level-prolonged reading of the Qur’an changes the mind. These very powerful verses and concepts on war, Satan, rain, women, 72 virgins, paradise, luxurious jannah, that is, Janah Tul-Fardos, the highest paradise, alters the mind processes and makes earthly benefits not really matter Qcode372 (Appendix vi)

The data provided by an array of key informants in the sample indicated that there was a proliferation of self-isolation in the sample. This was an indicator of extreme radicalization amongst youths. It was also a pre-radicalization phase (Section 2.3.4) but was listed in this study under Appendix viii as pre-radicalization behavior that was seen to precede succeeding stages in radicalization. The following data represented what isolation stood for in the sample based on key informants’ response to the question on indicators of radicalized youths.

Qcode142 (Appendix vi) said that “isolation behavior from former group and missing classes for no reason” while Qcode147 (Appendix vi) reported that it was “isolation from the normal people, for example, family members.” QCode149 (Appendix vi) “isolation from peers/people” and Qcode130 (Appendix vi) pointed out “isolation and discrimination from daily routines” was what self-isolation meant.

Based on the data from the key respondents above self-isolation amongst youths was indicator that mental processes of youths had been altered. As the youths distanced themselves from peers, family members and daily routines the study established this as an effect that was necessary considering separately. The theory of phased self-radicalization in the history of religious radicalization (2.2) and the determination of the growing threat of homegrown terrorism by Europe Police (Section 2.1.1.) confirmed that youths went through deep moments of identity
crisis that made them vulnerable to radicalization and self-isolation was a period of taking psychological journeys. A list of general effects of radicalization was discussed under Appendix ix.

c) **Proliferation of Assorted Weapons**

A unique feature reported by the sample was the proliferation of guns and ammunitions for attacks. Incidents of intervention of terror attacks with agents discovered to have been carrying Improvised Explosive Devices, bomb making material and weapons were well known to the sample. The source of the weapons was not easily determined and beyond the scope of the study but pointed to the recent overrunning of AMISOM bases in Somalia on one hand (Section 1.1.3) and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country on the other hand. The former involved the heavily armed Al-Shabaab militants who were shot dead during an attack at the Kenya-US retaliatory attacks in Lamu in January 2020 Appendix ii.

The analysis of the effects based on each terror group discovered that in the sample of 66 youths who gave their responses 43(65.15%) affirmed the youth(s) they knew who specifically joined Al-Shabaab as opposed to other groups and 23(34.85%) responded on the negative (Figure 4.29).

The question on which terror group the youth joined was the most secretive since most youths were not willing to release the information for suspicion and fear of repression. By this fact, the effect of Al-Shabaab in the community was inferred to be not only clandestine but also growing. The researcher and research assistants inferred and arrived at conclusions based on observation and reactions to the interview process by the sample. Figure 4.29 indicated the answers to the questionnaire on specific youths who had joined Al-Shabaab.
Consequently, the study considered that the effects of radicalization processes were evidenced by those who joined the Al-Shabaab terror group among others. This was occasioned by the terror group being proximate to the country. So far the youths who disappeared and joined global terror networks were reported on a higher rate on Al-Shabaab and therefore the lethal effects that had been experienced in the country from time to time.
4.5 DE-RADICALIZATION MEASURES

The findings of the study also resulted in a caveat to address radicalization. As much as the study observed the legal framework in the country to be at developmental stages on matters radicalization (4.4.6) the sample provided data that sought to improve on the measures already in place. A qualitative discussion was hereby given to that effect and a list of de-radicalization programs was presented (Appendix xii)

4.5.1 Policy Framework for Returnees

Qcode362 (Appendix vi) suggested that policy frameworks for returnees needed to be crafted as a de-radicalization measure. Her exact wordings “develop a policy for returnees” were echoed by a variety of other key respondents in different ways. Qcode368 (Appendix vi) another NGO director also said that “policy formulation for youth, youth economic welfare” were needed but his comments on “more research needed to be at par with terror initiatives” identified with what this research was already involved in.

Both of these NGO directors were members of the Muslim community in Isiolo County working on youth empowerment and the statements recorded in the view of the researcher carried more weight of matters de-radicalization processes. Qcode367 (Appendix vi) who was an assistant county commissioner “provide adequate religious information on Qur’an and Bible to avoid misleading information” was a policy issues that was bent on religious leaders, the ulama, to weigh in and provide sound religious and theological teachings to youths.

These findings on the role of policy in radicalization or de-radicalization were also situated in various policy jurisdictions. The role of policy in radicalization was anchored in global geopolitics. The findings from the sample also were evidenced by contexts like Osama bin Laden
anti-US modernization policy and occupation of the Holy land (Section 2.2.3) on one hand and
the war on Iraq occasioning 7th July 2005 London bombings on the other hand (Section 2.3.3).
Further, the 9/11 bombings were also seen to have been occasioned by group processes against
the US-foreign policy which supported authoritarian and corrupt Muslim government (Section
2.1.2). In this regard the findings of this study could not evade discussing the role of policy
frameworks in either abetting radicalization on one hand or preventing radicalization on the other
hand.

4.5.2 Interfaith Networks

The qualitative data presented suggested that interfaith dialogue and networks were necessary to
foster harmony and prevent youths from radicalization. Several respondents on interfaith
networks were also inclined on the religious leadership to take lead to that effect. In the sample
Qcode371 (Appendix vi) a military intelligence officer in the county suggested the “creation of
joint religious forums where discussions and talk on radicalization can be held and religious
leaders, elders and administrators to take a leading role in counseling” while Qcode369
(Appendix vi) who was a primary school teacher and an unfortunate case of previous
victimization suggested that “religious community to foster positive sermons and preaching and
Imam/Maalims must be against radicalization as totally un-Islamic” Qcode362 (Appendix vi)
also a military officer presented the “ulama vs. parents collaboration and employ ulama than
secular scholars” for religious education in schools.

The literature review was not privy to contexts on religious dialogue as a measure to counter
radicalization. This was because de-radicalization was not the mainstay of the study but was
sampled as a caveat and based on data presented by respondents. Therefore correlations were
impossible except for the concept of recidivism as a measure to monitor and evaluate returnees and which was only suggested in this study.

### 4.5.3 Psychosocial Support Programs

The study also sampled responses suggesting psychosocial support centres. The following data was presented on the need for guidance and counseling to help youths make sensible decisions:

Qcode362 (Appendix vi) said: Provide psychosocial support (Trauma counseling)

Qcode368 and Qcode367 (Appendix vi) said: Guidance and counseling

Qcode370 (Appendix vi) said: Through rehabilitation

Qcode374 (Appendix vi) said: Open rehabilitation centers all over the country and receive all those who return from terror group and give them protection

Qcode379 (Appendix vi) said: Counseling programs continuous in schools and psychosocial support and life skills training.

The psychosocial support centres were meant to help youths in making life’s choices which negated radicalization narratives. It was also determined from the data that a gradual and continuous counseling process be conducted amongst youths. The returnees were supposed to undergo rehabilitation centers so that they were de-radicalized before they were released back in the society. The list on de-radicalization was listed (Appendix xii)

### CONCLUSIONS

The presentation analysis and interpretation of the collected data in this chapter indicated indeed there were Islamic radicalization processes in Isiolo. After analysis it was found out that the Islamic radicalization processes had diverse and dire effects on youths.
Results of the analyzed showed that Islamic radicalization had pervaded society in Isiolo and that the youth were the most affected. The spread of Islam as a religion in Isiolo was found to have been embraced by most resident of Isiolo. Therefore it was plausible to say that Muslim youths subscribed to the Islamic radicalization agenda knowingly or unknowingly.

As the second objective of the study had indicated, literature reviewed and data collected corroborated the findings that there were five Islamic radicalization processes. The processes were not related to each other in a linear manner but more in unpredictable format. Consequently, the study proposed a new theory on Islamic radicalization processes theory to enable comprehensive study of the phenomenon.

Analysis of the data collected and the literature reviewed showed that there were specific characteristics of radicalized youths. The distinctive characteristics were essential tools for stakeholders and government agencies to undertake relevant and effective interventions to mitigate the effects of radicalization.

Assessment of the effects of Islamic radicalization processes on Muslim youths in Isiolo showed that indeed the effects were both positive and negative. For the positive effects some families had some recruits benefitted financially and economically. On negative effects the assessment indicated that extremist groups and radicalizers were taking advantage of youths to lure them to undertake violent activities that had personal, institutional, and public impact.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this chapter was to provide a summary of the main points in the study based on the findings on Islamic radicalization processes and the effects on Muslim youths as anchored on the objectives of the study. The chapter highlighted in summary the objectives as the extent of Islamic radicalization processes in Isiolo County, the processes of Islamic radicalization, the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths and finally the assessable effects of radicalization processes in the study. The chapter also provided the conclusion of the study in terms of the main findings and the significance of those findings to the research as conducted. In that case the chapters, objectives, research questions and the problem of the study were reflected upon in this conclusion session and whether the objectives of the study were achieved. Eventually, the study made recommendations based on the findings and results of the study

5.1 SUMMARY
The study discovered that the concept of radicalization was emotive and had attracted various stakeholder analyses who sought to provide a solution. By the scarce and limited empirical research in this sensitive area, this study as undertaken was an ambitious project that experienced the hurdles that terrorist scholars have had to encounter in their respective contexts. In chapter 1 the study situated radicalization discourse in religious radicalization processes as a concept which needed a religious dimension in its discussion and analysis. In that prism the study discussed the context of religious radicalization processes, the context of the effects on youth and the processes of Islamic radicalization that disbursed the violent religious extremist ideology to
most parts of the world. The chapter sought to lay the foundation under which the objectives of the research were anchored. Objective 1 was on examining the scope or extent of Islamic radicalization process in Isiolo County. Objective 2 sought to investigate the processes of Islamic radicalization while objective 3 was to determine the characteristics of radicalized Muslims youths. The last objective of the study, that is, objective 4 sought to assess the effects of Islamic radicalization on Muslim youths. The statement of the problem was based on the outcry that existed in the county on youths joining violent religious extremist groups and which required academic scrutiny that this study attempted.

In chapter 2 the literature review involved the discussion of religious radicalization processes to shade light and identified the gaps on the concept of religious radicalization as a reemergence of political Islam in contemporary violence. The history of religious radicalization processes situated contemporary violence in a setting of perpetual theologizing and philosophizing the concept of *Jihad* in sacred texts through the years. The review of literature also discovered that philosophers of terror were responding to secularization of society that relegated conservative religious culture and values in Islam. The contested nature of contemporary studies in radicalization prevented a consensus on theoretical formulations and therefore divergent views bargained for space. In that regard this study adopted the pyramid or staircase theory as suitable for the study on religious radicalization processes. The chapter also proposed a religious radicalization processes theory to develop the current theories and specifically the McCauley and Moskalenko theory.

In chapter 3 the study discussed the qualitative and quantitative nature of this research. The sample was mainly curved from schools to establish the level of awareness on the existence of Islamic radicalization processes. The tools and instruments in the study especially the scale and
the questionnaire were designed and piloted, among other methods, as in-depth interview were utilized to collect rich data. The triangulation of methods allowed the study to collect and analyze. The data that was collected was sorted and distilled by coding and keyed into the SPSS package. Eventually, SPSS tool was used for quantitative analysis were frequencies and percentages were generated. In short the charts, figures and tables that were generated were used for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The study also encountered ethical issues on fear and suspicion from respondents based on previous dealings from the government on radicalized youths which was mitigated through one-on-one interview as opposed to the filling the questionnaire method.

In chapter 4 the study discussed the findings and the results of the study. These findings were itemized based on the objectives of the study. All objectives of the study and research questions were realized through qualitative and quantitative data analysis. In this case Likert scale was applied on all objectives of the study. The findings were presented on cumulative mean score on youth radicalization which answered the objectives of the study. Both qualitative data and quantitative data were presented to support the findings and explain each objective.

On objective 1 it was discovered that radicalization had infiltrated the target population and was growing but in a clandestine manner. On objective 2 the processes of Islamic radicalization were determined to include indoctrination, recruitment, infiltration, training and deployment process. These processes were overlapping and influenced youths at varying degrees. On objective 3 the study established that the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths represented the phases and stages of radicalization. In the study, pre-radicalization behavior and indicators were discovered (Appendix viii). Eventually characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths were discussed and enlisted (Table 4.8). The assessment of objective 4 on effects of radicalization apart from
qualitative and quantitative analysis of each effect also resulted in a list of general effects (Appendix ix).

In chapter 5 a summary of all the chapters was provided. The objectives of the study as the extent of Islamic radicalization, the processes involved, the characteristics of radicalization Muslim youths and finally the assessable effects were all provided in summary form. The conclusions were made which anchored the aforementioned objectives of the study on the findings and results in chapter 4. Eventually recommendations based on the study were suggested and areas for further research were also given.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

In general the study was seen to have achieved the objectives and the purpose of the study. To that effect the study was anchored on the research questions by which objectives were derived. These were Research Questions (RQ) that the study sought to answer:

RQ1: To what extent has Islamic radicalization penetrated Isiolo County?
RQ2: What are the processes of Islamic radicalization?
RQ3: What are the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths?
RQ4: What are the assessable effects of Islamic radicalization of youths in Isiolo County?

As discussed in Chapter 4 each of these research questions were answered under assigned themes and subthemes. RQ1 was answered based on the conversions, the spread of Islam and Islamic radicalization in Isiolo County. The findings were based on how institutions as the
homes/villages the school, the Mosques and prison had succumbed to Islamic radicalization based on data provided by the sample.

A summary on the scope or extent of radicalization in these institutions based on a radicalization scale (Table 4.5) was established whereby each institution had a mean score percentage measured on a Likert scale. In addition qualitative and quantitative analysis of each of these institutions, that is, the villages/homes, Mosques, schools and prisons were measured and discussed in the aforementioned analyses mean score percentages. To this end research question 1 was exhaustively answered. Eventually, it was concluded that the outcry by parents and communities in Isiolo County on youth radicalization was a valid concern.

Objective 2 was also investigated through RQ2 on the processes of Islamic radicalization. This objective and RQ2 was exhaustively discussed in the study. The study discovered five Islamic radicalization processes in relation to on literature review and which were discussed alongside the findings. It was determined that these processes were intertwined and overlapped in ways that favored the clandestine nature of radicalization and recruitment.

The RQ2 on the processes of Islamic radicalization was measured and analyzed based on methods and factors; institutions, sacred texts and concepts that supported the processes of radicalization. These included inducements (Appendix ii data sample 4, the Internet (Figure 4.8), abductions (sample 5), sacred texts and concepts as the Qur’an (Figure 4.9), hadiths (Appendix ii Data sample 7), Madrassas (Figure 4.10) and the Jihad (Figure 4.11). Noteworthy, all the processes of Islamic radicalization apart from overlapping also were discovered to share the methods and factors as mentioned, that is, the institutions, inducements, abductions and sacred texts and concepts in the propagation and enhancement of the processes in general. In that case the discussion on the processes were structured in terms of the methodology of radicalization.
First, the recruitment processes (Figure 4.24) was based on clandestine groups within the target audience. The three terror groups that recruited youths were as discussed and analyzed from Al-Shabaab (Figure 4.12), Al-Qaeda (Figure 4.13) and Boko Haram (Figure 4.14). These terror groups were known to the audience but Al-Shabaab was the main youth recruitment terror group. The reason for this was because of the shared porous border. A portion of the sample also used the internet.

Second, the indoctrination processes were enhanced by the existence of sleeper cells which aided these overlapping recruitment process and indoctrination process (Figure 4.16). Further, a significant part of the sample was convinced that Isiolo County was a hotspot zone for youth radicalization (Figure 4.18). The routes used by recruiters to access the country and the percentages of returnees (Table 4.7) and sample 6 in Appendix ii respectively explained youth recruitment and indoctrinations. In other words the qualitative data was discussed, analyzed and quantified. Eventually the qualitative data resulted in quantities and percentages which were evidenced by charts, figures and tables as presented in Chapter 4 under objective on the extent of Islamic radicalization processes.

On sleeper cells in Isiolo County it was a covert radicalization process that was not easily identified. In that case the specific locations of these cells were never known but existed. Instances of overt radicalization in Mosques have been identified in the country with fiery and radical clerics which were also an indoctrination process. In Figure 4.16 the sample established these sleeper cells as the Table 4.6 identified the overt radicalization processes. Therefore the study established indoctrination process in the county from an underground perspective to be influencing youths for violent extremism.
Third, infiltration processes were as investigated were the main processes that occasioned or triggered the other processes. As the recruitment agents accessed the country or as the online radicalization ideology was embraced it orchestrated the other processes. Apart from the hotspots of radicalization existing in the county (4.11) infiltration routes enhanced access to the youths in the country by recruiters and radicalizers. It was in the context of infiltration routes (Table 4.7) that infiltration processes were established in the study.

Fourth, the training processes were determined by the existence of various types of cells that existed in Isiolo County (Section 4.2.4). These training cells were unearthed in the sample by the information as confided to the researcher by the experts in various key government institutions and by residents in the county. It was also confirmed that the training as radicalization in general occurred in clandestine manner but exposed youths to various functional and operational objectives of Al-Shabaab and other terror groups.

Fifth, the deployment processes had occurred in the county based on the youths who either escaped or returned home after deployment and purposed to remain in the country. The percentage of returnees according to the sample was quite minimal at 9.5% but enough to prove the processes of deployment was factual in the county. The percentages only proved deployment in part but official records in the county and parents reports to Isiolo police station up to and including their loved ones, that is, children and youth, calling from Somalia, put the percentages and rates on a higher scale.

In a nutshell, RQ2 on the processes of Islamic radicalization was achieved based on the data analyzed in chapter 4. The processes were seen to overlap and anchored on a structured institutional and ideological framework. Therefore the question on what the processes of Islamic radicalization were made the researcher identify five such processes as recruitment process,
indoctrination process, infiltration process, training process and deployment process. A theory was also proposed based on these processes (Section 2.4.4) to supplement, fill the gap and contribute to knowledge on radicalization from an Islamic radicalization processes and their effects on youth perspective. In conclusion the RQ2 was systematically analyzed and therefore the objective was achieved.

On objective 3 the research question that was projected on what characteristics of radicalized Muslims youths represented was also engaged with in the findings and results of the study. As in most radicalization models it was determined that a portion of the sample possessed what this research termed as pre-radicalization indicators or behaviors (Appendix viii and Table 4.8). These indicators anchored the research in other empirical terrorism studies which were still at their infancy and scarce as well.

The pre-radicalization indicators were the initial stages of radicalization. These initial stage indicators set the ground for indoctrination and for the main characteristics of violent extremism to emerge. But the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths were specifically curved in the findings and enlisted in Table 4.8. These characteristics were based on the findings of the study at the final stage of radicalization. As to whether the study answered the RQ3 of what the characteristics of radicalized Muslims youths were it was concluded that the findings as presented explained the objective in detail (4.3).

In objective 4 the research question as to the assessable effects of Islamic radicalization of youths in Isiolo County the findings discovered effects that were lumped into themes and subthemes. These themes and subthemes included political effects on youths, economic effects on youth, sociocultural effects on youth, and national security threats on youths, among others.
The effects on youths also affected families, schools, religion, the state and the general public. In other words the objective on effects was an all-encompassing activity.

For example, as the political class, religious leaders and foreigners radicalized the youths for their agenda this was construed as a political effect of radicalization on youth (Section 4.4.1). But the outcome of youths joining terror networks boomeranged back and hit the populace including political leaders hard. The concern of caliphates according to the findings had political ramifications with Western democratic ideals but the study established the divide in the Muslim community on violence (Section 4.4.1). This was such that even as contemporary political Islam radicalized youths for violence the effect on youths was effect on politics, economics and religion, among others. The economic effect on youth (4.4.4) was based on interruptions of normalcy and as a result livelihoods of youths were as well affected. Perhaps the finding on psychological trauma Section (4.4.2) was an effect that directly impacted on youths but their society as well in disastrous manner as youths succumbed to violence. This psychological trauma effect was also a mental health issue that affected other domains of human existence.

The study also established the monistic nature of the sample and therefore was able to discuss both the cultural and religious effects under the sociocultural effects subtheme (4.4.5). On the legal effects on youths (4.4.6) the legal apparatus were seen to have convicted radicalized youths as evidenced in the findings (Figure 4.28). Perhaps the effects on radicalization on youths were evidenced by the national threat that the state had been treated to from time to time.

In fact, Kenya had a history of attacks and the findings of the study situated those attacks from the 1980s onwards (Table 4.11). The study sample was also categorical in that the youths from Isiolo County were said to have participated in some of these attacks from time to time (Figure 4.26) yet apart from the Dusit2 Complex Restaurant attack linked to a resident and former school
boy from Isiolo County it was hard to establish specific other incidents from the sample. In fact for lack of space and in conclusion of these effects, a list of the general effects was provided (Appendix ix). Consequently, the RQ4 as to the assessable effects of Islamic radicalization on youths in Isiolo County was said to have been exhaustively answered based on findings and objective 3 as well was achieved. It was also argued that the effects which were reported were only those which were assessable since it was hardly possible to measure all the effects.

Based on the findings as discussed in chapter 4 it was concluded that the objectives of the study were systematically and thematically attained as discussed herein. All the research questions were answered. Therefore it was concluded that the study achieved its objectives and the purpose of the study which was to undertake an assessment of the effects of Islamic radicalization processes on Muslim youth in Isiolo County in Kenya.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter made recommendations from the findings/results of the study. The recommendations based on research findings on Islamic radicalization processes focused on an institutional framework approach in combating radicalization. The institutions targeted by recruiters were discussed as the prime movers that were to devise mechanism to cushion youths from indoctrination. The homes/villages, school, mosques and prisons were suggested as places to counter narratives and mechanisms of radicalization. A policy framework was also recommended to enhance counter radicalization measures as discussed. Recommendations for further research were those areas which were beyond the scope and objectives of the study but which required further investigation and research work.
5.3.1 **Recommendations Based on Findings**

The study established the fact of Islamic radicalization processes in Isiolo County which occurred in a clandestine manner. Apart from the underground nature of radicalization the sleeper cells in Isiolo County were affirmed by the sample as the key radicalizing strategy used by recruiters. Often the extent of radicalization targeted institutions as the schools, homes/villages, Mosques and prisons for recruitment and obviously made inroads to this institutions. Therefore, the recommendation based on the conclusions that the outcry by parents and schools on disappearance of children was factual had to do with the institutions as the homes, schools, mosques and prisons be responsible over youths.

As homes and villages were reported as hotspots of radicalization, parents were advised to be involved, be on the lookout, and be aware of the activities, events and companies that their children were engaged in. Parenting had to incorporate creating awareness and sensitization of children and youths by parents on the rise of radicalizing schemes and narratives, as a measure to curb recruitment and even abductions. In that case parents were to monitor the behavior of their children for any indicators (Appendix viii and Table 4.8) of radicalization and report any missing child or youth to the authorities with immediacy.

As a measure to safeguard and recover school going children from disappearance or abductions there was need to link the school administration, parents and security apparatus with hotline reporting numbers within the shortest time possible. The issue of truancy in schools was to be addressed by eliminating gaps between parents and teachers in terms of whereabouts of children at any given time. The Nyumba Kumi (Ten Houses) initiative needed to enhance the eradication of homegrown radicalization as a priority objective by possibly adopting the monitoring and
response mechanisms on pre-radicalization indicators as discovered in this study (Appendix viii, ix, xi and Table 4.8).

In schools it was recommended that guidance and counseling be a continuous and structured process which targeted indicators of radicalization as enlisted in this study (Appendix viii and Table 4.8). In that case having professional religious leaders and teachers or even paid school chaplains was of a necessity. A revision of school curriculum to incorporate emerging issues on radicalization, extremism and terrorism were possible educational incentives to curb the problem. This was requisite at primary, secondary and university levels such that the youths were prepared to combat contemporary violence at an informed ideological base background. The diversification of the curriculum to reintroduce and revamp technical education in schools that had immediate self-employment incentives was a mechanism necessary to make inducements from recruiters less attractive. The lacuna that was capitalized upon by recruiters as poverty and desperation of youths was a time bomb that required urgent attention either through empowerment programs up to and including economic measures and incentives. In the era of technology a database to monitor progress of persons from school life to integration into the workforce or society was necessary. This was an objective that was achievable through an interagency collaboration between government departments up to and including security apparatus. Most importantly, a concerted approach involving all and sundry and coordination of efforts, initiatives and stratagems cannot be gainsaid.

In the Mosque it was recommended that Imams and maalims structure their sermons to counter radicalization narratives. It was also necessary for religious bodies to dissuade radical religious clerics from their congregations. In fact the madrassa classes’ curriculum be made a supplementary tool to propagate moderate and cultured teachings as in relation to mainline
teachings. Therefore both the school curriculum and the Madrassa were necessary that Islam was properly taught as a subject. It was neither plausible nor wise to leave children to learn Islam from indoctrinating madrassa or from Mosque sermons only.

Interfaith networks were necessary to build bridges between faith communities and forge a concerted front against radicalization. This prevented ethnic or religious profiling as faith communities understood and embraced each other. Religious leaders from both Muslim and Christian backgrounds needed to be at the forefront in fostering religious harmony and building cohesive communities. However, an enhanced theological depth was necessary since both religious leadership and followership to an extent had quasi understanding on reinterpreted texts and concepts. The radicalized convicts in prison required separate prisons and de-radicalization venues that prevented more radicalization of inmates.

The processes of Islamic radicalization which anchored on infiltration processes were possible to mitigate through watertight border security measures. This was a precautionary measure even as cyberspace security was necessary despite global village imperatives of the internet age. Monitoring of online radicalization was never an encroachment to private liberties in the context of human and national security. Further the security apparatus can help address the problem of these processes by providing watertight security checks in roadblocks to prevent illegal foreigners from accessing the country at will. The underground radicalization sleeper cells were in the purview of intelligence services to do a thorough task of investigation to unearth these cells. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) was required to be on lookout continually on sleeper cells.

Further, urgent and prompt implementation mechanism on intelligence reports and counter intelligence services were recommended to reduce bureaucracy on acting upon such intelligence.
Of course the security apparatus in the processes of countering terrorism also required to uphold the rule of law and be dissuaded from an approach hinging on community profiling and rounding ups since these actions alienated communities and ended up in more radicalization. In retrospect, an understanding on Islamic radicalization processes by security agencies and sundry were seen to be possible interventions and measures before a pool of human resource was recruited into violent terror groups.

On the characteristics of radicalized Muslim youths it was suggested that stakeholders as parents, teachers, religious leaders and the general populace be accustomed to the indicators of radicalization. In that case the pre-radicalization behavior was presented in the study to help youth handlers have a reference point on dealing with youths undergoing identity crisis and on the possible verge of radicalization. The pre-radicalization indicators (Appendix viii) were the reference point to check the characteristics of radicalized Muslims youths whether at the beginning, at the middle or at the advanced stage of radicalization (Table 4.8). This was seen to monitor and evaluate youth behavior for any sudden change that might be suitable for radicalization or as a result of radicalization itself. This recommendation was necessary for psychosocial support and counseling of radicalized youths. The adoption of the matrix as discussed herein (Table 4.8) was meant to detect, interrupt and intercept Islamic radicalization processes from taking toll on youths.

The effects of radicalization were numerous but required interventions at the policy level to curb recruitment, training and deployment of youths. At the policy level it was recommended that the government continues to crafts a raft of policy measures that targeted both radicalization as an intervention on one hand and de-radicalization as a recovery of youths on the other hand. The former was to include empowerment programs in place to cater for economic welfare of youths
and the latter was to recover returnees, rehabilitate and reintegrate them back into society. The complex nature of radicalization invited scholars to shed more light and suggest informed ideas as in situating radicalization interventions.

As much as the study was privy on the NCTC contributions on de-radicalization as a legal requirement the interventions to cushion youths from radicalization was recommended to be an ongoing search for answers and solutions. In fact, the development of laws that define radicalization and interventions thereof was seen to be a policy issue. Further, funding of research and studies on radicalization and counter terrorism was suggested as necessary to create a knowledge base to solve the problem of recruitment and therefore research agencies and national funds were envisioned to be handy to that effect. This was because the African continent was still behind in empirical research in these emerging issues and a recycled results approach was hardly efficient in handling these complex issues as youth radicalization and homegrown terrorism.

5.3.2 Recommendations for Further Research

For amnesty purposes the returnees based on de-radicalization and reintegration processes required that the concept of recidivism which involved relapsing back into terror groups be further examined. This was uncharted and un-researched area in most contexts. To the extent that returnees turn into peace loving and law abiding citizens needed a case by case analysis. The threat any returnee faced and a follow-up of returnees or even those who recanted VE groups was necessary to build their resilience after they had been radicalized. In most cases, amnesties were hampered by fear of authorities and wanting proper mechanisms to help youths build
resilience against violent extremism. The cases of violent extremists eliminating returnees were areas for probing and as a starting point in comprehending the concept of recidivism.

The sympathizer attitude as support base of Al-Shabaab within religious communities was an area beyond the objectives of the study. It was not clear from the sample whether suspicion or fear of repression was a factor in radicalization or was anchored on genuine reasons. As much as there was claim to community profiling and alienation it was not possible to determine whether these claims were genuine or a gimmick and a façade to promote extremists ideologies by some respondents. Often, the nexus between financiers or funders of terrorism and the sympathizer attitude rarely had any substantive research-based academic work.

The future of recruitment and Jihadi terrorism as a trademark for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the developing nations in Africa and Asian countries was an area of concern. The bloodletting in most war tone countries in the developing world and multinational weapon trade based on religious terrorism was an area for further research. In other words the multinational arms trade thriving based on contemporary terrorism was a possibility to be established by more research.

The criminological theories were undeveloped in radicalization debate. The study of delinquent behavior was located in criminology and was weak in determining radicalization from a pathological experience or a behavioral conditioning per se. It was therefore recommended that the linkage of terrorism to criminological approaches were populist debates but never satisfied academic objectives. Often in the social construction of reality populist discourse obscures objective scrutiny and thus there was need to research further and establish on criminology and terrorism thereby salvaging the debate from elite populist discourse to an academic one.
In conclusion the study established the mass support by underground sympathizers and funding that terror organizations received. This was mentioned by respondents but was beyond the scope of the study apart from citations made in the processes of radicalization. Obviously, such glaring concerns required more probing and was an academic piece for more research.
REFERENCES


https://nation.africa


Sage Publications, Inc.


http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01039.x


http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017717


The Free Press

367


Race and Class Sage Publications.


India Pvt Ltd.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002716678986


373


Vidino, L. (2014). *Homegrown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, development and radicalization dynamics*. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI)


APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRES

A) CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE

PART ONE: PRELIMINARIES

Name (Optional) ________________________________________________________________

Age: 13-18 years □ 19-24 years □ 25 – 29 years □ 30 – 39 years □ 40 and above □

Religion: Christian □ Muslim □ Other (specify): ____________________________

Marital Status: Married □ Not married □ Single □ Widowed □

Education Level: Primary □ Secondary □ College □ University □

Home area __________________________________________________________________

School _________________________________________________________________________

Mosque/Church __________________________________________________________________

Occupation _____________________________________________________________________

PART TWO: GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Which religion do your family members mostly belong? Muslim □ Christian □ Other □

2. Which of the following religious groups do you know? ISIS □ Al-Qaeda □ MRC □
   Al-Shabaab □ Taliban □ Hezbollah □ Boko Haram □ IRA □ LRA □
   Hamas □

3. Approximately, how many Mosques/churches exist in your area? Mosques □ Churches □

4. Which informal classes have you attended? Sunday School □ Madrassa □ Other □

5. What sacred texts have you read so far? Bible □ Qur’an □ Hadiths □ Other □

6. Do you know anyone/a youth who have joined any violent religious group? Yes □ No □
7. Which group did he/she join? ISIS  Al-Qaeda  Boko Haram  MRC  
   Al-Shabaab  Hezbollah

8. Was he/she given any token/money/promises? Yes  No

9. Which of these religious concepts do you know? Crusade  Jihad  Fatwa
   Caliphate  Umma  Takfir  Shura  Jahili/Jahiliyyah

10. Is the final goal of radicalization to create Islamic states or caliphates? Yes  No

PART THREE: LIKERT SCALE QUESTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of youth into violent religious groups in Isiolo County is high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization of youths occurs mainly in homes/villages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization of youths occurs mainly in schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization of youths occurs mainly in some Mosques</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization of youths mainly occurs in prisons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization of youths occurs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main point</td>
<td>Scale 4</td>
<td>Scale 3</td>
<td>Scale 2</td>
<td>Scale 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance(s) of youths in the recent past is an indicator to joining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violent groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo county is a hotspot for radicalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Places/cells where youths are taught/indoctrinated exist in Isiolo County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The internet plays a key role in youth radicalization and recruitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some youths who joined terror groups have returned home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some youths in Isiolo County have planned/participated in violent acts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities have convicted youths linked to violent groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCALE**

SA = Strongly Agree  A = Agree
SD = Strongly Disagree  D = Disagree
B) OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE

1) QUESTIONS ON PROCESSES

i. Recruitment

1. How are youths Muslim youths recruited to extremist groups?
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________

2. What makes youths adapt extreme/violent religious views?
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________

3. What roles do politics play influencing youths to adapt extremist Islamist views?
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________

4. How long can it take for a youth to adapt extreme views or join violent terror group(s)
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________

5. How could governmental policies influence youths to join extremist group(s)
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________

ii. Indoctrination

1. Mention areas where you think indoctrination of Muslim youths takes place
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________

380
2. Which beliefs/teachings/narratives are used to make youths engage in violent actions?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

3. Who teaches/influences youths to adapt violent extreme views?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

4. Which inducements/promises/religious claims are common in luring youths to violent extremist group(s)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

iii. Infiltration

1. How do radicalizers access Isiolo County to recruit youths?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

2. Which routes do radicalizers/recruiters/agents use to access youths within the county?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

3. What are the countries of origin of recruiters/radicalizers/agents?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
4. What is the link between sleeper cells and agents of radicalization?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

iv. Training

1. What kind of training do you think Muslim youths are given when they join extremist/terror groups?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

2. What are the different types of trainings that youths get before joining extremist groups?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

3. Which training do you think is common to all youths who have been enlisted?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

v. Deployment

1. After getting training where do you think radicalized youths in Isiolo County are deployed or sent to work?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
2. Which violent terror group(s) in the county has/have influenced youths into their ranks?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

3. List the processes you think youth go through as they are radicalized

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

4. Which countries have been mentioned that youths from Isiolo County have been found after deployment?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

5. What kind of duties/tasks/responsibilities are youths assigned in the terror groups?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

2) QUESTIONS ON CHARACTERISTICS OF RADICALIZED MUSLIM YOUTHS

1. Enlist the indicators that prove that youth(s) beliefs have been altered?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

2. Which main sacred texts in the holy book(s) do recruiters use for their purposes?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

3. Which beliefs/teachings do youths hold that prove they have been or are being recruited?
4. Explain whether gender (male/female) is a factor in recruitment of youths into Al-Shabaab.

5. How can marginalization be associated with influencing youths to join violent terror groups?

6. How has Islam been used to support violent religious views?

7. How does education level amongst youths promote/prevent youth being recruited?

8. Which communities/tribes/clans have been targeted by Al-Shabaab for recruitment of youths?

9. Which age bracket has been affected by violent religious groups in the recent past?

10. Which characteristics/behaviors were present on youths who engaged in violence in Kenya?
3) QUESTIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION ON YOUTHS

1. How are youths affected by training after being recruited?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

2. What was the behavior of youths after being recruited and trained?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

3. What have been the results/outcomes of violent religious ideology on youth of Isiolo County?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

4. How does Islamist idea of Jihad affect Islam as a religion?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

5. Why has Jihadist brand of Islam become suitable for Islamic radicalization in modern times?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

6. How does religious violence from terror group(s) affect religious communities in Isiolo County?

___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
7. What contraband goods/arms/Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been intercepted?

___________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

8. How has the war on terror promoted alienation/animosity between youths and authorities?

___________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

9. Which specific methods could enhance re-integration of radicalized youths into society?

___________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

10. How might youths from Isiolo County have planned/participated in violent acts in the country?

___________________________________________________________________________
C) INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Why do you think religious-based violence is common today?

2. Rank or list the radicalization processes from first to the last: training, infiltration, recruitment, indoctrination and Deployment

3. What kinds of materials are used to make youths join violent religious groups?

4. Discuss the known locations where youths are taken for duties after being recruited into violent terror organizations

5. How are parents, teachers, friends and peers involved in making youths accept to join groups like Al-Shabaab and affiliated groups?

6. How is youth disappearance(s) from homes/schools linked to recruitment into violent religious groups?

7. What are the known incidents/cases/occurrences of youth joining Al-Shabaab terror organization and its affiliates?

8. Describe the methods used to recruit youths from Isiolo into mainly Al-Shabaab terror organization

9. Explain whether financiers/funders/sympathizers was the reason religious extremist groups thrived in the County of Isiolo
APPENDIX II: SAMPLES FOR DATA ANALYSIS

A) QUANTITATIVE DATA

Sample 1: Data on Muslim-Christian population Isiolo County
Sample 2: Data on family religion by respondents
Sample 3: Data on approximate Mosque distribution in Isiolo County

Approx. no. of Mosques

Percent

- 68.06% for 1-10 mosques
- 16.63% for None
- Other categories with much lower percentages:
  - 4.56% for 1-15 mosques
  - 1.90% for 6-20 mosques
  - 2.28% for 21-25 mosques
  - 0.36% for 26-30 mosques
  - 3.04% for 31-35 mosques
  - 0.00% for 35+ mosques
Sample 4: Data on Inducements of youths
Sample 5: Data on Abductions & Disappearances of Youths

Disappearance(s) of youths in the recent past is an indicator to joining violent groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sample 6: Data on caliphates as the ultimate goal of radicalization
Sample 7: Data on the Hadiths

![Graph showing data on Hadiths with percentages: Yes 73.85%, No 22.97%, Undecided 3.08%]

394
## Sample 8:  Covert Islamic Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agents of Radicalization</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>N = 14</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Islamic Clerics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peers (Radicalized Youths)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sample 9: Data on reinterpreted sacred texts and concepts

Analysis of data from 63 key respondents in the sample on the question ‘which main sacred texts in the holy book(s) do recruiters misapply for their purposes?’ gave the following data:

![Graph showing percent distribution of reinterpreted sacred texts and concepts]
Sample 10: Data on recruitment process

On the question ‘what makes youths adapt extreme/violent religious views?’ the following data was presented by key respondents/informants:
Sample 11: Data on Al-Shabaab recruitment

The prominence of Al-Shabaab as the main recruiting terror group was determined through the data provided on the question: ‘Which violent group(s) in the county has/have recruited youths into their ranks?’
Sample 12: Data on the role of governmental policies in influencing youths to radicalization

How could governmental policies influence the recruitment of youths into terror groups?
Sample 13: Data on the time taken to radicalize youth(s)

How long can it take to recruit a youth into violent terror groups/organizations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Day</td>
<td>7.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+ Months</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6 Months</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-12 Months</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many years</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 Months</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It depends</td>
<td>41.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sample 14: Data on agents of youth indoctrination
Sample 15: Data on the claim of misinterpreted version of Islam

How has Islam been misinterpreted to support violent religious views?
Sample 16: Data on beliefs/teachings/narratives

Which beliefs/teachings/narratives are used to make youths engage in violent actions?

- Multiple narratives: 39.68%
- Other(s): 11.11%
- Paradise: 7.94%
- Misinterpreted texts: 6.35%
- Jihad: 15.87%
- 72 virgins: 4.76%
- Brainwashing/indoctrination: 4.76%
- False promises: 1.59%
- Alternative employment/inducements: 1.59%
- Pull & Push Issues: 1.59%
- Anti-government propaganda: 4.76%
Sample 17: Data on Routes of Radicalization in the County
Sample 18: Data on the countries of origin of recruiting agents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sample 19: Data on infiltration from violent extremist(s) groups.

Which violent group(s) in the county has/have recruited youths into their ranks?
Sample 20: Data on the different kinds of training to the youths

- Unspecified: 12.70%
- Multiple trainings: 26.98%
- Intelligence gathering: 55%
- Ideological/religious training: 14.25%
- Vietnamese training: 6.35%
- Suicide bombing training: 4.76%
- Paramilitary training: 33.33%
Sample 21: Data on Gender Issues in Radicalization
Sample 22: Data on marginalization as characteristic of radicalized Muslim youths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical injustices</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE propaganda</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government grievances</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment &amp; underdevelopment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community profiling narratives</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple responses</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sample 23: Data on radicalization from a community-based perspective

Communities Targeted by Recruiters

Percent

Any community  Islamic communities  Specific tribes/regions  Marginalized communities  Unspecified

30.16%  7.94%  30.16%  1.59%  30.16%
Sample 24: Data on age bracket as a characteristic of radicalized youths
Sample 25: Characteristics/Behaviors of violent youths

![Diagram showing the percentage distribution of violent youths in Kenya by different characteristics: Physical (4.76%), Mental (1.59%), Emotional (11.11%), Socio-cultural (12.70%), Multiple (50.76%), and Unspecified (19.05%).]
B) QAULITATIVE DATA

Sample 26: A nyumba kumi elder responding on the question of radicalization of youths in his sub-area stated:

VQ: “Eya mono ng’ide ani yok kane alomathi nakiro na Al-Shabaab?”

BT: “Do we have youths from our area who have joined Al-Shabaab?” Nyumba Kumi Elder: VQ: Ng’ae tokona eyeni ibere niarai edukit alo tooma ng’ide lupei yok lu! Abayo robo cha lukolong a kambi a juu abuunio ethakete apudor ekwakaye lowae loa Somalia alomar nakroup a Al-Shabaab. Mam nyirara nabo ng’iche.

BT: Who really can tell this thing that his clandestine in nature within these our youths! Apart from the ones from Kambi ya juu area who were planning to exit to Somalia to join groups like Al-Shabaab but were intercepted I have not heard other incidents.

Sample 27: Abductions/Disappearances of Youths in Isiolo County

During an interview one of the youths stated:

“At a place designated as Qcode400 [a location designated in this study by phonetics Mike November] approximately over 10 youths have been recruited to Al-Shabaab. Three skirt boys (a nuanced tag name for morans and young men who tie lessos or shukas at the waist as they herd cattle) were asked by people pretending to have lost direction to be shown the way. As they proceeded into the thick of the bush they found themselves in the midst of people with turbans and covered faces. The three were abducted and each given an escort to different places never to see each other again. One of them overpowered the agent took hold of the gun and released all the bullets in the air and ran away. He was pursued but hid in a pool of water later travelled days and nights and found his way back home. The rest of his colleagues disappeared and were not
seen again. They were maligned by fellow herdsmen from a neighboring community only to be handed over to Al-Shabaab”

Sample 28: Radicalization in schools

During an interview with a deputy school principal school code Qcode224-Qcode266) stated:

VQ: Hata kulikuwa na mwali mu mmoja kwa hii shule alikuwa akifundisha watoto mambo ya ugaidi. Lakini aligunduliwa na akapigwa transfer.

BT: There was a teacher in this school who was radicalizing and teaching youths on extremism. He was discovered and transferred.

Sample 29: Radicalization leaflets

During a one-on-one interview with a military officer Qcode387 the respondent stated:

During patrols…we found leaflets in either 2011 or 2012 when I had just recently joined the forces. The message in the leaflets was “We are Al-Shabaab and prepare because we are coming to attack” Upon follow – up and investigation it was discovered that they were students from a secondary school. The issue caused tension and tightening of security measures including searching of students and teachers at school entry points. The students who were involved and were radicalized were expelled from the school and handed over to security apparatus for more interrogation and de-radicalization processes. The respondent also shared that she was privy to intelligence report that youths were lured by terror cells and were taken to hideouts for training but some youths do escaped upon realization that the money they initially received and promises of employment was bait as these promises turned to be fake and empty.
Sample 30: Community Radicalization

During a group discussion the following discussion was captured:

**1st Respondent:** Somalis in Eastleigh, South C and B buy property or invest as a community yet others do so and stay abroad. They live communally and settle their issues communally and clan dynamics play a key role in settling disputes including a high degree of secrecy. **VQ:** *Wananunua estate na wanaishi pekee yao hakuna mtu mwingine ni wao tu. Kwa nini? BT:* They buy estate and they live alone with no one from other communities it is only them. Why?

Transition: Why can’t we finish Al-Shabaab the way we finished the shiftas?

**2nd Respondent:** You think geopolitics will allow it to happen. The global community has been concerned in eliminating commanders but not foot soldiers except recently when they attacked an American Front Operation Base in Manda...Recently the Al-Shabaab killed a sheikh for refusal to give them money to fund their operations. Killing is no big deal to these guys.

Sample 31: Online terror addiction Focus Group Discussion A5

Waso Secondary School Form Four South on how online content influenced youths:

**Question:** Who teaches/influences youth to adopt violent terror views?

**Answer:** Mass media – technology – there are groups that show case the benefits of violent ways, for example they show off the influence of the youth by posting the advantages of violence

Sample 32: Kambi Garba Primary School Group Interview:

Q5 : Who influences youths to join Al-Shabaab?

A5 : Friends, *Technology* and personal decisions
Sample 33   Infiltration processes in Schools

An interview with a staff in the County Commissioner’s officer IR7:

VQ: Hata kuna mzee mmoja alileta kijana wake hapa ambaye alipatana na kijana mwingine Msomali hivi akiwa wanasaoma naye Merti. Huyo kijana alipomwambia twende Somalia kijana wa huyo mzee aliruka akakataa. Lakini vijana wengi wameenda, wengi sana! Hii Kenya yetu inahitaji maombi. Hata Kuna hata afisa wa usalama huusika na mambo ya kuwasaidia wageni kutoka nje. Aliens ni wengi lakini wanapita route gani na road blocks ni nyingi kitambo wafike ndani ya nchi?

BT: There is an elder who brought his son in my office who was in schooling with another boy who of Somali features in Merti. As the boy who was influenced told the elder’s son that the go to Somalia he vehemently denied. But many youths have gone and this our Kenya needs prayers. Even some bad elements security people were involved in helping aliens. There many aliens but which routes do they pass through and yet there are many roadblocks before these aliens reach inside of the county.

Sample 34: A Bodaboda rider from Isiolo Town

Qcode399 [a location designated in this study by phonetic Chali] the youth made the following statement:

There is a recruitment agency which targets youth from Isiolo to join radical violent religious groups all over the world. They first join the movement then those who join it are converted and eventually disappear after sometime never to be seen again. These youths are rough, rude, and careless and use drugs. At least three youths from a location designated Qcode399 [a location
designated in this study by phonetic Chali] joined the movement, disappeared and have been transported to terror groups even efforts to trace them by family members have not been successful

Sample 35: Extract from Interview with Qcode158

[Handwritten notes on the page]
- key to judgments - test all else are led - Sin class - grave & lesser - real - not able to classify - 2 types - punishments dished - would go adrift - runaway - working so relative mixture in which for - us could be able to determine punishment 1st time - no third... it's a very serious issue - get classified right to administered - real - may not be blamed for guidelines - say those with their own objectives - real goods gears - concepts & texts on his persuasion - lack of that 1st. teaching genuine sources - learn how could not be allowed to begin for a 5th without a teacher to play like learn for internet thus last able to differentiate for each & guidance -
- Sometimes must differ on how to practice ISL. - denomination
- Political & econ. reasons - able to use faults - TE ways interests - perceived invasion into Muslim land -
  effects -
- Distortion of ISL. image - xtics are distorted - example of cutting - ICs - interference -
  violence (increase) & extremism -
- Rads/extremists use an adv. just as a level of stress - 1/2 is what we do or act the cover -
  more research & refer to work from ex-navy -
- ISL. law classification of people into Muslims & non-Muslims - ignorance on this -
03/02/2017... a concerned lamager for a 2nd time... 1st time while I was reading a book "Boko Haram..." two days ago or three a boy from Tolu Robo was arrested at Philippines in a five star hotel with lots of money with grenades, guns & assorted weapons..."
"asked him..." "Did you personally know the four? Had you met before? Which media aired the news? replied "Don't you worry... usiaka kuju za idi..."
Sample 37: Extract of interview with Qcode360

14/08/2019
Interviews with AIPU Del Car

We've not estes cells & terror networks and most people inquire about it but unable to estates.

No prior presence of aliens/foreigners in ISISTo County.

How many youths returned about ISIS from ISIS to but those were intercepted by crossing border to Somalia but after crossing impossible to retrieve from ISIS networks.
05/07/2019 – A respondent: (SIF) wdl...

He radicalization is about money–10,001k only to a child after which the youth is recruited. The only other payment to a parent is a call either from the child to say bye-bye dadday or mummy or from agents that your child is dead. The child is made to believe that the 1st enemy is your parent... the problem comes from parents... do not sensitise and the care of our children... recruiters capitalize on this existing weakness from weak, poor or lack of parenting in its entirety.
C) DOCUMENTARY DIARY

i. TEXTS FROM THE HOLY QUR’AN

Sample 39: Al-Baqara 2:191-193

And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital for unbelievers. But if they desist, God is forgiving and kind. Fight them till sedition comes to an end, and the law of God (prevails). If they desist, then cease to be hostile, except against those who oppress.

Sample 40: Al-Baqara 2:216-217

Enjoined to you is fighting, and this you abhor. You may dislike a thing yet it may be good for you; or a thing may haply please you but may be bad for you. Only God has knowledge, and you do not know. They ask you of war in the holy month. Tell them: “To fight in that month is a great sin. But a greater sin in the eyes of God is to hinder people from the way of God, and not to believe in Him, and to bar access to the Holy Mosque and turn people out of its precincts; and oppression is worse than killing. They will always seek war against you till they turn you away from your faith, if they can. But those of you who turn back on their faith and die disbelieving will have wasted their deeds in this world and the next. They are inmates of Hell, and shall there abide for ever.
Sample 41:  Al-Tawba 9:4

But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every likely place.

But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations and pay the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.

Sample 42:  AN-Nisaa 4:76, 89

Those who believe fight in the way of God; and those who do not, only fight for the powers of evil; so you should fight the allies of Satan. Surely the stratagem of Satan is ineffective. They wish you to become disbelievers as they are, so that you should become like them. Therefore hold them not as friends until they go out of their homes in the way of God. If they do not, seize them wherever they are and do away with them. Do not make them your friends or allies

Sample 43:  Al-Anfaal 8:65

O Prophet, urge the faithful to fight. If there are twenty among you with determination they will vanguish two hundred; and if there are a hundred then they will vanguish a thousand unbelievers, for they are people of devoid of understanding

Sample 44:  As-Saff 61:

Surely God loves those who fight in His cause in full formations as though they were a compact wall.
Sample 45: Al-Bara’at 9:29

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of truth, from among the People of the Book, until they pay the jizyah with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.

Sample 46: Al-Imran 3:169-174

Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord. They rejoice in the bounty provided by Allah: and with regard to those left behind, who have not yet joined them (in their bliss), the (martyrs) glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they (cause to) grieve. They glory in the grace and the bounty from Allah, and in the fact that Allah suffereth not the reward of the faithful to be lost (in the least). Of those who answered the call of Allah and the messenger, even after being wounded, those who do right and refrain from wrong have a great reward – Men said to them: a great army is gathering against you: and frightened them: but it (only) increased their faith: they said: for us Allah sufficeth, and he is the best disposer of affairs. And they returned with grace and bounty from Allah: no harm ever touched them: for they followed the good pleasure of Allah: and Allah is the Lord of bounties unbounded
ii) TEXTS FROM HADITH

Sample 47: Quote from Ali

…they reported that the recruiters often use the Hadith (prophetic saying) that says: The Prophet of Allah (peace be upon him) said: “If a woman prays her five daily prayers, fast her month of Ramadan, guards her chastity and obeys her husband, it will be said to her: Enter paradise by whichever of the gates of paradise you wish.”

Sample 48: Muhammad 47:3-4

Therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; at length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind (the captives) firmly (on them): thereafter (it is time for) either generosity or ransom: until the war lays down its burden. Thus (are ye commanded): but if it had been Allah’s will, He could certainly have exacted retribution from them (Himself); but (He lets you fight) in order to test you, some with others. But those who are slain in the way of Allah, He will never let their deeds be lost

Sample 49: Muhammad 47:20

Those who believe say, why is not a Surah sent down (for us)? But when a Surah of basic or categorical meaning is revealed, and fighting is mentioned therein, thou wilt see those in whose hearts is a disease looking at thee with a look of one in swoon at the approach of death.
iii) ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

Sample 50: Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012

Section (3) paragraph 1 (a and b):

Where the Inspector General has reasonable grounds to believe that – (a) an entity has – (i) committed or prepared to commit; (ii) attempted to commit; or (iii) participated in or facilitated the commission of, a terrorist act; or (b) an entity is acting – (i) on behalf; (ii) at the direction of; or (iii) in association with, an entity referred in paragraph (a), he may recommend to the Cabinet Secretary that an order be made under subsection (3) in respect of that entity.

Section (13) paragraphs (a) and (b):

A person who knowingly recruits or facilitates the recruitment of another person – (a) to be a member of a terrorist group; or (b) to commit or participate in the commission of a terrorist act, commits an offense and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty years.

Section (14) Subsection (1) paragraphs (a) (b) and (c):

A person who provides or facilitates the provision of training, or instruction to any person or member of a terrorist group – (a) in the making or use of a weapon; (b) in the carrying out of a terrorist act; (c) in the practice of military exercise or movements, knowing that such a training or instruction is intended for the use in the commission of a terrorist act commits an offense and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty years.
Section (14) Subsection (2):

A person who receives training or instruction referred to in subsection (1) for the purpose of engaging or preparing to engage in the commission of a terrorist act commits an offense and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years.

Section (23) subsections (1) (2) (3) and (4):

(1) A person who, being outside Kenyan, conspires with a person who is in Kenya to carry out a terrorist act in any place outside Kenya being an act which if committed in Kenya would constitute an offence under this Act shall be deemed to have conspired to commit that act in Kenya (2) A person who, being in Kenya, conspires with a person who is outside Kenya carry out a terrorist act in Kenya shall be deemed to have conspired in Kenya to carry out that act (3) A person who, being outside Kenya, conspires with a person who is outside Kenya to carry out a terrorist act in Kenya shall be deemed to have conspired in Kenya to do that act (4) A person who conspires to carry out a terrorist act under this section commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years.

Section (24):

A person who is a member of, or professes to be a member of a terrorist group commits an offense and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty years.

Section (30):

A person who knowingly possesses an article or any information held on behalf of a person for the use in instigating the commission of, preparing to commit or committing a terrorist act
commits an offense, and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years.

Sample 51: Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014

Section(s) 40A (1) and 40B (1) (2) paragraph (c):

There is established a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, hereinafter referred to as the “Centre” which shall be an inter-agency body. The Centre shall be responsible for the co-ordination of national counter terrorism efforts in order to detect, deter and disrupt terrorism acts. Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (1) the Centre shall – develop strategies such as counter and de-radicalization.

Sample 52: Petition(s) nos. 628, 630 of 2014 and 20 no. 12 of 2015

231. With regard to Section 64 which introduces Section 30A prohibiting publication of offending material, the DPP argued that it captures conduct that encourages or induces others to commit acts of terrorism, and was informed by the methods used by terrorists to create and expand terrorist networks, particularly radicalization. It was the DPP’s position that any limitation of rights in the section (which he, again, denied exists) is justifiable under Article 24(1).

253. With regard to the causes of terrorism, the report cites continuous recruitment, indoctrination and radicalization of youths. The states that the challenges the Police Service faces in fighting terrorism include securing the Kenya/Somalia border, fighting Al-Shabaab radicalization, the numbers returning from training and fighting in Somalia and low levels of
awareness among the stakeholders thus hampering effective investigation and prosecution of terrorism suspects

464. In the premises we make, the following declarations and orders: (a) Section 12 of the Security Laws (Amendment) Act and Section 66A of the Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and the media guaranteed under Articles 33 and 34 of the constitution (b) Section 64 of Security Laws (Amendment) Act which introduced Sections 30A and 30F to the Prevention of Terrorism Act is hereby declared unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and the media guaranteed Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution…(d) Section 16 of the Security Laws (Amendment) Act and Section 42A of Criminal Procedure Code are hereby declared unconstitutional as they violate the right an accused person to be informed in advance of the evidence the prosecution intends to rely on as provided under Article 50(2) (j) of the Constitution

**Sample 53: Verdicts and Convictions**

Delivered on 7th October 2020 by Chief Magistrate Francis Andayi:

I find them guilty and convict them accordingly as follows: The 1st and 4th accused persons on count number two charge of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act contrary to section 23(4) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act the 1st and 4th accused persons on counts number three and twelve respectively for knowingly supporting the commission of a terrorist act contrary to section 9(1) of the Prevention of Terrorist Act the 1st accused person on count five and six for being in possession of an article connected with a terrorism offence contrary to section 30 of the Prevention of terrorism Act those be the orders of the court

430
iv) ARCHIVED DATA

Sample 54: Former Isiolo County Commissioner – George Natembeya:

Isiolo is one of those counties in this republic that has been identified as a hotspot for terrorism. And indeed it is true that it is the source of radicalized youth that have found their way to Somalia and these other countries that are having issues with terrorism. We have lost about 27 students. Out of the 27 (Twenty seven) 2 (two) have come back and we are monitoring their activities very closely they are supposed to be reporting to…and so far we have not got anything untoward…the parents of the other 25… (https://www.nation.co.ke)

Figure 4.30

Photo of Kenya Naval Base Manda Airstrip/US attacks in January 2020
Figure 4.31

Photo from 9/11 Terrorists Attackers

APPENDIX III: MAPS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF ISIOLO

a) Maps

Figure 4.32

Location of Isiolo County in the map of Kenya

Adopted from Google Maps
Figure 4.33

Map of Isiolo County

Isiolo District: Livelihood Zones

Adopted from Google Maps
Table 5.1

*Isiolo County Administrative Division of Isiolo*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Population*</th>
<th>Urban pop.*</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>52,280</td>
<td>18,077</td>
<td>Isiolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garba Tula</td>
<td>7,010</td>
<td>1,883</td>
<td>Garba Tula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinna</td>
<td>7,133</td>
<td>3,572</td>
<td>Kinna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merti</td>
<td>15,771</td>
<td>3,415</td>
<td>Merti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldonyiro</td>
<td>9,669</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sericho</td>
<td>8,998</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,861</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,224</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1999 Census
### APPENDIX IV: LIST OF MOSQUES IN ISIOLO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mosque Name</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia mosque</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al Huda mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa mosque</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Naim mosque</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Rahim mosque</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quba mosque</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjidul Faruq</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawfiq mosque</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Rahma mosque</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hidayah</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Fatma mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ansar mosque</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawa Nuri mosque</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid Markas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magfiram mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abubakar Masjid mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noor mosque</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bula mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raqma mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taqwa mosque</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabawi mosque</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mosque Kubwa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid shifa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Musa mosque</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuubeydah mosque</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Name</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Valid Percent</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawheed mosque</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Tamia mosque</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambi Garba mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Munawar mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjidul Fathi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Towba mosque</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jamaa mosque</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid Al-Hijab mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalifa Abubakar mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Abrar mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulu Roba mosque</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaisha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Furkan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(s)</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX V : LIST OF RESPONDENTS

1. County Commissioner

2. State agencies
   a. Directorate of Criminal Investigations Office (DCIO)
   b. Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
   c. National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)
   d. Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)
   e. National Intelligence Service (NIS)

3. Civil servants

4. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

5. Chiefs/Ass.Chiefs/County Commissioner

6. Schools, School heads/Principals

7. Kadhis/Imams/Sheikhs/Maalims/Chaplains

8. Prison warden(s)

9. Individuals

10. Affected families – Mother’s group/Two case studies/Parents

11. Members of the Kenya Defence Forces/Security Forces

12. Police officers

13. Small focus groups Discussions
   a) Bula Waso Sunshine Secondary School (10 Group Discussions)
   b) Isiolo Girls High School (11 Group Discussions)
   c) Wamy Secondary School (6 Group Discussions)
   d) Waso Day Secondary School (16 Group Discussions)

14. Nyumba Kumi chairmen
APPENDIX VI: TITLES OF RESPONDENTS & CODE NAME(S)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE OF INFORMANT</th>
<th>CODE NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Teacher 1 (VE Trained)</td>
<td>Qcode1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Kambi Garba</td>
<td>Qcode2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator (Al-Falah Mosque Primary)</td>
<td>Qcode3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waso Day Secondary School</td>
<td>Qcode4-Qcode82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo Girls High School</td>
<td>Qcode83-Qcode126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC-Religious Leaders Isiolo County</td>
<td>Qcode127-Qcode157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Imam (Military Chaplain)</td>
<td>Qcode158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bula Waso Sunshine Secondary School</td>
<td>Qcode159-Qcode206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wamy Isiolo High School</td>
<td>Qcode207-Qcode223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul’s Kiwanjani Mixed Day Secondary School</td>
<td>Qcode224-Qcode266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo Barracks Mixed Day Secondary School (Stream A)</td>
<td>Qcode267-Qcode307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo Barracks Mixed Day Secondary School (Stream B)</td>
<td>Qcode308-Qcode357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer Isiolo</td>
<td>Qcode358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Registrar Isiolo County</td>
<td>Qcode359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Terror Police Commander Isiolo</td>
<td>Qcode360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Peace Link Isiolo</td>
<td>Qcode361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director Isiolo Peace Link</td>
<td>Qcode362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant County Commissioner</td>
<td>Qcode367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director (Star of Hope Association) Isiolo Central</td>
<td>Qcode368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Kambi Garba Primary</td>
<td>Qcode369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Teacher Primary School Isiolo town</td>
<td>Qcode370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intelligence Officer Isiolo Barracks : Qcode371
Former Military Warrant Officer (Retired) : Qcode372
Military Warrant officer School of Infantry : Qcode373
Staff Officer 1 Defence Headquarters Mosque : Qcode374
Maalim Defence Headquarters Mosque : Qcode375
Chaplain (Imam) Defence Headquarters Mosque : Qcode376
Directorate of Military Intelligence (Isiolo Barracks) : Qcode377
NGO staff/Director NI WETU : Qcode378
Directorate of Military Intelligence staff (NCTC) Nairobi : Qcode379-Qcode382
Maalim Isiolo Barracks : Qcode383
University Student in Isiolo County : Qcode384
Staff Officer 1 Kenya Army Headquarters Nairobi : Qcode385
Staff Officer 1 Defence Headquarters Nairobi : Qcode386
Military Clerk Kenya Army Headquarters Nairobi : Qcode387
Military Police Officer (A Company) Nairobi : Qcode388
Military Intelligence Officer Nairobi : Qcode389
Intelligence Officer Defence Headquarters : Qcode390
Military Clerk Defence Headquarters : Qcode391
Military police officer : Qcode392
Military Intelligence Officer (Clerk) : Qcode393
Military Intelligence Officer (Data/Mapping) : Qcode394
Head teacher (Al-Falah Mosque Primary School) : Qcode395
A long serving Deputy Principal : Qcode396
A Bodaboda youth rider from Isiolo : Qcode 397
A place designated by phonetic Tango : Qcode398
A place designated by phonetic Chali : Qcode399
A place designated by phonetic November Mike : Qcode400
A place designated by phonetic Bravo Papa : Qcode401
A place designated by phonetic Kilo Oscar : Qcode402
A place designated by phonetic Kilo Bravo : Qcode403
Primary School Principal : IR1
Waso Secondary School teacher : IR2
A school leaver youth : IR3
A Muslim elder at a Barracks Mosque : IR4
An ACK church official in Isiolo : IR5
A University Student (Convert from Islam to Christianity) : IR6
County Commissioner staff member : IR7
A radicalized youth from Isiolo town : IR8
APPENDIX VII: EUROPEAN CONVERTS TO ISLAM (Karagiannis 2012, pp.109-110)

In France, estimates lie at approximately 50,000 to 100,000 converts out of a population of three to four million Muslims. In 2006, there were 850,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, including 12,000 converts. In Germany, the estimated number of converts’ ranges from 12,000 to 100,000 with the total Muslim population set at around three million, most of them of Turkish origin. In Great Britain, there were about 63,000 native converts out of a population of 1.6 million Muslims in the early 2000s. However, their number must have increased because the Muslim population as a whole reached 2.4 million in 2009. Spain has an estimated 800,000 Muslims, roughly 20,000 of whom are converts. In Belgium there are about 500,000 Muslims of whom approximately 10,000 are converts. In Sweden, the estimated number of native converts is 6,000 out of 300-350,000 Muslims. In neighboring Denmark, there are about 2,800 converts out of 200,000 Muslims. In total there must be probably 200,000 – 350,000 converts in the European, making up less than two per cent of its Muslim population. Outside the European Union, significant number converts can be found in Russia, where there are approximately 16 million Muslims mostly living in the North Caucasus and Tatarstan. In Switzerland, the estimated Muslim population is 400,000 Muslims of whom approximately 10,000 are converts. The estimates of the Muslim population, however, must be viewed as purely illustrative because they do not explain how many people are true believers/practitioners or call themselves Muslims simply meaning a certain kind of traditional identity. (Karagiannis, 2012, pp.109-100)
APPENDIX VIII: PRE-RADICALIZATION INDICATORS

1. Angst/bitterness/resentment
2. Peer influence/pressure
3. Protest against researching on extremism
4. Dismissing/Doubting intention of this research
5. Dishonest responses
6. Haphazard filling/destruction of questionnaire
7. Hiding questionnaire
8. Denial of access to facility
9. Suspicion and fear
10. Outright disobedience
11. Uncooperativeness
12. Muted responses
13. Negative responses
14. Hostility
15. Sympathizer attitude
16. Secretiveness
17. Derailing interview process
18. Stubbornness
19. Distrust to government agencies
20. Anti-Western tendencies
21. Oversensitive
22. Masquerading as respondents
APPENDIX IX: GENERAL EFFECTS OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION

1. Proliferation of radical reading materials and pamphlets.
2. Vehicle Bound Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)/IEDs
3. Proliferation of assorted weaponry as Guns/firearms/small arms/PKM/, bullets, Grenades, knives/swords
4. Military uniform and militia flags by AS
5. Expensive vehicles and motorbikes
6. Drugs and medicine (addictions)
7. Forgery of travel documents
8. Multiple identities through identity documents (ID cards/passports)
9. Families instabilities/outcry
10. School drop outs and truancy
11. Insecurity
12. Disappearance(s) of youths
13. Proliferation of attacks in East Africa
15. Manufacturing of explosive devices/bombs
16. Suffering and premature death of youths
17. Contraband goods as rice/charcoal/Bhang/milk/sugar/wood/grains/IEDs from Somalia
18. Psychological trauma in families and sudden behavior change among youths
19. Online content for radicalization
20. Training and deployment of youths
21. Distrust and disharmony amongst religious communities
APPENDIX X: COMMENTS FROM MUSLIM POLITICAL LEADERS

A. ADEN DUALE – MP Garissa County and leader of majority in the National Assembly on Citizen TV at One 19th January 2020

“…Governor Korane has convened all of us here, Governor Roba will convene leadership in Mandera County and Governor Mohamoud will do the same for Wajir and this is just like what we did after the Garissa university attack. And following the directives of the president that we the community have a role to play to make sure that our counties are secure, Kenya is secure and the region is secure because we are faced with a serious threat from al – shabaab. Schools have closed, health centres have collapsed, and communications have been disrupted across the region and in North Eastern and Coast region. You are hearing of what happened in Nairobi today people being arrested and I think we have come together as leaders under the chairmanship of our Governor so that the leaders can do their bit. So today the meeting convened by Governor Korane picks together all the political leaders, all the religious leaders, the members of parliament, our senator and we want to ask ourselves what is the role we can play as leaders. I mean this is not the first time we have the Garissa University attacked. So we want to make sure that as a community we are under obligation to protect our region, our community and our people….so we are here all of us together to make sure that if there are terror cells within the region, we must tell them that their time is up, if it is about resources, we are coming together to make sure that we have a recommendation, both for the community, for the political leaders and the national government and that is we have all come together because we what we are doing is part of the national security discussion….when Garissa is safe, Mandera is safe, Wajir is safe, Kenya will be safe and Nairobi will be safe….” (Citizen Television as reported by Faizal)
B.  YUSUF HAJI – Senator Garissa County on Citizen TV on 19 January 2020

This meeting is very important because enough is enough. A group of al-Shabaab numbering about twelve people are terrorizing our region and particularly when we talk of the County where we are and we very strongly feel that unless we put our heads together we might not be able to get the development we want because schools have been closed, hospitals have been closed yet we have a great number of security forces and these security forces need to be supported with information by parents and the people who live this county as well as the region…. (Citizen TV as reported by Feizal)
APPENDIX XI: LIST OF TERROR FINANCIERS IN KENYA

The Standard 3rd September 2020

Abdimajit Adan Hassan
  ▪ Arrested in Merti Isiolo, in 2018 as he transported a vehicle laden with explosives and other weapons
  ▪ Targeted the Supreme Court, KICC, Parliament Buildings, County Hall, Technical University of Kenya, Central Bus station, Jeevanjee Gardens, Serena Hotel, University of Nairobi and Milimani Law Courts.

Sheikh Guyo Gorsa Boru
  ▪ A Muslim preacher arrested two years ago
  ▪ Caused chaos in Marsabit in 2018
  ▪ Is facing charges related to terrorism and being a member of a terrorist group

Nuseiba Mohammed Haji
  ▪ Was a fourth-year medical student at the Kampala International University, Uganda
  ▪ Accused of passing information through the internet to terrorists belonging to the Islamic State group

Mohammed Abdi Ali
  ▪ Was charged with seven counts of providing property for the 2019 Dusit complex attack
- Monies sent via M-Pesa to the said person described as a member of terror group Al-Shabaab

**Mohammed Abdi Ali aka Abu Fidaa**

- Was a medical intern at Wote Hospital and was arrested on April 29, 2016
- Was accused of planning large scale attacks, including a biological attack in Kenya using anthrax
- Targeted medical doctors and university graduates

**Mukhtar Ibrahim**

- Mukhtar, Ali Salim Gichunge’s mother Sakina Mariam Abdalla, George Ndung’u and Isaak Hussein were charged in relation to the Dusit terrorist raid
- Believed to have communicated with one of the attackers and facilitated his movement before the terrorist incident
- Is an assistant to Sheikh in Mandera town

**Waleed Ahmaed Zein**

- Sanctions imposed on him in September 2018
- The US said he deposited large sums in a personal account claiming that the money came from an automobile spare parts company owned by his father
- Served as an important ISIS financial facilitator in East Africa
- Used to receive money from around the world, via Hawala
The exhaustive list of names with pending terror related charges in court as released by The Standard Newspaper on 3rd September 2020 were as follows:

1. Hamal Adan Ali
2. Waleed Ahmed Zein
3. Sheikh Guyo Gorsa Boru
4. Mohammed Abdi Ali aka Abu Fidaa
5. Nuseiba Mohammed Haji
6. Abdimajit Adan Hassan
7. Mohammed Ali Abdi
8. Mukhtar Ibrahim Ali
9. Mire Abdullahi Elmi

**NOTE:** As much as the study was aloof of any circumstantial evidence adduced to the names as listed and released in the aforementioned Newspaper by intelligence and security apparatus the data was only necessary and qualified for inclusion in this study for critical analysis and objective scrutiny.
APPENDIX XII: DE-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMS BASED ON STUDY

1. Continuous Counseling programs in schools
2. Develop a policy for returnees
3. Provide psychosocial support (Trauma counseling)/Guidance & counseling/rehabilitation
4. Sensitization and Counter radicalization narratives to youths and community
5. Empowerment programs to youths, economic and social welfare, social activities and events, games, sports etc
6. Promote inter – faith dialogue, networks and joint forums/rallies & cooperation of religious leaders, foster religious harmony in the communities through structured programs
7. Detect early radicalization signs and symptoms
8. More research needed to be at par with terror initiatives
9. Provide adequate religious information on Qur’an and Bible
10. Equal opportunity to youths in education
11. Nurture youth talents
12. Avoid community profiling & stop blanket blame game
13. Adopt County Action Plan (CAP) on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
14. Media platforms to report objectively
15. County government to offer amnesty
16. Madrassa curriculum be funded by the Government as opposed by NGOs aid
17. Social education and ethics in the curriculum
18. Soft skills over hard power by security apparatus
APPENDIX XIII: PERMISSIONS AND APPROVALS

a) NACOSTI

[Research License Image]

This is to Certify that Mr. DAVID LOMOJO of Kenya Methodist University, has been licensed to conduct research in Isiolo on the topic: ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION PROCESSES: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT ON MUSLIM YOUTHS IN ISIOLO, KENYA for the period ending: 30/July/2020.

License No: NACOSTI/P/19/177

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.
THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013

The Grant of Research Licenses is Guided by the Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014

CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period
2. The License may any rights therewith are non-transferable
3. The Licensee shall inform the relevant County Governor before commencement of the research
4. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearance from relevant Government Agencies
5. The License does not give authority to transfer research materials
6. NACOSTI may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project
7. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy and upload a soft copy of their final report (thesis) within one of completion of the research
8. NACOSTI reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
off Waiyaki Way, Upper Kabete,
P.O. Box 30623, 00100 Nairobi, KENYA
Land line: 020-4007000, 020-224349, 020 3310571, 020 8001077
Mobile: 0713 788 787 / 0735 404 245
E-mail: dgi@nacosti.go.ke / registry@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
b) THE GOVERNOR ISILO COUNTY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Telegram: “DEFENCE”, Nairobi
Telephone: Nairobi 721100
Email: info@mod.go.ke
When replying please quote
DHQ/AC/300/601/123

THE GOVERNOR
ISILO COUNTY
P. O BOX 36 - 30600
ISILO, KENYA

Dear Sir,

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH
REV DAVID I. LOKORO - MOBILE: 0725 898 655

The above named person is a staff in the Kenya Defence Forces Chaplaincy Services. He is currently undertaking his PhD studies at the Kenya Methodist University on a thesis titled “Islamic Radicalization Processes: An Assessment of its Impact on Muslim youths in Isiolo Kenya.”

He is undertaking research in your county as per the attached research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation (NACOSTI).

The main tool of his research will be questionnaire but tape/voice recording(s) and photography will be limited upon your approval.

Attached herewith, kindly find the relevant supporting documents for your perusal and consideration.

Your assistance will be highly appreciated.

ALFAYO K LELEI
Colonel (Rev)
for Cabinet Secretary of Defence
c) INTRODUCTION LETTER

DAVID L LOKORO
ST MICHAEL’S CATHEDRAL
DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
P.O BOX 40668
NAIROBI, KENYA

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS
DAVID L LOKORO – PRS-4-0101-1/2015

I am the above named person from the Kenya Methodist University undertaking PhD studies on a thesis titled: “Islamic Radicalization Processes: An assessment of the Effects on Muslim Youth in Isiolo County, Kenya.” I am requesting for permission to collect data from your school/institution through interviews and filling a questionnaire. Further, my research assistants will help in distributing the questionnaire and assisting in clarification of any point during the filling the questionnaire. The information collected through this questionnaire will be used for academic purposes only and therefore confidentiality of any personal views and institution’s name/image will be upheld. The assessment of the effect and processes will be expected to shade light to the threat caused by radicalization of youths today. Your permission, kindness and honesty in answering the questions will have contributed to the understanding of the problem. Thank you.

DAVID L LOKORO
PhD Candidate
Faculty of Education, Arts and Sciences
Kenya Methodist University
(+254 725 898 655)
KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY
P. O. Box 267 Meru - 60200, Kenya
Tel: 254-064-303101/303102/30367/31171
Fax: 254-64-30162
Email: deanrd@kemu.ac.ke

7TH JUNE, 2019

Commission Secretary,
National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovations,
P. O. Box 30623-00100,
NAIROBI.

Dear Sir/ Madam,

RE: DAVID LOKORO LOMOJO (PRS-4-0101-1/2015)

This is to confirm that the above named is a bona fide student of Kenya Methodist University, School of Education and Social Sciences undertaking the Doctor of Philosophy in Religious Studies. He is conducting research on, Islamic Radicalization Processes: An Assessment of the Impact on Muslim Youths In Isiolo, Kenya.

We confirm that his research proposal has been defended and approved by the University.

In this regard, we are requesting your office to issue a permit to enable him collect data for his research.

Any assistance accorded to him will be appreciated.

[Signature]

Dr. JOSEPH AMOS MOGOT cancellation

07 JUN 2019

[Stamp]

DR. JOHN MUCHIRI, PHD
DIRECTOR, POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
e) SCIENTIFIC ETHICAL CLEARANCE

KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY
P. O. BOX 267 MERU - 60200, KENYA
TEL: 254-064-30301/31229/30367/31171
FAX: 254-64-30162
EMAIL: INFO@KEMU.AC.KE

3rd JUNE, 2019
KeMU/SERC/PRS/51/2019

David Lokoro Lomojo
PRS-4-0101-1/2015

Kenya Methodist University

Dear David,

SUBJECT: ETHICAL CLEARANCE OF A PH. D. RESEARCH THESIS

Your request for ethical clearance for your Ph.D. Research Thesis titled “Islamic Radicalization Processes: An Assessment of The Impact on Muslim Youths in Isiolo, Kenya.” has been provisionally granted to you in accordance with the content of your research thesis subject to tabling it in the full Board of Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (SERC) for ratification.

As Principal Investigator, you are responsible for fulfilling the following requirements of approval:

1. All co-investigators must be kept informed of the status of the thesis.

2. Changes, amendments, and addenda to the protocol or the consent form must be submitted to the SERC for re-review and approval prior to the activation of the changes. The Thesis number assigned to the thesis should be cited in any correspondence.

3. Adverse events should be reported to the SERC. New information that becomes available which could change the risk: benefit ratio must be submitted promptly for SERC review. The SERC and outside agencies must review the information to determine if the protocol should be modified, discontinued, or continued as originally approved.
4. Only approved consent forms are to be used in the enrollment of participants. All consent forms signed by subjects and/or witnesses should be retained on file. The SERC may conduct audits of all study records, and consent documentation may be part of such audits.

5. SERC regulations require review of an approved study not less than once per 12-month period. Therefore, a continuing review application must be submitted to the SERC in order to continue the study beyond the approved period. Failure to submit a continuing review application in a timely fashion will result in termination of the study, at which point new participants may not be enrolled and currently enrolled participants must be taken off the study.

Please note that any substantial changes on the scope of your research will require an approval.

[Stamp]

Dr. A. Wamach
Chair, SERC
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND CO-ORDINATION OF
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

ISIOLO COUNTY COMMISSIONER

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER
P.O. BOX 3-60300
ISIOLO

28th October, 2019

The Director,
Post Graduate Studies,
Kenya Methodist University,
P O Box 207 – 50200,
MERU – KENYA.

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION - MR DAVID L LOKORO

This is to confirm that the above named person was authorized to conduct research in various institutions within Isiolo County.

He did an elaborate and exhaustive research on the topic "Islamic radicalization processes, and assessment of their effects on Muslim youth in Isiolo County - Kenya”.

He also had an opportunity to interview our staffs, security agencies and various security stakeholders in Isiolo County.

The outcome of the research is ground breaking and relevant in combating terrorism activities in the country.

We request that the finding of the study be made available to our office, security organs and other peace actors to help curb the problem.

Yours faithfully,

Jackson Lang’at
For: County Commissioner
ISIOLO COUNTY
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Telegram’s ‘EDUCATION’ Isiolo
Telephone: 064-52049/52069
Fax: 064-52049

When Replying Please quote

REF: ISL/CTY.EDU/MISC.3/VOL.1/203

County Education Office,
P.O. Box 56 - 60300,
ISIOLO.

Date: 28th October, 2019

DAVID L. LOKORO
ST. MICHAEL’S CATHEDRAL
DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
P.O. BOX 40668
NAIROBI, KENYA

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS

Following your application dated October 2019 asking for permission to conduct interviews on “Islamic radicalization processes: An assessment of the Impact on Muslim youths in Isiolo Secondary and primary schools,” you are here by permitted to conduct interviews in the following schools for a period ending 30th July 2020:-

1. Isiolo boys secondary school
2. Isiolo Girls secondary school
3. Barracks Secondary School
4. Wamy Secondary School
5. St. paul's Kiwanjani Secondary School
6. Waso Secondary School
7. Al Falah Primary school
8. Bula Waso Secondary School
9. Kambi Garba Primary School

DR. KORIYOW H. ALI
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
ISIOLO.

Copy to:

County Commissioner,
ISIOLO.
h) BULAWASO SUNSHINE MIXED SECONDARY SCHOOL

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION DAVID L. LOKORO

This is to acknowledge that the above named person on 28/1/2020 conducted Islamic radicalization Processes: An assessment of the effect on Muslim Youths in Isiolo County, Kenya.

We also request him to share his findings with the school to promote peace and curb radicalization.

YOURS FAITHFULLY

MUTHAMIA JOSHUA
PRINCIPAL
i) ISIOLO BARRACKS SECONDARY SCHOOL

ISIOLO BARRACKS SECONDARY SCHOOL
P.O BOX 563-60300
E-MAIL isiolobarracks563@g.mail.com
CONTACT: 0757 749 557

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: DAVID L. LOKORO- ST MICHAELS CATHEDRAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS.

This is to acknowledge that the above named person on 22/1/2020 conducted interviews on Islamic Radicalization with an aim of assessing its impact on Muslim youths in Isiolo County.

We also request him to share his findings with the school to promote peace and curb radicalization.

Yours faithfully,

Salat Adan
For Principal.

24 JAN 2020
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION- DAVID L. LOKORO.

This is to confirm that the above named research person was authorized to conduct interview with student and staff of Wamy Isiolo High School Islamic Radicalization with an aim of assessing its Impacts on Muslim youth. The exercise was carried on 25/1/2020

We request him to share his findings with the school.

Yours faithfully,

Habib Salim

For Principal.
k) WASO SECONDARY SCHOOL

WASO SECONDARY SCHOOL
P. O. BOX 755 - 60300
ISIOLO

Email: wasosec2011@gmail.com  Cell phone: 0721 922 822

OUR REF: WSS/RES/1/1/2020

30/1/2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FOR DAVID L. LUUKORO

This is to inform the concerned that the above research was carried out in our institution on 27/01/2020 and our form four students were engaged.

Thanks.

HALIMA S. GODANAP
PRINCIPAL

30 JAN 2020

IN ENDURANCE WE GROW AND GLOW
To Whom It May Concern

Re: Research Authorization - David Lokoro

David Lokoro did the research on Youth and Radicalization successfully in our school. The following were engaged:
1. Madam Amma Padikadiv
2. Class eight boys
3. The school administrator

Yours Faithfully

[Signature]

David Ochino
Date: D1/47
27/2/2020

OUR REF: IGSS/207/96/VOL.2/1067

The Director,
Post Graduate Studies,
Kenya Methodist University,
P.O. Box 267 – 60200,
MERU – KENYA.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION MR. DAVID L. LORORO.

We confirm that the above mentioned conducted research in our Institution titled Islamic radicalization process in Isiolo.

This is a topic of research which sounds relevant and topical thus we would not mind sharing in the results and recommendations.

Yours Faithfully,

MRS. FLORENCIA MACHACHA,
PRINCIPAL
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

This is to confirm that David L Lokoro carried his research on youth and radicalization on 24th January 2020 at St Pauls Kiwanjani Secondary school.

25 FEB 2020
BRIDGET BAARIU
PRINCIPAL
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION MR. DAVID L. LOKORO

The above named person carried out research entitled Islamic radicalization process; an assessment of the effects on Muslim Youth in Isiolo County – Kenya in our institution. The target group was standard eight of Kambi Garba Primary School. This was done on 27th January 2020.

Any assistance given to him is highly appreciated.

Thanks

Yours faithfully,

IBRAHIM BONAYA
HEAD TEACHER
Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: DAVID LOKORO LOMOJO (PRS-4-0101-1/2015).

This is to confirm that the above named student from your University visited and conducted interviews with us on the topic “Islamic Radicalization Processes”; An assessment of the impact on Muslim Youths in Isiolo, Kenya.

The research is a timely concern that will help us address the problem of radicalization of our Youth.

A. A. SET, FSC
Administrator General.

06/06/2019

KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY,
P.O BOX 267-60200,
MERU, KENYA.
FAX 254-64-30162.
EMAIL: deanrd@kemu.ac.ke.
KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY
P.O.BOX 267-60200 MERU – KENYA
Tel 254-064-30301/312291
3036731171

RE: DAVID LOKORO LOMOJO - (PRS-4-0101-1(2015)

This is to confirm that the above named student from your university conducted an interview and administered questionnaire to our staff on “Islamic Radicalization Process: An assessment of the IMPACT on Muslim youths in Isiolo-Kenya.
We hope that the responses will help the research unearth the process and impact of radicalization on our youths and also help us address the problem.
Isiolo has recently emerged as recruitment ground of the youth to Violent Extremists Organizations and this has prompted us to formulate programs to address this phenomenon.
The research commissioned by KEMU though Mr. David is timely and will be of great benefit to us. The study will also bridge the gap between academicians and practitioners.
We appreciate the commissioning of this study and hope our responses will be helpful

Yours Faithfully

ABDIA MOHAMUD(HSC) – EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR –ISIOLO PEACE LINK
THE MILITARY EPISCOPATE

MINISTRY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

THE DIRECTOR
POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
KENYA METHODIST UNIVERSITY
P.O.BOX 267 - 60200
MERU, KENYA

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

DAVID L LOKORO

This is to confirm that the above named person undertaking PhD studies at your university was accorded permission to conduct research with our personnel with effect from January 2020 till he completes his thesis work.

We hope the findings of the research on “Islamic Radicalization Processes: An Assessment of the Effects on Muslim Youths in Isiolo County, Kenya” will help us address the challenges we are facing in our country today.

Thanks.

AMOS O OKING
Lieutenant Colonel (Rev)
for Principal Chaplain
Kenya Defence Forces

Telegrams: “DEFENCE”, Nairobi
Telephone: Nairobi 2721100
When replying please quote

DHQ/MUS/300/601/208

The Director
Postgraduate Studies
Kenya Methodist University
P O Box 267 – 60200
Meru, Kenya.

Ref: RESEARCH RESPONDENTS
      DAVID LOKORO

This is to confirm that the above named person undertaking PHD at your University collected data from our Mosque personnel.

Thanks.

S J MWARORAH
Major (Imam)
for Principal Imam

Defence Headquarters
ULINZI HOUSE
P O Box 40668 - 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA

15 Jun 2020